Second Circuit confirms: Seven-figure emotional distress awards in attempted workplace rape need no medical proof; amounts exceeding the Title VII cap properly ride on NYCHRL/NYSHRL

Introduction

In Pizarro v. Quezada, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a substantial jury verdict arising from egregious workplace sexual harassment culminating in an attempted rape. The plaintiff, Maria Jose Pizarro, sued her employer, Euros El Tina Restaurant Lounge and Billiards Corp. (the “Lounge”), and her manager, Santiago Quezada, under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). A jury found liability and awarded significant compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, the defendants primarily challenged the size of the compensatory and punitive awards, arguing they were excessive and required remittitur or a new trial. The Second Circuit affirmed in full. In doing so, it:

Applied New York’s “deviates materially” standard to the bulk of the compensatory damages because the Title VII cap applied and the excess necessarily rested on state/city law.
Confirmed that juries may credit a plaintiff’s own testimony to award substantial emotional distress damages without medical or expert corroboration, especially where the conduct includes attempted sexual assault.
Upheld punitive damages under the BMW v. Gore guideposts and federal common law, emphasizing a reasonable ratio to compensatory damages and comparability to analogous awards in sexual assault cases.

Although the disposition is a summary order without precedential effect, it provides robust, practice-relevant guidance on assessing damages in cases involving severe sexual harassment and attempted rape and on the interaction between capped Title VII remedies and uncapped state and city law remedies.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s judgment after a jury trial. The jury credited Pizarro’s testimony that over nine years she endured pervasive sexual harassment by her manager and an attempted rape corroborated by a witness who interrupted the assault. The jury awarded:

Compensatory damages: $1,000,000 against Quezada and $725,000 against the Lounge (total $1,725,000).
Punitive damages: $625,000 against Quezada and $375,000 against the Lounge (total $1,000,000).

The defendants sought remittitur of compensatory damages and, for the first time on appeal, argued the punitive awards were excessive. The Second Circuit:

Held the compensatory awards did not “deviate materially” from reasonable compensation when compared to sexual assault cases, given the attempted rape and severe emotional harm (PTSD, depression, nightmares, a suicide attempt).
Rejected the notion that the lack of medical/expert proof required reduction, reaffirming that credible plaintiff testimony alone can sustain substantial emotional distress awards.
Concluded that the punitive awards—approximately 57% of the compensatory total—were well within constitutional bounds under BMW v. Gore and aligned with outcomes in comparable sexual assault cases.
Explained that because the Lounge had about 30 employees, Title VII’s $50,000 damages cap applied; amounts above the cap are treated as awarded under the NYSHRL/NYCHRL, which have no compensatory cap and (for the NYCHRL) permit punitive damages.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2014): Establishes abuse-of-discretion review for denial of remittitur and the instruction that the appellate court must affirm if the excessiveness question is “close or in balance.” The panel used this standard to defer to the district court’s refusal to remit.
DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2003): Articulates the federal “shock the judicial conscience” test for excessiveness. The panel contrasted this with New York’s stricter “deviates materially” standard and ultimately held the awards pass both.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996): Requires federal courts to apply New York’s “deviates materially” standard to New York law claims because it is substantive under Erie principles. This drove the court’s approach to the compensatory awards that exceeded the Title VII cap.
Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012): Confirms application of the “deviates materially” standard to NYSHRL claims; the court followed that path here.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A): Title VII’s damages cap for small employers (15–100 employees) is $50,000. The panel emphasized that when overlapping claims are proven, recovery exceeding this cap is allocated to uncapped state/city claims (NYSHRL/NYCHRL).
Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC and Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc.: District court authorities endorsing the practice of treating amounts above Title VII’s cap as awards under state law when claims are coextensive. The panel cited these to validate the allocation approach.
Magee v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 976 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1992): Supports paying under the theory that provides the most complete recovery when multiple theories cover the same harm. The panel analogized this to allocate excess damages to NYSHRL/NYCHRL.
DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2005): Appellate courts assume the jury credited the plaintiff’s testimony; crucial here to accept the attempted rape and the emotional sequelae in assessing damages.
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds: Upholds emotional distress awards based solely on plaintiffs’ testimony. The panel used this to reject defendants’ argument that medical evidence is mandatory.
Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006): Similarly sustains awards based on testimony that credibly describes humiliation and physical manifestations of distress; relied on to uphold the jury’s compensatory award.
Ortiz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d 198 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1999); Doe v. HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426; Breest v. Haggis, 2023 WL 374404; Noonan v. Becker, 2018 WL 1738746: Comparative cases involving rape or sexual assault with high emotional distress awards. The panel placed Pizarro’s compensatory awards within this bracket given the attempted rape.
United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017): Recognizes appellate discretion to consider forfeited pure questions of law; the panel acknowledged forfeiture of punitive-damages arguments but assessed excessiveness anyway.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996): Provides the constitutional due process framework (reprehensibility, ratio, and comparability) for reviewing punitive damages. The panel’s punitive analysis tracks Gore.
Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014) and Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2013): Explain supervisory review under federal common law, the “shock the conscience” test, and how ratios function when compensatory damages redress intangible harms.
Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Warren & Baram Mgmt. LLC, 2024 WL 2941222; Villalta v. JS Barkats, 2021 WL 2458699; Gavel v. Korang, 2024 WL 4203732: Authorities underscoring the high reprehensibility of sexual assault and supporting punitive awards at or below parity with compensatory damages in such contexts.
Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that punitive damages are unavailable under the NYSHRL but available under the NYCHRL and Title VII; informs why the punitive award is best understood as resting on the NYCHRL.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two tracks—compensatory damages and punitive damages—with careful attention to applicable standards and the federal/state law overlay.

1) Compensatory damages: New York’s “deviates materially” standard governs the excess beyond Title VII’s cap

Allocation of remedies across overlapping statutes. Because the Lounge had approximately 30 employees, Title VII’s damages cap under § 1981a(b)(3)(A) limited total recovery for Title VII to $50,000. Where Title VII claims are pled alongside NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims for the same conduct, courts treat any amount above the federal cap as awarded under the uncapped state/city laws. The panel endorsed that approach, relying on Caravantes, Funk, and Magee.
Standard of review and substantive law applied. Denial of remittitur is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Stampf), with the court affirming if the issue is close. For the New York claims, the “deviates materially” test (Gasperini; Lore) requires the court to compare the award to those in similar cases.
Comparators and the role of attempted rape. The panel acknowledged that Pizarro’s compensatory awards exceed many workplace harassment awards, even those with physical contact. But the attempted rape—corroborated by a witness—places the case alongside sexual assault cases, which support higher figures (Ortiz, HRH Prince Abdulaziz, Breest, Noonan). Given that comparison set, the awards do not materially deviate from reasonable compensation.
No categorical need for medical/expert proof. Responding to the defendants’ argument that the absence of medical records or expert testimony required remittitur, the panel reaffirmed that credible plaintiff testimony can suffice to support emotional distress damages (Meacham; Patterson). Pizarro testified to PTSD, depression, nightmares, psychiatric treatment, and a suicide attempt—evidence the jury was entitled to credit (DiBella).
Result. The total compensatory award—$1,725,000—stood, both under New York’s “deviates materially” benchmark and, a fortiori, under the federal “shock the conscience” test (DiSorbo).

2) Punitive damages: Constitutionally reasonable under Gore and consistent with NYCHRL outcomes

Forfeiture and standard of review. Although defendants did not adequately raise excessiveness of punitive damages in post-trial motions, the panel noted its discretion to address pure legal questions (Gomez). Review of punitive awards blends federal common law oversight (abuse of discretion in a narrow sense) with de novo constitutional scrutiny (Turley).
Gore guideposts applied.
- Reprehensibility: Severe workplace sexual harassment culminating in attempted rape is highly reprehensible conduct (Villalta; Gavel; HRH Prince Abdulaziz).
- Ratio: The punitive total ($1,000,000) is about 57% of compensatory ($1,725,000). Ratios under 1:1 typically do not raise due process concerns, especially where compensatory damages compensate intangible, immeasurable harms (Turley; Payne). Courts in this circuit often award punitive damages equal to or less than compensatory damages in sexual assault cases (Doe v. Warren & Baram; Noonan; HRH Prince Abdulaziz).
- Comparability: The awards align with punitive damages in comparable sexual assault cases (Noonan; HRH Prince Abdulaziz; Mathie).
Statutory context. The panel noted that punitive damages are unavailable under the NYSHRL but available under the NYCHRL and Title VII (subject to the Title VII cap). Given the cap, the punitive awards here are understood to rest primarily on the NYCHRL, with their constitutional reasonableness confirmed by the Gore analysis.
Result. The punitive awards are not grossly excessive under federal common law or the Constitution and are comparable to awards in analogous cases under the NYCHRL.

Impact and Practical Implications

Damages valuation in harassment cases involving sexual violence. When workplace harassment includes attempted or completed sexual assault, courts may place emotional distress awards in the higher comparator category associated with sexual assault cases, supporting seven-figure compensatory awards.
No medical evidence prerequisite. Plaintiffs can sustain substantial emotional distress awards based on credible testimony alone. Defense strategies that hinge on the absence of medical/expert corroboration are weakened, especially where the conduct and resulting symptoms are severe and specific.
Overlapping statutory frameworks and the Title VII cap. Plaintiffs who bring tandem Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL claims for the same conduct can recover above Title VII’s statutory cap, with the excess allocated to state/city claims. This is critical for small employers: even though Title VII limits damages to $50,000 for employers with 15–100 employees, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL impose no cap on compensatory damages, and the NYCHRL permits punitive damages.
Punitive damages calibration. Ratios at or below parity with compensatory damages—especially where compensatory damages are for intangible harms—carry strong due process footing, particularly in cases of sexual violence or extreme harassment.
Issue preservation. The decision underscores the importance of preserving punitive damages arguments in post-trial motions. Although the panel addressed the forfeited punitive argument, parties should not rely on appellate grace to reach unpreserved issues.
Employer risk management. Small employers in New York City face substantial exposure under the NYCHRL for supervisory harassment involving sexual violence. Training, prompt remedial action, and effective compliance programs are indispensable to mitigate liability and damages risks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Remittitur: A post-trial request that the court reduce a jury’s damages award as excessive. If denied, appellate review is deferential (abuse of discretion).
“Deviates materially” vs. “shock the conscience”: New York’s standard asks whether the award materially deviates from reasonable compensation as shown by comparable cases (a more searching review). The federal standard is whether the award is so high that it shocks the judicial conscience (a looser oversight).
Title VII damages cap: For employers with 15–100 employees, total compensatory and punitive damages are capped at $50,000. This does not limit back pay/front pay or injunctive relief and does not cap state/city law damages.
Allocation across statutes: When a verdict rests on overlapping federal, state, and city claims based on the same facts, courts attribute amounts exceeding Title VII’s cap to NYSHRL/NYCHRL, which have no compensatory cap (and NYCHRL allows punitive damages).
Punitive damages due process (BMW v. Gore): Courts assess (1) reprehensibility; (2) ratio between punitive and harm/compensatory; and (3) comparability to penalties in similar cases. Ratios at or below 1:1 are generally safe where compensatories address intangible harms.
Forfeiture on appeal: Issues not raised in post-trial motions are typically forfeited. Appellate courts may, in discretion, consider pure questions of law despite forfeiture but are not obliged to do so.
NYSHRL vs. NYCHRL punitive damages: Punitive damages are not available under the NYSHRL (as noted by the panel citing Edelman), but they are available under the NYCHRL and Title VII (subject to federal caps).

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary affirmance in Pizarro v. Quezada offers clear guidance on damages in severe workplace harassment cases involving sexual violence. The court held that:

Seven-figure emotional distress awards can be sustained based solely on credible plaintiff testimony, particularly where the harassment includes attempted rape and produces significant psychological injury.
Where Title VII and NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims overlap, amounts exceeding Title VII’s small-employer cap are properly understood as awarded under state and city law.
Punitive damages that are less than compensatory damages, especially in sexual assault contexts, typically comport with due process under the Gore guideposts and align with comparable case outcomes.

For litigants and courts, the decision reinforces a practical framework: select the appropriate comparators (sexual assault where attempted rape is proven), apply New York’s “deviates materially” standard to the state/city portions of the award, recognize that medical proof is not a prerequisite to substantial emotional distress damages, and assess punitive awards through the well-established Gore lens. Even as a non-precedential order, Pizarro is a comprehensive and persuasive application of damages law in the most serious forms of workplace sex-based misconduct.