Rule 36 Limits: Correct the Record to the Statute of Conviction (Not Later Renumbered Subsections) and Permit PSR Clerical Corrections “At Any Time”

I. Introduction

In United States v. William Baskerville (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2026) (not precedential), the Court of Appeals reviewed three distinct post-conviction issues arising from a 2007 jury verdict and life sentences imposed in the District of New Jersey.

• Parties: United States of America (appellee) v. William Baskerville (appellant).
• Convictions/Sentence: conspiracy to murder a witness, conspiracy to retaliate against an informant, and eight drug-trafficking offenses; nine concurrent life terms.
• Post-judgment motions: (1) compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); (2) a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act; (3) correction of alleged clerical errors in the judgment and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.
• Key issues on appeal: (a) whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying compassionate release based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (b) whether it properly declined to reach the First Step Act merits under the concurrent sentence doctrine; (c) whether Rule 36 allowed the court to “correct” a statutory citation by using a later redesignated subsection, and whether Rule 36 applies to clerical errors in PSRs.

II. Summary of the Opinion

1. Compassionate release: Affirmed. The District Court acted within its discretion in denying relief because the § 3553(a) factors—particularly deterrence and the seriousness of conduct tied to a “brutal murder of an FBI informant”—weighed against release.
2. First Step Act (Section 404) reduction: Affirmed. The District Court did not clearly err in applying the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid deciding whether the drug counts merited a reduction, because Baskerville would remain subject to concurrent life sentences.
3. Rule 36 correction of judgment (Count Two): Vacated in part and remanded. The judgment should be corrected to the statute of conviction as it existed at the time—18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)—not to 18 U.S.C. § 1513(f), which did not exist when Baskerville was sentenced.
4. Rule 36 correction of PSR: Vacated and remanded. The panel reiterated that Rule 36 can reach clerical errors in PSRs and has no time limit; the District Court must address whether the PSR should be amended.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Compassionate release framework and standard of review

• United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021): The opinion relied on Andrews for both (i) the abuse-of-discretion standard and (ii) the three-part structure for compassionate release analysis: “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” consistency with “applicable policy statements,” and support in the § 3553(a) factors. Practically, Andrews reinforces that even if a movant raises a plausible extraordinary-and-compelling argument, courts may deny relief based solely on § 3553(a).

2. Section 404 First Step Act review

• United States v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2020): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing denial of a reduced sentence under Section 404, anchoring the panel’s deference to the District Court’s case-management decision to avoid reaching the merits via the concurrent sentence doctrine.

3. Concurrent sentence doctrine

• United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 1997): Provided the Third Circuit’s articulation of the doctrine as a discretionary tool to avoid resolving legal issues affecting fewer than all counts where at least one count and its sentence will remain.
• Duka v. United States, 27 F.4th 189 (3d Cir. 2022): Supplied the doctrine’s underlying rationale: conserving judicial and litigant resources where the outcome cannot affect the operative sentence. The panel used Duka to rebut the claim that “uncomplicated” issues should still be decided, emphasizing that resource conservation remains the central point.

4. Rule 36: scope (clerical vs. substantive) and “at any time”

• United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2005): The key Third Circuit authority that Rule 36 is limited to clerical errors, not substantive changes; it also recognizes that Rule 36 corrections have “no time limit.” The panel deployed Bennett to invalidate the District Court’s timeliness-based reasoning for the PSR and to frame what is—and is not—a “clerical error.”
• United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), quoting Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus., 694 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1982): These cases supplied the “mechanical in nature” definition of a clerical error—“merely of recitation”—and were decisive in holding that changing Count Two to a subsection that did not exist at sentencing exceeded Rule 36.

5. Rule 36 and PSRs as “part of the record”

• United States v. Gjeli, 867 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 23, 2017): The panel relied on Gjeli to reaffirm that Rule 36 extends to PSRs because they are “part of the record.”
• Out-of-circuit support (cited by the panel) further reinforced this view: United States v. Mackay, 757 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Vanderhorst, 927 F.3d 824 (4th Cir. 2019), both recognizing PSRs as correctable under Rule 36.

6. Preservation/waiver on appeal

• Komis v. Sec'y of United States Dep't of Lab., 918 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2019): Used to reject the Government’s newly raised appellate argument that the PSR’s mistakes were mere “imprecision” rather than clerical error. Because the Government did not press that contention below, the panel applied its standard practice of not considering new arguments on appeal.

7. Standards of review discussion (contextual citations)

While the panel did not definitively choose a single standard of review for all Rule 36 issues, it surveyed authorities reflecting general consensus on de novo review for Rule 36 legal questions and varying approaches for factual questions, citing: United States v. Vanderhorst, United States v. Mackay, United States v. Robinson, United States v. Portillo, United States v. Burd, States v. Bergmann, and United States v. Niemiec. This survey signals the Third Circuit’s continued openness to refining the standard, but it was not outcome-determinative here.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Compassionate release: § 3553(a) can independently defeat relief

The panel treated the District Court’s § 3553(a) analysis as sufficient on its own, focusing on deterrence and the gravity of the underlying conduct. Importantly, the panel declined to address whether COVID-19-related medical risks were “extraordinary and compelling” because the § 3553(a) factors supplied an independent basis to deny relief. That approach reflects a pragmatic sequencing: if § 3553(a) clearly forecloses release, a court need not resolve the “extraordinary and compelling” prong.

The panel also rejected arguments that the District Court’s analysis was “deficient” for failing to weigh purported guideline/jury-instruction errors, noting Baskerville did not adequately substantiate those claims and that the sentencing judge had addressed related issues previously.

2. First Step Act Section 404: concurrent sentence doctrine as a merits-avoidance tool

The court approved using the concurrent sentence doctrine where the appellant challenged only some of multiple concurrent life sentences and would remain imprisoned for life even if the challenged counts were reduced. The key move is institutional: federal courts may conserve resources by declining to decide issues that cannot alter the bottom-line custody term.

The panel also implicitly rejected the notion that “simplicity” of the legal question is the controlling metric. Under McKie and Duka, the doctrine’s hinge is practical effect: if the operative sentence does not change, adjudication may be avoided.

3. Rule 36: “clerical error” does not authorize retrofitting later statutory renumbering

The opinion’s most concrete doctrinal clarification concerns the boundary between clerical correction and substantive alteration. The judgment incorrectly cited statutory subsections for Counts One and Two. The District Court attempted to “correct” Count Two by changing the citation to 18 U.S.C. § 1513(f) to reflect Congress’s later redesignation (after the time of conviction, when § 1513 contained two subsections labeled (e)).

The Third Circuit held this exceeded Rule 36 because it did not merely make the record accurately reflect what happened at the time; it instead inserted a statutory subsection that “did not exist at the time Baskerville was sentenced.” Under Guevremont (and Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus.), Rule 36 is limited to “mechanical” errors of recitation. Therefore, the only permissible Rule 36 correction was to amend Count Two to 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), i.e., the statute of conviction as it existed at the time of sentencing.

The panel noted the District Court may add clarifying language (e.g., a footnote) to explain which “(e)” Baskerville was convicted of, but the operative citation must remain historically accurate.

4. Rule 36 applies to PSRs; timeliness rationale was legally flawed

The District Court denied PSR correction both for lack of authority and (alternatively) untimeliness under Rule 32(f). The panel vacated because (i) Third Circuit authority recognizes PSRs as “part of the record” subject to Rule 36 correction (United States v. Gjeli), and (ii) Rule 36 corrections have “no time limit” (United States v. Bennett).

Moreover, the Government’s attempt to reframe the PSR mistake as non-clerical was not entertained because it was raised for the first time on appeal (Komis v. Sec'y of United States Dep't of Lab.). The remand requires the District Court to address whether the PSR should be amended to reflect accurate statutory subsections.

C. Impact

• Rule 36 practice in the Third Circuit: Even in a non-precedential decision, the opinion consolidates a clear operational rule: Rule 36 corrections must mirror the historical reality of conviction and sentencing; courts should not “update” judgments to conform to later statutory renumbering when doing so introduces text that was not part of the legal landscape at sentencing.
• PSR corrections remain live issues long after sentencing: The decision underscores that PSR clerical errors can matter (e.g., BOP classification, programming, parole/clemency considerations, or collateral consequences) and that Rule 36 provides a procedural vehicle without a time bar.
• Compassionate release litigation: The opinion reinforces a recurring appellate posture: denials will be affirmed where the record supports a reasoned § 3553(a) analysis—particularly deterrence and seriousness—without requiring appellate resolution of “extraordinary and compelling” disputes.
• First Step Act administration: The endorsement of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the Section 404 context may encourage district courts to conserve resources where reductions on some counts cannot change the actual term of imprisonment due to other concurrent life sentences.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i))

A mechanism allowing a sentencing court to reduce a prison term if there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the reduction aligns with any applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements, and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors support it.

Section 3553(a) factors

The statutory considerations guiding federal sentencing (and sentence reductions), including seriousness of the offense, deterrence, public protection, and avoiding unwarranted disparities.

Concurrent sentence doctrine

A discretionary doctrine allowing a court to skip deciding issues about some counts if at least one conviction and its concurrent sentence will remain and the defendant’s actual time in custody will not change.

Rule 36 clerical error

A purely mechanical mistake in the record—like a wrong statutory citation or typo—that fails to reflect what the court actually did. Rule 36 cannot be used to make substantive changes or rewrite history; it is meant to make the paperwork match the real, original actions.

PSR (Presentence Investigation Report)

A report prepared for sentencing that becomes part of the record and may influence imprisonment conditions and later proceedings; clerical errors in it may be correctable under Rule 36.

V. Conclusion

United States v. William Baskerville affirms the District Court’s denial of compassionate release and its use of the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid a Section 404 merits decision where concurrent life terms render any reduction ineffectual. The opinion’s most significant contribution is its Rule 36 clarification: courts may correct clerical mis-citations, but they must correct the record to reflect the actual statute of conviction at the time, not a later redesignated subsection that did not exist when sentence was imposed. It also reiterates that PSRs, as part of the record, may be corrected for clerical errors under Rule 36 without a time limit, requiring careful district-court attention on remand.