Second Circuit Confirms Special-Needs Authority to Search a Parolee’s Cellphone, Distinguishing Riley When the Device Is Unauthorized

Introduction

In United States v. Smurphat (No. 24-1707, 2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2025) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a suppression motion following a warrantless parole search of a parolee’s cellphone that uncovered child pornography. The court held that the search fell within the “special needs” framework governing parole supervision because it was reasonably related to detecting parole violations and was explicitly contemplated by the defendant’s parole conditions. The panel also distinguished Riley v. California’s warrant requirement for cellphones in ordinary law enforcement contexts, explaining that Riley leaves room for case-specific exceptions—including the special-needs doctrine as applied in the parole setting.

The case involves a parolee with a prior sex offense and a history of supervision violations, including possessing an unauthorized phone. Parole officers entered his motel room early in the morning, observed a phone in plain view on the bed, obtained the passcode after initial denial, and located child sexual abuse material on applications such as Kik, Dropbox, and Gmail. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving a Fourth Amendment challenge to the cellphone search. On appeal, he argued that both the entry into the room and the subsequent search violated the Fourth Amendment.

Two issues framed the appeal: (1) whether the challenge to the parole officers’ room entry was preserved or forfeited; and (2) whether the warrantless search of the cellphone was permissible under the special-needs doctrine governing parole supervision. The Second Circuit concluded that (1) the entry challenge was forfeited because it was not raised below, and (2) the cellphone search was lawful under the special-needs doctrine because it was reasonably related to detecting parole violations and authorized by the conditions of parole, notwithstanding Riley.

Although the decision is a nonprecedential summary order, it provides clear and practical guidance on how the Second Circuit analyzes digital-device searches of parolees under the special-needs doctrine post-Riley, especially when the device itself is an unauthorized item in violation of supervision conditions.

Summary of the Opinion

Scope/forfeiture: The court declined to reach the challenge to the parole officers’ entry into the motel room. Regardless of any appellate-waiver questions in the conditional plea, the defendant did not raise the entry issue in the district court, so it was forfeited. The panel declined to exercise discretion to consider it on an undeveloped record, noting the absence of a sworn affidavit to support factual assertions about the entry.
Cellphone search upheld: The court held that the search of the cellphone satisfied the special-needs doctrine for parole supervision. The search was “reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties,” particularly to detect parole violations, and explicitly authorized by parole conditions requiring cooperation with unannounced examinations of electronic devices. The device was an unauthorized phone, observed in plain view, giving the officers reason to believe Smurphat was violating clear conditions (e.g., no internet-capable devices without permission, and no sexually explicit materials).
Riley distinguished: The panel explained that Riley’s warrant requirement for cellphone searches incident to arrest does not control in the special-needs context. Riley itself acknowledged that case-specific exceptions may justify warrantless cellphone searches. The court cited Second Circuit authority confirming that suspicionless search conditions for supervisees are permissible when sufficiently supported by the record and embedded in the parole framework.
Disposition: The denial of the suppression motion was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987): Established that probation systems present “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement that justify departures from ordinary warrant and probable-cause requirements. This foundation supports analogous departures in parole.
United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004): Applied Griffin’s special-needs rationale to parole supervision, affirming that parole systems also warrant departures from the traditional warrant requirement.
United States v. Braggs, 5 F.4th 183 (2d Cir. 2021): Reiterated that a parole search is permissible if “reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties,” especially to detect parole violations. Braggs frames the core test the panel applied to validate the cellphone search.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024): Confirmed and clarified Braggs’ standard, cementing the “reasonably related to parole duties” inquiry as the touchstone for supervisee searches.
United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2000): Earlier Second Circuit articulation recognizing the permissibility of parole searches undertaken to detect violations as consonant with the special-needs framework.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014): Held that police must obtain a warrant to search a cellphone incident to arrest. The panel invokes Riley to distinguish the parole/special-needs context from ordinary law enforcement searches; Riley also expressly contemplates other exceptions that can justify warrantless cellphone searches.
United States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that special-needs doctrine can permit suspicionless search conditions when supported by the record, underscoring that Riley does not foreclose warrantless cellphone searches in the supervision context.
Forfeiture/standard-of-review authorities: In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008); Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 2006); Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021) (forfeiture when arguments not preserved); United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (discretion to correct forfeited error, declined here); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1990) (unsworn assertions in suppression proceedings do not compel crediting); United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (de novo review of legal conclusions; clear error for facts); Headley v. Tilghman, 53 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirm on any ground in the record).

Legal Reasoning

Threshold: forfeited challenge to the room entry. The court first addressed what issues were properly before it. Even though the conditional plea preserved a Fourth Amendment challenge to “the search of the defendant’s phone pursuant to his conditions of parole,” the government argued that the entry was outside the preserved issue. The panel bypassed that debate because the defendant never argued below that the entry itself was unconstitutional. Under the Second Circuit’s ordinary forfeiture rule, issues raised for the first time on appeal are not considered. The panel also declined to exercise discretionary review of the forfeited issue given the undeveloped factual record and absence of a sworn affidavit supporting the entry-related assertions.
Special needs and the parole cellphone search. Turning to the preserved cellphone-search challenge, the court applied the special-needs doctrine as developed in Griffin and Newton and refined in Braggs and Oliveras. Under this framework:
- Parole supervision presents special needs that justify departures from the warrant/probable-cause regime.
- A parole search is lawful if “reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties”—typically, detecting or preventing parole violations.
The panel found that standard satisfied for several reinforcing reasons:
- Explicit search-related conditions: Smurphat had agreed to conditions authorizing unannounced examinations of electronic devices, and to submit his person, residence, and property to search and inspection.
- Substantive prohibitions: He was subject to special conditions prohibiting possession of internet-capable devices without prior approval and banning sexually explicit materials. These conditions were responsive to his sex-offense history and prior supervision violations, including possession of an unauthorized phone.
- Device in plain view and unauthorized: Parole officers observed the cellphone on the bed. It was undisputed that Smurphat was not authorized to possess the device. This gave the officers reason to believe he was in active violation of multiple conditions and justified seizing—and, under the conditions, examining—the phone to determine compliance.
- Search aimed at detecting violations: The officers’ inspection of applications commonly used for messaging and file storage (e.g., Kik, Dropbox, Gmail) was reasonably tailored to verifying whether the parolee was using the device for prohibited purposes or possessing prohibited materials. That nexus to detection of parole violations placed the search squarely within the special-needs paradigm.
Riley does not govern; Robinson confirms device searches under special needs. The panel expressly rejected the argument that, even if seizure of the device were justified, a separate warrant was required to search the phone under Riley. Riley’s incident-to-arrest rule does not control when a distinct exception applies. Citing Robinson (2025), the court emphasized that:
- Riley itself acknowledges that case-specific exceptions can justify warrantless cellphone searches.
- In the Second Circuit, the special-needs doctrine can support suspicionless search conditions for supervisees when the record supports them—and Smurphat’s record did, especially given the nature of the conditions and his prior violations.
Thus, the seizure/search distinction that is critical in ordinary policing contexts is “inapposite” when the search arises from valid, supervision-related special needs and conditions authorizing device examinations.
Standard of review and affirmance on any supportable ground. Consistent with Ganias, the court reviewed legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, and underscored its authority to affirm on any ground supported by the record. Here, the record of conditions, the observation of an unauthorized device in plain view, and the tailored examination to detect violations sufficed to affirm.

Impact and Practical Implications

While this is a summary order without precedential effect, it reflects—and operationalizes—recent Second Circuit doctrine on supervisee searches of digital devices. Several takeaways emerge:

Digital device searches remain viable under special needs. Post-Riley, the Second Circuit continues to recognize that parole officers may search a parolee’s cellphone without a warrant when the search is reasonably related to detecting parole violations and supported by supervision conditions. Robinson confirms the doctrinal bridge between Riley and the special-needs context.
Unauthorized device possession is a powerful trigger. When a parolee is prohibited from possessing an internet-capable device without permission, the discovery of such a device in plain view provides a strong basis for seizure and a supervision-focused search. Officers need not treat devices as sacrosanct when conditions specifically authorize examinations to verify compliance.
Scope matters, but purpose controls. The selection of apps to review (e.g., messaging and storage platforms) aligned with the purposes of detecting prohibited online activity and restricted materials. Future challenges will focus on whether the search “drifted” from supervision aims into general criminal investigation; Smurphat indicates that where the record and conditions align, courts are comfortable with targeted reviews of relevant apps.
Preservation is critical. Defense counsel must raise entry and search challenges together—and do so with sworn affidavits—to avoid forfeiture. Smurphat underscores that appellate courts will not credit unsworn factual proffers at suppression and will hesitate to reach forfeited issues on sparse records.
Conditional pleas and appellate waivers require precise drafting. The court sidestepped the scope of the plea’s appellate waiver because forfeiture resolved the entry claim. But the distinction between “entry” and “device search” can matter. Parties should draft and litigate conditional pleas with clear, specific issue preservation.
Uniform application across supervisee contexts. Although focused on parole, the rationale draws from probation caselaw (Griffin) and aligns with broader supervisee search jurisprudence in the Circuit. Expect continued application to supervised release conditions that mirror parole search authorities, provided the record supports the need and the conditions are clear.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Special-needs doctrine: A Fourth Amendment exception recognizing that certain government programs—like parole and probation—serve supervisory and rehabilitative purposes beyond ordinary law enforcement. Because of those purposes, officers can conduct searches without the usual warrant and probable cause, as long as the searches are reasonably related to supervision duties (e.g., verifying compliance with conditions).
Reasonably related to parole duties: A functional test: Was the search aimed at detecting or preventing a parole violation? If yes—and the method and scope align with that aim—the search is generally valid under the special-needs framework.
Riley v. California (cellphone warrants): In ordinary policing, officers need a warrant to search the digital contents of a cellphone seized incident to arrest. But Riley acknowledges exceptions. Supervision contexts like parole can be one such exception when special-needs criteria are met.
Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right or argument (e.g., not raising an issue in the district court). Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (often via plea agreements). Forfeited issues are typically not considered on appeal unless the court exercises discretion—which Smurphat declined to do.
Plain view (as used here): The officers saw an unauthorized phone on the bed. While plain view is a well-known doctrine for seizures in ordinary policing, here its import was to show the officers had an immediate, supervision-related basis to believe the device itself violated parole conditions, justifying its seizure and examination under the special-needs and conditions framework.

Conclusion

United States v. Smurphat confirms that, within the Second Circuit’s special-needs jurisprudence, parole officers may conduct warrantless searches of a parolee’s cellphone when the search is reasonably related to supervision duties—particularly to detect violations expressly addressed in parole conditions—and when the record supports the need for such oversight. Although Riley generally requires warrants to search phones in ordinary law enforcement settings, the court emphasizes that Riley does not displace exceptions like the special-needs doctrine, especially where supervision conditions specifically contemplate unannounced device examinations. The decision also highlights the procedural imperative of preserving entry-based Fourth Amendment challenges with sworn factual submissions at the suppression stage. While nonprecedential, this summary order provides a clear, practical roadmap for courts and practitioners navigating the intersection of parole supervision, digital privacy, and Riley.