Sanchez-Mayorga v. Bondi: Clarifying the “Prejudice” Prong in Due-Process Challenges to Expedited Immigration Proceedings

Sanchez-Mayorga v. Bondi: Clarifying the “Prejudice” Prong in Due-Process Challenges to Expedited Immigration Proceedings

1. Introduction

Sanchez-Mayorga v. Bondi, No. 24-9559 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025), is a non-precedential but highly instructive order that addresses several recurring themes in U.S. immigration litigation:

  • What constitutes a deprivation of procedural due process in removal proceedings, especially when a case is placed on an expedited docket and the applicant appears pro se?
  • How far immigration judges (IJs) must go to sua sponte develop the record and to advise unrepresented respondents of possible forms of relief.
  • The evidentiary hurdles in establishing nexus to a “particular social group” (PSG) for asylum and withholding of removal, and the distinct analytical framework for Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection.

The petitioners – Jacqueline Sanchez Mayorga and her minor son, John Doe – fled alleged domestic violence in Colombia. They sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, but the Immigration Judge and subsequently the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied relief. The Tenth Circuit now affirms, emphasizing that demonstrable prejudice is an indispensable element of any due-process claim and reiterating the demanding evidentiary standards for humanitarian relief.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Sitting without oral argument, the Tenth Circuit (Judges Matheson, Eid, and Carson) denied the petition for review on all grounds. Key holdings include:

  1. Due Process: To prevail, a noncitizen must not only show a procedural flaw (e.g., placement on an expedited docket, lack of advisal regarding Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, or generic legal boilerplate in the IJ’s opinion) but also prejudice – i.e., a realistic possibility that the flaw affected the outcome. Petitioners failed to show this.
  2. Asylum / Withholding: Substantial evidence supported the findings that (a) the alleged persecutor (Juan) acted out of personal jealousy and drunken violence rather than on account of a protected ground, and (b) Colombian authorities were not shown to be unwilling or unable to protect.
  3. CAT: No clear probability of torture “by, at the instigation of, or with the acquiescence of” a public official was established.
  4. Extra-Record Evidence: Appellate review is limited to the administrative record; documents appended to briefing were stricken.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2005) – Articulates the “meaningful opportunity to be heard” standard for procedural due process. The Court reprises it to frame the debate.
  • Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2019) – Clarifies that due-process claims require a showing of prejudice; cited repeatedly as the governing test.
  • Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 2017) – Supplies both the de-novo review standard for legal questions and the “potential to affect the outcome” prejudice benchmark.
  • Miguel-Peña v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145 (10th Cir. 2024) – Reiterates that a protected ground must be “one central reason” for persecution; applied to uphold the nexus finding.
  • Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021) – Supreme Court pronouncement limiting judicial second-guessing of BIA factual findings; invoked for the substantial-evidence test.
  • Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) – Establishes that “acts of common criminality or personal hostility” fall outside asylum protection absent a protected-ground nexus.
  • CAT regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 – Cited to define “torture” and “acquiescence.”

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Standard of Review. Legal issues are reviewed de novo; factual findings stand unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to disagree (§ 1252(b)(4)(B)).
  2. Due Process Framework. The Court divides each alleged procedural defect into two steps:
    1. Was the procedure deficient?
    2. If so, did the deficiency prejudicially affect the outcome?
    Petitioners faltered at step (b) every time: they never specified what counsel would have done with more preparation, what evidence additional time would have produced, or how SIJS eligibility was plausible for John Doe.
  3. Nexus to Protected Ground. The IJ credited the domestic-violence narrative but found the motivation was “anger, jealousy, or drunkenness”—personal rather than protected. The Tenth Circuit refuses to re-weigh credibility and stresses that criminal motives ≠ statutorily protected motives.
  4. Record Development Duty. The Court again sidesteps explicitly recognizing an affirmative IJ duty to develop the record for pro se respondents (see Matumona) but holds that, even assuming such a duty, petitioners show no prejudice.
  5. CAT Analysis. Failure to report the domestic abuse prevents a finding of official acquiescence; police inaction regarding a burglary does not amount to acquiescence in “torture,” which must be severe and intentional.
  6. Limitation to Administrative Record. Extra-record documents appended to the brief were stricken, reinforcing the statutory confinement of appellate review to the administrative record (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A)).

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Why, if it is “not binding precedent,” does this case matter?

  • Practical Precedent on Prejudice: The decision synthesizes prior Tenth-Circuit caselaw into a clear, easily quotable statement that prejudice is the sine qua non of any due-process claim in removal proceedings. Future litigants must come armed with concrete, record-based examples of how the outcome might have changed.
  • Guidance on Expedited Dockets: Immigration courts increasingly rely on “rocket dockets.” Sanchez-Mayorga signals that mere docket acceleration, without a showing of specific detriment, will not suffice for reversal.
  • Clarification of IJ Obligations to Pro Se Respondents: The Court leaves the doctrinal status of an IJ’s affirmative duty unresolved, but hints that even if a duty exists it is limited and tethered strictly to prejudice.
  • Continued Emphasis on Mixed-Motive Proof: The ruling underscores that domestic-violence asylum claims must marshal evidence showing gender-based or “inability-to-leave” motives, not just generalized violence.
  • Strategic Reminder on Record Building: By striking extra-record attachments, the Court reminds counsel that protective documents must be moved into the administrative record before appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Due Process
The constitutional guarantee that the government will follow fair procedures (notice & opportunity to be heard) before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Prejudice (in this context)
A realistic likelihood that, but for the procedural error, the outcome could have been different.
Particular Social Group (PSG)
A group of persons who share “immutable characteristics” (e.g., gender) and are “socially distinct” in the eyes of society. To win asylum, harm must be inflicted because of PSG membership.
Convention Against Torture (CAT)
An independent form of protection that forbids removal to a country where the person is more likely than not to face torture by, or with the consent of, a public official.
Substantial-Evidence Review
An appellate court must affirm agency factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.

5. Conclusion

Sanchez-Mayorga v. Bondi does not blaze new constitutional trail, yet it crystallizes existing doctrine into a practical rule: Every due-process claim in immigration court lives or dies on proof of prejudice. The opinion also reaffirms that domestic violence, while tragic, must be tied to a protected statutory ground to trigger asylum or withholding, and that CAT relief demands evidence of official complicity in torture. For advocates, the message is unmistakable: build a robust record in the immigration court, pinpoint how each procedural lapse could have changed the result, and do not rely on extra-record supplementation at the circuit-court level. Although technically “non-precedential,” the decision will likely be cited for its succinct articulation of the prejudice requirement and its disciplined application of substantial-evidence review.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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