Rule 60(b) Cannot Cure Discovery Omissions: Officer “Participation” and Malicious Prosecution in Sweatt v. Philipp

I. Introduction

In Derek Sweatt v. Samuel Philipp, No. 25-1339 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The case arises from an alleged theft at an auto body shop, a resulting criminal charge that was later dismissed, and a subsequent federal malicious prosecution suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law.

The decision is significant for two intertwined reasons:

• It reinforces stringent limits on Rule 60(b) relief where the losing party failed to comply with discovery, especially the obligation to disclose key evidence before summary judgment.
• It clarifies, once again, that police officers generally do not “participate” in a prosecution for malicious prosecution purposes merely by accurately relaying conflicting witness statements and referring prosecutors to body-camera footage.

Although unpublished and not precedential in the Sixth Circuit, the opinion encapsulates important principles on:

• What qualifies as “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1) when evidence is not produced in discovery;
• The very limited circumstances in which Rule 60(b)(6) will apply;
• The causal element of malicious prosecution—what it means for officers to “make, influence, or participate” in a decision to prosecute; and
• How courts treat post-judgment attempts to rely on evidence that was not properly introduced earlier.

II. Case Background

A. Factual Background

Derek Sweatt worked at Tripp’s Auto Shop & Collision Center, Inc. (Tripp’s Auto), owned by Brandon Tripp. Approximately one year into his employment, Sweatt was terminated. The parties disputed the reason for the firing, but they agreed that Tripp accused Sweatt of theft of shop tools and contacted the police.

Officer Jeremiah Wheeler responded. According to Wheeler’s body camera:

• Tripp stated that he had reviewed security footage showing Sweatt accessing toolboxes and taking a DeWalt tool bag.
• Tripp claimed he confronted Sweatt, who allegedly responded that the bag was empty.
• Tripp estimated that approximately $500 worth of tools were missing, though he did not yet know precisely what had been taken.
• Tripp promised to complete his review of security footage and provide Wheeler a copy.

Wheeler interviewed Sweatt, who denied stealing any tools. Officer Samuel Philipp also attempted to speak with Sweatt, but Sweatt declined to talk without first consulting counsel.

A county prosecutor then charged Sweatt with larceny of $200 or more but less than $1,000. During the state criminal case, Sweatt’s criminal defense attorney interviewed Tripp. A state-court order barred any “taping, recording or stenographic record” of that conversation. Nonetheless, the attorney had his secretary, Danella Woods, take stenographic notes. According to Sweatt, these notes showed that Tripp did not know what, if anything, Sweatt had actually taken from the tool bag.

Eventually, the state prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge based on “information obtained during [a] follow-up investigation” indicating that the prosecution likely could not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Civil Malicious Prosecution Suit

After the dismissal, Sweatt sued:

• Officers Philipp and Wheeler under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution;
• Philipp, Wheeler, Tripp, and Tripp’s Auto under Michigan state law for malicious prosecution.

Discovery proceeded. When discovery closed, defendants moved for summary judgment. In his response to the motion filed by Tripp and Tripp’s Auto, Sweatt attached a “Transcript of Brandon Tripp Interview,” arguing that it showed Tripp lacked knowledge of what had been in the tool bag and thus undermined probable cause. However:

• Sweatt did not explain how or when the transcript was created;
• He had never produced this transcript during discovery; and
• He did not attach any supporting declaration (for example, from Woods) authenticating the transcript at the summary judgment stage.

The district court declined to consider the transcript due to Sweatt’s failure to disclose it in discovery and granted summary judgment to all defendants. As to the officers, the court found there was no evidence that they “made, influenced, or participated in” the decision to prosecute.

C. Rule 60(b) Motion and Appeal

Sweatt then filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6), seeking relief from the judgment. He attached an affidavit from Woods, who attested that:

• The transcript related to the state-court interview of Tripp; and
• The transcript reflected notes she took at that interview.

Sweatt argued that the transcript was introduced at summary judgment merely as an exemplar of prior statements that Woods would testify to at trial, and that the state-court order had limited the means by which the interview could be recorded. He claimed the district court erred by:

• Refusing to consider the transcript;
• Failing to recognize “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(1) or (6); and
• Making several factual and legal mistakes concerning probable cause and the officers’ role in the prosecution.

The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion. Sweatt appealed, focusing on whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Readler joined by Judges Stranch and Bush, affirmed the denial of Sweatt’s Rule 60(b) motion. The court held:

1. Rule 60(b)(1) – Excusable Neglect: Sweatt failed to show that his omission in discovery (not producing the Tripp interview transcript) was the result of “excusable neglect.” A threshold requirement for excusable neglect is lack of culpability, which Sweatt did not establish; he offered no satisfactory explanation for the omission or for his failure to submit Woods’s declaration at summary judgment.
2. Rule 60(b)(1) – Alleged Legal Error: The district court did not commit a mistake of law in granting summary judgment. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) and related Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court was not required to consider evidence not disclosed during discovery.
3. Rule 60(b)(1) – Alleged Factual Errors: The district court did not clearly err in its factual findings. It accurately characterized the record regarding what Tripp reported, what Sweatt admitted (borrowing items), and what Wheeler’s report and body camera footage showed. The officers’ materials did not contain deliberate falsehoods or omissions and did not demonstrate officer “participation” in the prosecution under § 1983 or Michigan law.
4. Rule 60(b)(6): Sweatt effectively waived Rule 60(b)(6) as an independent ground for relief by failing to meaningfully develop the argument in the district court and on appeal. In any event, Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary circumstances,” which were absent here.

Consequently, the appellate court did not revisit the underlying merits of the original summary judgment but confined its review to whether the denial of Rule 60(b) relief constituted an abuse of discretion. It held there was no such abuse and affirmed.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Rule 60(b) and Post-Judgment Relief

Rule 60(b) allows a federal court to relieve a party from a final judgment for specified reasons. The two subsections at issue are:

• Rule 60(b)(1): “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
• Rule 60(b)(6): a broad “catchall” for “any other reason that justifies relief” but limited by the requirement of “extraordinary circumstances.”

In Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856 (2022), the Supreme Court confirmed that “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s legal errors, but relief remains narrow. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), similarly emphasized that Rule 60(b) cannot be used to relitigate the merits.

The Sixth Circuit reiterated here that Rule 60(b) is not “a tool for a losing party ‘to convince the court to rule in his or her favor by presenting new explanations, legal theories, or proof.’” (quoting Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 2014), which in turn cited Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Further, a motion under Rule 60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Citing BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612 (2025), the court reiterated that abuse of discretion occurs if a district court:

• Relies on erroneous factual findings;
• Applies the wrong legal standard;
• Misapplies the correct legal standard; or
• Makes a clear error of judgment.

B. Malicious Prosecution – § 1983 and Michigan Law

Under Sixth Circuit law, a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must generally prove, among other elements:

• A criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff;
• The criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor;
• There was a lack of probable cause for the prosecution; and
• The defendant “made, influenced, or participated in the decision to initiate a prosecution” against the plaintiff.

The opinion emphasizes the last element, citing:

• Price v. Montgomery County, 72 F.4th 711, 724 (6th Cir. 2023);
• Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2015);
• Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 655 (6th Cir. 2020).

Michigan’s common-law malicious prosecution tort has similar elements, including lack of probable cause, malice, and that the defendant “instigated” or “participated in” the prior criminal proceeding. The court cited Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 572 N.W.2d 603, 609–10 (Mich. 1998), and Rivers v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 300 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), to support the conclusion that Michigan’s participation requirement tracks the federal standard.

The “participation” requirement, as interpreted by the Sixth Circuit in cases such as Johnson, Tlapanco, and Price, demands more than merely providing truthful or even disputed information to prosecutors; it requires that officers supply falsehoods, deliberate omissions, or materially misleading information that proximately cause the prosecution.

C. Discovery Rules and Undisclosed Evidence

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 imposes an obligation to disclose relevant information and documents in discovery. Rule 37(c)(1) provides that if a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required, “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,” unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.

In support of this principle, the opinion cited:

• U.S. ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn., 821 F.3d 742, 752 (6th Cir. 2016), quoting
• Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2003), to the effect that courts routinely decline to consider evidence at summary judgment that was not disclosed in discovery.

Recent Sixth Circuit authority such as Hall v. Navarre, 118 F.4th 749, 755 (6th Cir. 2024), similarly stresses that parties are responsible for adhering to discovery schedules and that failures to comply are ordinarily not excused.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

A. Rule 60(b)(1): “Excusable Neglect” and Failure to Produce the Transcript

1. The legal test: culpability, prejudice, and merits

The court applied the well-established Sixth Circuit framework for evaluating “excusable neglect,” drawn from cases such as Flynn v. People’s Choice Home Loans, Inc., 440 F. App’x 452 (6th Cir. 2011), and Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2012):

1. The moving party must first show a lack of culpability for the failure.
2. If that threshold is met, the court then considers:
   • Prejudice to the non-moving party; and
   • Whether the underlying claim appears meritorious.

The opinion stressed that only if the movant clears the culpability hurdle does the court reach prejudice and the merits. This approach closely tracks Yeschick, where the Sixth Circuit held that a district court need not consider prejudice or merits if the movant fails to establish that the neglect was not the result of their own blameworthy conduct.

2. Application to Sweatt’s failure to disclose the transcript

Sweatt’s alleged excusable neglect centered on his failure to produce the Tripp interview transcript in discovery. He argued that:

• The unusual restrictions imposed by the state-court order on recording the interview created “extraordinary circumstances.”
• He always intended to present Woods’s testimony at trial, using the transcript as a mere reference point.

The Sixth Circuit rejected these arguments. Key points:

• No explanation for nondisclosure: Even by the time of the appeal, Sweatt had not explained why he failed to produce the transcript during discovery. It was not the existence of the transcript that was impossible or forbidden – he eventually produced it when responding to summary judgment.
• State-court order did not justify omission: The briefing did not convincingly explain how the state court’s prohibition on “taping, recording or stenographic record” excused failure to disclose what was, in fact, a stenographic record created in apparent tension with that order.
• Failure to provide declaration at summary judgment: Sweatt conceded that it was a mistake to attach the transcript without any authentication or explanation. He provided Woods’s affidavit only after judgment, at the Rule 60(b) stage. The court treated this as further evidence of culpability rather than excusable neglect.

Because Sweatt failed to demonstrate a lack of culpability, the court did not need to (and largely did not) analyze prejudice or the merits under the excusable neglect framework. Even so, the district court had alternatively found that, even if the transcript were considered, it did not create a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

The appellate panel agreed there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1).

B. Rule 60(b)(1): Alleged Legal Error Concerning Summary Judgment

Sweatt also argued that the district court legally erred by granting summary judgment while there existed a genuine factual dispute about whether Tripp was truthful with the police and prosecutor. This argument fundamentally rested on the Tripp transcript and on potential trial testimony by Woods.

The Sixth Circuit rejected this as a basis for Rule 60(b)(1) relief:

• At summary judgment, courts consider only the record evidence before them, not hypothetical or prospective trial testimony. Citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), the court reiterated that speculation about what might be offered later is not cognizable.
• The “usual rule,” per Rule 37(c)(1) and decisions such as Tennessee Valley Auth. and Roberts, is that evidence not disclosed during discovery cannot be used at summary judgment absent substantial justification or harmlessness. Sweatt offered neither.
• Accordingly, the district court had no obligation to consider the transcript or the theoretical future testimony of Woods. There was thus no legal error in granting summary judgment on the record properly before the court.

Because the legal premise of Sweatt’s Rule 60(b)(1) argument depended on the district court’s supposed duty to consider undisclosed evidence, his attack on the summary judgment ruling failed.

C. Rule 60(b)(1): Alleged Factual Errors

Sweatt claimed the district court committed two factual mistakes that warranted relief:

1. It allegedly conflated the taking of the tool bag and blowtorch with the theft of $500 worth of tools.
2. It allegedly erred in finding no evidence that the officers made false statements that influenced the prosecution.

1. The $500 estimate and what was allegedly taken

The Sixth Circuit found no confusion in the district court’s treatment of these facts. The district court had observed that:

• Tripp told the officers that he believed approximately $500 in tools were missing;
• Wheeler’s report accurately reflected what Tripp and Sweatt said;
• According to the report (and corroborated by Sweatt’s own statements), Sweatt acknowledged taking the bag and other items but claimed he was borrowing them.

Thus, there was no factual error. The district court did not equate the presence of the tool bag or blowtorch with proof that $500 in tools were stolen; it simply recorded that Tripp made that allegation and provided an estimate, and that the officers faithfully relayed that allegation to the prosecutor.

2. Officer participation and alleged falsehoods

The more substantial factual issue concerned whether the officers made false statements that “made, influenced, or participated in” the decision to prosecute, as required for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under Price and Johnson.

To establish officer participation through falsehoods or omissions, a plaintiff must show that officers supplied investigative materials containing “falsehoods, omissions, or misstatements,” made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth, that were material to the decision to prosecute. The court cited Price, 72 F.4th at 724, quoting Tlapanco, 969 F.3d at 655.

Importantly, Johnson illustrates that officers usually do not act with reckless disregard for the truth simply by relaying an accuser’s inconsistent statements to a prosecutor without independently resolving all credibility issues. In Johnson, officers forwarded a victim’s inconsistent and questionable allegations to the prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless held that this did not constitute reckless disregard sufficient for malicious prosecution liability because the officers did not fabricate or conceal evidence.

Applying these principles:

• Wheeler’s report explicitly attributed the $500 estimate to Tripp: “Brandon [Tripp] said that Derek stole $500 in tools.”
• The report also noted that $500 in tools “were reported stolen” – emphasizing that this was a report, not a verified fact.
• The report acknowledged that Tripp did not know precisely what was missing and that he would review footage and attempt to compile a list.
• Wheeler cautioned that his written report was a synopsis and directed the prosecutor to his body camera footage for a verbatim account.

The court found no inconsistency between Wheeler’s report and the body camera footage:

• In the footage, Tripp may have said he did not know exactly what was missing, but he also stated his estimate (~$500) and his belief that Sweatt took items.
• Wheeler’s report faithfully relayed that Tripp believed and reported that $500 in tools had been taken; it did not adopt that estimate as Wheeler’s own factual conclusion or guarantee its accuracy.

The panel analogized to Jones v. Naert, 121 F.4th 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2024), where the court held that an officer did not “participate” in the decision to prosecute even though his report contained false statements, because the prosecutor independently reviewed video footage of the incident. Here, Wheeler similarly pointed the prosecutor to body camera footage, which could independently inform the charging decision.

Because Sweatt could not identify specific, material falsehoods or omissions by either Wheeler or Philipp, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that there was no triable malicious prosecution claim. Thus, no factual error justified Rule 60(b)(1) relief.

D. Rule 60(b)(6): Extraordinary Circumstances and Forfeiture

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but, as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612 (2025), this provision is generally limited to “extraordinary circumstances.”

In his motion, Sweatt styled his request as one under both Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6), but the grounds he advanced fell squarely within Rule 60(b)(1): mistakes and neglect. On appeal, he essentially only recited the standard for Rule 60(b)(6) without actually developing an argument as to how his situation satisfied that standard beyond what he had already argued under 60(b)(1).

The Sixth Circuit invoked its usual rule that inadequately briefed issues are forfeited, citing:

• Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1012 (6th Cir. 2022);
• M.J. ex rel. S.J. v. Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.4th 436, 446 n.3 (6th Cir. 2021);
• Bard v. Brown County, 970 F.3d 738, 750 (6th Cir. 2020).

Since Sweatt did not meaningfully differentiate his Rule 60(b)(6) claim from his 60(b)(1) arguments, he forfeited any independent 60(b)(6) theory. Additionally, the record revealed no “extraordinary circumstances” such as:

• Fraud on the court;
• Subsequent drastic changes in law undermining the judgment; or
• Other highly unusual events making enforcement of the judgment manifestly unjust.

Thus, the panel held that Rule 60(b)(6) provided no avenue for relief.

E. The Underlying Merits: Malicious Prosecution and Officer Non-Participation

Although the Sixth Circuit repeatedly emphasized that it was not reviewing the underlying summary judgment ruling (Tyler, Jinks, and Zagorski v. Mays, 907 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2018)), its analysis confirms key substantive points about malicious prosecution.

1. Officers’ role in initiating prosecution

The opinion underscores that for both § 1983 and Michigan malicious prosecution:

• Simply responding to a complaint, interviewing witnesses, and forwarding their (even disputed) statements to a prosecutor is typically not enough to satisfy the “made, influenced, or participated in” requirement.
• Officers cross the line into actionable participation only if they:
  • Fabricate evidence;
  • Knowingly or recklessly omit material exculpatory information; or
  • Otherwise materially mislead the prosecutor in a way that causes the prosecution.

Here, the officers:

• Accurately described Tripp’s allegations and Sweatt’s denials;
• Noted the uncertainty surrounding what exactly had been taken;
• Referred the prosecutor to body camera footage for more detail.

The prosecutor then independently decided to charge Sweatt, later dismissing the case due to concerns about proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That prosecutorial judgment, whether wise or not, did not retroactively convert the officers’ conduct into malicious prosecution.

2. Probable cause and later declination

The prosecutor’s eventual dismissal “based on information obtained during follow-up investigation” may raise questions about the strength of the original case. But the opinion implicitly reaffirms the settled principle that:

• A prosecutor’s later doubts or decision to dismiss do not necessarily indicate a prior lack of probable cause; and
• Nor do they prove that officers misled the prosecutor, absent evidence of specific false statements or omissions.

The court did not need to decide probable cause conclusively because the causation/participation element already failed.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Rule 60(b) and Standards of Review

• Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856 (2022) and Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005):
  These Supreme Court decisions anchor the doctrinal backdrop. They confirm that Rule 60(b) provides a limited mechanism for relief and cannot be used as a vehicle to relitigate the merits or present new arguments that could have been raised earlier.
• BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612 (2025):
  Cited for two propositions:
  • Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary circumstances”; and
  • Denials of Rule 60(b) relief are reviewed for abuse of discretion, echoing Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
  The Sixth Circuit uses this to emphasize that its task is not to revisit the correctness of the original summary judgment but only to assess whether the district court’s refusal to reopen was outside the range of permissible choices.
• Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2014) and Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2001):
  Provide the oft-quoted warning that Rule 60(b) is not intended for losing parties to reargue the case with new theories or evidence. These cases support rejecting Sweatt’s attempt to repurpose Rule 60(b) as a second bite at summary judgment using the previously undisclosed transcript.
• Zagorski v. Mays, 907 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2018):
  Reinforces that appellate review of a Rule 60(b) denial is confined to the propriety of denying relief, not the underlying judgment itself.
• Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2015) and Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2011):
  Define abuse of discretion in terms of reliance on erroneous facts, misapplication of law, or clear error of judgment—standards that the court concludes are not met here.

B. Excusable Neglect and Discovery Failures

• Flynn v. People’s Choice Home Loans, Inc., 440 F. App’x 452 (6th Cir. 2011) and Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2012):
  These decisions supply the three-part framework for excusable neglect: (1) culpability; (2) prejudice; and (3) meritoriousness of the underlying claim. The Sixth Circuit leans heavily on Flynn/Yeschick to hold that Sweatt failed at the threshold step because he did not show lack of culpability in failing to disclose the transcript.
• Hall v. Navarre, 118 F.4th 749 (6th Cir. 2024):
  Employed to emphasize that courts generally will not excuse a party’s failure to comply with discovery schedules. Hall supports the conclusion that Sweatt’s omission was not excusable; parties must take responsibility for discovery compliance.

C. Use of Undisclosed Evidence at Summary Judgment

• U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn., 821 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2016) and Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2003):
  These cases support the proposition that a court may refuse to consider evidence at summary judgment that was not disclosed in discovery, in line with Rule 37(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit uses them to uphold the district court’s choice to exclude the Tripp transcript from its summary judgment analysis.

D. Malicious Prosecution – Participation and Causation

• Price v. Montgomery County, 72 F.4th 711 (6th Cir. 2023):
  Reaffirmed that for § 1983 malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that officers “made, influenced, or participated in the decision” to prosecute, and that this entails more than just reporting facts. Price is cited for the requirement that the officer’s misrepresentations or omissions must be deliberate or reckless.
• Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015):
  Clarifies that officers do not act with reckless disregard merely by relaying an alleged victim’s inconsistent or dubious statements to a prosecutor. The court analogizes Sweatt’s case to Johnson, concluding that the officers’ transmission of Tripp’s allegations did not equate to reckless falsification.
• Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2020):
  Provides the standard that malicious prosecution liability can arise where officers present “falsehoods, omissions, or misstatements” in investigative materials, made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Sixth Circuit finds no such behavior by Wheeler or Philipp.
• Jones v. Naert, 121 F.4th 558 (6th Cir. 2024):
  Used to emphasize that even where an officer’s report is inaccurate, the causal chain may be broken if the prosecutor has independent access to critical evidence (here, body camera footage). That principle undercuts Sweatt’s claim that Wheeler’s report “caused” the prosecution.
• Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 572 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. 1998) and Rivers v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 300 N.W.2d 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980):
  Michigan decisions showing that the state-law malicious prosecution tort mirrors the federal rule on participation/instigation. This supports applying a common “participation” analysis to Sweatt’s state and federal claims.

E. Waiver and Forfeiture on Appeal

• Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2022), M.J. ex rel. S.J. v. Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.4th 436 (6th Cir. 2021), and Bard v. Brown County, 970 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2020):
  These cases supply the rule that issues are forfeited when raised only in passing or without meaningful argumentation. The court uses them to hold that Sweatt forfeited his separate Rule 60(b)(6) claim.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts may be useful to unpack in more accessible terms.

1. Malicious Prosecution

Malicious prosecution is a claim that someone wrongfully caused a criminal case to be brought against a person without proper grounds. To succeed, a plaintiff generally must show:

• A criminal case was started against them;
• The case ended in their favor (for example, dismissal or acquittal);
• There was no reasonable basis (probable cause) for bringing the case; and
• The defendant (such as a police officer or private individual) actively and wrongfully helped cause the prosecution.

The last part is crucial: simply providing information to police or prosecutors, even if mistaken, does not always amount to malicious prosecution. There must be improper or malicious conduct that actually leads to the prosecution.

2. “Made, Influenced, or Participated in” the Decision to Prosecute

This phrase describes what level of involvement is enough to hold a police officer responsible for malicious prosecution. Officers “participate” when they:

• Pressure or mislead prosecutors;
• Supply fabricated evidence or knowingly omit important exculpatory facts; or
• Otherwise misuse their role to trigger or maintain a prosecution they know or strongly suspect is unwarranted.

On the other hand, officers usually do not “participate” merely by:

• Taking a report from a complaining witness and passing it on;
• Including the suspect’s version of events and the complainant’s version of events, even if the two conflict;
• Leaving credibility determinations to prosecutors and juries, so long as the officers do not lie or conceal crucial facts.

3. Rule 60(b) and “Excusable Neglect”

After a final judgment is entered, Rule 60(b) offers limited opportunities to reopen the case. Under Rule 60(b)(1), a party asking for relief based on “excusable neglect” must basically convince the court:

• “This mistake wasn’t really my fault in any meaningful way” (lack of culpability);
• “The other side won’t be unfairly harmed if the case is reopened”; and
• “My underlying claim is strong enough that it’s worth reopening the case.”

Mistakes based on poor planning, misunderstanding of the rules, or strategic withholding of evidence are rarely “excusable.”

4. Rule 60(b)(6) and “Extraordinary Circumstances”

Rule 60(b)(6) is a “catchall” that allows courts to grant relief for “any other reason” that justifies relief. Courts, including the Supreme Court, interpret this very narrowly. It is reserved for highly unusual situations, such as:

• Dramatic, unforeseen changes in the law that make the judgment fundamentally unfair;
• Fraud on the court;
• Situations where enforcing the judgment would be manifestly unjust in ways not captured by the other subsections of Rule 60(b).

Merely rearguing the case with “better” evidence or improved briefing generally does not qualify.

5. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedure where the court decides a case (or parts of it) without a trial if there is no “genuine dispute of material fact” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In practice:

• The court looks only at the evidence in the record (depositions, documents, affidavits) compiled during discovery.
• If the nonmoving party (here, Sweatt) cannot point to admissible evidence in that record to show a real factual dispute, the court may grant judgment without a trial.

Evidence not disclosed in discovery is generally excluded, which is exactly what occurred with the Tripp transcript.

VIII. Impact and Broader Implications

A. Discovery Compliance and Rule 60(b)

The opinion sends a strong signal to litigants that:

• Discovery deadlines and disclosure obligations matter. Failing to produce key evidence, and then attempting to rely on it at summary judgment, invites exclusion under Rule 37(c)(1) and leaves little room for relief under Rule 60(b).
• Rule 60(b) is not a safety net for late-arriving evidence. Where a party simply neglects to disclose or properly support evidence in the established timeline, courts are unlikely to deem that neglect “excusable.”
• Strategic withholding is especially disfavored. Although the opinion does not explicitly label Sweatt’s conduct as strategic, the lack of any credible explanation for the nondisclosure undermines claims of excusability.

B. Police Reports, Body Cameras, and Malicious Prosecution

The decision also has practical implications for how officers document and transmit information:

• Officers who carefully attribute statements to witnesses, acknowledge uncertainties, and preserve fuller records (such as body camera footage) generally position themselves outside malicious prosecution liability.
• Citing both Tripp’s allegations and Sweatt’s denials, and flagging the provisional nature of estimates (like the $500 value), helped the officers demonstrate they did not mislead the prosecutor.
• Directing prosecutors to body camera footage, as Wheeler did, undercuts arguments that officers controlled or distorted the narrative underpinning the prosecution decision.

For civil rights plaintiffs, the opinion underscores the need for specific, concrete evidence that officers:

• Fabricated facts;
• Omitted known exculpatory information from reports; or
• Otherwise took affirmative steps to engineer a prosecution under false pretenses.

C. State-Court Constraints and Federal Litigation Strategy

An undercurrent in the case is the state-court order prohibiting “taping, recording or stenographic record” of Tripp’s interview, and the defense attorney’s decision to have a secretary take stenographic notes anyway. Although the Sixth Circuit does not expressly resolve the propriety of this conduct, the episode highlights:

• The potential tension between state-court discovery or confidentiality orders and later federal litigation use of such materials;
• The importance of transparently addressing any such constraints in federal discovery, including seeking protective orders or clarifying permissible usage, rather than simply withholding documents.

Lawyers who anticipate subsequent civil litigation arising from criminal cases should be especially meticulous in:

• Documenting what can be used and under what conditions;
• Disclosing materials in civil discovery with appropriate confidentiality protections; and
• Properly authenticating and supporting evidence at the summary judgment stage.

D. Limited Role of Unpublished Opinions

The opinion is “not recommended for publication,” which under Sixth Circuit rules means it is not binding precedent. Nonetheless, such opinions often:

• Reinforce existing published doctrine;
• Provide practical illustrations of how established standards—like excusable neglect and officer participation—apply to concrete fact patterns; and
• Function as persuasive authority for district courts and litigants confronting similar issues in the future.

IX. Conclusion

Sweatt v. Philipp offers an instructive example of the limits of post-judgment relief and malicious prosecution liability. It stands for several key propositions:

• Rule 60(b) is narrow. A losing party cannot use it to undo a judgment by belatedly offering evidence that should have been disclosed and supported during discovery and at summary judgment.
• Excusable neglect requires a lack of culpability. Unexplained or poorly explained discovery failures are typically not excusable, particularly when the missing evidence is later produced without any compelling justification for the delay.
• Officers generally avoid malicious prosecution liability when they accurately report information and preserve full records. Merely transmitting a complaining witness’s statements—even if those statements prove unreliable—does not constitute “participation” in prosecution absent deliberate or reckless falsehoods or omissions.
• Rule 60(b)(6) is not a catch-all for re-arguing Rule 60(b)(1) grounds. It is reserved for extraordinary circumstances and is forfeited when not meaningfully developed.

In the broader legal context, the decision underscores that litigants must diligently comply with discovery obligations, marshal and properly present their evidence at the appropriate procedural juncture, and understand that Rule 60(b) is not a backstop for earlier strategic or negligent omissions. For civil rights practitioners, it reinforces that successful malicious prosecution claims require careful proof that law enforcement actors did more than just pass along disputed information—they must have materially, and wrongfully, shaped the decision to prosecute.