Rule 8018(a)(4) Notice Flexibility and “Consistently Dilatory Conduct” as Grounds to Dismiss a Bankruptcy Appeal

Introduction

2408 W. Kennedy, LLC v. Bank of Central Florida (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) addresses when a district court, sitting as an appellate court in a bankruptcy appeal, may dismiss an appeal for failure to timely file the appellant’s initial brief. The dispute began as an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, where 2408 West Kennedy, LLC (“Kennedy”) attempted to revive a foreclosed leasehold interest against Bank of Central Florida (the “Bank”).

The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the Bank on two independent bases—lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, claim/issue preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel)—and denied Kennedy leave to amend or supplement the record. Kennedy appealed those orders to the district court but repeatedly failed to meet briefing deadlines, even after multiple extensions and a final express warning that noncompliance could lead to dismissal. The district court dismissed the bankruptcy appeal, struck a late-filed brief, and denied rehearing. Kennedy then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The central issues on appeal were procedural: (1) whether the district court applied the correct standard for dismissing a bankruptcy appeal for failure to prosecute; (2) whether the notice requirement in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4) was satisfied and consistent with due process; and (3) whether the district court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court held that dismissal was warranted because Kennedy’s pattern of missed deadlines and inadequate explanations constituted “consistently dilatory conduct,” demonstrating negligence and indifference under Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy-appeal dismissal jurisprudence. The panel also held that Rule 8018(a)(4) did not require “notice” to be given only after a deadline is missed, and that the district court’s warning—coupled with a final, short extension—satisfied any notice requirement and did not violate due process. The court further concluded that Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) did not obligate the district court to provide a pre-dismissal opportunity to prove good cause or excusable neglect; rather, it conferred discretion to extend deadlines, which the district court exercised repeatedly. Finally, the panel found no clearly erroneous factual findings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) In re Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc., 531 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1976)

Role in the decision: The court treated In re Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc. as foundational authority for dismissing bankruptcy appeals for failure to prosecute and for the “obstinately dilatory conduct” framing. The opinion used Pyramid to rebut Kennedy’s argument that the district court failed to consider “other factors” beyond bad faith/negligence/indifference. The panel emphasized that Kennedy “waited until the last day to seek further time,” mirroring the conduct condemned in Pyramid.

Doctrinal point: In bankruptcy appellate practice, repeated delay—particularly last-minute extension requests and failure to heed prior indulgences—supports dismissal as a docket-management sanction.

2) In re Beverly Mfg. Corp., 778 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1985)

Role in the decision: In re Beverly Mfg. Corp. supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s operative standard: dismissal is proper upon a showing of “bad faith, negligence, or indifference” and is typical where the record shows “consistently dilatory conduct.” The panel applied this standard directly, holding Kennedy’s repeated missed deadlines and vague explanations evidenced negligence and indifference.

Practical effect: The court signaled that a pattern—rather than a single late filing—can satisfy Beverly, especially where warnings are given and extensions have already been granted.

3) In re Piazza, 719 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013)

Role in the decision: The opinion cited In re Piazza for the general abuse-of-discretion framework (wrong legal principle or clearly erroneous factfinding). It functions as the appellate lens through which the Eleventh Circuit assessed the district court’s case-management and sanction decision.

4) Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2004)

Role in the decision: Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla. was invoked to underscore the district court’s “managerial power” to control its docket. The panel used Young to reject the due-process framing of Kennedy’s notice argument and to support the district court’s authority to enforce deadlines after repeated extensions.

5) Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)

Role in the decision: Kennedy cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. for due process notice principles. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished it implicitly by concluding the warning and final extension constituted sufficient notice for a procedural dismissal in an ongoing case where counsel had actual awareness of deadlines and consequences.

6) Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, 771 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2014)

Role in the decision: Kennedy also invoked Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia as due-process support. The panel found it “not to the contrary,” reinforcing that due process does not prevent enforcement of clear deadlines, especially where prior extensions and explicit warnings were provided.

Legal Reasoning

• Rule-based obligation to timely brief: The court started with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a), which sets a default 30-day deadline to file the appellant’s brief after docketing notice that the record is transmitted, unless the district court sets different limits (which it did repeatedly).
• Dismissal authority for late briefing: Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4), if the appellant fails to file a brief on time, the district court may dismiss the appeal “after notice.” The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the rule as not prescribing when notice must occur (i.e., not requiring notice only after an actual missed deadline).
• “Notice” satisfied on these facts: Even if a post-default notice were required, the panel concluded the district court effectively provided it because, after earlier defaults/near-defaults, the court granted a final extension and warned dismissal could follow noncompliance. The key was that Kennedy had clear, case-specific warning and a final opportunity to comply.
• Conduct establishing negligence/indifference: The panel emphasized the sequence: multiple extensions over five months; a last-minute request without reasons; a final extension with an explicit warning; missing even the self-requested deadline; then filing late extension requests with vague explanations (“unable”) and only later an “unexpected issue related to his computer.” This pattern supported a finding of negligence and indifference under In re Beverly Mfg. Corp.
• Rule 6(b) does not create a pre-dismissal entitlement: Kennedy argued it was entitled to an opportunity to show good cause/excusable neglect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The panel rejected that framing: Rule 6(b) gives discretion to extend deadlines; it does not compel the court to keep extending or to hold a separate pre-dismissal proceeding where chronic noncompliance is shown.
• Post-dismissal consequences: Striking the late-filed brief and denying rehearing were treated as natural and non-abusive consequences once the appeal had been dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is significant in three practical ways for bankruptcy appellate practice in the Eleventh Circuit:

1. Reinforcement of dismissal risk after repeated extensions: The opinion underscores that multiple extensions do not create a safe harbor; rather, they may strengthen the case for dismissal once patience is exhausted and deadlines remain unmet.
2. Flexible understanding of Rule 8018(a)(4) “notice”: The court’s reading suggests “notice” is a functional requirement—aimed at fairness—rather than a rigid sequencing rule requiring a warning only after a missed deadline. A clear warning tied to a final deadline can satisfy the requirement.
3. Limited traction for “excusable neglect” arguments after chronic delay: The decision signals that vague, last-minute explanations (including generic statements about being “unable” to file or unspecified computer issues) may be insufficient, particularly where the record reflects a pattern of dilatory behavior.

The decision may be cited persuasively (where allowed) for the proposition that district courts retain broad discretion to dismiss bankruptcy appeals for failure to prosecute when the appellant exhibits repeated noncompliance and provides inadequate explanations, even if the court previously granted multiple extensions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adversary proceeding: A lawsuit within a bankruptcy case (e.g., to determine rights against a creditor), governed by procedural rules similar to civil litigation.
• Bankruptcy appeal to the district court: Many bankruptcy court orders are appealed first to the federal district court (or a bankruptcy appellate panel where available), which functions as an appellate tribunal.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to hear a type of dispute. If lacking, the court must dismiss regardless of the merits.
• Res judicata / collateral estoppel: Preclusion doctrines that can bar claims or issues previously litigated and resolved. (The Eleventh Circuit did not reach these merits barriers; the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.)
• Sua sponte: Action taken by the court on its own initiative, without a party’s motion (here, dismissal authority under Rule 8018(a)(4) after notice).
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. The appellant must show the lower court made a serious legal error (wrong rule) or a clear factual error, not merely that another outcome was possible.
• Excusable neglect: A recognized basis for extending deadlines in some contexts, typically requiring a concrete, credible explanation; it is not a guaranteed escape from dismissal after repeated, poorly explained delay.

Conclusion

2408 W. Kennedy, LLC v. Bank of Central Florida reaffirms that, in bankruptcy appeals, repeated failures to meet briefing deadlines—especially after multiple extensions and an explicit warning—support dismissal for failure to prosecute under the “bad faith, negligence, or indifference” standard articulated in In re Beverly Mfg. Corp. The opinion also clarifies that Rule 8018(a)(4)’s notice requirement is satisfied by practical, fair warning and does not hinge on a rigid “notice only after default” sequence. Ultimately, the decision strengthens district courts’ ability to manage bankruptcy appeal dockets and signals that chronic delay, paired with vague explanations, will rarely be tolerated.