Second Circuit Clarifies Pro Se Estate Representation and Upholds Qualified Immunity for Warrantless Code‑Enforcement Entry Under Claimed Exigent Circumstances

Case: Simmons v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, No. 24-2021-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (summary order)

Panel: Carney, Sullivan, and Lee, Circuit Judges

Disposition: Affirmed in part; remanded in part for limited fact-finding under United States v. Jacobson

Note on precedential status: This is a Summary Order under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1; it does not have precedential effect, though it may be cited as a summary order.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a long-running dispute between members of the Griffin family and officials of the Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre over municipal inspections and entries onto the Griffins’ residential property in 2012 and 2013. Plaintiffs Caril Simmons and Craig Griffin, proceeding pro se, alleged a series of constitutional and state-law violations, including unlawful searches under the Fourth Amendment, substantive due process violations, municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and trespass under New York law.

The district court (E.D.N.Y., Judge Hector Gonzalez) dismissed certain claims at the pleading stage and granted summary judgment to defendants on others. On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed threshold representation issues concerning Simmons’s attempt to represent the estates of her deceased parents, Charles and Geraldine Griffin, and then resolved the remaining challenges to dismissals and summary judgment rulings on Simmons’s and Craig’s individual claims. The court affirmed in part and remanded in part, providing instructive guidance on pro se representation of estates, pleading a Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy,” the limits of municipal liability under Monell, the very high bar for substantive due process claims, and the objective reasonableness (qualified immunity) of warrantless code-enforcement entries premised on perceived fire safety exigencies.

Summary of the Opinion

• Representation of estates remanded for fact-finding: A non-lawyer may represent an estate pro se only if the estate has no beneficiaries other than the representative and no creditors. The record did not establish whether Simmons was the sole beneficiary of her parents’ estates or whether creditors existed. The panel therefore remanded under United States v. Jacobson, directing the district court to determine those facts. If representation is improper and counsel is not timely retained, the district court may consider dismissing the estates’ claims without prejudice.
• Individual claims affirmed: The court affirmed dismissal of Simmons’s Fourth Amendment claims for lack of sufficiently pleaded facts showing a reasonable expectation of privacy at her parents’ residence; affirmed dismissal of Simmons’s and Craig’s August 20, 2012 search claims for lack of specificity; affirmed dismissal of state-law trespass claims for failure to comply with New York’s notice-of-claim requirement (with the “continuing violation” argument forfeited on appeal); affirmed dismissal of Monell and supervisory liability claims against the Village and Mayor Murray; and affirmed dismissal of substantive due process claims as not conscience-shocking.
• Summary judgment affirmed on Craig’s remaining § 1983 claims:
  • July 17, 2012 “inspection”: No triable issue showed a Fourth Amendment search; officials’ observations were from publicly accessible areas consistent with an implied license to approach, see Florida v. Jardines.
  • May 1, 2013 entry (padlock cut; entry into backyard): Qualified immunity applied because reasonable officials could believe exigent fire-safety circumstances justified immediate action given conditions observed (e.g., strong smell of gas, overgrowth, clutter, propane tanks, blocked windows, worn extension cord). Conclusory attacks on credibility were insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 1997); Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., 122 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2024); Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2010): These authorities frame the bright-line rule that non-lawyers cannot represent others; an estate representative may proceed pro se only if the representative is the sole beneficiary and the estate has no creditors. The panel relied directly on Guest and remanded for fact-finding because the record was unclear on beneficiaries and creditors.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2106; United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994): Authorizes a limited remand to the district court for targeted fact-finding while the circuit retains jurisdiction. The panel used this mechanism to resolve the estate-representation issue efficiently.
• Pleading standards—Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2018): The court emphasized plausibility, requiring factual content that allows a reasonable inference of liability and a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence.
• Fourth Amendment expectations—Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2016); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998): These cases explain that “standing” to challenge a search depends on a reasonable expectation of privacy derived from a sufficient degree of acceptance into the household. Simmons’s bare allegations (“regularly” present; “maintained a bedroom”) lacked detail and temporal context and thus did not suffice.
• Approach to home—Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013): Officers may do what any private citizen might do from public thoroughfares and areas impliedly open to visitors. The court applied this to hold there was no triable evidence of an unlawful search on July 17, 2012.
• Municipal and supervisory liability—Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011): The panel reaffirmed that § 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom (or deliberate indifference in training/supervision); conclusory allegations are insufficient. Similarly, individual liability of the mayor requires plausible allegations of personal involvement, which were lacking.
• Substantive due process—Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 2006): The “conscience-shocking” standard is stringent; mere incorrect or ill-advised actions do not suffice. The plaintiffs’ allegations did not meet this threshold.
• Summary judgment—Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Windward Bora, 982 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2020); Galloway v. County of Nassau, 141 F.4th 417 (2d Cir. 2025); Alberty v. Hunter, 144 F.4th 408 (2d Cir. 2025): The court reiterated de novo review, the “no genuine dispute of material fact” standard, and the obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
• Qualified immunity—Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1995); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015): Officials are immune if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on legality. The court used this “objective reasonableness” framework to uphold immunity for the May 1, 2013 warrantless entry based on arguable exigent circumstances.
• Evidentiary sufficiency—Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2005): Conclusory attacks on credibility do not create a material factual dispute at summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ general assertions of fabrication did not forestall immunity.
• Appellate forfeiture—In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008): Arguments not raised below are generally not considered on appeal. Plaintiffs’ continuing-violation theory for the notice-of-claim issue was therefore rejected as forfeited.

Legal Reasoning

1) Pro Se Representation of Estates: Remand for a Guest Inquiry

Section 1654 permits parties in federal court to appear either personally or through counsel, but not to represent other persons or entities. Under Guest v. Hansen, an executor or administrator may appear pro se for an estate only if the estate has a single beneficiary (the representative) and no creditors. Because the record did not establish whether Simmons was the sole beneficiary and whether creditors existed for either estate, the panel remanded for limited fact-finding under Jacobson. If representation is improper and counsel cannot be promptly retained, dismissal without prejudice of the estates’ claims may be considered. Meanwhile, Simmons and Craig could—and did—proceed pro se on their own claims.

2) Pleading Fourth Amendment Claims: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Specificity

To challenge a search, a plaintiff must plausibly allege a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. The court found Simmons’s allegations—she “regularly” spent time at her parents’ home and “maintained a bedroom”—too vague, lacking frequency, duration, and temporal connection to the alleged searches (July 2012, August 2012, May 2013). Without details such as consistent overnight stays, possession of keys, control over spaces, or other indicia of integration into the household, the complaint failed to cross the plausibility threshold. Likewise, Simmons’s and Craig’s allegations about an August 20, 2012 search were insufficiently specific to assess reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.

3) State Trespass Claim and New York’s Notice-of-Claim Requirement

The district court dismissed trespass claims tied to the July 2012 incident for failure to comply with the notice-of-claim requirement referenced as N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 217-a. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the July 2012 and May 2013 entries were part of a continuing violation, making their July 30, 2013 notice timely. Because they did not raise that theory in opposing reconsideration below, the panel deemed it forfeited and declined to consider it, following In re Nortel.

4) Municipal and Supervisory Liability: Monell and Connick Failures

The complaint did not plausibly allege a municipal policy or custom or a deliberate indifference failure-to-train theory under Monell and Connick. Nor did it include non-conclusory facts showing Mayor Murray’s personal involvement. Those claims were properly dismissed.

5) Substantive Due Process: No Conscience‑Shocking Conduct

Under Ferran, substantive due process liability requires conduct that is arbitrary, oppressive, or conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense. The panel agreed with the district court that the alleged conduct, even if disputed or ill-advised, did not approach that high threshold.

6) Summary Judgment on Craig’s Remaining § 1983 Claims

• July 17, 2012: The record contained no evidence of an unlawful search. Officials’ observations were made from areas impliedly open to the public (e.g., a “mailman’s route”), which Jardines allows. Absent evidence of intrusion beyond what a private citizen could do, summary judgment was appropriate.
• May 1, 2013: It was undisputed that officials cut a padlock and entered the backyard without a warrant. The district court found qualified immunity due to an objectively reasonable belief in exigent circumstances. The panel agreed: upon arrival, officials observed conditions they reasonably viewed as “hazardous” and potentially “threatening,” including a strong smell of gas, a worn extension cord on the porch, severe overgrowth, windows blocked by dirt and packed clothes, and clutter including vehicle parts, wires, debris, and propane tanks. They shut off electricity and investigated. Craig’s assertions that officials fabricated the gas smell were conclusory and insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Even if officials were mistaken (e.g., if there was no gas service), qualified immunity protects reasonable errors in judgment about exigent risks, consistent with Lennon, Malley, and Mullenix.

Impact

• Estate litigation by pro se parties: The order underscores that non-lawyer family members cannot litigate on behalf of an estate unless they are the sole beneficiary and the estate has no creditors. District courts should inquire sua sponte if needed. Pro se litigants should anticipate producing estate documents establishing beneficiary status and creditor absence.
• Pleading Fourth Amendment interests for non-resident family members: Bare assertions of “regular” presence or an unspecified “bedroom” are inadequate. Plaintiffs should plead concrete facts (frequency and timing of overnight stays around the searches, possession of keys, receipt of mail, contribution to household expenses, control over the premises, ability to exclude others).
• Code enforcement and fire safety entries: This order signals that detailed contemporaneous observations of objective hazards (e.g., odors suggesting gas, visible electrical dangers, obstructed egress/windows, combustible clutter) can support qualified immunity for warrantless entries based on arguable exigency—even when access requires defeating a lock. Agencies should train personnel to carefully document conditions and safety judgments; when time permits, administrative warrants remain best practice.
• Municipal liability pleading: Plaintiffs must allege a specific policy or custom or deliberate-indifference training failures, with facts showing causation. Isolated events or conclusory assertions will be dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
• State-law torts against municipalities: Notice-of-claim compliance is a threshold requirement; theories like “continuing violation” must be timely raised in the district court or risk forfeiture on appeal.
• Summary judgment practice: Generalized attacks on credibility are not enough; specific, admissible evidence is needed to create a genuine dispute. Where defendants present detailed, sworn accounts of hazardous conditions, plaintiffs must counter with competent evidence, not conjecture.
• Procedural efficiency: The Jacobson remand mechanism enables targeted district court fact-finding while the panel retains jurisdiction. The order also provides a clear path for restoring the appeal regarding the estates without additional fees.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Pro se representation of estates: “Pro se” means representing yourself. You cannot represent someone else (including an estate) unless you are a licensed attorney. A narrow exception exists: if you are the executor/administrator and the estate has no other beneficiaries and no creditors, you may appear pro se because you are effectively litigating only your own interests.
• Fourth Amendment “standing” vs. Article III standing: Here, “standing” refers to whether the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, not the constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact (Article III). Without that privacy interest, you cannot challenge the search—no matter how unlawful it might have been as to someone else.
• Reasonable expectation of privacy in a home: Owners and overnight residents typically have it; occasional visitors usually do not. Facts like frequent overnight stays, possession of keys, keeping personal belongings, and authority to exclude others are important.
• Curtilage and implied license: Areas immediately surrounding a home (curtilage) are protected, but the law recognizes an implied license for anyone to approach the front door via customary paths. Officials who do no more than any private person could do are not conducting a “search.”
• Monell liability: A city or village is not liable under § 1983 just because an employee violated the Constitution. The plaintiff must tie the violation to a municipal policy/custom or to a failure to train/supervise amounting to deliberate indifference.
• Substantive due process: A rarely successful claim. The conduct must be so egregious that it “shocks the conscience,” not merely be wrong or unreasonable.
• Qualified immunity: Shields officials unless no reasonable officer could think their conduct lawful. It protects reasonable mistakes of fact and law. If officers of reasonable competence could disagree, immunity applies.
• Exigent circumstances: Emergencies that make getting a warrant impractical (e.g., perceived immediate fire risks) can justify warrantless entry. Even if an emergency later proves to be less serious than believed, officers may be immune if their belief was reasonable at the time.
• Notice of claim: New York law generally requires timely notice to a municipality before suing it for state-law torts. Missing this step can doom the claim.
• Jacobson remand: An appellate tool allowing the district court to find specific facts while the appeal remains with the same panel, expediting resolution of narrow issues.

Conclusion

Although non-precedential, the Second Circuit’s summary order in Simmons offers clear, practical guidance in several recurrent areas:

• Pro se litigants cannot represent an estate unless they are the sole beneficiary and there are no creditors; courts must verify those facts and may remand for that purpose.
• Pleading a Fourth Amendment claim requires specific facts establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy; general references to time spent at a property or an unspecified “bedroom” will not do.
• Municipal liability demands concrete allegations of policy/custom or deliberate indifference; supervisory liability requires plausible personal involvement.
• Substantive due process claims face a steep “conscience-shocking” hurdle.
• For code enforcement and fire safety, robust documentation of observable hazards can sustain qualified immunity for warrantless entries premised on arguable exigency, even when physical barriers (like padlocks) are defeated.
• On appeal, new arguments are generally forfeited if not raised below, and conclusory credibility attacks cannot defeat summary judgment.

Ultimately, the court affirmed all rulings affecting Simmons’s and Craig’s individual claims and remanded solely to determine whether Simmons can lawfully represent her parents’ estates. Practitioners should take from this order both a procedural roadmap for estate representation issues and a substantive reminder: success on constitutional claims will turn on concrete, contemporaneous facts—carefully pleaded at the outset and competently supported at summary judgment.