Ruling on Cumulative Sentencing Enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2: No Double Counting for Strangulation and Life-Threatening Injury

1. Introduction

United States v. Theodore Ian Chavez, IV was decided April 1, 2025, by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chavez was convicted of assaulting his intimate partner by strangulation in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8) and § 1153. At sentencing, the district court increased his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) on two counts:

• A seven-level enhancement for “permanent or life-threatening bodily injury” under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(C).
• A three-level enhancement for “strangling” an intimate partner under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(4).

Chavez argued these two enhancements impermissibly “double-counted” the same conduct, since strangulation by definition creates a risk of permanent or life-threatening injury. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) the guideline text expressly authorizes cumulative application of those two specific offense characteristics, and (2) they do not meet the three-part test for impermissible double-counting under established Tenth Circuit precedent.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel unanimously affirmed the district court’s sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment. Applying plain-language principles of guideline interpretation, the court observed that U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b) explicitly caps—but does not prohibit—the cumulative application of enhancements under subdivisions (2), (3) and (4) so long as they do not exceed a total increase of 12 offense levels. Because Chavez’s combined increase (7 levels for life-threatening injury + 3 levels for strangulation = 10 levels) fell under the 12-level ceiling, the district court acted within the commission’s unambiguous directive. Moreover, the court applied the tripartite “double-counting” test from United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1999), and concluded that the enhancements address distinct aspects of a violent assault—one measuring injury severity, the other measuring the specific dangerous method against a protected victim—and thus do not impermissibly overlap in every conceivable application.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997): Guidelines must be applied according to their clear and unambiguous terms; if the text requires multiple uses of a factor, the court may not refuse to apply it.
• United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1999): Established the three-part test for impermissible double-counting (overlap, indistinctness, identical purpose).
• United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1999): Framed the de novo standard of review for double-counting claims preserved at sentencing.
• United States v. Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2003): Emphasized that double counting requires mutual implication of enhancements, not one-way overlap.
• United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2001): Clarified that overlapping enhancements must coincide in every conceivable scenario to trigger invalid double counting.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

1. Express Cumulative Directive: U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(4) provides that subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) may be aggregated but their total increase cannot exceed 12 levels. This explicit “cap” implies a legislative intent to permit concurrent enhancements rather than to forbid double-counting in these contexts.
2. Three-Part Rucker Test: Even if a cap did not exist, courts must ask whether the two enhancements:
   1. “necessarily overlap”—i.e., always co-occur;
   2. are “indistinct”—i.e., lack clear boundaries; and
   3. serve “identical purposes.”
   Here, the court held that:
   • Strangulation under (4) can occur without causing a permanent or life-threatening injury (e.g., attempted strangulation, non-serious injury). Conversely, a non-intimate-partner assault might cause life-threatening injury without implicating the intimate-partner enhancement under (4).
   • The injury-based enhancement (§ 2A2.2(b)(3)(C)) and the method/victim-based enhancement (§ 2A2.2(b)(4)) serve distinct purposes: evaluating injury severity versus punishing particular dangerous conduct against a protected class.

3.3 Impact

This decision provides important guidance for district courts and practitioners:

• It reaffirms that sentencing courts must follow the explicit text of the Guidelines, even when it results in what appears to be “double counting.”
• It clarifies the scope of the domestic violence-related enhancements in § 2A2.2, underscoring that a categorical cap controls rather than piecemeal restrictiveness.
• It strengthens the Rucker framework by illustrating its application and demonstrating that showing one enhancement overlaps with another in common cases is insufficient to invalidate cumulative application.
• Future appellants will face a high bar when challenging multiple “specific offense characteristic” enhancements based on allegations of double counting.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Sentencing Guidelines vs. Statutes: The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines operate like a detailed rulebook for calculating offense levels. When the guideline text is clear, judges must apply it literally, even if it seems to punish the same worst act more than once.

2. Base Offense Level & Specific Offense Characteristics (SOCs):

• Base Level: Starts with a baseline number (e.g., Level 14 for aggravated assault under § 2A2.2).
• SOCs: Loaded onto the base for aggravating factors (e.g., weapon use, injury severity, strangulation, obstruction). Each SOC adds specific levels up to a statutory or guideline cap.

3. “Double Counting” Test: Merely because two enhancements both relate to the same act does not make them double counting. They must always overlap, be indistinguishable in scope, and serve the same penal purpose. Showing overlap in one case is not enough.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Chavez reaffirms that sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 for life-threatening injury and for strangulation of an intimate partner may be applied cumulatively so long as their combined increase does not exceed the explicit 12-level cap. The Tenth Circuit’s methodical application of guideline plain-text rules and the Rucker double-counting test provides a roadmap for courts grappling with overlapping offense characteristics. Ultimately, this ruling bolsters the Guidelines’ internal coherence and ensures that particularly dangerous domestic violence conduct—strangulation compounded by grave injury—is met with fully calibrated punishment.