Rule 74.06(b)(5) Relief Requires Equitable Change Beyond Doctrinal Shifts—and an Unvacated Declaration of Unconstitutionality Blocks Enforcement

1. Introduction

City of Normandy v. Kehoe (Supreme Court of Missouri, Apr. 15, 2025) arises from long-running litigation over portions of 2015’s Senate Bill No. 5 (“SB 5”), enacted to reform municipal courts and municipal governance after widely publicized concerns about municipal fine revenue and policing practices.

SB 5 imposed, among other requirements, (i) municipal court revenue caps for minor traffic violations under § 479.359.2, and (ii) minimum municipal standards (accounting transparency and police accreditation-related requirements) under § 67.287. Critically, both provisions were drafted to apply only to “any county with a charter form of government and with more than nine hundred fifty thousand inhabitants”, which—at enactment and in practice—meant St. Louis County and its municipalities.

In 2016, the circuit court entered a declaratory judgment holding these St. Louis County–limited provisions unconstitutional under the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition on local or special laws (Mo. Const. art. III, § 40) and issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement. This Court affirmed in City of Normandy I.

After this Court decided City of Aurora v. Spectra Communications Group, LLC (2019)—rejecting the “closed-ended/open-ended” framework and returning local-or-special-law challenges to a rational basis analysis—the State sought to lift the injunction via Rule 74.06(b)(5) (“no longer equitable”). In City of Normandy v. Parson (2022) (“City of Normandy II”), this Court held that a change in decisional law is “neither necessary nor sufficient” for Rule 74.06(b)(5) relief and remanded for an equitable weighing.

On remand, the circuit court denied the State’s motion. The State appealed again. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, clarifying (and in key respects tightening) the practical pathway for post-judgment attempts to revive enforcement of statutes previously declared unconstitutional.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the State’s Rule 74.06(b)(5) motion seeking relief from the injunctive portion of the 2016 judgment.
The Court rejected the State’s contention that it was a per se abuse of discretion to deny relief because, under City of Aurora, the SB 5 provisions would allegedly be constitutional.
The Court emphasized three decisive points:
1. Law of the case: City of Normandy II already foreclosed any rule that doctrinal change alone compels relief.
2. Equity-centered Rule 74.06(b)(5): finality is paramount; relief requires a concrete showing of inequity, not merely a belief the State would win today.
3. Independent barrier to enforcement: the 2016 declaratory judgment declaring the statutes unconstitutional remains in force, and the State did not seek relief from that declaration—so even lifting the injunction would not supply enforceable law.
The Court also upheld the circuit court’s denial of the State’s expansive discovery requests as within the trial court’s discretion.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The governing Rule 74.06(b)(5) framework and the primacy of equity

Henry v. Piatchek, 578 S.W.3d 374 (Mo. banc 2019): supplies the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and anchors the proposition that the ultimate “no longer equitable” assessment is committed to the trial court’s discretion.
Cox v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107 (Mo. banc 2015): provides the Court’s oft-used definition of “abuse of discretion,” emphasizing rulings that “shock the sense of justice.”
Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. v. Landolt, 661 S.W.3d 778 (Mo. banc 2023): reinforces the “very narrow exceptions” to finality and reiterates that, even with a legal change, Rule 74.06(b)(5) requires “a showing of inequity demonstrating the necessity” of modification or vacatur.
City of Normandy v. Parson, 643 S.W.3d 311 (Mo. banc 2022) (“City of Normandy II”): is treated as controlling “law of the case.” It holds: “[a] change in decisional law is neither necessary nor sufficient” for Rule 74.06(b)(5) relief and requires equitable balancing on remand.

B. “Law of the case” and finality as structural limits on relitigation

Am. Eagle Waste Indus., LLC v. St. Louis Cnty., 379 S.W.3d 813 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Williams v. Kimes, 25 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2000)): provides the “law of the case” rule barring relitigation of issues already decided in the same case.
Goldsmith v. M. Jackman & Sons, Inc., 327 F.2d 184-85 (10th Cir. 1964): quoted in City of Normandy II to emphasize the systemic need for litigation to end and rights to become certain.

C. The local-or-special-law doctrinal pivot and its limits in post-judgment procedure

City of Aurora v. Spectra Communications Group, LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764 (Mo. banc 2019): rejected the “closed-ended/open-ended dichotomy” and restored rational basis review for local/special law challenges. Importantly, this opinion reiterates (quoting City of Aurora) that the rational basis must support “the line drawn by the legislature” between included and excluded locations—not merely a general policy aim.
Jefferson County Fire Protection Districts Ass'n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866 (Mo. banc 2006), and City of St. Louis v. State, 382 S.W.3d 905 (Mo. banc 2012): are referenced as exemplars of the prior analytical approach the State litigated under in City of Normandy I.
City of Normandy I, 518 S.W.3d 183 (Mo. banc 2017): remains the operative merits judgment declaring the SB 5 provisions unconstitutional under Mo. Const. art. III, § 40. This case is pivotal because the State sought to undo only the injunction, not the declaration.

D. The legal effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality

State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 117 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. banc 1938), and Trout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. banc 2007): establish the Missouri rule that an unconstitutional statute “is no law,” confers no rights, and is void from enactment, not merely from the date of the judicial decision.
The Court contrasts this entrenched Missouri doctrine with academic criticism cited by the State (Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933 (2018)), while reaffirming Missouri’s longstanding approach.
Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S. 610 (2020) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)): referenced to echo the foundational principle that a legislative act contrary to the constitution “is not law.”
Armco Steel v. City of Kan. City, Mo., 883 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. banc 1994) (quoting State v. O'Malley, 117 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. banc 1938)): underscores that even a later constitutional amendment does not automatically “revive” a statute previously unconstitutional—absent express ratification/confirmation, the statute must be reenacted.

E. Remedy vs. right, and “correct result” appellate affirmance

LO NG Pharmacy Corp. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (E.D. Mo. 2024): cited for the proposition that injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent cause of action.
Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10 (Mo. banc 2003): supports affirmance on any ground supported by the record—here, the continuing effect of the unvacated declaratory judgment supplies an independent basis to affirm denial of relief from the injunction.

F. Federal Rule 60(b)(5) analogies and the Court’s differentiation

Building & Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 64 F.3d 880 (3d Cir. 1995): relied on heavily by the State as a federal analog for injunction modification factors under “no longer equitable.” The Court distinguishes it: those authorities address legal changes that directly legalize/prohibit the enjoined conduct; here, the “change” is an analytical shift, and the underlying declaration of unconstitutionality remains.

G. Discovery discretion and prejudice

State ex rel. Delmar Gardens N. Operating, LLC v. Gaertner, 239 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. banc 2007): confirms broad trial court discretion in discovery.
Rule 84.13(b): invoked to note reversal requires prejudicial error materially affecting the merits—something the State failed to show regarding discovery.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Threshold procedural constraint: “law of the case”
Because City of Normandy II already held doctrinal change is not, by itself, enough to justify Rule 74.06(b)(5) relief, the State could not repackage that claim as a “per se abuse of discretion” argument. The Court treats the matter as foreclosed, not merely unpersuasive.
Rule 74.06(b)(5) is equity-driven, not merits-driven
The Court re-centers the inquiry on equity and finality: Rule 74.06(b)(5) is a “narrow exception” to finality, and dissatisfaction with the original outcome—especially years later—does not convert the rule into a “do-over” mechanism. A change in decisional law may be relevant, but it cannot substitute for a concrete inequity showing.
The opinion’s most practically consequential move: the unvacated declaratory judgment blocks enforcement
The State sought only “Partial Relief” from the injunction, not from the 2016 declaration that the statutes violate Mo. Const. art. III, § 40. Under Missouri doctrine (State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley; Trout v. State), once declared unconstitutional, the statute is “no law.” Accordingly, even if the injunction were lifted, the State would still face a binding declaration that there is nothing to enforce. This functions as an independent, record-supported ground to affirm under Mo. Soybean Ass'n.
Equities as applied: the “lost grace periods” problem
The Court endorses the circuit court’s equitable concern that lifting the injunction nearly a decade later would effectively eliminate legislatively provided compliance periods in § 67.287.2 (three years for enumerated services; six years for accreditation/certification or contracting). The inequity is not framed as “they can’t comply,” but as “the remedy would reimpose duties immediately in a way the legislature expressly avoided.”
Separation-of-powers caution: courts should not retrofit statutory effective-date policy
The State proposed that courts could mitigate burdens by delaying the effective date of lifting the injunction for some statutory requirements. The Court rejects this as an improper judicial assumption of legislative policy-making (e.g., crafting delayed effective dates, grandfathering, safe harbors).
“Public interest” and federal-factor balancing does not overcome the structural defects in the State’s theory
The Court views the State’s reliance on Building & Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B. as mismatched: those cases contemplate injunctions regulating conduct that becomes lawful/unlawful due to substantive legal change. Here, by contrast, the injunction is “largely gratuitous” because it merely tracks the declaration that the statutes are void. The analytical shift in City of Aurora does not itself “make legal” what was declared unconstitutional in 2016.
Discovery denial upheld
The State’s sweeping, decade-late discovery requests were deemed not reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence for the equitable inquiry the State actually advanced (which rested on doctrinal change, not factual change). The Court also emphasizes lack of demonstrated prejudice under Rule 84.13(b).

3.3. Impact

Rule 74.06(b)(5) motions face heightened functional barriers when the underlying merits declaration remains intact.
The opinion signals that seeking to lift only an injunction—while leaving in place a declaration that a statute is unconstitutional—will often be strategically futile, because Missouri treats unconstitutional statutes as void ab initio and unenforceable.
Doctrinal change is demoted from “trigger” to “context”.
Even after City of Aurora, litigants cannot treat shifts in constitutional analysis as automatic grounds to reopen prospective judgments. The Court reinforces a finality-first posture: equity requires something beyond “we would win under today’s test.”
Institutional competence and separation of powers are explicit equity factors.
By refusing to craft delayed enforcement schemes, the Court narrows remedial creativity in post-judgment injunction modification and pushes the State toward legislative solutions (reenactment) rather than procedural reopening.
Practical roadmap the Court itself highlights: reenactment.
The opinion repeats City of Normandy II’s observation that the State’s recourse is reenactment: new legislation would not be governed by the 2016 judgment and could be defended under City of Aurora. This channels reform efforts back into the political branches.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Local or special law (Mo. Const. art. III, § 40): A constitutional limitation preventing the legislature from passing laws that single out particular localities or create special rules for some places without adequate justification. After City of Aurora v. Spectra Communications Group, LLC, the core question is whether there is a rational basis for the geographic line the legislature drew between who is covered and who is not.
Closed-ended/open-ended dichotomy: A prior method for evaluating whether a law’s classification was improperly “fixed” (closed-ended) or potentially expandable (open-ended). City of Aurora rejected this as the governing test.
Rule 74.06(b)(5): “no longer equitable”: A procedural rule allowing a court to relieve a party from a judgment with prospective effect (like an ongoing injunction) if continuing to apply it would be inequitable. It is not designed to relitigate old cases just because the law or legal reasoning has evolved.
Declaratory judgment vs. injunction: A declaratory judgment states what the law is (e.g., “this statute is unconstitutional”). An injunction is a remedy ordering or forbidding conduct (e.g., “the State may not enforce the statute”). This opinion emphasizes that if the declaration remains, lifting the injunction may not matter because Missouri treats unconstitutional statutes as void and unenforceable.
Law of the case: A doctrine preventing parties from re-arguing issues already decided earlier in the same case (especially after remand), promoting consistency and finality.

5. Conclusion

The Court’s decision reinforces a disciplined, finality-protective understanding of post-judgment relief: Rule 74.06(b)(5) turns on equity, not on whether a later case would change the merits analysis. It also adds a crucial practical clarification for constitutional litigation strategy in Missouri: where a judgment includes both a declaration of unconstitutionality and an injunction, seeking to lift only the injunction—while leaving the declaration intact—will not restore enforceability.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion harmonizes Missouri’s commitment to the finality of judgments (Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. v. Landolt) with the post-City of Aurora doctrinal shift, while steering governmental actors toward the constitutionally and institutionally appropriate remedy for changed legal climates: reenactment, not procedural end-runs around settled judgments.