Second Circuit Clarifies ADA: Accommodations May Be Required Even If the Employee Can Perform Essential Functions Without Them

Introduction

In Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a grant of summary judgment that had dismissed a teacher’s failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The panel (Judges Jacobs, Carney, and Pérez) held that an employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of her job without an accommodation does not categorically defeat an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim. The decision realigns Second Circuit law with the ADA’s text and the nationwide consensus among other circuits, and it rejects a per se “necessity” rule that had crept into some formulations of the prima facie test.

The ruling has broad implications for ADA litigation and workplace practices in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. It clarifies that reasonable accommodations can be required not only to enable essential job performance, but also to mitigate disability-related limitations affecting the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment—subject to the familiar fact-intensive reasonableness and undue-hardship analyses.

Case Background

Plaintiff-Appellant Angel Tudor is a long-serving high school math teacher who has worked for Whitehall Central School District for roughly two decades. She suffers from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from prior workplace sexual harassment and assault. Her PTSD manifests in neurological impairment, difficulties performing daily tasks, significant anxiety, a stutter affecting communication, severe nightmares, and periodic need for psychiatric intervention. To manage symptoms, Tudor uses multiple medications and has been hospitalized three times.

Beginning in 2008, Whitehall granted Tudor a reasonable accommodation: permission to leave campus for one 15-minute break during each morning and afternoon prep period (times when she did not supervise students). These breaks allowed her to compose herself away from a trigger-laden environment.

In 2016, a change in administration brought a new policy barring teachers from leaving campus during prep periods. After Tudor was reprimanded when she attempted to take her established breaks, she took paid sick leave and then FMLA leave (her physician documented “PTSD with severe anxiety and agitation”). Upon returning in January 2017, Whitehall partially accommodated her: one morning break and an afternoon break only when a librarian could cover her students—an ad hoc arrangement that remained through the 2018–2019 school year. That earlier period spawned separate litigation in which the district court found disputed fact issues precluding summary judgment on disability status and the adequacy of accommodations.

The present case addresses the 2019–2020 school year. Tudor’s schedule included a morning prep and an afternoon study hall. No staff were available to cover the study hall, yet Tudor nevertheless took off-campus 15-minute breaks on 91 of 100 days before COVID-19 moved classes online. Administrators never authorized these breaks, and Tudor testified the perceived rule violation exacerbated her anxiety. Critically, in discovery Tudor acknowledged she could perform the essential functions of her job even if the requested afternoon break were denied—albeit “under great duress and harm.”

The district court (Sharpe, J.) granted summary judgment to Whitehall, holding that because Tudor could perform essential job functions without accommodation, she could not satisfy the third prong of the ADA prima facie case, which the court stated as: “with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that:

The ADA’s plain text forecloses a per se rule that an employee who can perform essential job functions without an accommodation is automatically ineligible for a reasonable accommodation.
A “qualified individual” under the ADA includes someone capable of performing essential functions “with or without reasonable accommodation” (42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). The phrase “with or without” means that being able to do the job without an accommodation does not disqualify the employee from receiving one.
Whether an accommodation is “reasonable” is a fact-specific inquiry, and accommodations may include modified work schedules and other changes affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment (42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)).
The district court’s reading of the third prima facie element was erroneous; prior Second Circuit formulations should not be read to impose a necessity requirement. Ability to perform without the accommodation is relevant but not dispositive.
On remand, Whitehall may still raise other defenses, including disputing disability status, challenging reasonableness, or proving undue hardship; those issues remain open.

Detailed Analysis

Statutory Framework

Prohibition: The ADA forbids discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” regarding the “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” (42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
Failure to Accommodate: Discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” unless the employer shows undue hardship (42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
Qualified Individual: An individual who, “with or without reasonable accommodation,” can perform the essential functions of the job (42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
Reasonable Accommodation Examples: “Job restructuring” and “part-time or modified work schedules” among others (42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)).

The court emphasizes that the “with or without” language is dispositive of the question presented: the statute contemplates qualified individuals who can perform essential functions either way and entitles them, absent undue hardship, to reasonable accommodations that address their limitations.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Borkowski v. Valley Central School District (2d Cir. 1995): Interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, the Second Circuit previously held that an individual is “otherwise qualified” if able to perform essential functions “with or without a reasonable accommodation.” This set the stage for reading the ADA’s parallel text similarly.
Woolf v. Strada (2d Cir. 2020); Natofsky v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2019); McBride v. BIC (2d Cir. 2009): Earlier Second Circuit cases articulated the prima facie third element in slightly different ways. The district court leaned on the “with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform essential functions” phrasing to infer a necessity requirement. The panel clarifies that both formulations are compatible with the statute and should not be read to require inability without accommodation.
Noel v. NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm’n (2d Cir. 2012): The ADA is remedial and must be broadly construed to effectuate its anti-discrimination purpose—an important interpretive backdrop against per se limitations.
Noll v. IBM Corp. (2d Cir. 2015); Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2d Cir. 1996): Reasonableness of an accommodation is “fact-specific,” and per se rules are unreliable in disability law. This supports rejecting categorical bars based on necessity.
Fink v. NYC Dep’t of Personnel (2d Cir. 1995): The ADA does not require “perfect elimination of all disadvantage,” but accommodations may mitigate disability-related pain or limitations. This foreshadows the panel’s recognition that pain-reducing accommodations can be required.
Nationwide Circuit Consensus:
- First Circuit: Bell v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises (2020) — employees who can do the job “with some difficulty” remain eligible for accommodation.
- D.C. Circuit: Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ. (2018) — working “with pain” when the pain can be alleviated by accommodation can violate the ADA.
- Fifth Circuit: Feist v. Louisiana (2013) — accommodations need not facilitate essential functions; the text does not impose such a limitation.
- Tenth Circuit: Sanchez v. Vilsack (2012) — accommodations are not per se unreasonable even if the employee can perform essential functions without them.
- Ninth Circuit: Buckingham v. United States (1993) — duty to accommodate persists even when essential functions are performable without accommodation.
- Sixth Circuit (unpublished): Gleed v. AT&T Mobility (2015) — rejected the notion that being physically capable of the job, regardless of pain or risk, bars accommodation.
- Seventh Circuit: EEOC v. Charter Communications (2023) — reasonableness of work-schedule accommodations is highly fact-specific.
- Eighth Circuit: Hopman v. Union Pacific (2023) — declined to adopt a “necessary-only” rule; ADA accommodations are not limited to enabling essential job tasks.
- Eleventh Circuit: Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts (2023) — dicta recognizing that “terms, conditions, and privileges” are broader than essential functions.

These authorities collectively reinforce the plain-language reading that accommodations may be required even absent strict necessity to perform essential tasks.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Plain Text Controls: The court begins with the statutory text (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A)). The phrase “with or without reasonable accommodation” necessarily includes employees who can perform essential functions without accommodation.
No Necessity Requirement: Because the ADA speaks in terms of “reasonable” accommodations, not “necessary” ones, courts cannot impose a higher threshold. If Congress intended a necessity standard, it would have said so.
Fact-Specific Inquiry: Reasonableness depends on the specific workplace and the employee’s limitations. Per se rules, including a categorical “necessity” rule, are incompatible with the ADA’s structure and remedial purpose.
Harmonizing Prior Formulations: The panel candidly acknowledges that prior Second Circuit articulations of the prima facie test may have invited confusion, but clarifies that they do not—and cannot—contradict the statute. Requiring proof that the employee can perform with accommodation does not imply she must be unable to perform without one.
Pain-Mitigation Accommodations: The panel cites approvingly decisions recognizing that accommodations can be required to alleviate disability-related pain even when the employee can otherwise fulfill essential duties. This confirms that ADA protections extend to the conditions under which work is performed.
Role of the Government’s Amicus: The DOJ and EEOC, as amici, underscored the logical flaw in converting a “can with accommodation” showing into a “must be unable without accommodation” prerequisite. The court adopts that logic.

What the Court Did Not Decide

The court’s holding is deliberately narrow. It resolves only the legal question whether the ability to perform essential functions without accommodation is fatal to a failure-to-accommodate claim. It does not decide:

Whether Tudor has a qualifying disability under the ADA.
Whether her requested accommodation (a daily 15-minute off-campus afternoon break) is reasonable under the circumstances.
Whether providing that accommodation would impose an undue hardship on Whitehall.

Those issues remain for the district court on remand. The panel notes the history of Tudor’s prior accommodation and Whitehall’s evolving policies as potentially relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, but it expresses no ultimate view.

Impact and Implications

Doctrinal Significance

Clarified Prima Facie Showing: In the Second Circuit, plaintiffs need not prove that they are unable to perform essential functions without accommodation. The third element is satisfied by showing they are “otherwise qualified” (able to perform essential functions with or without accommodation) and that the employer refused a reasonable accommodation.
Broader Scope of “Reasonable Accommodation”: Accommodations may address disability-related pain, anxiety, or barriers that affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—not only tasks strictly tied to essential functions.
Alignment with National Consensus: The Second Circuit now expressly joins other circuits in rejecting “necessity” as a categorical bar, enhancing uniformity in federal disability law.

Practical Consequences for Employers

Interactive Problem-Solving Is Critical: While the opinion does not create a standalone “interactive process” claim, it underscores that reasonableness is context-specific. Employers should promptly engage with employees to explore feasible accommodations—even when the employee can perform the job without them.
Document Reasonableness and Undue Hardship: Employers should be prepared to show why a requested accommodation is unreasonable or would cause undue hardship. Past successful accommodations may be probative against undue hardship.
Beware of Per Se Rules: Policies that automatically deny accommodations because “the job is getting done” invite liability. Assess the actual impact on the employee’s limitations and workplace conditions.
Schedules and Short Breaks: Requests for modified schedules or short, predictable breaks can be reasonable under § 12111(9). Denials require individualized justification.

Practical Consequences for Employees and Counsel

Do Not Under-Cut Your Claim by Doing Your Job: Admitting you can do the job without accommodation no longer dooms an ADA claim. Evidence that the lack of accommodation causes pain, exacerbates symptoms, or materially burdens the conditions of employment still matters.
Build the Link to “Known Limitations”: Plaintiffs should connect the requested accommodation to their specific disability-related limitations (e.g., a brief off-campus break to manage PTSD triggers).
Remedies Beyond Essential Tasks: Consider accommodations that improve the work environment and reduce symptom severity, even where core duties can be completed without change.

Litigation Posture and Summary Judgment

Fact-Intensive Reasonableness: Courts should avoid categorical dismissals where there is evidence bearing on the reasonableness of the requested accommodation, the employee’s limitations, the employer’s operations, and potential undue hardship.
Evidence to Develop: History of accommodations; operational feasibility; availability of coverage (e.g., for study hall); effect of denials on symptoms; comparative treatment; and employer’s reasons for policy changes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Individual: An employee who can do the essential parts of the job—with or without accommodation. This means being able to do the job without accommodation does not disqualify you from ADA protections.
Essential Functions: The core duties of a position, not marginal or incidental tasks.
Reasonable Accommodation: A change to the work environment or how things are usually done (e.g., modified schedule, short breaks, job restructuring) that helps a qualified employee manage disability-related limitations.
Undue Hardship: A significant difficulty or expense for the employer, considering the employer’s size, resources, and the nature of the operation. Employers bear the burden to prove undue hardship.
Failure-to-Accommodate Claim: A claim that the employer did not provide a reasonable accommodation to known limitations, absent undue hardship. It does not require proof of animus; the failure itself can be discriminatory.
Summary Judgment: A procedure to resolve cases without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In ADA cases, because reasonableness is fact-specific, summary judgment may be inappropriate if material disputes exist.

Conclusion

Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District establishes an important principle in the Second Circuit: employees do not forfeit ADA accommodation rights merely because they can, with difficulty or pain, perform their essential job functions without the requested accommodation. The ADA’s text includes such employees within the category of “qualified individuals,” and it requires a fact-intensive assessment of whether proposed accommodations are reasonable and whether they would impose undue hardship on the employer.

By vacating the district court’s per se ruling and remanding, the Second Circuit restores the ADA’s intended breadth, aligns with the majority view among sister circuits, and refocuses courts and litigants on the statute’s central inquiry—whether a reasonable accommodation would address known limitations without imposing undue hardship. For employers and employees alike, the decision underscores that ADA compliance is not a binary “can you do the job or not” analysis. It is a nuanced, individualized evaluation of how to make work feasible and sustainable for people with disabilities under the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

Key Takeaways

New Rule in the Second Circuit: An employee’s ability to perform essential functions without accommodation does not bar an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim.
Textual Anchor: “With or without” in § 12111(8) means eligibility for accommodations does not hinge on inability without them.
Scope of Accommodations: May include pain- and symptom-mitigating measures, like short breaks and schedule modifications.
No Per Se Rules: Reasonableness and undue hardship remain fact-specific; categorical necessity tests are inconsistent with the ADA.
Remand Focus: Disability status, reasonableness of the requested accommodation, and undue hardship are the live issues for further proceedings.