Runey v. Faring: Reaffirming Certiorari-Only Review for Denials of Preliminary Injunctions and the Binding Force of Unappealed Judgments

Runey v. Faring: Reaffirming Certiorari-Only Review for Denials of Preliminary Injunctions and the Binding Force of Unappealed Judgments

Introduction

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision in Jeanette Runey v. Wayne S. Faring (No. 2024-201-Appeal) addresses a heated boundary dispute that spawned multiple Superior Court actions, cross-claims, and motions for injunctive relief. In this latest skirmish, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction compelling her neighbor to remove alleged encroachments from “Parcel 4,” property she contends was definitively awarded to her in a 2022 judgment. The Superior Court (the “motion justice”) denied the injunction, and Ms. Runey attempted a direct appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal, holding that:

  1. The denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewable only by petition for common-law certiorari, not by direct appeal (procedural holding); and
  2. Trial judges are bound by final, unappealed judgments and may not revisit those determinations under the guise of disagreement (substantive reminder on res judicata).

Although the Court ultimately declined to reach the merits because of the procedural misstep, its opinion provides a robust reminder of the jurisdictional boundaries between trial and appellate courts and the preclusive effect of final judgments.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court held that because Ms. Runey sought to challenge the denial of a preliminary injunction, the correct vehicle was a petition for writ of certiorari, not an appeal as of right.
2. Consequently, the appeal was denied and dismissed.
3. The Court nevertheless admonished the motion justice for openly disagreeing with—and effectively ignoring—the April 7, 2022 unappealed judgment that awarded Parcel 4 to Ms. Runey, stressing that the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion bar such relitigation.
4. Finally, the Court ruled that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal once it had been docketed at the Supreme Court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc., 112 A.3d 703 (R.I. 2015) – Denial of a preliminary injunction is not directly appealable; certiorari required.
  • Ciprian v. Providence School Board, 29 A.3d 1239 (R.I. 2011) – Same principle, cited as lead authority.
  • King v. Grand Chapter of R.I. Order of Eastern Star, 919 A.2d 991 (R.I. 2007); Gabriel v. Willis, 326 A.3d 172 (R.I. 2024); Finnimore & Fisher, Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham, 291 A.3d 977 (R.I. 2023) – Standards of review for the grant of preliminary injunctions.
  • Thompson v. Thompson, 973 A.2d 499 (R.I. 2009) – Trial-court jurisdiction ends once an appeal is docketed.
  • Apex Oil Co. v. State, 297 A.3d 96 (R.I. 2023); Mello v. Killeavy, 242 A.3d 53 (R.I. 2020) – Modern articulation of res judicata/claim preclusion.

Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdictional Misstep. The Court began with a straightforward application of the rule reiterated in Gianfrancesco and Ciprian: while the grant of a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable under G.L. 1956 § 9-24-7, the denial is not. Instead, a losing party must file a petition for common-law certiorari. Because Ms. Runey pursued a direct appeal, the Supreme Court had no choice but to dismiss.

2. Trial-Court Jurisdiction Post-Docketing. Relying on Thompson, the Court found error in the motion justice’s attempt to dismiss the appeal after the case appeared on the Supreme Court’s docket. Once docketed, the Superior Court’s jurisdiction terminates except for matters specifically allowed under Rule 62(b) or similar provisions.

3. Res Judicata and Trial-Court Deference. Although procedural posture prevented substantive review, the Supreme Court issued a pointed dicta admonition: the motion justice’s vocal disagreement with the 2022 judgment violated bedrock preclusion principles. Where the three familiar elements—(i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of issues, and (iii) a final judgment—are present, a subsequent trial-court judge cannot revisit or undermine that judgment.

Impact on Future Litigation

  • Clear Roadmap for Interlocutory Review. Litigants and counsel must channel challenges to denied injunctions through certiorari. Failure to do so delays relief and wastes resources.
  • Boundary-Dispute Litigation. Parties embroiled in serial property disputes are now on notice that once a declaratory judgment on title becomes final, further claims or defenses inconsistent with that judgment will likely be barred.
  • Trial-Court Discipline. The opinion underscores that personal disagreement with a colleague’s earlier final decision affords no license to disregard it. Superior Court judges must apply, not re-decide, settled judgments.
  • Appellate Process Integrity. The decision fortifies the jurisdictional handoff: once a matter is docketed, the trial court’s role is essentially custodial until remand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Preliminary Injunction – A temporary court order preventing a party from acting (or requiring action) during litigation to preserve the status quo.
  • Appeal vs. Certiorari – An appeal is a statutory right to higher-court review; certiorari is a discretionary writ the Supreme Court may grant to review certain non-final orders.
  • Res Judicata / Claim Preclusion – A doctrine that bars re-litigation of claims or issues that were, or could have been, raised in a prior action between the same parties that ended in a final judgment.
  • Jurisdiction Transfer – When an appeal is docketed, the trial court’s authority to take further action on the merits generally ends; only the appellate court may act until remand.
  • Adverse Possession – Gaining legal title to property by openly, continuously, and hostilely possessing it for the statutory period (typically 10 years in Rhode Island).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Runey v. Faring delivers two critical messages. First, procedural rigor matters: parties must use common-law certiorari—not direct appeal—to challenge the denial of a preliminary injunction. Second, the finality of judgments is sacrosanct; once a title dispute is resolved and unappealed, subsequent judges cannot re-litigate ownership because they “disagree.” Together, these holdings reinforce appellate-procedure orthodoxy and the stability of final judgments, ensuring predictability in Rhode Island’s civil litigation landscape.

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