Scott v. Carnival: The Eleventh Circuit’s Strict Enforcement of Rule 26 Expert-Disclosure Deadlines in Maritime Personal-Injury Litigation

1. Introduction

Alvin Scott’s cruise-ship slip-and-fall seemed a textbook maritime claim: water on a deck, alleged negligence by the crew, and resulting back surgery. But when the case reached the Eleventh Circuit on 19 August 2025, it became something else—an authoritative statement on how unforgiving federal courts can be when Rule 26 expert disclosures are missed. The panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Abudu, and Marcus) affirmed summary judgment for Carnival Corporation, holding that Scott’s total failure to provide a timely expert medical-causation disclosure doomed all four negligence theories, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding late evidence under Rule 37(c)(1).

2. Summary of the Judgment

Key Holding: When a maritime personal-injury plaintiff fails to make the expert disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(2), the district court may—and ordinarily should—exclude the expert testimony under Rule 37(c)(1); absence of medical-causation proof entitles the defendant to summary judgment.
Expert Testimony Required: Following Willis v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, the court reiterated that non-readily-observable injuries (such as spinal conditions) require expert medical testimony to show causation.
No Excuse for Non-Compliance: The plaintiff offered no substantial justification and the lapse was not harmless; the court rejected arguments that the importance of the evidence, alleged “gamesmanship,” or the possibility of a continuance outweighed the prejudice to Carnival.
Outcome: District court’s exclusion of the evidence and grant of summary judgment AFFIRMED.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Willis v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 77 F.4th 1332 (11th Cir. 2023)
– First circuit decision formally requiring expert testimony on medical causation in maritime personal-injury cases where injuries are not obvious.
– Provided explicit notice to practitioners months before Scott’s disclosure deadline.
Romero v. Drummond, 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008)
– Set the three-factor test (importance, explanation, prejudice) for reviewing Rule 37 exclusions. – Court reapplied it and emphasized that the second and third factors can outweigh the first.
Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710 (11th Cir. 2019)
– Restated general maritime-negligence elements; cited for duty, breach, causation, and harm framework.
Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008); Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2004)
– Stressed that Rule 26 compliance is mandatory and mere name disclosure is insufficient.
District-level cases (e.g., Torres v. Wal-Mart) distinguished because some disclosure—though imperfect—had been made. Here, no expert disclosure existed at all.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two linked steps:

Discovery Sanction: Rule 37(c)(1) imposes an automatic exclusionary sanction unless the failure is substantially justified or harmless.
- Importance: Acknowledged that medical-causation testimony was critical (factor one).
- Explanation: Plaintiff offered none; alleged informal agreement and blame-shifting to Carnival were rejected (factor two).
- Prejudice: Carnival had closed discovery, could not depose experts, and faced imminent trial; thus prejudice substantial (factor three).
- Continuance: Court found reopening discovery two weeks before trial unwarranted; docket control is discretionary.
Summary Judgment: Without admissible expert evidence, Scott could not establish proximate cause. The court relied on maritime-negligence elements and the specific rule in Willis that lay testimony cannot prove medical causation where pathology is internal and complex.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

The judgment cements a “hard-deadline” approach to Rule 26(a)(2) in the Eleventh Circuit, particularly in maritime personal-injury suits—a prolific docket in Florida federal courts. Expected consequences include:

Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs’ counsel must treat expert disclosures as jurisdictional; late or half-complete submissions will likely be fatal.
Defense Leverage: Defendants may move quickly for summary judgment once disclosure deadlines lapse, confident that exclusion will follow.
District-Court Practice: Encourages judges to deny continuances where parties ignore scheduling orders, reinforcing docket certainty.
Clarified Pro Se Distinction: Opinion notes leniency may apply only to unrepresented litigants; represented parties receive no such indulgence.
Inter-circuit Persuasive Value: Because few appellate opinions deal squarely with the interplay between Willis-style medical-causation requirements and Rule 37(c)(1), this case will be cited beyond maritime contexts when essential expert evidence is withheld.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 26(a)(2) Expert Disclosure: A mandatory pre-trial notice telling the opposing side (a) who your expert is and (b) what they will say. Treating physicians also need a brief “summary” if they will give opinion testimony.
Rule 37(c)(1) Sanction: The “automatic penalty.” If you miss Rule 26 disclosures, the information is barred unless you prove the lapse was excusable or harmless.
Medical Causation: Showing not just that you were injured, but that this specific incident caused the injury. Internal injuries (e.g., spinal fusion) usually require a doctor to bridge that gap.
Non-Argument Calendar: Appeal decided without oral argument because the panel found the issues clear from the briefs.
Maritime Jurisdiction: Federal courts apply “general maritime law” for torts aboard vessels in navigable waters—largely similar to common negligence but with unique precedents.

5. Conclusion

Scott v. Carnival is a sobering reminder that procedural missteps can be outcome-determinative. The Eleventh Circuit leaves no doubt: When expert testimony is indispensable—especially for medical causation in maritime cases—plaintiffs must timely and fully comply with Rule 26(a)(2). Courts need not rescue parties from their own omissions, nor grant continuances that disrupt tightly managed dockets. The precedent sets a clear, bright-line rule that will reverberate across personal-injury litigation: “Miss the disclosure deadline, and you may well lose your case—no matter how strong the merits might otherwise be.”