Rule 60(b)(4) Voidness Is Narrow: Untimely Rule 60 Motions Do Not Preserve Appellate Review of Underlying Title VII Dismissals

1. Introduction

In Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock (10th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026), Michael Lawrence—appearing pro se—sued Bonaventure of Castle Rock, a senior living facility operator, alleging a Title VII disparate-impact violation after Bonaventure declined to hire him as a line cook following a criminal background check. Lawrence contended the decision disproportionately affected Hispanics and also alleged Bonaventure failed to follow a Colorado regulation regarding consideration of criminal history.

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. More than seven months after final judgment, Lawrence filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), arguing the judgment was “void” because the court allegedly exceeded its authority by rejecting his claim notwithstanding the EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter and purported evidence. The district court denied the motion, and Lawrence appealed.

The central appellate issues were procedural and jurisdictional: (i) what portions of the case were properly before the court of appeals given the timing of the notice of appeal, and (ii) whether the district court’s judgment could be deemed “void” under Rule 60(b)(4) based on alleged legal error concerning Title VII exhaustion and the EEOC’s role.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that because Lawrence filed his Rule 60(b)(4) motion well beyond 28 days after judgment, the motion did not toll the time to appeal the underlying dismissal. As a result, the notice of appeal was untimely as to the merits dismissal, and appellate review was limited to the denial of Rule 60(b) relief.

On Rule 60(b)(4), the court concluded the judgment was not void. The district court had an “indisputably legitimate” jurisdictional basis to adjudicate a Title VII complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Lawrence’s objections went to the correctness of the district court’s exhaustion analysis, not to a total absence of jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2016)

Lebahn supplies the decisive appellate-jurisdiction framework. The Tenth Circuit reiterated two rules drawn from Lebahn:

• Appellate jurisdiction generally extends only to judgments from which a timely notice of appeal is filed (typically 30 days).
• A Rule 60 motion tolls the time to appeal only if filed within 28 days of the judgment (as referenced through Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)); otherwise, it does not enlarge the appeal window.

Applying Lebahn, the panel held it lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying dismissal and could review only the denial of Rule 60(b) relief.

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 145 F.4th 1279 (10th Cir. 2025)

Waetzig was cited for the standard of review: denial of Rule 60(b) relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion, including whether the ruling rested on an erroneous view of the law or was arbitrary/capricious. This standard constrained the appellate court’s role: it was not revisiting the dismissal’s merits, but only whether the district court properly refused extraordinary post-judgment relief.

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)

Espinosa provides the modern, narrow conception of “void” judgments under Rule 60(b)(4). The panel quoted the core limitation: Rule 60(b)(4) relief is generally reserved for the “exceptional case” where the rendering court lacked even an “arguable basis” for jurisdiction. This sharply distinguishes (a) jurisdictional nullities from (b) alleged legal errors within a court’s jurisdiction.

Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680 (10th Cir. 2020)

Johnson reinforced the application of Espinosa in Tenth Circuit practice: Rule 60(b)(4) is not a vehicle for relitigating the correctness of a judgment; it targets judgments entered without jurisdiction (or other narrow voidness circumstances), not judgments allegedly wrong on the law.

Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019)

Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis was used to confirm the jurisdictional foundation for Title VII suits: federal courts exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Title VII’s jurisdictional provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). This citation directly answered Lawrence’s “voidness” narrative by identifying an unquestionable statutory jurisdictional basis for the district court to decide the case, even if it allegedly erred in applying Title VII’s procedural prerequisites.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

1. Appellate jurisdiction and scope of review: The panel treated the timing rules as dispositive. Because the Rule 60(b)(4) motion was filed long after judgment (and outside the 28-day tolling window), the appeal could not reach the underlying dismissal. This is a critical doctrinal move: the court did not “choose” not to review the merits; it declared it had no jurisdiction to do so.
2. What counts as a “void” judgment under Rule 60(b)(4): The court framed Rule 60(b)(4) as extraordinary relief, reserved for a near-total absence of jurisdiction—lack of even an arguable jurisdictional basis. It then contrasted that standard with Lawrence’s argument, which asserted the district court exceeded authority by disagreeing with the EEOC and by finding a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
3. Jurisdiction versus merits/procedure: The panel emphasized the distinction between (a) jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims and (b) the correctness of rulings about exhaustion or the effect of the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter. Because the complaint invoked Title VII, the district court had federal-question jurisdiction and Title VII jurisdiction. Any alleged error regarding exhaustion was, at most, a legal mistake within jurisdiction—not voidness.
4. Misplaced reliance on “arbitrary and capricious” review: The district court (affirmed by the panel) rejected Lawrence’s claim that the court was bound to defer to the EEOC unless the EEOC acted “arbitrarily and capriciously.” That standard belongs to Administrative Procedure Act review of agency action, not to a district court’s adjudication of a private Title VII civil action following a right-to-sue notice.

3.3. Impact

• Reinforces the jurisdictional “funnel” created by timing rules: Litigants who miss the notice-of-appeal deadline cannot use a later Rule 60 motion to obtain appellate review of the underlying merits. The appellate court will confine review to the Rule 60 ruling.
• Constrains Rule 60(b)(4) in civil-rights litigation: The decision underscores that disagreement with a dismissal—whether framed as the court “overruling” the EEOC or misapplying exhaustion—does not render a judgment void. This discourages post-judgment strategies aimed at recharacterizing substantive error as jurisdictional defect.
• Clarifies the limited role of EEOC right-to-sue letters in federal court: The issuance of a right-to-sue letter permits a plaintiff to file suit but does not bind the district court’s legal analysis (including exhaustion-related determinations) nor convert the case into APA-style review of EEOC decisionmaking.
• Practical lesson for pro se (and all) litigants: The “appropriate course of action” after dismissal is a direct, timely appeal. Rule 60 is not a substitute appeal mechanism.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Rule 60(b)(4) judgment is void”: A judgment is “void” only in rare situations—primarily when the court had no jurisdictional power even to hear the case. It does not mean “the judge got it wrong.”
• “Tolling” the appeal deadline: Certain post-judgment motions can pause (toll) the deadline to appeal. But a Rule 60 motion generally tolls only if filed within 28 days after judgment; filing later does not extend the appeal time.
• Administrative Procedure Act “arbitrary and capricious” review: This is a deferential standard used when a court reviews federal agency action under the APA. A Title VII lawsuit after a right-to-sue letter is not an APA appeal of the EEOC.
• “Exhaustion of administrative remedies” in Title VII: Title VII typically requires presenting claims to the EEOC before suing. Whether exhaustion occurred can affect whether a claim proceeds, but disputes about exhaustion ordinarily concern case processing/merits—not the court’s basic subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Title VII cases.

5. Conclusion

Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock is a procedurally focused decision emphasizing two controlling principles: (1) an untimely Rule 60 motion does not preserve appellate review of the underlying judgment, and (2) Rule 60(b)(4) voidness is exceptionally narrow—available only where the district court lacked even an arguable jurisdictional basis. Because federal courts plainly have jurisdiction over Title VII actions, disagreements about exhaustion or the significance of an EEOC right-to-sue letter cannot transform a dismissal into a “void” judgment. The decision thus reinforces finality, deadline discipline, and the limited function of Rule 60(b)(4) in federal civil litigation.