Salinas Orellana v. Bondi: Re-defining “Intent” in CAT Prison-Condition Claims and Clarifying the “Likely to Alter the Result” Standard for Motions to Reopen

1. Introduction

In its July 16, 2025 decision in Salinas Orellana v. Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit delivered a split outcome: it denied Jose Salinas Orellana’s petition for review of his original Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) denial, but granted his petition challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) refusal to reopen the case.

The judgment is significant for two independent reasons:

It re-states and refines the evidentiary standard the BIA must apply when assessing a motion to reopen grounded in newly-emerging country-condition evidence: the evidence must be “likely to alter the result.”
It clarifies that harsh prison conditions can amount to torture where there is evidence that government officials intend those conditions to inflict pain—thereby requiring the BIA to evaluate indicia of intent, not merely the existence of overcrowding or resource shortages.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court addressed two consolidated petitions:

22-6482 (Lead): Petition for review of the IJ/BIA denial of CAT relief.
Outcome: Denied.
24-1873 (Consolidated): Petition for review of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on new evidence regarding El Salvador’s 2022–present “State of Exception.”
Outcome: Granted and remanded.

“We remand to ensure that the BIA has considered … evidence that the Salvadoran government is intentionally creating or refusing to ameliorate prison conditions … to inflict pain and suffering on perceived gang members.”

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning relied heavily on earlier Second Circuit and Supreme Court authority:

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020) – Confirmed de novo review of legal questions in CAT claims.
Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021) – Reiterated the applicant’s burden to show torture is “more likely than not.”
Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) – Held that prison conditions constitute torture if imposed with intent to inflict severe pain.
Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008) – Emphasized that each link in a causal chain leading to torture must itself be “more likely than not.”
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992) & Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008) – Articulated the three-prong test and the “likely to alter the result” requirement for motions to reopen.
Paucaur v. Garland, 84 F.4th 71 (2d Cir. 2023) – Distinguished ineffective-assistance motions (prejudice standard) from country-conditions motions (likelihood standard).
Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2005) – Duty of the BIA to consider country-conditions evidence in the aggregate.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Lead CAT Claim – Why It Failed

Substantial evidence supported the IJ/BIA view that before the 2022 “State of Exception” the risk of torture did not cross the 50 % threshold for a former gang member who had genuinely converted to Christianity.
The panel found no due-process violation; disagreements about how the IJ weighed evidence do not constitute legal error.

(b) Motion to Reopen – The Core Holdings

Applicable Standard Clarified. The BIA must evaluate whether newly-submitted evidence “would likely alter the result,” not merely whether it shows a “reasonable likelihood of success.” The panel harmonized language across past cases, anchoring it squarely in Jian Hui Shao.
Intent in Prison-Condition Cases. The panel admonished the BIA for overlooking evidence that Salvadoran officials publicly endorsed overcrowded-and-abusive conditions as suitable punishment for (suspected) gang members. Such statements, coupled with documented patterns of beatings, waterboarding, and deaths, can demonstrate the requisite intent to torture.
Record-Consideration Duty. Citing Poradisova, the Court reiterated that the BIA abuses its discretion when it fails to grapple with salient country-condition reports. The presence of strong statements by the Salvadoran Prison Director (“no gang member will ever leave prison again”) made summary dismissal of intent analysis impermissible.

3.3 Potential Impact

The judgment is likely to have ripple effects in immigration jurisprudence, particularly within the CAT framework:

BIA Practice Change: The Board must now expressly address evidence indicating intentionality behind harsh conditions. A perfunctory conclusion that “overcrowding is not torture” will no longer suffice where intent evidence exists.
State-of-Exception Cases: El Salvador, Honduras, and other nations adopting emergency anti-gang measures may see a surge of CAT-based reopen motions citing systemic, government-approved abuses.
Clarified Reopening Standard: Litigants now have clearer guidance: they must show the new evidence makes a different outcome more probable than not; the BIA must articulate how it applies that test.
Prison-Condition Precedent: The Court’s discussion revives and strengthens Pierre, signaling that conditions of confinement, combined with official statements or policies, can establish torture.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Convention Against Torture (CAT): A U.N. treaty implemented in U.S. immigration law that forbids the government from sending anyone to a country where they are more likely than not to be tortured.
Motion to Reopen: A procedural request asking the BIA to revisit a final order because of new, previously unavailable evidence.
“State of Exception” (El Salvador): Ongoing suspension of certain constitutional guarantees, permitting mass arrests of suspected gang members without warrants or timely judicial oversight.
Intent Requirement: Under CAT, torture must be intentional. Negligently allowing bad conditions is insufficient; officials must at least be willfully blind or purposefully inflict suffering.
Substantial-Evidence Review: A deferential standard; the court affirms agency findings unless any reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to decide differently.

5. Conclusion

Salinas Orellana v. Bondi does not grant immediate relief to the petitioner, but it cements two pivotal propositions:

The BIA must apply the “likely to alter the result” benchmark when deciding motions to reopen based on new country-condition evidence.
When evaluating CAT claims premised on prison conditions, the agency must examine evidence that authorities intend the harshness as punishment or intimidation—official pronouncements, systemic abuses, and statistical reports cannot be ignored.

By articulating these principles, the Second Circuit provides a roadmap for future CAT litigants and imposes a clearer analytic discipline on the BIA. Practitioners should marshal concrete proof of governmental intent—press releases, legislative statements, human-rights findings—and link that evidence to individual risk, thereby satisfying both the “intent” and “likelihood” prongs reinforced in this precedent.