Second Circuit (Non-Precedential) Guidance on Successive Summary Judgment Motions and Relation-Forward Appellate Jurisdiction in Pro Se Prisoner Litigation

Note on precedential weight: This is a Summary Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued on October 14, 2025, in Zimmerman v. Randall, No. 23-7683-pr. As the Order itself emphasizes, rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect in the Second Circuit. They may, however, be cited in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Nicholas Zimmerman against numerous New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) officials. Zimmerman alleged violations of the First Amendment (retaliation), Eighth Amendment (conditions of confinement), and Fourteenth Amendment (procedural due process during disciplinary hearings), among other claims, stemming from events at Clinton Correctional Facility.

Over the life of the case, the district court (N.D.N.Y., Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel) dismissed some claims at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, granted a first partial summary judgment to defendants on certain claims, then—during the COVID-19 pandemic—permitted a second summary judgment motion. The court later granted that second motion in part, leaving one Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim for a jury. Following a defense verdict at trial (Zimmerman appeared pro se with standby counsel), the court denied his motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.

On appeal, Zimmerman challenged (i) the district court’s decision to allow a second summary judgment motion and the court’s partial grant of that motion; and (ii) the denial of his Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The Second Circuit affirmed across the board and also explained its appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of the Rule 59 motion.

Summary of the Opinion

Appellate jurisdiction: The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the Rule 59 motion. Zimmerman’s pro se letter filed in the Second Circuit within 30 days of that denial was construed as a timely notice of appeal. Separately, the notice of appeal he filed a day after his Rule 59 motion “related forward” and became effective upon entry of the order disposing of that motion, consistent with Supreme Court authority.
Second summary judgment motion: The panel found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to permit a second summary judgment motion, given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and the availability of pro bono assistance for Zimmerman’s response.
Partial grant of summary judgment: Affirmed. The court agreed that claims against certain supervisory defendants failed for lack of personal involvement (under Tangreti v. Bachmann) and that Zimmerman’s procedural due process challenges to disciplinary hearings lacked evidence to satisfy the necessary elements.
Rule 59 motion for new trial: Denial affirmed. The court rejected Zimmerman’s arguments regarding late evidence gathering, redactions at trial, alleged prejudice from visible restraints and prison clothing, request for adverse inference instructions, and an instruction on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) physical-injury requirement (which he had not preserved by objection).
Disposition: The judgment and order of the district court were affirmed. Zimmerman’s motion to overturn the judgment was denied.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 722 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam): Cited for the proposition that district courts possess inherent power to manage their dockets to ensure the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. This supported allowing a second summary judgment motion in unusual circumstances.
Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2012): Noted that successive summary judgment motions can be procedurally improper when the arguments could have been advanced in the first motion. The panel distinguished Zimmerman’s case on its facts—COVID-19 case-management realities and pro bono assistance mitigated concerns—finding no abuse of discretion in permitting a second motion.
Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020): Reaffirmed that for § 1983 claims, each government official must be personally involved; supervisory liability cannot rest on a respondeat superior theory. The panel relied on Tangreti to affirm summary judgment for supervisory defendants on First and Eighth Amendment claims where Zimmerman failed to show personal involvement.
Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101 (2d Cir. 2022): Restated the two elements of a procedural due process claim: (1) a protected property or liberty interest; and (2) deprivation without due process. The panel affirmed dismissal where Zimmerman did not produce evidence sufficient to sustain the due process claims arising from his disciplinary hearings.
LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1995): Cited for abandonment: issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned. Zimmerman did not challenge certain earlier dismissals and thus forfeited review of them.
Rana v. Islam, 887 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam): Supports liberal construction of notices of appeal, especially for pro se litigants. The court treated Zimmerman’s letter as a notice of appeal from the Rule 59 denial.
Parrish v. United States, 605 U.S. 376 (2025): The Supreme Court reaffirmed the “relation-forward” principle for premature notices of appeal: an adequate but premature notice relates forward and becomes effective upon entry of the order that renders an appeal possible. The Second Circuit relied on Parrish to confirm jurisdiction.
New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2006): Explained that a notice of appeal filed while a Rule 59 motion is pending becomes effective only upon the disposition of that motion. Applied here to support jurisdiction.
Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386 (1995): Clarified that Rule 59 motions render underlying judgments nonfinal, affecting appellate timing. Reinforced the jurisdictional analysis.
Ortiz v. Stambach, 137 F.4th 48 (2d Cir. 2025): Stated the standard of review for denial of a Rule 59 motion—abuse of discretion. Guided the panel’s approach to Zimmerman’s new-trial arguments.
Harris v. O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2014): Defined abuse of discretion: decisions resting on error of law, clearly erroneous facts, or outside the range of permissible choices. The panel found none of those in the Rule 59 ruling.
United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999): Appellate courts will not reverse evidentiary admissibility determinations absent abuse of discretion. Supported affirmance of the district court’s redaction rulings.
Hoffer v. Tellone, 128 F.4th 433 (2d Cir. 2025): For an adverse-inference instruction due to spoliation, there must be a preponderance finding of “intent to deprive.” Zimmerman did not meet this threshold.
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994): States that unpreserved jury-instruction challenges are reviewed only for plain error affecting substantial rights. The panel found no plain error in the PLRA physical-injury charge.
Federal Rules: Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4), 3(c)(7), 4(a)(4)(v) were cited in connection with the content, timing, and liberal construction of notices of appeal, and the effect of post-judgment motions on appellate timing.

2) Legal Reasoning

Second summary judgment motion. While successive summary judgment motions are not routine and may be improper when they simply rehash arguments that could have been made earlier, district courts retain substantial discretion to manage their dockets. Here, the panel emphasized the “unique circumstances” of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the availability of pro bono counsel to assist Zimmerman in responding. Those considerations ameliorated fairness concerns and placed the district court’s allowance of a second motion well within its case-management discretion.

Supervisory liability under § 1983. Applying Tangreti, the court affirmed summary judgment on claims against supervisory officials where there was no evidence of their personal involvement. The opinion underscores that plaintiffs must connect each individual defendant to specific constitutional violations through that defendant’s own actions or omissions, rather than relying on positional authority or chain-of-command theories.

Procedural due process claims in disciplinary hearings. Relying on Radwan, the court held that Zimmerman did not come forward with evidence sufficient to show both a protected liberty or property interest and a deprivation without due process. Notably, the panel observed that Zimmerman did not provide specific appellate arguments addressing the district court’s analysis of each hearing, reinforcing the importance of targeted appellate briefing.

Rule 59 motion—new trial standards. The panel, applying abuse-of-discretion review (Ortiz; Harris), rejected a series of trial-related challenges:

Timing of evidence gathering: Because discovery had long been closed and Zimmerman had ample time to pursue the evidence earlier, the district court acted within its discretion in declining last-minute assistance.
Redactions: The district court permitted mixed-admissibility documents but required redaction of inadmissible statements (e.g., references to non-party individuals). Under Diaz, no abuse of discretion occurred.
Visible restraints and clothing: The record reflected efforts to keep shackles out of the jury’s view, and Zimmerman had access to civilian clothing but declined to use it. The conspiracy allegation was unsupported by the record.
Adverse inference instruction: Under Hoffer, an adverse inference requires proof by a preponderance of intent to deprive; Zimmerman made no such showing.
PLRA physical-injury instruction: Zimmerman did not object at trial, forfeiting the issue. Even on plain-error review (Anderson), the panel found no error.

Appellate jurisdiction over the Rule 59 denial. The panel provided a clear jurisdictional roadmap: (i) liberal construction of Zimmerman’s pro se letter as a notice of appeal (Rana); and (ii) the “relation-forward” doctrine (Parrish), under which his earlier notice of appeal—filed while the Rule 59 motion was pending—became effective upon entry of the order denying the Rule 59 motion. The panel also invoked Stone and New Windsor to explain how Rule 59 affects finality and appellate timelines.

3) Likely Impact

Although non-precedential, this summary order provides practical guidance with potential persuasive value, particularly in prisoner civil rights litigation and pro se appeals:

Successive summary judgment motions: The order illustrates how extraordinary docket-management circumstances (e.g., COVID-19 disruptions) can justify allowing a second motion even without new evidence or rulings, especially where steps are taken to safeguard fairness (such as pro bono assistance).
Supervisory liability rigor: The reiteration of Tangreti reinforces that plaintiffs must marshal record evidence of each defendant’s personal involvement to withstand summary judgment—an essential takeaway in multi-defendant institutional cases.
Due process claims must be particularized: Plaintiffs challenging prison disciplinary hearings must identify the protected interest at stake and specify the procedural deficiencies with record support, then brief those points distinctly on appeal.
Preservation matters: The outcome underscores the necessity of timely discovery efforts, contemporaneous objections to jury instructions, and developed arguments on appeal. Failure to object can reduce review to the demanding plain-error standard.
Adverse inference is exceptional: Spoliation-based inferences require proof of intentional deprivation; allegations alone will not suffice.
Pro se appellate practice: The jurisdiction discussion is a useful primer: courts may construe a pro se letter as a notice of appeal, and a premature notice can “relate forward” under Parrish. That said, litigants should still strive for clarity and timeliness under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary order (non-precedential): A decision that resolves the parties’ dispute but does not establish binding precedent for future cases in the circuit. It can be cited as persuasive authority.
Successive summary judgment motions: A second round of summary judgment after one has already been decided. Generally disfavored if it simply re-packages earlier arguments, but permissible at the court’s discretion, especially with compelling case-management reasons.
Supervisory liability after Tangreti: To hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that supervisor’s own actions or omissions violated the Constitution. A supervisor’s title or role is not enough.
Procedural due process: To prove a due process violation, a plaintiff must show (1) a protected interest (e.g., liberty or property) and (2) that the government deprived that interest without adequate procedures. In the prison context, due process claims often hinge on whether the sanction implicates a protected liberty interest and whether the hearing procedures were adequate.
Rule 59 motion for new trial: A request asking the district court to order a new jury trial due to errors that affected the verdict. Appellate courts review denials for abuse of discretion and give trial judges wide latitude.
Adverse inference (spoliation): A jury instruction allowing it to infer that lost or destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the party responsible. It typically requires a finding that the evidence was destroyed with the intent to deprive the opponent of its use.
PLRA physical-injury requirement: The Prison Litigation Reform Act limits compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury absent a showing of physical injury. Challenges to related jury instructions must be preserved at trial, or they face plain-error review on appeal.
Relation-forward doctrine for notices of appeal: If a party files a notice of appeal too early (e.g., while a Rule 59 motion is pending), the notice becomes effective when the order disposing of that motion is entered, permitting the appeal to proceed.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Zimmerman v. Randall affirms the district court’s management of a complex, pro se prisoner civil rights case through pandemic disruptions, including its allowance of a second summary judgment motion. The court reinforced core principles of § 1983 litigation—especially the necessity of personal involvement for supervisory liability and the two-element structure of procedural due process claims—and it provided practical clarity on appellate jurisdiction via liberal construction of pro se filings and the relation-forward doctrine for premature notices of appeal. Finally, the order illustrates the high bar for obtaining a new trial under Rule 59 and for securing adverse-inference instructions, while reminding litigants that preservation of objections at trial is essential for meaningful appellate review.

While non-precedential, the order offers useful, practice-oriented guidance for litigants and courts alike on case management, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions (including under the PLRA), and the mechanics of appellate jurisdiction in the wake of post-trial motions.