Safety-Based Union Discretion: Sixth Circuit Affirms No DFR Breach When Union Declines to Grieve Termination Based on Credible Workplace-Safety Concerns

Case: Thomas Schramm v. Neenah Paper Michigan, Inc. (United Steelworkers International, Appellee)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date: October 6, 2025
Panel: Chief Judge Sutton; Judges Stranch (author) and Ritz
Disposition: Affirmed (summary judgment for the union)

Note: The opinion is “Not Recommended for Publication,” limiting its precedential force but offering persuasive guidance within the Sixth Circuit.

Introduction

This appeal centers on the contours of a union’s duty of fair representation (DFR) when balancing the interests of a member facing discharge against the safety concerns of other employees. Thomas Schramm, a long-time employee and Fire Chief at Neenah Paper’s Munising, Michigan plant, sued the United Steelworkers International (USW) after the union declined to grieve his second termination—one predicated on reports that coworkers feared him and that he had referenced a “hit list.” The district court granted summary judgment to USW, finding no evidence of arbitrary or bad-faith conduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The opinion distills and applies well-settled DFR principles to a fact pattern involving alleged threats and safety anxieties. It clarifies that a union’s reasoned decision to forego a grievance—grounded in credible safety reports from both employer and union officials and reinforced by the member’s own statements—falls within the “wide range of reasonableness” and does not evince bad faith absent proof of improper motive or serious, material deception. It also emphasizes waiver rules: a new vicarious-liability theory raised only in a reply brief will not be considered.

Factual and Procedural Background

Key Facts

Schramm worked at Neenah since 1986; as of 2021, he was Fire Chief and a member of USW Local 2-96 (maintenance employees). USW negotiated the CBA for both Local 2-96 and Local 2-87 (production).
First termination (March 2021): Neenah terminated Schramm for reporting a chemical spill to a state agency, allegedly violating confidentiality. The union processed the grievance through Steps 1–2; at Step 3, USW staff representative Chris Haddock assumed the case. Before arbitration, Neenah reinstated Schramm with backpay (Settlement in Dec. 2021 setting a return-to-work date of Jan. 3, 2022), and the whistleblower lawsuit was dismissed.
Workplace tensions: During reinstatement discussions, local union officials (including Local 2-96 President Josh Trader and Local 2-87 President Michael Peters) relayed employee fears that Schramm maintained a list of five coworkers (including HR Director Kathy Hill and Plant Manager Brian Houghton) he wanted fired. Reports described Schramm as volatile and possibly violent. These concerns were communicated to Haddock, although the informants’ identities were not shared due to fear of retaliation.
Hill and other managers reported increasing safety concerns, including Schramm’s repeated calls/messages and inquiries into Hill’s whereabouts. Union and company officials circulated these concerns up their respective chains.
Second termination (Dec. 28, 2021): Neenah’s HR leadership (Howe, with corporate personnel) decided to terminate Schramm for violating workplace harassment/behavior policies—citing excessive communications and threats, including references to a “hit list.” On a call announcing the termination, Schramm acknowledged anger at five employees and said, regarding Hill, that Haddock “knows what’s in the wind when I come back to work,” a remark Haddock viewed as a threat.
Union’s decision: Despite telling Schramm he would file a grievance and an information request, Haddock ultimately declined to grieve. He cited: (1) credible reports of threatening behavior; (2) Schramm’s admission that he remained angry with five colleagues; and (3) the “in the wind” statement, which he reasonably interpreted as a threat. A post-termination extension request sent January 3 was denied January 5; the grievance deadline passed January 4 without filing.

Procedural History

Schramm sued Neenah and later added USW under Section 301 of the LMRA, alleging a hybrid claim: breach of the CBA by the employer and breach of DFR by the union. He settled with Neenah, leaving only the DFR claim against USW.
The district court granted summary judgment to USW, finding no triable issue on arbitrariness or bad faith. Schramm appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that USW did not breach its duty of fair representation by declining to grieve Schramm’s second termination. Applying the deferential “wide range of reasonableness” standard to arbitrariness and a motive-focused inquiry for bad faith, the court concluded that:

No arbitrariness: Haddock’s decision was rational and informed. He had multiple reports—from both employer and union sources—of safety concerns, which were corroborated by Schramm’s own statements on the termination call (including his acknowledgment that Hill feared him and his “in the wind” remark that reasonably read as a threat in context).
No bad faith: There was no substantial evidence of improper intent, purpose, or motive. Expressions of support to HR for prioritizing employee safety did not amount to collusion. Even assuming Haddock downplayed his prior knowledge of the termination on the call and stated he would grieve when he ultimately did not, those actions did not constitute the kind of serious, materially deceptive conduct tied to an improper motive that would establish bad faith.
Waiver of vicarious-liability theory: Schramm sought—only in his reply brief—to hold USW vicariously liable for conduct of local union officials. The court deemed the argument waived.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Foundational DFR case. A union must serve all members without hostility, in good faith, and avoid arbitrary conduct. A breach occurs if union conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991): Arbitrariness is judged against a “wide range of reasonableness.” Unions have room for discretionary judgment, even if mistaken.
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33 (1998): Reinforces deference to a union’s discretionary judgments; conduct is irrational if “without a rational basis or explanation.”
Merritt v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 613 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2010): A breach occurs if conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith; deference applies to arbitrariness, but not to bad faith inquiries.
Walk v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 958 F.2d 1323 (6th Cir. 1992): A union must undertake a reasonable investigation appropriate to the circumstances when defending a member against discipline.
Driver v. U.S. Postal Service, 328 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2003): The investigation must be independent; a union cannot simply accept the employer’s account and abandon a grievance without its own evaluation, but the scope is context-dependent.
Williams v. Molpus, 171 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1999), overruled in part on other grounds (Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 2012)): Discusses bad faith in context of alleged misrepresentations during negotiations; the opinion contrasts the serious, material misrepresentations there with the less consequential statements here.
Amalgamated Ass’n v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964): Bad faith requires “substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.”
Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967): Bad faith may be implied from “gross mistake or inaction,” but the threshold is high and context-specific.
Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co., 334 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2003): In a hybrid §301 suit, the employee must prevail on both the employer-breach and union-DFR prongs; failure on one is fatal.
Vencl v. IUOE, Local 18, 137 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 1998): Elements of a DFR claim (duty, breach, causation).
Alston v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 950, 998 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2021): A union may take reported threats seriously to protect other members; balancing competing interests is a legitimate union function.
Carr v. ALPA, 866 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 2017): Bad faith requires sufficiently egregious conduct.
Standards of review: King v. Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., 30 F.4th 551 (6th Cir. 2022) (summary judgment) and Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ., 974 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2020) (view evidence favorably to non-movant). The court also cites a recent Sixth Circuit decision, James v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. (2025), consistent with Vencl on DFR elements.

Legal Reasoning Applied

1) Arbitrariness: Rational, Informed Judgment within the “Wide Range of Reasonableness”

The arbitrariness inquiry asks whether the union’s decision was “wholly irrational,” not whether it was correct. The court emphasized:

Information base: Haddock had multiple, mutually reinforcing reports from both employer representatives (Hill, Howe) and union officials (Trader, Peters, Murk) that employees feared Schramm’s return and were “looking for places to hide.”
Corroboration by the grievant: On the termination call, Schramm admitted sustained anger at five coworkers, acknowledged Hill’s fear of him, and made the “in the wind” remark that a reasonable listener could construe as a threat—especially against the backdrop of reported safety concerns.
Contextual discretion: Even if Schramm meant no threat, the union’s decision is assessed for reasonableness based on information available at the time—not on Schramm’s subjective intent.
Investigation adequacy: A “reasonable” investigation is context-sensitive. Here, independent union sources (local officers) provided safety reports, and the grievant’s own statements aligned with the employer’s stated rationale. That combination gave the union adequate grounds to conclude a grievance lacked merit.

Given these circumstances, the decision not to grieve was not “wholly irrational.” The union had a rational basis to believe the grievance would fail—particularly at arbitration—and was entitled to deference on this discretionary judgment.

2) Bad Faith: No Substantial Evidence of Improper Motive or Serious, Material Deception

Bad faith requires proof of improper intent, purpose, or motive—for example, fraud, dishonesty, or intentionally misleading conduct—and the Sixth Circuit affords no deference on this element. Schramm advanced three theories; none sufficed:

“Inaction” and missed deadline: Standing alone, the failure to file the grievance by the tight contractual deadline is not bad faith where the union had by-then-conclusive reasons to conclude the grievance lacked merit. The union’s obligation is not to press every grievance, but to make a reasonable, good-faith judgment about its viability.
Perceived “support” for termination: Haddock’s expressions of support for HR’s safety-driven decision did not show improper motive. The union may, consistent with its DFR, prioritize the safety of the wider membership and balance competing interests. There was no evidence he participated in, or orchestrated, the termination decision; nor that his encouragement was rooted in animus or hostility toward Schramm.
Alleged misrepresentations during the termination call: Even assuming Haddock feigned surprise or told Schramm he would file a grievance when he ultimately did not, the court deemed any deception insufficiently serious or material to imply bad faith—especially absent evidence it served an improper motive. The record reflected fear for employee safety, which is a legitimate union concern—not an illegitimate purpose.

On this record, there was no “substantial evidence” of fraud or deceit evincing an improper motive, so summary judgment for the union was proper on bad faith.

3) Waiver of Vicarious-Liability Theory

Schramm argued—only in his reply brief—that USW could be held vicariously liable for the acts of Local 2-96 and Local 2-87 officials, or treated as indistinct from them. Because this theory was not raised in his opening brief, it was deemed waived. The court therefore confined its DFR analysis to the conduct of USW’s staff representative, Haddock.

Impact and Practical Implications

Key Takeaways

Safety concerns can be dispositive: Credible reports of threats—especially when echoed by union officials and reinforced by the grievant’s own words—provide a rational basis for a union to forego a grievance without breaching its DFR.
Investigation is contextual: The union’s duty is to conduct a “reasonable” and “independent” investigation, not an exhaustive one. Independent corroboration from union sources and the employee’s statements can satisfy this standard, even if some complainants remain unnamed due to fear of retaliation.
Bad faith requires more than inconsistency or poor communication: To establish bad faith, plaintiffs must show a serious, material deception tied to an improper motive (e.g., hostility, discrimination, or dishonesty aimed at securing an unfair outcome). Mere support for safety concerns, or even questionable candor on a call, will not suffice absent an improper purpose.
Preserve theories early: New theories (such as vicarious liability for locals) must appear in the opening brief. Raising them for the first time in a reply waives the argument.
Hybrid §301 vulnerability: Because hybrid claims require proof of both employer breach and union DFR breach, the failure of the DFR prong ends the case—even if the underlying discharge might otherwise be contestable.

Practice Pointers

For unions:
- Document safety reports, including the source (even if anonymized), timing, and specifics of the feared conduct; note cross-corroboration from union officials.
- Record contemporaneous assessments of the grievance’s prospects and the basis for declining to file, particularly when deadlines are short.
- Communicate candidly with grievants about viability assessments; avoid statements that may later be portrayed as material misrepresentations.
For employees and counsel:
- Avoid ambiguous or escalatory language—particularly references that could be construed as threats—while disputes are pending.
- Respond promptly to union inquiries and provide exculpatory evidence to enable a fuller investigation within grievance deadlines.
- Preserve all legal theories (including vicarious liability) in the opening appellate brief.

Likely Influence on Future Cases

DFR arbitrariness remains deferential: The opinion reinforces that courts will not second-guess unions’ discretionary judgments when grounded in a rational information base—especially in safety-charged environments.
Bad faith remains a high bar: Absent proof of improper motive and “substantial evidence” of serious dishonesty, courts are unlikely to infer bad faith from a union’s refusal to grieve or its supportive stance on safety.
Anonymity of complainants: While not squarely deciding the issue, the court’s acceptance of unnamed complainants (given fears of retaliation) suggests that unions may, in appropriate circumstances, rely on such reports alongside other corroboration.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): A union’s legal obligation to represent all bargaining-unit members fairly, honestly, and without discrimination. A breach occurs if the union acts arbitrarily (wholly irrationally), discriminatorily, or in bad faith (with improper motive).
Arbitrariness vs. Bad Faith: Arbitrariness asks whether the decision was rational and informed. Courts give unions deference here. Bad faith focuses on motive—did the union act with improper purpose or serious dishonesty? No deference applies to this motive analysis.
Hybrid §301 Claim: A two-part claim under the Labor Management Relations Act: the employee must show the employer breached the CBA and the union breached its DFR. Failure to prove either element defeats the claim.
Reasonable/Independent Investigation: The union must conduct a sensible investigation proportionate to the circumstances and cannot blindly accept the employer’s account. However, it need not exhaust every lead when credible, independent corroboration exists.
Summary Judgment: A pretrial ruling that one side wins as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Courts view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party but still require evidence sufficient to go to a jury on the governing standards.
“Not Recommended for Publication”: Signals that the decision is non-precedential within the circuit, though it can be cited for persuasive value.
Waiver on Appeal: Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally deemed waived and will not be considered.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s affirmance underscores the robust discretion unions have when evaluating whether to pursue a grievance, particularly where workplace safety concerns are credibly reported by multiple sources and reinforced by the grievant’s own statements. The court held that USW’s refusal to grieve Schramm’s second termination was neither arbitrary nor in bad faith: Haddock possessed sufficient, independent information to form a rational judgment that a grievance lacked merit, and no evidence showed an improper purpose or serious deception.

For unions, the opinion validates carefully documented, safety-driven case assessments and highlights the need for transparent communication. For employees, it is a cautionary tale: ambiguous remarks—especially those reasonably perceived as threatening—can be dispositive in the union’s calculus and in subsequent judicial review. Finally, appellate practitioners are reminded to preserve all theories in opening briefs; new arguments introduced in reply will be deemed waived.