Precedents Cited

1) State v. Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 480 S.E.2d 507 (1996)

Head supplies two pillars of the decision. First, it provides the controlling standard of review for Rule 35 rulings: (i) abuse of discretion for the ultimate decision, (ii) clearly erroneous review for underlying facts, and (iii) de novo review for legal questions and interpretations. Second, it characterizes Rule 35(b) as a leniency mechanism directed to the circuit court’s discretion and arising from a “presumptively valid conviction.” The Court relies on this framing to reject the idea that rehabilitation evidence creates any entitlement to reduction.

2) State v. Jessie D., No. 21-0542, 2022 WL 4355570 (W. Va. Sept. 20, 2022) (memorandum decision) (“Jessie III”)

Jessie III is procedurally central: it held the circuit court had never ruled on the timely 1997 Rule 35(b) motion, and it directed a remand for consideration of both the original motion and the 2021 amendment. The current decision presupposes that remand was properly executed (appointment of counsel, hearings, updated PSI, review of sentencing materials), and addresses only whether the eventual denial of leniency was within discretion.

3) Davis v. Ballard, No. 11-1062, 2012 WL 6097616 (W. Va. Dec. 7, 2012) (memorandum decision) (“Jessie I”) & Jessie D. v. Ames, No. 17-0582, 2019 WL 1977033 (W. Va. May 3, 2019) (memorandum decision) (“Jessie II”)

These cases appear as background demonstrating the breadth of Davis’s post-conviction litigation and that his sentence had previously been corrected once (reducing the cumulative term). Their role in this opinion is contextual, underscoring that the present appeal is not an attack on conviction validity but a discretionary request for leniency.

4) State v. Arbaugh, 215 W. Va. 132, 595 S.E.2d 289 (2004)

Davis invoked Arbaugh to argue that denial of Rule 35(b) relief can constitute abuse of discretion where a defendant presents strong mitigating circumstances and rehabilitative goals. The Court rejects this analogy, noting Arbaugh involved a juvenile offender and a highly specific rehabilitative request (attendance at a renowned treatment program), tied to a distinct factual profile including an “extensive history” of abuse. The current Court treats Arbaugh as a case-specific application of existing Rule 35 principles, not a general template requiring leniency when rehabilitation evidence is substantial.

5) State v. Georgius, 225 W. Va. 716, 696 S.E.2d 18 (2010)

Georgius is used to limit Arbaugh: the Court quotes the proposition that Arbaugh “did not create any new standards, guidelines, or requirements” for Rule 35(b) and was confined to its facts. This citation is doctrinally important because it forecloses the argument that Arbaugh elevated rehabilitation evidence into a quasi-mandatory basis for sentence reduction.

Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 35(b) as discretionary leniency, not resentencing as of right.

   The Court anchors its analysis in Head: Rule 35(b) is a “plea for leniency” from a “presumptively valid conviction.” That framing matters because it sets the default posture against relief: the sentence stands unless the circuit court, in its discretion, chooses to temper it. This is not a vehicle to relitigate trial issues or to obtain proportionality review as a matter of right.

2. The circuit court considered the rehabilitation evidence but found it unpersuasive against the original record.

   Davis argued the circuit court “based solely” on the sentencing transcript and ignored the favorable record (education, therapy, programs, lack of infractions, IRPP compliance, medical issues, release plan, and the victim’s death in 2020). The Supreme Court rejected that characterization: it concluded the circuit court did consider the submitted evidence, yet weighed it against the sentencing judge’s stated intent and the victim impact statement.

3. Reliance on original sentencing rationale is permissible in Rule 35(b) adjudication.

   The circuit court explicitly found the sentencing transcript “very compelling” and concluded the original sentence remained “fair and appropriate.” The Supreme Court treated this as a legitimate exercise of discretion: Rule 35(b) does not require the circuit court to privilege post-sentencing conduct over the seriousness of the offense, sentencing objectives, or the original court’s rationale.

4. The State’s conditional proposal did not bind the court.

   The State opposed making the last first-degree sexual assault sentence concurrent (because the convictions predated the extended supervised release statute), but suggested that if the court were inclined to provide relief it could suspend remaining time and impose probation. The Supreme Court treated this as a contingent position, not a concession that leniency was warranted. Discretion remained with the court.

5. Arbaugh provides no entitlement and is fact-bound.

   By emphasizing Georgius, the Court reinforced that Arbaugh did not change the Rule 35 landscape. The upshot is that defendants cannot transform favorable prison conduct into a legal standard that compels relief.

Impact

• Reinforcement of broad circuit-court discretion.

  The decision underscores that appellate review of Rule 35(b) is highly deferential. Even extensive rehabilitation records and long service time may be insufficient where the circuit court finds the original sentencing rationale continues to justify the sentence.

• Clarifies evidentiary weighting in Rule 35(b) proceedings.

  The opinion effectively confirms that a circuit court may assign substantial weight to the original sentencing transcript and victim impact statement, and may conclude that post-sentencing rehabilitation does not amount to a change warranting leniency.

• Limits strategic reliance on Arbaugh.

  By reiterating Georgius, the Court signals that Arbaugh should not be cited as establishing a general Rule 35(b) “rehabilitation-based” standard. Future litigants should expect courts to treat Arbaugh as confined to extraordinary, youth-related, and program-specific facts.

• Practical consequence for very old Rule 35 filings.

  Although the present decision is primarily merits-based, the procedural history (unruled-upon 1997 motion later adjudicated after remand) illustrates that delayed consideration does not necessarily translate into relief. Even after a remand ensuring the motion is heard, the remedy remains discretionary.