The case of Aleksandra Malgorzata Stankiewicz v. Merrick B. Garland, United States Attorney General challenges the classification of a state-level drug distribution conviction as an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law. Petitioner Stankiewicz, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1992, was convicted in 2003 of distributing a controlled substance near school property under New Jersey Statute § 2C:35-7. This conviction was deemed an aggravated felony by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), leading to her removal and ineligibility for cancellation of removal. Stankiewicz appealed this determination to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, questioning whether her state conviction aligns with the federal definition of an aggravated felony.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit scrutinized whether Stankiewicz's 2003 conviction under N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7 qualifies as an "aggravated felony" per 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Applying the categorical approach, the Court concluded that the state statute does not categorically match any offense under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) that is a felony punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Specifically, § 2C:35-7 was found not to align with the federal analogs 21 U.S.C. § 860 (school zone statute) or 21 U.S.C. § 841 (controlled substance distribution statute). Moreover, the Court determined that § 2C:35-7 is not divisible, meaning it does not create separate offenses based on different factual elements such as the type or quantity of the substance. Consequently, the Second Circuit granted Stankiewicz’s petition for review, vacated the DHS's ruling, and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for further proceedings.

Precedents Cited

The Judgment extensively references several key cases and statutes to support its decision:

• Hylton v. Sessions (2018): Establishes the categorical approach for determining if a state offense matches a federal aggravated felony.
• Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013): Clarifies that only those state offenses that categorically match federal definitions should be considered aggravated felonies.
• Mathis v. United States (2016): Differentiates between divisible and indivisible statutes, influencing how multiple elements within a statute are analyzed.
• MARTINEZ v. MUKASEY (2008): Highlights the necessity for state offenses to correspond to CSA felonies to be classified as aggravated felonies.
• Rosa v. Attorney General United States (2020): A prior Third Circuit decision which erroneously found a similar New Jersey statute to be an aggravated felony.

Legal Reasoning

The Court employed the categorical approach, which entails analyzing whether the statutory elements of a state offense align entirely with those of a federal offense. This method avoids delving into the specifics of an individual's conduct and focuses solely on the statutory definitions.

The Court evaluated two federal statutes proposed by the parties as analogs:

• 21 U.S.C. § 860: The federal school zone statute, which mandates enhanced penalties for distributing controlled substances in proximity to schools.
• 21 U.S.C. § 841: The federal controlled substance distribution statute.

Upon comparison, the Court found that N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7 encompasses broader conduct than either federal statute. For example, § 2C:35-7 includes the distribution of substances on school buses or within 1,000 feet of school property, areas not covered by 21 U.S.C. § 860. Additionally, § 2C:35-7 criminalizes dispensing, a term not present in 21 U.S.C. § 860.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of divisibility, determining that § 2C:35-7 is indivisible because it does not create separate offenses based on different factual elements such as the type or quantity of the substance distributed. This indivisibility means that the statute does not meet the requirements to be considered a categorical match with the federal analogs.

Impact

This Judgment has significant implications for immigration law and the classification of state offenses as aggravated felonies under federal law. By clarifying that N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7 does not categorically match any federal CSA felony, the ruling:

• Provides a clearer framework for evaluating similar state convictions in future immigration cases.
• Limits the scope of what constitutes an aggravated felony, potentially allowing more noncitizens to qualify for cancellation of removal.
• Emphasizes the importance of the categorical approach, ensuring that only state offenses aligning fully with federal definitions impact immigration status.

Additionally, the decision serves as a precedent within the Second Circuit, influencing how lower courts and the BIA assess comparable cases.

Aggravated Felony

An "aggravated felony" is a serious category of crimes under federal immigration law that can lead to a noncitizen's removal from the United States and disqualify them from certain relief options, such as cancellation of removal. This classification is defined by specific federal statutes, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).

Categorical Approach

The categorical approach is a legal methodology used to determine whether a state offense matches a federal offense by comparing their statutory elements without considering the individual circumstances of the case. This ensures uniform application of the law by focusing strictly on the definitions provided by the statutes.

Divisible vs. Indivisible Statutes

- Divisible Statute: A statute is divisible if it contains elements listed in the alternative, effectively creating separate offenses based on different factual scenarios. Each alternative can be treated as a distinct element that must be proven for conviction.

- Indivisible Statute: An indivisible statute refers to a single offense that encompasses various ways to commit the crime but does not separate these into distinct elements. All provided factual variations must still satisfy the overall offense for a conviction.

The Second Circuit's decision in Stankiewicz v. Garland underscores the critical importance of the categorical approach in determining whether state convictions align with federal definitions of aggravated felonies. By meticulously analyzing the statutory language and comparative federal analogs, the Court clarified that N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-7 does not meet the stringent criteria to be classified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). This ruling not only affects Stankiewicz’s eligibility for cancellation of removal but also sets a precedent that may influence future immigration cases involving similar state convictions. Ultimately, the decision reinforces the necessity for precise statutory matching in immigration law, ensuring that noncitizens are not subject to removal based on misaligned or broader state statutes.