Introduction

In the case of Eric Hu, NY Drilling, Inc., and 888 Consulting Corp. v. City of New York et al. (927 F.3d 81, 2d Cir. 2019), plaintiffs, comprising an Asian construction worker and Asian-owned companies, alleged that the City of New York's Department of Buildings (DOB), particularly Assistant Chief Inspector Dennis Burkart, engaged in discriminatory enforcement of building codes based on racial and personal animus against Asians and Mr. Hu. The plaintiffs raised a variety of claims, including those under the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, section 1981 of Title 42, the Monell doctrine, and New York tax law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit delivered a comprehensive opinion addressing these claims, clarifying important aspects of Equal Protection jurisprudence concerning non-class-based discrimination claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The District Court initially dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined supplemental jurisdiction over their state tax claim. Upon appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the lower court's decision. Specifically, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' Olech claim, Due Process claim, and Monell claim but vacated the dismissal of their section 1981 claim and their Equal Protection claims under the LeClair theory for race-based and malice-based selective enforcement. Additionally, the appellate court vacated the District Court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state tax claim, remanding it for further consideration.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively analyzed several key precedents that shape Equal Protection claims, particularly distinguishing between two doctrines: LeCLAIR v. SAUNDERS and VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK v. OLECH.

• LeCLAIR v. SAUNDERS establishes a framework for non-class-based Equal Protection claims based on disparate treatment motivated by impermissible considerations such as race or personal animus.
• VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK v. OLECH introduces the "class of one" theory, allowing individuals to claim Equal Protection violations without belonging to a protected class by demonstrating irrational and arbitrary differential treatment.
• NEILSON v. D'ANGELIS provides the Second Circuit’s standard for similarity in Olech claims, requiring an "extremely high" degree of similarity between plaintiffs and comparators.
• ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE limits the applicability of Olech claims in employment contexts but underscores jurisdictional boundaries for such claims.
• Other cited cases include Montero v. City of Yonkers, which elaborates on Monell claims, and CHALFY v. TUROFF, addressing substantive Due Process claims.

Legal Reasoning

The court delved into the nuances distinguishing LeClair and Olech claims:

• LeClair Claims: These require plaintiffs to show that they were treated differently from similarly situated individuals due to impermissible motives such as race or personal animus. The similarity standard here is less stringent, necessitating only a "reasonably close resemblance" between the plaintiff and the comparator.
• Olech Claims: These "class of one" claims do not require proof of malice but demand a much higher similarity standard. Plaintiffs must demonstrate an "extremely high" degree of similarity to comparators to show that any differential treatment lacks a rational basis tied to legitimate government policy.

In this case, the District Court erred by applying a stringent similarity standard to LeClair claims, conflating them with Olech standards. The appellate court corrected this by affirming that LeClair claims should be evaluated under a less stringent standard, thereby allowing the plaintiffs' Equal Protection and section 1981 claims based on LeClair theory to proceed.

Furthermore, the court addressed the Monell claim, determining that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient evidence of an official municipal policy mandating discriminatory enforcement. Regarding Due Process claims, the court held that business losses alone do not suffice to establish a deprivation of the right to occupational choice and that the alleged harassment did not reach the level required for a substantive Due Process claim.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for future Equal Protection litigation, particularly in cases of alleged non-class-based discrimination. By clearly delineating the difference in similarity standards between LeClair and Olech claims, the Second Circuit provides clearer guidance on how courts should evaluate the similarity of circumstances between plaintiffs and comparators. This clarification can enhance the plaintiffs' ability to successfully plead discrimination claims where personal or racial animus is alleged without belonging to a recognized protected class.

Additionally, the decision underscores the limitations of Monell claims, emphasizing the necessity for plaintiffs to provide concrete evidence of official policies or widespread departmental practices that sanction discriminatory behavior.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Equal Protection Clause

A component of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits states from denying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It is frequently invoked in cases alleging discrimination.

LeClair vs. Olech Claims

• LeClair Claims: Pertains to non-class-based discrimination where the plaintiff alleges they were treated differently due to impermissible motives like race or personal vendetta. Requires demonstrating that the plaintiff and a comparator are similarly situated.
• Olech Claims: Also known as "class of one" claims, allowing individuals to assert Equal Protection violations without being part of a protected class. These claims do not require proof of malice but demand that the plaintiff and comparator are extremely similar in circumstances.

Rule 12(b)(6)

A federal rule allowing a court to dismiss a lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Essentially, if the complaint doesn't contain sufficient factual matter to support a legal claim, the court can dismiss it.

Monell Doctrine

Derived from Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), this doctrine allows municipalities to be sued under Section 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from official policy or customs.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit's decision in Hu v. City of New York serves as a pivotal clarification in Equal Protection jurisprudence. By distinguishing between LeClair and Olech claims and appropriately applying similarity standards, the court ensures that plaintiffs alleging non-class-based discrimination have the necessary framework to present their cases effectively. This ruling not only affirms the importance of nuanced legal standards in discrimination claims but also reinforces the need for concrete evidence when alleging institutionalized discrimination under doctrines like Monell. Lawyers and litigants in similar disputes will find this judgment instrumental in understanding how to structure their claims and what standards they must meet to succeed in federal courts.

Ultimately, this case underscores the judiciary's role in balancing the accessibility of discrimination claims with the necessity for clear and stringent standards that prevent frivolous lawsuits. It affirms that while individuals have avenues to challenge discriminatory practices, the legal system maintains rigorous criteria to ensure that such claims are substantiated and grounded in plausible factual allegations.