Sampson Limited: Affirmative Defenses Must Be Evidenced at Summary Judgment; Hayden Foreclosure Standard Reaffirmed

Introduction

In Russell A. Collins and Stacey D. Collins v. West Alabama Bank & Trust (consolidated appeals from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court), the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgments for the foreclosing lender in two ejectment actions—one involving the Collinses’ residence and the other their rental property. The case clarifies critical procedural and substantive rules that regularly arise in post-foreclosure litigation:

Procedurally, nonmovants cannot withhold evidence supporting pleaded affirmative defenses until a Rule 59(e) motion; they must come forward with evidence at the summary judgment stage once the movant makes a prima facie showing and seeks judgment on “any and all claims.” The Court further confines Sampson v. Heartwise Health Systems to situations where the movant failed to raise the relevant ground.
Substantively, the Court applies the classic Hayden v. Smith framework to attacks on foreclosure sales based on alleged price inadequacy: a sale at ≤10% of fair market value may be voided on price alone; otherwise, mere inadequacy is insufficient and must be coupled with unfairness or similar irregularities.

While affirming both judgments, the Court’s opinions are fractured. A majority agrees on the outcome and the evidentiary/procedural rulings; some reasoning on price inadequacy and how to read Hayden garnered less than majority support. Special concurrences invite both judicial and legislative re-evaluation of Alabama’s century-old foreclosure architecture.

Case Background

West Alabama Bank & Trust (the “Bank”) foreclosed on two mortgages given by Russell and Stacey Collins: a rental property (foreclosed November 8, 2022) and their residence (foreclosed December 19, 2022). The Bank purchased both properties at foreclosure, credit-bidding the full indebtedness in each sale. It then filed separate ejectment actions (November 2022 for the rental property; February 2023 for the residence) to obtain possession.

The Collinses answered asserting multiple affirmative defenses—void sale for inadequate price; lack of notice; estoppel; fraud; trickery; unfairness; culpable mismanagement; and illegality—and counterclaimed. The Bank moved for summary judgment in each action, seeking judgment on “any and all claims” and the counterclaims. On February 21, 2024, the Circuit Court entered summary judgment for the Bank on ejectment and on all counterclaims, and found the Collinses had forfeited statutory redemption. The court clarified finality on February 28, 2024, accepting the Bank’s waiver of any damages claims and noting that fictitiously named defendants were unserved, thus not impeding finality (Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.).

The Collinses filed Rule 59(e) motions on March 22, 2024, offering new evidence to support several defenses beyond price inadequacy; the court denied the motions without a hearing on March 28, 2024. The Collinses appealed both cases; the Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.

Summary of the Opinion

Evidence Scope: The Court refused to consider evidence first submitted with the Rule 59(e) motions. Opposition evidence to summary judgment must be presented before judgment; Rule 59(e) cannot be used to sandbag with new evidentiary material (Moore v. Glover; Ex parte Ryals; Tucker).
Foreclosure-Price Challenge: Applying Hayden v. Smith, the Court held that the Collinses’ own evidence showed the residential sale price (~47.5% of alleged FMV) did not “shock the conscience” and, standing alone, could not void the sale. The rental property sale (~26.4% of alleged FMV) fell between one-tenth and one-third of FMV; because the Collinses timely offered no evidence of “other circumstances” (unfairness, fraud, etc.), they failed to create a triable issue. Summary judgments were therefore affirmed.
Unfair Conduct/Good Faith: Arguments that the Bank acted unfairly or breached any quasi-fiduciary duty (e.g., by not offering the rental property in parcels) relied solely on evidence first offered postjudgment and were not considered.
Statutory Redemption: The Collinses’ argument under § 6-5-248(h), Ala. Code (notice tolling redemption) was not preserved below and lacked supporting authority; no reversal.
Postjudgment Hearing: Any error in denying a Rule 59(g) hearing was harmless because the motions lacked probable merit given the governing law and the late-submitted evidence (Ex parte Evans; Flagstar).

Disposition: Affirmed in both appeals (SC‑2024‑0274—residential property; SC‑2024‑0275—rental property).

Detailed Analysis

I. Precedents and Authorities Cited

Moore v. Glover, 501 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. 1986) and Ex parte Ryals, 773 So. 2d 1011 (Ala. 2000): Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle for belated submission of evidentiary material in opposition to summary judgment; appellate review is confined to the record as it existed when judgment was entered.
Hun Es Tu Malade? #16, LLC v. Tucker, 963 So. 2d 55 (Ala. 2006): A defendant intending to rely on pleaded affirmative defenses must come forward with evidence in opposition to a properly supported summary judgment; courts decide only issues presented by the motion and supported by record materials at the time.
Sampson v. Heartwise Health Systems Corp., 386 So. 3d 411 (Ala. 2023): The Court distinguished Sampson. There, reversal was warranted where summary judgment was granted on grounds the movant never raised. Here, the Bank moved for judgment on “any and all claims” and characterized the defenses as limited to price; the Collinses did not contest that framing pre-judgment or produce evidence on the other defenses until after judgment. Hence, Sampson’s burden-shifting limit did not apply.
Hayden v. Smith, 216 Ala. 428, 113 So. 293 (1927): The lodestar for evaluating inadequate-price challenges to power-of-sale foreclosures:
- A mortgagee acts as a trustee in executing the power of sale and must act in good faith, adopting reasonable procedures to make the sale most beneficial to the debtor.
- Mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a sale; it is a “circumstance” that must be coupled with other unfairness, misconduct, fraud, or “stupid management.”
- A sale price at or below one-tenth of actual value “shocks the conscience” and may, by itself, justify setting aside the sale.
- Generally, a price less than one-third of value is grossly inadequate, but there is no fixed rule; cases must be judged by their circumstances (e.g., inadequate advertising, lack of notice).
Martin v. Scarborough (Ala. 2024): The Court recently reversed a summary judgment where the foreclosure sale was at approximately 16% of a pre-foreclosure quick-sale valuation, and the record reflected circumstances raising fairness concerns. Martin underscores that evidence of “other circumstances” with a very低 price can preclude summary judgment.
Berry v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 57 So. 3d 142 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010): Often cited to hold that a significant disparity between fair market value and sale price (e.g., 40%) may create a fact issue on validity. The per curiam suggests in a footnote that 40% alone is not enough under Hayden; however, a majority did not join the per curiam’s full reasoning on price, limiting the precedential force of that limitation.
Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1387 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Harrington, 289 So. 3d 1232 (Ala. 2019): A judgment disposing of all served parties is final notwithstanding unserved fictitious defendants.
Statutory redemption notice: § 6‑5‑248(h), Ala. Code 1975: Requires a specific pre-foreclosure notice for homestead residential property; actions related to notice must be brought within one year; possession or proof of mailing is an affirmative defense. Not reached here due to lack of preservation and supporting authority.
Flagstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Foster, 779 So. 2d 1220 (Ala. 2000); Ex parte Evans, 875 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 2003): Denial of a requested Rule 59(g) hearing is error, but reversible only if probably injurious; otherwise, harmless.

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Evidence submitted with Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used to defeat summary judgment

The Collinses attempted to rely on evidence first offered with their Rule 59(e) motions—affidavits and materials aimed at “lack of notice, estoppel, fraud, trickery, unfairness, culpable mismanagement, and illegality.” The Court reiterated the long-standing principle that Rule 59(e) does not extend the time for filing materials opposing summary judgment and is not a vehicle for introducing new evidence that could have been presented earlier. Because the Bank moved for judgment on all claims and the trial court construed the case as one about price inadequacy, the onus shifted to the Collinses to present all evidence supporting any affirmative defenses they intended to rely on in opposing summary judgment. Having failed to do so, they could not cure the omission post-judgment.

The Court distinguished Sampson: there, summary judgment was entered on a ground not raised in the movant’s papers; here, the Bank sought complete relief and the Collinses did not challenge the Bank’s framing of the defenses or offer their “other circumstances” evidence before judgment.

B. Hayden’s framework governs price-inadequacy attacks on power-of-sale foreclosures

The Court carefully recited Hayden’s rules:

At-or-below one-tenth of actual value: price alone may “shock the conscience” and support setting aside the sale.
Between one-tenth and one-third: price inadequacy alone is not enough; must be coupled with other unfairness, misconduct, fraud, “stupid management,” or similar circumstances (including potentially deficient advertising).
Above one-third: price inadequacy alone is even less likely to suffice; other circumstances are needed.

Applying those rules, even assuming the Collinses’ valuations:

Residential property: $180,000 bid vs. $379,000 alleged FMV (~47.5%): above one-third. No timely “other circumstances” evidence was offered; price alone could not void the sale.
Rental property: $184,500 bid vs. $699,000 alleged FMV (~26.4%): between one-tenth and one-third. Again, the Collinses offered no timely evidence of “other circumstances”; price alone was insufficient.

The Court emphasized that the only “other circumstances” evidence appeared for the first time after judgment and was therefore out of bounds on appeal.

C. Ejectment prima facie case; burden shifting

The Bank established prima facie title and right to immediate possession by submitting the notes, mortgages, proof of publication and foreclosure notices, foreclosure deeds, and an affidavit of its CEO, plus uncontroverted evidence of demand for possession and continued detention. The burden thus shifted to the Collinses to raise a genuine dispute via substantial evidence on their affirmative defenses. On the timely record, they did not.

D. Statutory redemption and postjudgment hearing

The Collinses’ § 6‑5‑248(h) argument (notice affecting redemption) was not presented below and lacked supportive authority; no relief. As to the Rule 59(g) hearing, any error in denying the requested hearing was harmless because the price argument failed under Hayden on the timely record, and the “unfair conduct” arguments relied on inadmissible postjudgment materials.

III. The Separate Writings: Where the Justices Agree—and Disagree

The Court’s decision is fractured, particularly on the treatment of price inadequacy and the use of Hayden in the summary-judgment context:

Justice Cook (concurring specially): Fully concurs but urges future re-examination of Hayden, questioning whether a 1927 rule should govern modern mortgage markets. He invites briefing on how to calculate fair market value (pre- vs. post-foreclosure appraisals; independence), whether a creditor must ever bid more than the debt, and, more broadly, invites the Legislature to modernize foreclosure procedures (e.g., online marketing/auctions, improved notice regimes, revisiting redemption), citing academic literature and other states’ reforms.
Justice Sellers (concurring in part, concurring in result): Agrees in outcome but emphasizes that mere price inadequacy never suffices absent misconduct. He underscores that foreclosure’s purpose is to satisfy debt, not to generate profit; requiring creditors to bid more than the debt would disrupt lending. He posits that public auction price may represent fair market value and stresses debtor protections (curing default, bidding at sale, redeeming).
Justice Shaw (concurring in result): Concurs that the prices do not “shock the conscience” and that no substantial evidence of unfairness exists.
Justice Bryan (concurring in part in SC‑2024‑0274; dissenting in SC‑2024‑0275): Critiques the per curiam for crafting a rigid “Hayden framework” in the Rule 56 context. He notes Hayden was an equity case decided pre-Rules without summary judgment. He would affirm as to the residence but reverse as to the rental property (26.4% of FMV), invoking Berry to hold that such a disparity can create a triable issue even without additional circumstances. He rejects the notion that a mortgagee’s bid equal to the debt automatically validates the sale, calling it a factor, not a rule.

Practical import: A majority clearly endorses the procedural evidentiary rulings and outcome. By contrast, the per curiam’s tighter reading of price inadequacy (including a footnote signaling skepticism that a 40% price is enough by itself) did not command a majority and thus carries limited precedential weight, as Justice Bryan highlights.

IV. Impact and Practical Takeaways

A. Litigation practice: summary judgment and Rule 59(e)

If you plead affirmative defenses (e.g., lack of notice; unfairness; fraud; improper advertising; failure to sell in parcels), you must come forward with evidence supporting those defenses in response to a properly supported summary judgment that seeks judgment on “any and all claims.” Do not assume the movant’s failure to brief each defense relieves you of that burden; contest the movant’s framing promptly and submit your proof before judgment.
Do not hold back evidence for a Rule 59(e) motion. Postjudgment submissions cannot be used to create disputes that should have been raised earlier, absent grounds recognized under Rule 59(e) that are not present here.
Movants should frame their motions broadly and identify the opponent’s pleaded theories; this decision reinforces that doing so can successfully shift the burden.

B. Foreclosure price challenges: Hayden remains the controlling yardstick

≤10% of fair market value: price alone may suffice to set aside the sale.
Between 10% and 33%: price alone is not enough; you must add evidence of unfair conduct, irregularities, or other circumstances connected to the sale process.
≥33%: price inadequacy alone will not carry the day; “other circumstances” are even more critical.
Evidence quality matters: contemporaneous, independent pre-foreclosure valuations (e.g., broker’s price opinions or appraisals) are likely to carry more weight than after-the-fact estimates prepared for litigation—an issue Justice Cook flags for future development.

C. Credit bidding and “must bid more than the debt?”

The Court did not adopt a rule requiring creditors to bid more than the debt, and several justices caution against such a requirement as economically destabilizing. A creditor’s bid equal to the debt is a relevant circumstance, but it is not an absolute safe harbor validating any sale irrespective of price-to-value disparity.
Debtors retain tools: cure default pre-sale, bid at the auction, and redeem post-sale under the statutory scheme.

D. Statutory redemption (§ 6‑5‑248(h))

Arguments premised on the homestead notice requirement must be preserved in the trial court and supported with authority; otherwise, they are forfeited on appeal.
Proof of mailing is an affirmative defense for the mortgagee; any action relating to the notice must be brought within one year of foreclosure.

E. Appellate review and finality

Judgments disposing of all served parties are final even if fictitiously named defendants remain unserved (Rule 4(f)).
Denial of a requested Rule 59(g) hearing is error but reversible only if likely injurious. Where the record could not support relief under governing law on the timely evidence, lack of a hearing will be deemed harmless.

F. The path ahead: judicial and legislative reform

Judicially, Justice Cook invites briefing in a future case on whether and how to recalibrate Hayden for modern mortgage markets, including methodological questions about valuing property in the foreclosure context and the role of credit bidding.
Legislatively, the separate writing outlines a menu of reforms other jurisdictions have embraced: online notices and auctions, real-estate-agent sales akin to bankruptcy practice, clearer notice standards utilizing multiple communication channels, streamlining ejectment to reduce delay, and reassessing redemption’s economic effects. These observations, while dicta, signal openness to modernization.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Ejectment: A lawsuit to recover possession of real property from someone who is allegedly wrongfully occupying it.
Power of sale: A clause in a mortgage allowing the lender to sell the property nonjudicially upon default, following statutory and contractual procedures.
Credit bid: At foreclosure, the lender may “bid” using the debt owed rather than cash. If the lender is high bidder, the debt is credited up to the bid amount.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that no genuine factual dispute exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the evidence submitted.
Rule 59(e) motion: A postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment; not a vehicle to submit new evidence that could have been presented earlier.
Prima facie case in ejectment: The plaintiff must show legal title at filing and right to immediate possession, plus that the defendant withholds possession.
“Shock the conscience” (Hayden): A judicial shorthand meaning the sale price is so low compared to fair market value that it strongly indicates unfairness—traditionally at or below 10% of value.
Statutory right of redemption: In Alabama, certain parties may redeem property after foreclosure by paying amounts set by statute, subject to time limits and notice rules.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision affirms two ejectment judgments and delivers two overarching lessons. First, procedural rigor: parties opposing summary judgment must marshal their evidence—on every theory they intend to rely upon—before judgment is entered; Rule 59(e) is not a backdoor for new proof. Sampson’s guardrail applies only when a movant fails to raise the basis for judgment; it does not excuse a nonmovant’s failure to support pleaded affirmative defenses once the burden shifts.

Second, substantive continuity: Hayden’s century-old architecture still controls price-inadequacy attacks on power-of-sale foreclosures. Price alone will rarely undo a sale unless the bid is ≤10% of fair market value; otherwise, challengers must add evidence of unfairness or other irregularities. On the timely record here, the Collinses’ valuations—47.5% (residence) and 26.4% (rental)—could not carry the day without additional circumstances, which were presented too late.

Yet the fractured opinions reveal fault lines and future possibilities. Several justices urge reexamination of Hayden’s fit with modern finance and call on the Legislature to modernize foreclosure processes. For now, practitioners should heed the immediate, concrete guidance: present all your evidence early, frame your summary-judgment positions precisely, and, if contesting a foreclosure sale, be ready to prove more than a low price.