Rule 67 Deposits, Mootness, and Prevailing-Party Fees: A Commentary on Cruz v. UIA (1st Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

Cruz v. Unión Independiente Auténtica de los Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (“Cruz v. UIA”), decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on December 3, 2025, sits at the intersection of three important strands of federal law:

• Post‑Janus public‑sector union fee litigation,
• The constitutional doctrine of mootness under Article III, and
• The “prevailing party” requirement for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The case arises from a Puerto Rico public employee’s attempt to resign from a union and stop paying union dues that he believed violated his First Amendment rights. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, the employer and the union changed course: they accepted his resignation, stopped withholding dues, and the union sought to pay him everything he claimed in damages—plus interest and nominal damages—by depositing the money into court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67.

The district court then dismissed the entire action as moot. On appeal, the central questions became:

• Whether the tender and deposit of full monetary relief mooted the plaintiff’s damages and declaratory claims, and
• Whether the unresolved issue of “prevailing party” attorneys’ fees could keep the case alive or at least required a merits determination.

The First Circuit’s opinion does not definitively resolve the relationship between complete monetary tender, mootness, and fee entitlement. Instead, it articulates a key procedural principle about how to read a district court’s final judgment (including a Rule 59(e) order), and then remands for further consideration of the attorneys’ fees dimension, expressly retaining appellate jurisdiction. This limited but important holding shapes how Rule 67 deposits and mootness will be handled in cases where fee-shifting statutes are in play.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Puerto Rico Labor Relations Act and the CBA

The Puerto Rico Labor Relations Act (“PRLA”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 61 et seq., authorizes public employers to enter into:

• “All-union” agreements that require all employees to be union members as a condition of employment, § 63(7); and
• “Maintenance of membership” agreements that require those who are union members at the time a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is executed to remain members as a condition of continued employment, § 63(8).

The PRLA also permits employers to deduct dues from employee wages where required by a CBA:

PRLA further allows employers to “deduct[] any sum of money” from employees' wages “for the payment of dues to a labor organization when . . . required by the terms of a collective bargaining contract.” Id. § 69(1)(b).

PRASA (the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority) and UIA (the union) entered into a 2011 CBA making UIA membership a condition of employment and mandating that PRASA withhold initiation fees and union dues from employees’ paychecks and remit them to UIA.

B. Cruz’s Employment and Attempted Resignation

Reynaldo Cruz began working for PRASA around 1992 and became a UIA member at the start of his employment. In 2016, he attempted to:

• Resign his membership in UIA, and
• Stop paying dues used for “political, ideological, and other nonbargaining expenditures,” while still conceding he could be required to pay amounts related to collective bargaining (so-called “fair-share” or “agency” fees).

He relied on the then‑controlling Supreme Court decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which allowed public employers to require non‑members to pay fair‑share fees limited to collective bargaining, but barred compelled support for political or ideological activities.

PRASA and UIA—acting under the CBA and PRLA—refused to recognize his resignation or limit his payments. PRASA continued to deduct full dues and remit them to UIA.

C. The Federal Lawsuit

In 2017, Cruz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District of Puerto Rico against:

• PRASA (his employer),
• UIA (the union), and
• The Governor of Puerto Rico in her official capacity (then‑governor and successors under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2)).

Cruz alleged that forcing continued union membership and dues deductions after his attempted resignation violated his First Amendment rights. He sought:

1. Declaratory relief that PRASA and UIA violated his federal constitutional rights;
2. Declaratory relief that the PRLA provisions and related CBA terms were unconstitutional as applied, for allowing compulsory union membership and dues payments post‑resignation;
3. A permanent injunction forbidding enforcement of those requirements;
4. Restitution and compensatory damages for dues deducted after his 2016 resignation, plus interest;
5. Nominal damages; and
6. Costs and attorneys’ fees.

PRASA, in turn, filed a cross‑claim against UIA under a CBA “hold-harmless” clause that purported to make UIA responsible for any monetary liability PRASA might incur for dues deducted under the CBA. That cross-claim was not before the First Circuit on appeal.

D. The Intervening Supreme Court Decision in Janus

While Cruz’s case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018), which:

• Overruled Abood, and
• Held that the First Amendment prohibits public employers from deducting any agency fees from nonconsenting employees, effectively requiring affirmative consent before any union dues or fees can be taken from public employees’ wages.

After Janus, the district court ordered the parties to show cause regarding the decision’s impact. The Governor conceded that the PRLA provisions at issue were unconstitutional under Janus and that Cruz was entitled to the relief he sought. PRASA likewise:

• Accepted Cruz’s resignation,
• Stopped withholding dues from his pay, and
• Expressed no objection to a prospective declaratory judgment mirroring Janus’s holding as applied to the PRLA provisions.

UIA and PRASA nonetheless took the position that Janus did not fully resolve Cruz’s claims. UIA was particularly resistant to any ruling that might expose it to damages or attorneys’ fees.

E. The Rule 67 Deposit and the District Court’s Mootness Ruling

Cruz moved for summary judgment, itemizing his damages as $525 in post‑resignation dues plus interest. In response, UIA filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67 seeking permission to deposit with the court:

• $525 (the dues),
• $94.68 in interest, and
• $1 in nominal damages.

UIA described this as a “tender payment” but made the deposit request:

“with a full and explicit reservation of [UIA’s] rights and without prejudice to all [of] UIA’s defenses and claims.”

UIA and PRASA both opposed Cruz’s motion for summary judgment. They argued that his claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because:

• Cruz’s resignation had been recognized, and
• Dues deductions had ceased after Janus.

UIA alone went further, contending that Cruz’s damages claim was also moot because the Rule 67 deposit fully satisfied his monetary demands.

The district court initially denied UIA’s Rule 67 motion because the proposed deposit was not unconditional. It invited UIA to refile an unconditional deposit, and when UIA did not initially respond, the court ordered UIA to state whether it had:

“unconditionally tendered plaintiff a check . . . plus interest, or intends to unconditionally deposit with the court a check in that amount.”

In response, UIA deposited the funds with the court complying with the court’s direction for an unconditional deposit. The district court then:

• Held that Cruz’s claims for prospective relief were moot because the unconstitutional practices had ceased and he was no longer affected, and
• Concluded that his damages claim was effectively moot in light of UIA’s deposit of the full amount of dues and interest.

The court acknowledged the general rule that “a claim for damages will keep a case from becoming moot,” but treated the deposit as satisfying that claim and dismissed the action.

F. The Rule 59(e) Motion and “Money Is [Cruz’s] for the Asking”

Cruz moved to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). He argued that:

• Without a declaratory judgment or other explicit adjudication of his entitlement to relief,
• He could not access the funds deposited by UIA in the court registry.

He asked the district court to enter a declaratory judgment adjudicating his legal claims and his entitlement to the deposited funds. The court denied the motion, stating that:

UIA had “deposited the money that plaintiff requested” and “the money is [Cruz’s] for the asking.”

No further merits determination was made. This phrase—“for the asking”—became central on appeal.

G. The Appeal

On appeal, Cruz sought:

1. Vacatur of the Rule 67 order permitting deposit,
2. Vacatur of the mootness dismissal, and
3. A directive that the district court grant his summary judgment motion and enter declaratory and monetary relief.

He did not contest that his claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief had become moot. Instead, he argued that:

• His claims for monetary relief and for a declaratory judgment regarding past conduct were not moot, because no judgment explicitly adjudicated his legal entitlement to that relief or to the funds in the registry, and
• Without such an adjudication, he would potentially be unable to claim “prevailing party” status and seek attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

An additional appellate issue was whether Cruz had waived the attorneys’ fees–related mootness argument by not developing it more fully in his initial briefing.

III. Summary of the First Circuit’s Opinion

A. Prospective Relief: Mootness Conceded

The First Circuit accepted, without detailed discussion, that Cruz’s claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. After Janus:

• Cruz had successfully resigned from UIA,
• Dues were no longer being deducted from his wages, and
• The PRLA provisions were no longer being enforced against him.

Accordingly, there was no live controversy over future conduct warranting a forward‑looking injunction or declaration.

B. Monetary Relief: The District Court’s Ruling as an Entitlement Judgment

The First Circuit rejected Cruz’s assertion that his damages and retrospective declaratory claims were not moot due to the lack of a judgment adjudicating his entitlement to the deposited funds. Relying on the rule that a ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion merges into the original judgment, the court held:

• The district court’s statement in the Rule 59(e) order—that the money was “[Cruz’s] for the asking”—must be read as part of the final judgment, and
• That statement is properly understood as a determination that Cruz is legally entitled to the funds in the court registry.

Thus, the court concluded, Cruz’s premise that no judgment entitled him to the funds was “mistaken” because “the judgment in his case does entitle him to it.”

C. Attorneys’ Fees and Prevailing Party Status: No Waiver, But No Ruling (Yet)

At oral argument, Cruz reframed his position: even if he is entitled to the funds, he argued, the case is not moot because he may be unable to obtain attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” unless the district court explicitly finds that his First Amendment rights were violated.

Defendants suggested that this argument had been waived on appeal. The First Circuit disagreed, noting that Cruz had:

• Argued below that UIA was misusing Rule 67 “to evade liability and entry of judgment,” thereby “depriving him of the opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees,” and
• Cited Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and the Third Circuit’s decision in Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th 111 (3d Cir. 2023), in support of this position.

Although the argument was “admittedly limited,” the court found it sufficient to avoid appellate waiver.

However, the district court had not addressed the relationship between prevailing‑party status, attorneys’ fees, and mootness. The First Circuit therefore did not decide whether the unresolved fee claim or the need for a merits determination affects mootness. Instead, it:

• Remanded to the district court to consider the attorneys’ fees–related ground for challenging the mootness dismissal “in the first instance,”
• Left open the question of whether any such argument had been waived at the district court level, and
• Retained jurisdiction over the appeal during this limited remand.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Abood and Janus: The Constitutional Backdrop

1. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)

Abood permitted public‑sector employers to require non‑members to pay agency fees to cover collective bargaining and contract administration, while forbidding compelled support for political or ideological activities. Cruz’s initial legal position—resignation plus continued payment only for core bargaining costs—was crafted under Abood.

2. Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018)

Janus overruled Abood and held that:

• Any compelled payment of agency fees by nonconsenting public employees violates the First Amendment, and
• Affirmative consent is required for deductions.

In Cruz, Janus is the seismic event that:

• Prompted the Governor to concede the unconstitutionality of the PRLA provisions,
• Led PRASA to accept the resignation and cease deductions, and
• Erased any ongoing controversy over future implementation of those statutory and contractual provisions, thereby mooting the prospective relief claims.

B. Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67

Rule 67 allows a party, by leave of court, to deposit with the court “all or part of the money or thing” when “any part of the relief sought is a money judgment or the disposition of a sum of money.” Funds deposited under Rule 67 are then held in the court’s registry and can be withdrawn only under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041 and 2042.

Here:

• UIA attempted to use Rule 67 to “tender” full satisfaction of Cruz’s damages and nominal damages claims,
• Initially, the district court rejected the motion because of UIA’s reservation‑of‑rights language,
• The court then signaled that an unconditional tender or deposit could be acceptable, and
• UIA ultimately complied with an unconditional deposit.

The First Circuit does not analyze Rule 67 in depth, but the operation of Rule 67 is integral to the mootness question and the controversy over whether UIA was trying to “buy its way out” of a judgment and attorneys’ fees.

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

Rule 59(e) permits a party to move to “alter or amend a judgment” within 28 days of its entry. Cruz used this rule to seek:

• A declaratory judgment explicitly adjudicating his constitutional claims, and
• A ruling clarifying his entitlement to the funds on deposit.

The district court’s denial of this motion—specifically the statement that the money was “for the asking”—was crucial to the First Circuit’s conclusion that a judgment on entitlement existed.

3. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2)

Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) governs automatic substitution of public officers in their official capacities when the officeholder changes. The caption here reflects successive automatic substitutions—from Governor Rosselló Nevares to Pierluisi-Urrutia, and then to González-Colón. This rule, while procedural, underscores that the Governor was sued only in an official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief.

C. Mootness and Judgment Merger

1. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020)

Banister provides the key rule that “the ruling on [a] Rule 59(e) motion merges with the prior determination, so that the reviewing court takes up only one judgment.” In Cruz, this principle allows the First Circuit to treat the original judgment and the later Rule 59(e) order as a single integrated judgment for appellate purposes.

That merger is what makes the district court’s language in the Rule 59(e) ruling—“the money is [Cruz’s] for the asking”—legally operative as part of the final judgment, and thus sufficient to constitute a determination of entitlement.

2. Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443 (2025)

Rivers is cited alongside Banister for the same merger proposition. The opinion does not elaborate on Rivers beyond that, and the First Circuit simply uses the pair of Supreme Court citations to underscore that only one judgment is before it—the original judgment as modified or illuminated by the Rule 59(e) order.

D. Appellate Practice, Waiver, and “Subordinate Findings”

1. Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1998)

Field is cited for the proposition that a party who has “secured a favorable judgment” ordinarily has “no reason to contest” the district court’s “subordinate findings” on appeal. In Cruz, the First Circuit suggests that once Cruz has a favorable judgment entitling him to the monetary relief he requested, he might typically have no basis to appeal the legal reasoning that accompanied that outcome.

Nonetheless, because Cruz ties his challenge to the judgment’s legal characterization (violation of constitutional rights) to his ability to recover attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party, the court does not dismiss his appeal on this ground alone.

2. United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2009)

Dunbar addresses waiver on appeal. The First Circuit relies on it for the proposition that an argument is not waived where the appellant has identified relevant facts and cited supporting case law, even if the argument is underdeveloped.

Applying this standard, the court holds that Cruz did not waive his attorneys’ fees–related mootness argument because he:

• Argued that UIA’s use of Rule 67 was an effort to evade a merits judgment and associated fee liability, and
• Cited Buckhannon and Lutter in support.

E. Attorneys’ Fees and “Prevailing Party” Status

1. Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)

Buckhannon rejected the “catalyst theory” of fee awards and held that to be a “prevailing party” under fee‑shifting statutes, a plaintiff must obtain a:

• Judicially sanctioned material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,
• Such as a judgment on the merits or a court‑ordered consent decree.

Voluntary changes in the defendant’s conduct—without such judicial imprimatur—do not suffice. In Cruz, Buckhannon is central to Cruz’s concern that:

• If UIA can moot the case by voluntarily depositing funds without a formal finding of liability or constitutional violation,
• He may lose any basis for claiming prevailing‑party status and thus for recovering attorneys’ fees under § 1988.

2. Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th 111 (3d Cir. 2023)

In Lutter, the Third Circuit cautioned that:

“[W]here a live controversy remains, a defendant who would otherwise be liable for attorney’s fees should not be able to wiggle out on the basis of a spurious claim of mootness.”

Cruz cited this language to argue that UIA was attempting to “wiggle out” of fee exposure by invoking mootness based on its own voluntary tender and Rule 67 deposit, without allowing a merits adjudication of the underlying constitutional violation.

The First Circuit does not endorse or reject Lutter’s approach; instead, it highlights Cruz’s reliance on it as sufficient to preserve his argument for further consideration by the district court.

V. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

A. Mootness and Complete Relief

Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts may only adjudicate live “cases” or “controversies.” A case becomes moot when:

• The parties no longer have a cognizable interest in the outcome, or
• The court can no longer grant any effectual relief to the plaintiff.

Ordinarily, as the district court recognized, an unresolved claim for monetary relief prevents mootness even if prospective relief is no longer necessary. Here, however, the key question was whether UIA’s full and unconditional deposit of damages, interest, and nominal damages extinguished any live controversy over monetary relief.

The First Circuit effectively answers that question in the affirmative if the deposit is accompanied by a judgment entitling the plaintiff to those funds. The court’s logic:

1. UIA deposited sufficient funds in court, under Rule 67, to satisfy Cruz’s claimed monetary relief.
2. The district court, in its Rule 59(e) ruling, stated that the money was “[Cruz’s] for the asking.”
3. Under Banister (and Rivers), this ruling merges with the original judgment, meaning:
   • There is a single final judgment, and
   • That judgment should be read as determining that Cruz is entitled to the deposited funds.
4. Because Cruz has a judgment entitling him to all the monetary relief he sought, and no prospective relief remains necessary, his damages claim is—absent the fee issue—moot.

Importantly, the First Circuit does not hold that a bare Rule 67 deposit, without a judicial ruling on entitlement, moots a damages claim. Instead, it anchors mootness in the existence of a judgment that can be read (via merger) to confer legal entitlement to the funds.

B. Interpreting the Phrase “For the Asking” as a Judgment on Entitlement

Cruz’s core appellate argument was that, because no explicit judgment awarded him damages or declared defendants’ liability, he lacked the judicially sanctioned relief necessary to:

• Access the funds in the registry, and
• Claim prevailing‑party status under § 1988.

The First Circuit responds by construing the district court’s language generously. When the court said that “the money is [Cruz’s] for the asking,” it effectively:

• Resolved any dispute over whether Cruz could claim those funds, and
• Recognized that UIA’s deposit fully satisfied his monetary entitlement as pleaded.

Combined with the earlier dismissal of claims as moot and the fact that no one else claimed an interest in the funds, this phrasing is treated as equivalent to a declaratory ruling that Cruz is entitled to the deposited sums. The First Circuit thus reads the district court’s ruling as a merits‑based conclusion that the funds belong to Cruz.

This interpretive move is subtle but significant. It protects plaintiffs from being left with an “empty” dismissal that neither awards them money nor clarifies their entitlement, while at the same time preventing litigants from manufacturing a jurisdictional defect by insisting there is no judgment where the court’s language reasonably provides one.

C. Appellate Waiver and the Scope of the Remand

Defendants argued that Cruz had waived his attorneys’ fees–based challenge to mootness by not squarely arguing, before the district court, that fee entitlement prevented the case from becoming moot. The First Circuit disagrees, for two related reasons:

1. In opposing UIA’s use of Rule 67, Cruz expressly argued that Rule 67 was being misused:
   • To evade a merits judgment, and
   • To deprive him of the opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees.
2. He supported this argument with citations to Buckhannon and Lutter, demonstrating awareness of the prevailing‑party standard and the risk of “spurious mootness.”

Under Dunbar, this is sufficient to preserve an argument for appellate consideration, even if the argument was not elaborately developed below. The court thus holds there is no appellate waiver.

At the same time, the First Circuit does not itself decide:

• Whether Cruz preserved this argument adequately in the district court, or
• Whether, as a matter of law, entitlement to attorneys’ fees can keep the case alive or require a merits determination on the constitutional violation.

Instead, the court remands:

“for consideration of this ground for challenging [the] dismissal of the claims based on their being moot, insofar as it determines that any such basis for challenging the dismissal has not been waived.”

In other words, the district court must decide in the first instance:

• Whether Cruz’s interest in recovering attorneys’ fees under § 1988, and his need for a merits judgment to support prevailing‑party status, prevent his claims from being moot, and
• Whether any failure to more fully articulate that theory below constitutes waiver at the trial level.

The First Circuit retains jurisdiction over the appeal, indicating a limited remand designed to clarify the mootness and fee issues before a final appellate disposition.

D. Prevailing Party Status, Attorneys’ Fees, and Mootness

The opinion acknowledges, but does not resolve, a complex doctrinal question: does the existence of a potential claim for attorneys’ fees—and the need for a merits judgment to qualify as a prevailing party—affect whether a case is moot?

Several layers of doctrine intersect here:

• Buckhannon’s requirement of a “judicially sanctioned” change in the parties’ legal relationship, such as a judgment on the merits or a consent decree, for prevailing‑party status.
• The practice of defendants unilaterally ceasing challenged conduct and offering full relief to the named plaintiff to avoid a merits ruling and potential fee liability.
• Decisions like Lutter cautioning that “spurious” mootness claims should not be allowed to shield defendants from fee exposure where a live controversy truly remains.

In Cruz, UIA essentially tried to:

1. Depose all monetary claims via Rule 67, and
2. Argue that the combination of full tender and cessation of challenged conduct left no live issue for the court to decide, thereby forcing dismissal without a merits ruling on the constitutional question and without a clear path to fee recovery for Cruz.

Cruz counters that:

• Without a judgment explicitly stating that his First Amendment rights were violated,
• He may be unable to show he is a prevailing party under § 1988, and
• UIA’s strategy is precisely the kind of “wiggling out” Lutter warns against.

Rather than resolve this tension, the First Circuit emphasizes procedural regularity: the district court should confront and analyze these arguments before the appellate court weighs in. This approach respects the district court’s role as the primary fact‑finder and initial interpreter of fee‑related issues, especially where the record might need further development.

E. Limited Remand with Retained Jurisdiction

The panel’s decision to remand while retaining jurisdiction reflects a cautious and efficient strategy. It allows:

• The district court to address a discrete legal question (the impact of fees and prevailing‑party status on mootness),
• The appellate case to remain open, avoiding the need for a new notice of appeal, and
• The First Circuit to quickly review and integrate the district court’s findings into a final appellate disposition.

This kind of limited remand is particularly useful where the appellate court has already resolved part of the dispute (here, the interpretation of the existing judgment and the mootness of prospective relief), but needs the district court’s views on a connected but underdeveloped issue (here, fee‑driven arguments about mootness and waiver).

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Mootness

Mootness asks whether there is still something meaningful for a court to do in a case. Even if there was a genuine controversy when the case began, it can become moot if:

• The plaintiff has already received all the relief the court could provide, or
• Events have made it impossible for the court to grant effective relief.

Example: If a student sues a school over a disciplinary suspension but graduates while the case is pending, and there is no damages claim, the case may become moot because the suspension no longer affects the student and there is no relief the court can realistically order.

In Cruz, the forward‑looking claims (to stop dues deductions and invalidate the PRLA provisions prospectively) became moot once:

• Cruz’s resignation was recognized, and
• Dues deductions ceased in compliance with Janus.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67: Deposits into Court

Rule 67 lets a party pay money into the court’s registry instead of paying it directly to another party, in order to:

• Protect the depositor from multiple or conflicting claims, or
• Preserve disputed funds while the court decides who is entitled to them.

A key point in Cruz is that a Rule 67 deposit alone does not automatically resolve who is entitled to the money. There must be a:

• Judicial determination of entitlement, or
• Agreement of the parties.

The district court’s initial refusal to allow a deposit “with reservation of rights” underscores that a deposit intended to moot a claim must be unconditional: it cannot be used to force the plaintiff to accept money while leaving legal issues unresolved in a way that prejudices the plaintiff’s rights.

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e): Altering or Amending a Judgment

Rule 59(e) allows a party to ask the district court to:

• Correct clear legal or factual errors,
• Consider newly discovered evidence, or
• Clarify or amend its judgment.

Cruz used Rule 59(e) to seek a formal declaration that he was entitled to the funds and that his rights had been violated. The district court’s brief response—“the money is [Cruz’s] for the asking”—became part of the final judgment by virtue of the merger doctrine recognized in Banister.

D. “Prevailing Party” and Attorneys’ Fees under § 1988

Many civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allow courts to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to the “prevailing party.” Under Buckhannon, to be a prevailing party, a plaintiff must:

• Obtain a court‑ordered material change in the legal relationship between the parties—such as a judgment on the merits or a consent decree—not just voluntary changes in the defendant’s behavior.

This matters because civil rights litigation is often costly, and fee‑shifting is a major incentive for private enforcement of constitutional rights. Plaintiffs rely on a formal judicial recognition of their rights to recover fees.

In Cruz, the concern is that:

• If the case is dismissed as moot after a unilateral deposit, without a merits ruling, Cruz may not qualify as a “prevailing party” even though his First Amendment rights were arguably vindicated in practice.

E. Waiver

Waiver in appellate practice generally means that a party has lost the right to raise an issue on appeal by failing to:

• Raise it in the trial court, or
• Develop it adequately in its appellate briefs.

The First Circuit distinguishes between:

• Appellate waiver (whether the argument can be raised on appeal at all), and
• Trial‑level waiver or forfeiture (whether the argument can be considered because it was or was not properly presented to the district court).

The court finds no appellate waiver—since Cruz did point to fee‑related concerns and cited relevant case law—but leaves to the district court the question whether he adequately preserved those issues at the trial level.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Public-Sector Union Litigation After Janus

Cruz is part of a broader wave of litigation challenging pre‑Janus union‑dues arrangements in the public sector. These cases often:

• Seek damages or restitution for dues collected prior to Janus, and
• Raise complex questions about retroactivity, “good faith” defenses, and fee‑shifting.

Although the First Circuit’s opinion is narrow and procedural, it shows how Janus has effectively mooted most forward‑looking challenges (once defendants cease contested practices), leaving only retrospective monetary and fee issues to litigate.

B. The Use of Rule 67 Deposits to Moot Damages Claims

The decision underscores a delicate balance regarding Rule 67:

• On one hand, defendants are permitted to deposit funds in court to satisfy a plaintiff’s monetary demands, and if a court then enters a judgment recognizing the plaintiff’s entitlement to those funds, the damages claim may become moot.
• On the other hand, Rule 67 cannot be used as a tool to unilaterally end litigation in a way that strips plaintiffs of the judicial determinations necessary to recover attorneys’ fees or to secure a formal vindication of their rights.

The First Circuit’s reading of the district court’s “for the asking” language illustrates how courts may try to ensure that a deposit results in a genuine, judicially sanctioned entitlement—not a procedural sleight‑of‑hand.

C. Precision in Drafting Judgments and Orders

The case highlights the importance of clarity in district court judgments. A few words in a Rule 59(e) order—“the money is [Cruz’s] for the asking”—became controlling for:

• Whether damages were effectively awarded and thus moot, and
• Whether Cruz could argue that he had obtained judicial relief sufficient for prevailing‑party status.

Going forward, district courts dealing with Rule 67 deposits and mootness should:

• Clearly state whether the plaintiff is legally entitled to the funds on deposit, and
• Explicitly address whether the defendant’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights, so as to avoid ambiguity over prevailing‑party status and fee eligibility.

D. Attorneys’ Fees as a Check on “Spurious” Mootness

Although the First Circuit does not decide whether a live dispute over fee entitlement can defeat mootness, Cruz brings this issue into sharper relief. The concern, reflected in Lutter and in Cruz’s arguments, is that:

• Defendants may use voluntary cessation and belated payments to sidestep unfavorable precedent and avoid paying attorneys’ fees, thereby undercutting the deterrent and compensatory function of civil rights fee‑shifting.

By remanding for further consideration, the First Circuit signals that:

• The interplay between mootness and prevailing‑party status is a live and important doctrinal issue,
• Defendants cannot simply assume that tendering money ends all controversy, and
• District courts must carefully assess whether a case has truly become moot or whether fee‑related interests keep a genuine dispute alive.

E. Litigation Strategy Implications

For plaintiffs in civil rights and union‑dues cases:

• It is crucial to raise the connection between merits determinations, prevailing‑party status, and fee entitlement early and explicitly.
• When defendants tender full monetary relief, plaintiffs should consider whether to:
  • Accept the funds while preserving arguments for a merits judgment, or
  • Contest mootness on the ground that unresolved legal issues and fee claims remain.

For defendants (public employers and unions):

• Rule 67 deposits and unconditional tenders remain a viable tool for resolving damages claims, but courts may scrutinize attempts to pair these tenders with mootness arguments that would deprive plaintiffs of fee recovery.
• Defendants should anticipate that courts may either:
  • Interpret their actions as conferring prevailing‑party status on plaintiffs, or
  • Require a merits ruling where necessary to prevent “spurious” mootness.

VIII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Cruz v. UIA establishes and reinforces several important procedural and doctrinal points:

1. Merger of Judgments: When a district court rules on a Rule 59(e) motion, that ruling merges with the original judgment into a single final judgment. Language in a Rule 59(e) order—such as “the money is [Cruz’s] for the asking”—can therefore operate as a binding determination of entitlement to relief.
2. Mootness After Complete Tender: A fully satisfied damages claim can be moot where the court’s judgment clearly entitles the plaintiff to the tendered funds and no prospective relief remains necessary. A Rule 67 deposit, coupled with such a judgment, may extinguish the live controversy over damages.
3. Appellate Waiver Is Narrowly Construed: Even limited arguments and citations to relevant authorities (e.g., Buckhannon and Lutter) can be sufficient to preserve complex issues—such as the relationship between fee entitlement and mootness—for appellate review.
4. Attorneys’ Fees and Mootness Remain Intertwined: The First Circuit acknowledges, but does not yet resolve, whether an unresolved claim to prevailing‑party attorneys’ fees can prevent a case from becoming moot when damages have been tendered and prospective relief is no longer needed. This question is remanded to the district court for further consideration.
5. Care in Using Rule 67: Courts and litigants must use Rule 67 carefully. Deposits intended to moot monetary claims must be unconditional and coupled with clear judicial determinations to avoid procedural maneuvers that undermine plaintiffs’ rights, particularly in fee‑shifting contexts.

In the larger landscape of post‑Janus union‑dues litigation and civil rights enforcement, Cruz v. UIA is not a sweeping constitutional decision, but it meaningfully clarifies how federal courts should treat tenders of complete relief, Rule 67 deposits, and the residual issue of attorneys’ fees. Its limited remand underscores that courts must confront the incentives and fairness concerns surrounding mootness and fee‑shifting, rather than allowing unilateral defendant actions to quietly erase the judicial role in declaring and vindicating constitutional rights.