Rule 61 Applied As of Filing Date: Limits on Successive Postconviction Motions (Washington v. State)

Introduction

Washington v. State, decided April 22, 2025 by the Supreme Court of Delaware, addresses the procedural requirements for filing successive motions for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The appellant, LeShawn Washington, was convicted after a 2011 bowling-alley shooting and, after exhausting direct appeal and his first Rule 61 motion, filed a second motion in August 2022. He claimed violations of Brady v. Maryland, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of various counsel, and actual innocence based on new affidavits and recantations. The Superior Court dismissed his second motion as procedurally barred under the version of Rule 61 in effect at filing, and this Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Delaware held:

The version of Rule 61 in effect at the time a successive motion is filed governs adjudication of that motion.
The 2014 amendments to Rule 61, which narrowed procedural exceptions, had been clearly established long before Washington’s 2022 filing and did not violate due process or equal protection.
Federal habeas decisions such as Martinez v. Ryan and Bronshtein v. Horn do not excuse compliance with state-court procedural bars in successive Rule 61 motions.
The narrow exceptions for actual innocence or retroactive constitutional rules require new, non-cumulative evidence that probably would change the outcome—Washington’s affidavits and recantations failed to meet that standard.
His motions to compel discovery and for an evidentiary hearing lacked the “good cause” and substantive basis required under Rule 61.
The Superior Court’s summary dismissal of Washington’s second postconviction motion was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Washington v. State, 2013 WL 961561 (Del. Mar. 12, 2013) – This Court’s prior opinion on the facts of the bowling alley shooting and Washington’s direct appeal and first postconviction motion.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) – Recognized in federal habeas law only that inadequate postconviction counsel may excuse procedural default of a trial-level ineffectiveness claim; it does not override state procedural bars for successive motions.
Burroughs v. State, 2014 WL 1515102 (Del. Apr. 16, 2014) – A narrow remand for new counsel after postconviction counsel’s admitted ineffectiveness pre-June 2014 amendments. Distinguished on its unique facts and party stipulation to pre-amendment Rule 61.
Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005) – A federal habeas time-bar case under Pennsylvania law, inapplicable to Delaware’s Rule 61 amendments.
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811 (Del. 2013) – Affirmed that Rule 61 is intended to correct trial errors, not to permit unlimited collateral relitigation.

Legal Reasoning

1. Version of Rule 61 Governs by Filing Date. This Court reaffirmed that “a motion for postconviction relief is to be adjudicated in accordance with Rule 61 as it exists at the time the motion is filed.” At Washington’s August 2022 filing, Rule 61(d)(2) – as amended June 4, 2014 – barred successive motions absent particularized new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence or a new retroactive constitutional rule.

2. No Retroactivity Violation. Washington argued that applying the post-2014 Rule 61 barred claims that the pre-2014 version would have permitted. The Court distinguished Bronshtein and held that Delaware’s amended Rule 61 had been clearly established and applied for years, giving fair notice. Turnage v. State and subsequent decisions confirmed that the 2014 amendments do not offend due process or access-to-courts guarantees.

3. Martinez Does Not Excuse State Bars. The Court explained that Martinez applies only in federal habeas corpus proceedings to establish cause for default of trial-level ineffectiveness claims; it does not create an exception to state procedural bars for successive Rule 61 motions.

4. Burroughs Limited to Unique Facts. In Burroughs the Court remanded to appoint new counsel for a first Rule 61 motion that was never timely appealed due to postconviction counsel’s acknowledged ineffectiveness, and the parties stipulated to apply the pre-2014 rule. Those circumstances are absent in Washington’s case, where counsel timely appealed the first motion and eight years elapsed since the Rule 61 amendments.

5. Actual Innocence Exception. To bypass procedural bars under amended Rule 61, a successive motion must plead with particularity new evidence: (i) which probably would change the result; (ii) discovered after trial with due diligence; and (iii) non-cumulative and not purely impeaching. Washington’s proffered new evidence—including Anthony Stanley’s affidavit, JoeQwell Coverdale’s recantations, affidavits by Janard Brown and Gary Clark, and a statement by Kennesha Land—was either not credible, not truly new, or at best impeaching. None pointed to another shooter or undermined Washington’s guilt by establishing a person other than Washington committed the charged offenses.

6. Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing. The Superior Court’s inherent authority to grant postconviction discovery requires a “good cause” showing – a heavier burden than pretrial discovery. Washington’s speculative requests and conclusory allegations failed to demonstrate that undisclosed material existed that could meet the actual innocence standard. His request for an evidentiary hearing was therefore properly denied as moot.

Impact

This decision clarifies and cements Delaware law on successive postconviction petitions:

Rule 61’s text as of the filing date controls, reinforcing predictability and finality in postconviction collateral review.
State postconviction movants cannot invoke federal habeas procedural exceptions (e.g., Martinez) to bypass state rules.
New evidence claims must meet a rigorous actual innocence standard; mere recantations or impeaching affidavits are insufficient.
Courts will strictly enforce Rule 61(d)(2)’s procedural bars absent truly persuasive, newly discovered, outcome-changing evidence.

Lower courts and practitioners in Delaware must carefully assess the applicable version of Rule 61, ensure movants understand their one-shot post-amendment window, and apply rigorous standards to “actual innocence” allegations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Bar: A rule that prevents a court from considering certain claims if not raised in a timely or proper manner, unless specific exceptions apply.
Rule 61(d)(2) Successive-Motion Bar: Limits movants to one collateral postconviction petition unless they present new evidence of actual innocence or a newly recognized constitutional rule that invalidates the conviction.
Actual Innocence Exception: To override procedural bars, a movant’s new evidence must be so convincing that it likely would produce an acquittal if a new trial were granted.
Martinez v. Ryan Exception: In federal habeas corpus law, inadequate counsel on an initial state postconviction motion may excuse a federal procedural default of trial-level ineffectiveness claims—but it does not apply to state collateral review rules.

Conclusion

Washington v. State reaffirms that Delaware’s Supreme Court Criminal Rule 61 amendments as of June 4, 2014 govern all post-amendment filings. It rejects retroactive application of the pre-2014 exceptions, clarifies that federal habeas exceptions do not override state-court procedural bars, and underscores the demanding requirements for actual innocence claims. This ruling preserves the finality of convictions while providing a narrowly tailored safety valve for truly extraordinary evidence of innocence.