Safety-Risk Limitation on ADA “De-escalation” Accommodations During Police Detentions, and Probable-Cause/Force Standards for Mental-Health Seizures

Case: Brandi Booth v. Jonathan Lazzara, DO (with Monroe officers and City of Monroe as Defendants-Appellees)  |  Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit  |  Date: Jan. 14, 2026

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from a fatal police encounter during an attempted “mental-health seizure” of Dustin Booth, who was experiencing acute, escalating psychiatric symptoms amid heavy THC vaping and medication noncompliance. After an hours-long barricade/standoff at his home—where police believed Booth was armed and making alarming statements—officers later stopped a truck in which Booth was traveling. During the stop, Booth reached for a firearm, exited the vehicle, and moved toward a public intersection. A K-9 deployment and a takedown attempt preceded Booth’s brandishing of a revolver; officers then shot and killed him.

Brandi Booth, as administratrix of the estate, did not challenge the ultimate shooting. Instead, she pursued three federal theories relevant on appeal:

• ADA Title II (reasonable accommodation): that the City of Monroe failed to accommodate Booth’s disability by not using de-escalation during the attempted detention.
• Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizure): that officers lacked sufficient justification to stop the truck.
• Fourth Amendment (excessive force): that Officer Fred Doughman’s K-9 release and takedown were unreasonable.

The district court granted summary judgment on the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. ADA Title II: reasonable accommodation, “fundamental alteration,” and safety constraints

• Jones v. City of Detroit — The court cited Jones for two propositions: Title II reaches (i) intentional discrimination and (ii) in some circumstances reasonable accommodations; and critically, the ADA does not allow municipal liability on a simple vicarious-liability theory for officers’ misconduct. The panel flagged (but did not decide) how Mrs. Booth could hold the City liable while praising its guidelines and criticizing officer noncompliance.
• Roell v. Hamilton County — The controlling Sixth Circuit comparison point. In Roell, an estate proposed “de-escalation techniques” as an ADA accommodation; the court held that accommodation unreasonable under “exigent circumstances.” Booth extends Roell’s logic to a high-risk stop where officers had reason to believe the subject was armed and dangerous.
• Wilson v. Gregory — Used to support the court’s approach of “assum[ing]” the ADA might regulate some arrest-related conduct while resolving the case on reasonableness grounds.
• Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) — Cited for the regulatory articulation that modifications need not be made if they would “fundamentally alter” the activity; the panel treated safety as fundamental to arrest/stop tactics.
• Doe by K.M. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Ed. and Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. — Invoked for the proposition that a “reasonable” accommodation is typically a “moderate” change, not a fundamental reworking.
• Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr. and Finley v. Huss — Used for the “fact-specific” nature of the inquiry and the principle that accommodations are often unreasonable when they impinge the rights/safety of third parties.
• Arrest-context safety authorities: Tucker v. Tennessee (as limited by Anderson v. City of Blue Ash), Thompson v. Williamson County, plus out-of-circuit support (De Boise v. Taser Int'l, Inc.; Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs Frederick Cnty.; Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County)—all reinforcing that proposed accommodations yielding safety risks are not required.
• “Scope” disclaimer authorities: City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan and Hainze v. Richards — Cited for the proposition that it is not obvious the ADA reaches arrest conduct, a question the majority avoided deciding.

B. Fourth Amendment: mental-health seizures and traffic stops

• Brendlin v. California — Establishes that a traffic stop seizes all occupants, requiring Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
• United States v. Brooks — Used for the general framework that stops typically require reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and for rejecting the notion that “aggressive” execution alone negates legality absent a doctrinal hook.
• Mental-health seizure line: Monday v. Oullette, Ziegler v. Aukerman, Machan v. Olney, and the Sixth Circuit’s then-recent Helms ex rel. Helms v. Boyd Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't — Together supply the rule that police may seize for evaluation if they have probable cause the person poses a danger to self/others.
• Illinois v. Gates — Imported to define probable cause as a “probability or substantial chance,” rather than certainty.
• Zucker v. City of Farmington Hills and Simon v. Cook — Zucker illustrates probable cause based on reports of delusions and gun possession; Simon supports objective interpretation of threatening statements.
• District of Columbia v. Wesby — Frames qualified immunity’s “beyond debate” standard; the court did not reach the “clearly established” prong because it found no constitutional violation.

C. Fourth Amendment: force during mental-health seizures; K-9 and takedown as intermediate force

• Graham v. Connor — Provides the “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” perspective and general reasonableness approach; the court emphasized that some Graham factors fit poorly in mental-health seizures.
• Est. of Hill v. Miracle and Puskas v. Delaware County — Establish the “tailored” approach for mental-health seizures: focus on medical crisis/danger and whether force was reasonably necessary to eliminate that danger.
• Barnes v. Felix — Reinforces totality-of-circumstances analysis and cautions against “chronological blinders.”
• Puskas v. Delaware County and Jarvela v. Washtenaw County — Characterize a police dog as “comparatively measured” intermediate force not typically carrying a significant risk of serious injury.
• Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Township — Supports using intermediate force (including a police dog) when a subject appears dangerous; also supports the inference that if dog use is reasonable, tackling may be reasonable.
• Robinette v. Barnes — Stands for the proposition that a properly trained police dog is not deadly force.
• Reich v. City of Elizabethtown — Used to diminish any categorical “de-escalation first” argument, especially when a suspect is armed; also supports assessing threats to bystanders.
• Ashford v. Raby — Cited for considering practical alternatives and the principle that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not the “best technique.”
• Burgess v. Bowers — Supports that a K-9 can be reasonable where it is unsafe to approach.
• “Policy vs Constitution”: Smith v. Freland and Johnson v. Sootsman — Reinforce that departmental policy violations do not define Fourth Amendment minima.
• Distinguishing deadly-force cases: Palma v. Johns (noting later “abrogated by Barnes”), Graves v. Malone, Jacobs v. Alam, and Woodcock v. City of Bowling Green — The court treated them as inapt because Mrs. Booth did not challenge the shooting, and the contested force was nonlethal.

D. The separate concurrence: skepticism about Title II accommodations and arrests

• PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin — Used to frame the ADA’s three-title structure.
• Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring (Thomas, J., dissenting) — Cited on the ordinary meaning of “discrimination.”
• Alexander v. Choate and A. J. T. ex rel. A. T. v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) — Discussed for the possibility of reading “excluded/denied” in an “effective denial” sense (and “by reason of” as but-for), though the concurrence expressed skepticism.
• Statutory-comparator cases: Alexander v. Sandoval (Title VI requires intentional discrimination) and the Sixth Circuit’s Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc. (Rehabilitation Act not triggered by nondiscriminatory reasons / disparate effects) — Used to argue Title II should not silently embed an accommodation/disparate-impact regime.
• Administrative deference: Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo — Cited to argue courts may not defer to agency interpretations to expand Title II’s reach.
• Federalism/canon caution: Reinhart v. City of Birmingham (Readler, J., concurring), Stanley v. City of Sanford, and Commonwealth v. Biden — Used to emphasize textual limits and caution against purpose-driven expansion.
• “Service, program, or activity” debate: Johnson v. City of Saline (broad dictum), contrasted with employment-exclusion cases Brumfield v. City of Chicago, Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., and the Sixth Circuit’s open question in Whitfield v. Tennessee; plus Babcock v. Michigan (building design not itself a service/program/activity) — marshaled to argue an arrest does not fit Title II’s textual architecture.
• Corrections analogy: Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey — The concurrence distinguished “programs/services” in custody (medical, education) from the act of arrest itself.
• “By reason of” and motive: INS v. Elias-Zacarias, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. — Used to argue “reason” language commonly focuses on motive and more than but-for causation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. ADA: why “de-escalate more” was unreasonable here

The majority treated the ADA claim as a reasonable-accommodation theory and resolved it on the “reasonableness” element without deciding two threshold questions: (1) whether Title II reaches the manner of arrest/stop conduct at all, and (2) how municipal liability would work given Jones v. City of Detroit’s no-vicarious-liability rule.

On the merits, the court applied its Title II framework: accommodations must be “moderate,” not a “fundamental alteration,” and must be evaluated case-by-case, including the impact on third-party safety. In arrests and similar detentions, the Sixth Circuit’s prior decisions (especially Roell v. Hamilton County) treat exigent threats as making “de-escalation” accommodations unreasonable as a matter of law.

The court emphasized that the safety threat existed before the traffic stop: Booth’s prolonged erratic behavior; family reports of dangerousness; an hours-long barricade; visible firearm carry; weapons distributed around the home; refusal to leave without a gun; and statements reasonably interpreted as threats. Those facts made the detention a high-risk situation in which police were not required to alter their usual high-risk procedures to attempt de-escalation.

B. Fourth Amendment stop: probable cause for a “mental-health seizure”

The court framed the stop as a “mental-health seizure,” not an ordinary criminal stop. Under Monday v. Oullette, officers may seize for evaluation when they have probable cause the person poses a danger to self or others. Applying Illinois v. Gates, the question is whether there was a “probability or substantial chance” of danger from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.

The court found probable cause based on the same objective indicators driving the ADA analysis: the family’s danger reports (including the 911 call), officers’ observations of mania and refusal to comply, statements suggesting threats, and Booth’s insistence on being armed. The court rejected an attempt to reframe the stop as one for minor misdemeanors, noting that officers’ subjective motives do not control Fourth Amendment analysis and, in any event, the mental-health seizure basis sufficed.

C. Fourth Amendment force: K-9 plus takedown as reasonable intermediate force

Because Booth was lawfully subject to a mental-health seizure, the issue became whether the challenged force was “reasonably necessary” to address the danger in the moment. The court treated the scene as rapidly evolving: a struggle over a firearm inside the truck; a shout that Booth had a gun (and possibly stabbed someone); Booth exiting and walking toward open businesses and an intersection; and noncompliance with commands.

In that context, the court characterized a properly trained police dog as intermediate, non-deadly force (citing Robinette v. Barnes and Puskas v. Delaware County), and held that deploying it to stop a potentially armed and unstable individual moving toward bystanders was reasonable. When the dog did not successfully engage, an immediate hands-on takedown was also reasonable given the perceived threat and the limited alternatives. The court further rejected the argument that department policies could define the Fourth Amendment floor (Smith v. Freland; Johnson v. Sootsman).

D. Concurrence: a textual challenge to Title II arrest-based accommodation claims

Judge Murphy’s concurrence went beyond the majority’s narrow holding. It questioned whether Title II contains an accommodation requirement at all (contrasting Titles I and III, which expressly define “discrimination” to include failure to accommodate), and whether an arrest can even be a “service, program, or activity” whose “benefits” can be “denied.” The concurrence also relied on Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo to undercut agency-deference-based expansions of Title II and suggested federalism-sensitive interpretation. While not controlling, the concurrence signals openness to a future Sixth Circuit case holding that arrests (standing alone) fall outside Title II’s textual scope.

3.3. Impact

• ADA claims against police tactics in high-risk mental-health detentions face a steep reasonableness barrier: Booth reinforces that where officers have objective grounds to view a disabled individual as armed/dangerous, courts may treat “de-escalation” accommodations as unreasonable as a matter of law, especially under Roell v. Hamilton County.
• Clarifies the doctrinal pathway for stopping a vehicle to transport someone for evaluation: The opinion re-centers “mental-health seizures” on probable cause of dangerousness, not suspicion of crime, and rejects attempts to invalidate a stop based on its “aggressive” execution without a specific constitutional rule tying aggressiveness to illegality.
• Affirms intermediate-force leeway when danger is imminent: K-9 deployment and tackling can be reasonable in rapidly developing mental-health crises involving weapons and bystander risk, even when the subject is “walking away,” if the broader chronology supports immediate threat.
• Signals future doctrinal retrenchment possibilities under Title II: The concurrence provides a roadmap for defendants to argue that (i) Title II does not mandate accommodations absent intentional discrimination, and/or (ii) arrests are not covered “services, programs, or activities.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title II “reasonable accommodation”: A limited, feasible adjustment to a government policy that allows a disabled person meaningful access. It is not required if it would fundamentally change the activity or create serious safety risks.
• “Fundamental alteration” (28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i)): A change so significant it would transform the nature of the government function. The court treated officer and public safety as fundamental to high-risk detentions.
• Mental-health seizure: A Fourth Amendment seizure not aimed at investigating crime, but at taking a person for mental-health evaluation. It is permitted with probable cause the person poses a danger to self or others.
• Probable cause (Illinois v. Gates): Not certainty—an objectively reasonable belief that there is a substantial chance a dangerous condition exists.
• Qualified immunity (District of Columbia v. Wesby): Officers are protected unless they violated the Constitution and existing precedent made that unlawfulness “beyond debate.” Here, the court found no violation at all.
• Intermediate force: Force between minimal hands-on control and deadly force. The court treated a trained police dog as intermediate and generally non-deadly (Robinette v. Barnes).
• Policy vs Constitution: A department’s rules can be stricter than the Fourth Amendment; violating policy does not automatically mean violating the Constitution (Smith v. Freland).

5. Conclusion

Booth v. Lazzara affirms a safety-first boundary on disability-accommodation claims against police detention tactics: where officers have objective grounds to believe a mentally ill individual is armed and dangerous, courts in the Sixth Circuit may deem de-escalation-based accommodations unreasonable as a matter of law. The decision also strengthens Fourth Amendment doctrine allowing vehicle stops and measured intermediate force for mental-health seizures supported by probable cause of dangerousness, and it underscores that constitutional reasonableness is not pegged to departmental policy. Finally, Judge Murphy’s concurrence signals a possible future narrowing of Title II in the arrest context—either by questioning an implied accommodation requirement or by arguing arrests do not qualify as covered “services, programs, or activities.”