Schoenhals: Monschke Is a Retroactive, Substantive Change; Mandatory LWOP for 18–20-Year-Olds Is Unconstitutional; Per Se Prejudice and Facial Invalidity Provide Two Paths Around the PRP Time Bar

Schoenhals: Monschke Is a Retroactive, Substantive Change; Mandatory LWOP for 18–20-Year-Olds Is Unconstitutional; Per Se Prejudice and Facial Invalidity Provide Two Paths Around the PRP Time Bar

Introduction

In In re Personal Restraint of Schoenhals, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously grants a personal restraint petition (PRP) and orders resentencing for a petitioner who, at age 20, received a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence for aggravated first degree murder in 1986. The court’s per curiam sets the stage: all justices agree the PRP is timely and that the sentence is unconstitutional; they divide only on the doctrinal route to get there.

The case tests the convergence of three important lines of Washington law: (1) the state constitution’s prohibition on cruel punishment, (2) PRP timeliness rules and exceptions under RCW 10.73.090 and .100(7), and (3) the individualized sentencing requirement for youthful offenders ages 18–20 articulated in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke and embraced and implemented in State v. Carter.

Two core issues frame the decision:

  • Whether Monschke constitutes a “significant change in the law” that is retroactive and material so as to exempt otherwise untimely collateral attacks under RCW 10.73.100(7).
  • What showing a petitioner must make to establish “actual and substantial prejudice” for PRP relief in this Monschke cohort.

The parties are petitioner John H. Schoenhals and the State. The trial court had imposed a mandatory LWOP sentence under RCW 10.95.030 for a 1986 aggravated first-degree murder; the Court of Appeals certified the PRP for direct Supreme Court review.

Summary of the Opinion

The court unanimously grants the PRP and remands for a new sentencing hearing. All agree that an LWOP sentence mandatorily imposed on an 18–20-year-old without individualized consideration of youth violates the Washington Constitution’s ban on cruel punishment (art. I, § 14), as articulated in Monschke and reaffirmed and implemented in Carter.

The justices divide on the rationale:

  • Lead opinion (Whitener, J., joined by González, Montoya-Lewis, and Mungia):
    • Monschke is a “significant change in the law” under RCW 10.73.100(7).
    • Monschke’s rule is new, of constitutional magnitude, and substantive; thus, it applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane and Washington precedent.
    • Monschke is material to mandatory LWOP sentences imposed on 18–20-year-olds, including Schoenhals.
    • For this cohort, a Monschke violation constitutes per se actual and substantial prejudice; a petitioner need not prove the original judge would likely have imposed a lesser sentence.
  • Concurring opinion (Madsen, J., joined by Stephens, C.J., Johnson, and Yu):
    • Under Carter, the mandatory LWOP sentence is unlawful; the judgment and sentence is facially invalid.
    • Facial invalidity exempts the PRP from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.090(1), making it unnecessary to analyze RCW 10.73.100(7) or prejudice standards.
  • Concurring opinion (Gordon McCloud, J.):
    • Agrees both that Monschke supplies the RCW 10.73.100(7) timeliness exception and that Carter renders the judgment facially invalid under RCW 10.73.090(1); also agrees the sentence is unconstitutional.

Practical result: individuals who were 18–20 at the time of aggravated first-degree murder and who received mandatory LWOP are entitled to resentencing at which the sentencing court must consider mitigating qualities of youth and exercise discretion. LWOP may be reimposed only after constitutionally adequate individualized sentencing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

  • In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305 (2021): Held (with five votes on the merits) that mandatory LWOP for 18–20-year-olds under RCW 10.95.030 violates art. I, § 14 because it denies consideration of youth. Although fractured on timeliness, it announced the core constitutional rule and required individualized sentencing for this cohort.
  • State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198 (2024): A majority embraced Monschke’s constitutional holding and severed RCW 10.95.030’s mandatory language, making life imprisonment permissive rather than mandatory. Carter did not resolve PRP timeliness but confirmed the unconstitutionality of mandatory LWOP for 18–20-year-olds and operationalized a discretionary sentencing framework.
  • In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1 (2022): Articulates the “significant change in the law” framework: the change must be significant, material, and retroactive. Distinguished here because the petitioner in Kennedy was not actually subject to mandatory LWOP; Monschke was therefore immaterial in that case.
  • In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220 (2020): Supports the materiality analysis by recognizing that a change in law is material where it would have given a sentencing judge discretion (e.g., to consider youth, to run enhancements concurrently).
  • State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111 (2016); In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328 (2018); In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614 (2016); In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71 (2003): Define “significant change in the law” and the “could not have raised it before” test, and distinguish between decisions that apply old law to new facts versus those that break new ground.
  • Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (as adopted in Washington) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016): Supply the retroactivity framework; substantive constitutional rules—those that prohibit a category of punishment for a class of defendants—apply retroactively. The court analogizes Monschke to Miller/Montgomery.
  • Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012): For juveniles under 18, mandatory LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment; establishes the “individualized sentencing” principle—a key analytical foundation for Monschke.
  • State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420 (2017): Provides the youth-related considerations Washington courts use at sentencing—guidance relevant at resentencing after Monschke/Carter.
  • State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017) and progeny (In re Hinton, In re Forcha-Williams, In re Meippen): Require sentencing discretion to account for youth in juvenile cases under the SRA. The court carefully distinguishes these “procedural” PRP prejudice rules from the Monschke context; unlike SRA standard-range sentences, the mandatory LWOP statute left no discretion at all, making procedural prejudice showings ill-suited here.
  • State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493 (1982): Earlier held that particularized consideration was not required for LWOP generally; Monschke did not “overrule” Grisby, but carved out a constitutionally required individualized-sentencing exception for the 18–20 cohort in aggravated murder cases.
  • Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792 (1999): Capital cases emphasizing individualized sentencing as a constitutional requirement for the most severe punishments; used as analogies to explain why mandatory LWOP for young adults is constitutionally suspect without individualized review.
  • Snively, Coats, and Cook: Establish that a sentence unauthorized by law renders a judgment and sentence facially invalid, triggering RCW 10.73.090(1)’s timeliness exception—the path chosen by the Madsen concurrence.
  • State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379 (2009): Plurality doctrine: when there is no majority, the holding is the position taken by those concurring on the narrowest grounds. Applied to explain the fractured timeliness aspects of Monschke.

Legal Reasoning

1) Significant Change in the Law and Retroactivity under RCW 10.73.100(7)

The lead opinion anchors timeliness in RCW 10.73.100(7). It first holds that Monschke effected a “significant change in the law.” Although Monschke did not overrule prior precedent, it was the first time Washington interpreted RCW 10.95.030 in light of article I, section 14, to require individualized youth consideration and sentencing discretion for 18–20-year-olds facing LWOP for aggravated first-degree murder. Before Monschke, defendants could not plausibly argue that sentencing courts had discretion to deviate from mandatory LWOP, or that youth must be considered for 18–20-year-olds. After Monschke, they can—and must.

The court then ties Monschke to Carter, which severed the statute’s mandatory language, confirming that mandatory LWOP for this cohort is unconstitutional and that life imprisonment is now discretionary.

On retroactivity, the court applies the Teague framework as adopted in Washington. Monschke announced a:

  • New rule: It imposes a novel obligation on sentencing courts to exercise discretion and to consider youth for 18–20-year-olds convicted of aggravated murder.
  • Of constitutional magnitude: Rooted in article I, section 14’s ban on cruel punishment, informed by Miller’s individualized sentencing principle.
  • That is substantive: It prohibits a category of punishment—mandatory LWOP—being imposed automatically on a class of defendants (18–20-year-olds) without individualized consideration. Per Montgomery, the requirement of individualized sentencing does not convert the rule into a mere procedural regulation; it is the substantive constraint against mandatory LWOP for this cohort that renders it retroactive.

Thus, Monschke is retroactive and can excuse the one-year PRP time bar.

2) Materiality

Materiality is straightforward here: Schoenhals was 20 at the time of the offense and was subject to mandatory LWOP. Monschke and Carter render that sentencing framework unconstitutional and require consideration of his youth and the exercise of judicial discretion at resentencing. Unlike in Kennedy—where the petitioner had never faced mandatory LWOP—Monschke directly alters the legal landscape that controlled Schoenhals’ sentence.

3) Actual and Substantial Prejudice: A Per Se Rule for Monschke Petitioners

PRPs ordinarily require a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of “actual and substantial prejudice.” The State urged the court to apply prejudice standards developed in Houston-Sconiers procedural-error cases (e.g., Meippen and Forcha-Williams), requiring a petitioner to show the sentencing judge likely would have imposed a lower sentence had the judge understood and exercised discretion. The court rejects that analogy as ill-fitting.

The key distinction: Houston-Sconiers involves SRA sentences where judicial discretion exists, so a failure to exercise it may or may not have mattered. By contrast, under RCW 10.95.030 as applied here, the judge had no discretion and could consider no youth mitigation; LWOP was automatic. Requiring a petitioner to show what the judge “would have done” if the law had been different asks the impossible.

The court therefore holds that for Monschke petitioners, once materiality is shown, actual and substantial prejudice is established per se. In practical terms, a petitioner makes the prejudice showing by proving that no judge has ever exercised sentencing discretion under the aggravated murder statute because mandatory LWOP foreclosed it at the time of sentencing.

4) Alternative Timeliness Route: Facial Invalidity under RCW 10.73.090(1)

The Madsen concurrence offers a simpler path: Carter makes clear that mandatory LWOP imposed on 18–20-year-olds without individualized youth consideration is unauthorized. A judgment and sentence that imposes an unauthorized sentence is facially invalid. RCW 10.73.090(1) allows a PRP at any time when the judgment and sentence is facially invalid, rendering it unnecessary to assess RCW 10.73.100(7) or to parse prejudice.

Justice Gordon McCloud concurs in both approaches, underscoring that petitioners have two independent timeliness avenues: significant-change retroactivity under RCW 10.73.100(7) and facial invalidity under RCW 10.73.090(1).

Impact

The decision has immediate and broad consequences for Washington’s aggravated murder sentencing of youthful adults:

  • Eligibility for resentencing: Persons who were 18–20 at the time of aggravated first-degree murder and received mandatory LWOP are entitled to resentencing. At resentencing, courts must consider mitigation related to youth and exercise discretion. LWOP may still be imposed, but only after constitutionally adequate individualized consideration.
  • Two timeliness pathways: Petitioners can proceed under either
    • RCW 10.73.100(7): Monschke is a retroactive, significant change of substantive constitutional law that is material; or
    • RCW 10.73.090(1): after Carter, the judgment and sentence imposing mandatory LWOP is facially invalid.
  • Per se prejudice simplifies PRP litigation: Petitioners need not prove that their original sentencing judge would have imposed a lesser sentence; proof that the original sentence was mandatory and lacked individualized youth consideration suffices.
  • Doctrinal clarity: The court further delineates the boundary between Houston-Sconiers procedural prejudice analysis and Monschke’s substantive rule. For truly mandatory sentencing schemes, prejudice is inherent.
  • Trial court workload and process: Remands will require development of youth-related mitigation and evidence of rehabilitation (e.g., Ramos factors), with courts evaluating individualized culpability and prospects for reoffense. The decision does not guarantee release; it guarantees a constitutional process.
  • Statutory framework going forward: Carter’s severance of RCW 10.95.030 ensures prospective sentencing is discretionary, minimizing recurrence of the constitutional defect. Schoenhals clarifies how to remedy historical sentences and how to navigate PRP timeliness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Personal Restraint Petition (PRP): Washington’s principal vehicle for postconviction relief. Generally must be filed within one year unless an exception applies. Relief requires showing of constitutional or legal error and “actual and substantial prejudice.”
  • RCW 10.73.090 vs. RCW 10.73.100(7):
    • RCW 10.73.090(1): Imposes a one-year time bar unless the judgment and sentence is “facially invalid” (e.g., imposes a sentence unauthorized by law).
    • RCW 10.73.100(7): Exempts the time bar when there has been a “significant change in the law” that is material and retroactive.
  • Significant Change in the Law: A later appellate decision that breaks new ground or makes a previously untenable argument viable, rather than merely applying settled law to new facts. If defendants could not have made the argument before the new decision, that suggests a “significant change.”
  • Substantive vs. Procedural Rules (Retroactivity):
    • Substantive rules prohibit a type of punishment for a class of persons (e.g., mandatory LWOP for 18–20-year-olds without individualized sentencing). These apply retroactively.
    • Procedural rules regulate how guilt or punishment is determined. These generally do not apply retroactively unless they are “watershed,” a category now virtually nonexistent in federal doctrine.
  • Individualized Sentencing: A constitutional requirement, borrowed from capital cases and juvenile LWOP jurisprudence, mandating that the court consider the offender’s individual characteristics—here, the mitigating qualities of youth—before imposing the harshest penalties.
  • Plurality Decisions and Binding Effect: When no majority agrees on a single rationale, the holding can rest on the position taken by those concurring on the narrowest grounds. Monschke yielded five votes on the merits (unconstitutionality) but fractured on timeliness; Carter later supplied a majority embracing Monschke’s constitutional holding and severed the statute.
  • Per Se Prejudice in the Monschke Context: Because the prior statute mandated LWOP and barred any consideration of youth, the error infects the sentence by its nature; petitioners need not prove a different outcome would have occurred.

Practical Guidance and Checklist

For counsel evaluating potential PRPs under Schoenhals/Monschke/Carter:

  • Confirm the petitioner’s age at the time of the offense was 18, 19, or 20.
  • Confirm conviction of aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020 and imposition of mandatory LWOP under RCW 10.95.030 as it existed at the time.
  • Obtain the original sentencing records to show the judge lacked discretion and did not consider youth (often explicit in the record).
  • Select a timeliness pathway:
    • RCW 10.73.090(1): facial invalidity (Carter) if the J&S imposed mandatory LWOP without individualized youth consideration; or
    • RCW 10.73.100(7): significant change in law (Monschke), with retroactivity and materiality; prejudice is per se if material.
  • At resentencing, prepare robust youth mitigation and rehabilitation evidence consistent with Ramos and Carter, including neurodevelopmental science, background, institutional record, and progress.

Conclusion

Schoenhals completes the doctrinal architecture that Monschke and Carter began. It cements that:

  • Mandatory LWOP for 18–20-year-olds, imposed without individualized consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth, is unconstitutional under article I, section 14.
  • Monschke is a significant, material, and retroactive substantive change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(7).
  • For this cohort, actual and substantial prejudice is established per se upon a showing that Monschke is material—no counterfactual “different outcome” proof is required.
  • Alternatively, Carter renders such sentences unauthorized, making the judgment and sentence facially invalid under RCW 10.73.090(1), independently exempting the PRP from the time bar.

The decision underscores Washington’s commitment to proportionality and individualized sentencing for youthful offenders facing the harshest punishments. It equips petitioners and courts with clear timeliness and prejudice rules, ensures constitutional sentencing moving forward, and channels past mandatory LWOP sentences for young adults into resentencing proceedings calibrated to the offender’s individualized culpability and growth.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Washington

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