Rule 35(b) in the CNMI: Motions to Reduce Sentence Are Pleas for Leniency, Not Legal Corrections

Introduction

In Commonwealth v. Rios, 2025 MP 7 (Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Oct. 6, 2025), the CNMI Supreme Court resolved a longstanding ambiguity about the proper standard governing motions to reduce sentence under Commonwealth Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). The case arises from Anthony Peter Rios’s motion to reduce his reinstated sentence after probation revocation. The Superior Court denied the motion because Rios did not show his sentence was “illegal” or a “gross abuse of discretion.”

On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated that denial and remanded, holding for the first time that a Rule 35(b) motion is not a legal challenge to the sentence but a plea for leniency resting within the sentencing court’s broad discretion. The Court rejected the importation of a Fifth Circuit formulation that had collapsed the trial court’s role into an appellate illegality/abuse-of-discretion review. The ruling establishes that trial courts may grant or deny Rule 35(b) motions for almost any equitable reason, need not hold a hearing or provide reasons, but if reasons are given they must reflect the correct standard.

Parties: The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Plaintiff-Appellee) and Anthony Peter Rios (Defendant-Appellant). The opinion is authored by Associate Justice Perry B. Inos, with Chief Justice Alexandro C. Castro and Associate Justice John A. Mangloña concurring.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: A Rule 35(b) motion to reduce sentence in the CNMI is a discretionary plea for leniency and does not require the movant to prove the sentence is illegal or that its imposition was a gross abuse of discretion. When a trial court provides reasons for denying such a motion, those reasons must reflect the motion’s proper purpose; applying an “illegality/gross abuse” threshold is legal error.
• Reasoning: The Court traced CNMI Rule 35 to the pre-1984 federal Rule 35 and adopted the majority federal view under that regime: Rule 35(b) affords a “second look” grounded in compassion, equity, or new information, not legal correction (which falls under Rule 35(a)). The Fifth Circuit’s “illegality/gross abuse” approach—rooted in an appellate review standard—was not persuasive for trial-level decision-making and had been only noted in dictum in an earlier CNMI case.
• Disposition: The Superior Court’s denial was vacated and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard. The trial court may decide on the papers or hold a new hearing, at its discretion.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court’s opinion situates Rule 35(b) within the pre-1984 federal framework and canvasses circuit authority:

• CNMI authorities
  • Commonwealth v. Ramangmou, 1996 MP 17: Earlier CNMI case reviewing a Rule 35(b) denial for abuse of discretion. A footnote in Ramangmou referenced Fifth Circuit cases allowing summary denial where no “illegality” or “gross abuse” was shown. The Rios Court clarified that footnote was not part of Ramangmou’s holding and does not control the trial court standard.
  • Commonwealth v. Laniyo, 2012 MP 1: Confirmed that orders denying Rule 35(b) motions are final and appealable.
  • In re Abraczinskas, 2023 MP 12: Articulated that a court abuses its discretion if it relies on an erroneous view of the law—central to finding error in Rios.
  • Commonwealth v. Rios, 2015 MP 12; Rios v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Corrs., 2022 MP 2: Prior litigation involving the same defendant, providing background but not controlling the Rule 35(b) standard at issue.
• Federal authorities under pre-1984 Rule 35
  • United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1973): Rule 35 addresses whether the original sentence was “unduly harsh,” not post-incarceration conduct as such. Upholds district court denial without hearing.
  • United States v. Phillips, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 13376 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1983); United States v. Colvin, 644 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1981); Poole v. United States, 644 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957): Characterize Rule 35(b) as a “plea for leniency” presupposing a valid conviction.
  • United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1968): Describes Rule 35 as giving defendants a “second round” before the sentencing judge; recognizes consideration of new information not available at sentencing.
  • United States v. Distasio, 820 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1987): Emphasizes Rule 35(b) as a vehicle for the sentencing court to temper its sentence on compassionate grounds.
  • United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1987): Confirms broad discretion, including ability to resolve Rule 35(b) motions on the papers without an evidentiary hearing, and the court’s capacity to consider new, material information (e.g., health deterioration).
  • United States v. Twomey, 845 F.2d 1132 (1st Cir. 1988): Describes the discretion under Rule 35 as “commodious,” and reasons need not be provided in the “usual case.”
  • United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1984) and United States v. Milburn, 836 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1988): Illustrate appellate restraint—denials of Rule 35(b) motions are upheld absent abuse, even for very severe sentences, reflecting the breadth of trial court discretion.
  • United States v. Yates, 553 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Muniz, 571 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1978), and progeny: These Fifth Circuit cases framed the appellate standard of review as “illegality or gross abuse of discretion.” Some district courts in the Fifth Circuit mirrored that standard at the trial level. The CNMI Supreme Court rejects transposing this appellate standard onto the trial court’s Rule 35(b) determination.
  • Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, Advisory Committee Notes: Clarify that CNMI’s Rule 35 mirrors the pre-1984 federal version, rendering post-1984 federal decisions inapposite.
  • U.S. Sentencing Commission, The Use of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) (2016): Describes the pre-1984 regime as having “no substantive restrictions” on sentence modification—supporting the breadth of discretion recognized in Rios.

Legal Reasoning

The central legal question was whether a defendant must demonstrate “illegality” or “gross abuse of discretion” to obtain relief under Rule 35(b). The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. Text and structure of Rule 35: CNMI Rule 35 separates two functions:
   • Rule 35(a): Correction of an illegal sentence (at any time) or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner (within the reduction window).
   • Rule 35(b): Reduction of sentence—within 120 days after specified procedural markers (sentencing, revocation, mandate, or denial of review).
   The Court underscores that 35(a) addresses legal defects, whereas 35(b) provides a discretionary opportunity for leniency. Conflating the two—by demanding proof of illegality under 35(b)—misstates the rule’s function.
2. Historical and persuasive authority: Because CNMI Rule 35 tracks pre-1984 federal Rule 35, the Court looks to pre-1984 federal jurisprudence. The weight of authority (Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, D.C., and First Circuits) treats 35(b) as a compassionate second look, authorizing adjustments based on equitable considerations or new, material information. The Fifth Circuit line (Yates/Muniz) speaks to appellate review standards, and its migration into some district court practice lacks persuasive rationale for defining the trial-level decision rule. The prior CNMI reference to the Fifth Circuit approach in Ramangmou was dictum and not binding.
3. Application and error below: The trial court “summarily denied” Rios’s motion expressly because he failed to show illegality or gross abuse of discretion. Even though Rule 35(b) permits summary denials and trial courts are not required to give reasons, once a court articulates a reason, it must be the correct legal reason. By constraining its discretion to legal error or fundamental unfairness, the court applied the wrong standard, which is per se an abuse of discretion under Abraczinskas (abuse exists where a decision rests on an erroneous view of the law).

The Court is careful not to convert Rule 35(b) into a mandatory leniency rule or a reasons-giving requirement. The decision preserves trial courts’ “commodious” discretion, including the power to deny without explanation. The key constraint is conceptual fidelity: if the court explains its decision, the explanation must align with 35(b)’s leniency function, not with 35(a)’s legality function or an appellate standard.

Impact and Practical Consequences

The decision in Rios has immediate and systemwide implications for sentencing practice in the CNMI:

• Standard clarified: Rule 35(b) motions are pleas for leniency grounded in equitable considerations or new material information, not vehicles to prove illegality or to re-litigate sentencing errors. The latter belongs under Rule 35(a) or direct appeal/postconviction remedies.
• Trial court discretion broadened (and bounded correctly):
  • Judges may deny or grant for nearly any justifiable reason; they may act on the papers and need not hold a hearing (DeCologero).
  • Judges may summarily deny, but if they choose to state reasons, reasons must be tethered to leniency judgments—e.g., undue harshness in light of circumstances, mercy, equitable considerations, or genuinely new information not available at sentencing.
  • Appellate review remains deferential. However, reliance on an erroneous legal standard (such as an illegality/gross abuse threshold) is an abuse of discretion warranting vacatur and remand.
• Advocacy guidance for defense counsel:
  • Frame the motion around leniency and compassion: age, health deterioration, family hardship, significant post-sentencing developments that were not available at the original sentencing, and overall equity.
  • Avoid collateral attacks on the conviction or claims of legal error (those belong under Rule 35(a), direct appeal, or habeas).
  • Provide a concise evidentiary record (medical records, affidavits, declarations) to support new information. Propose specific, measured reductions or alternatives (e.g., reduction to probation where permissible).
• Prosecution posture:
  • Oppositions should respond to the equitable merits—public safety, nature of the offense, criminal history, recidivism, and the adequacy of prior opportunities—rather than insisting on a showing of illegality.
  • Where appropriate, acknowledge changed circumstances but argue why leniency remains unwarranted under the court’s broad discretion.
• Judicial practice tips:
  • It is permissible to deny without reasons. If explaining, avoid invoking “illegality” or “gross abuse” as the basis for denial; those belong to Rule 35(a) or appellate review standards.
  • Consider whether new material information (e.g., health status, family circumstances) warrants a tempered sentence, recognizing that some forms of post-incarceration conduct (e.g., routine good behavior) may carry less weight (see Maynard; Ramangmou).
  • Manage the record efficiently. Ordering targeted production of records (as in DeCologero) can be appropriate without triggering a full evidentiary hearing.
• Temporal constraints reaffirmed: The 120-day filing window from the specified triggers (sentencing, probation revocation, mandate, or denial of review) is jurisdictionally significant for Rule 35(b). Counsel must preserve timeliness carefully.
• Open doctrinal space: Rios does not impose a factor test or mandate a particular weighting. Future CNMI cases may develop guideposts for common categories of equitable considerations, but the overarching theme remains discretion and leniency.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 35(a) vs. Rule 35(b):
  • Rule 35(a) = correct a legal defect (illegal sentence or sentence imposed in an illegal way).
  • Rule 35(b) = ask the judge to show mercy (reduce a lawful sentence for equitable reasons).
• Abuse of Discretion:
  • A high-deference standard on appeal. The appellate court does not reweigh equities; it asks whether the trial court acted within the range of acceptable choices.
  • But if the trial court applies the wrong legal standard, that is itself an abuse of discretion.
• Summary Denial:
  • The trial court can deny a Rule 35(b) motion without a hearing and without explaining why. That is permitted.
  • However, if the court chooses to explain, the explanation must accurately reflect Rule 35(b)’s function (leniency), not illegality.
• New Information:
  • Facts arising or discovered after sentencing that could justify tempering the sentence (e.g., serious health deterioration). The court may consider these, but it need not hold a hearing.
• Pre-1984 vs. Post-1984 Federal Rule 35:
  • CNMI’s Rule 35 mirrors the pre-1984 federal rule, which permitted broad, equitable reductions.
  • Post-1984 federal changes narrowed Rule 35(b) to government-initiated reductions for substantial assistance; those changes are not relevant in the CNMI.

Conclusion

Commonwealth v. Rios establishes a clear, practical, and historically grounded standard for Rule 35(b) motions in the CNMI: such motions are discretionary pleas for leniency, not vehicles to correct illegal sentences. Trial courts retain wide latitude to grant or deny relief, may do so summarily and without explanation, and are not confined to assessing legal error or “gross abuse.” Nonetheless, when a court explains its ruling, it must apply the correct legal frame—equity and leniency—rather than the illegality paradigm of Rule 35(a) or an appellate review standard.

By vacating the Superior Court’s denial (which had adopted the erroneous “illegality/gross abuse” threshold) and remanding for reconsideration under the proper standard, the CNMI Supreme Court aligns local practice with the dominant pre-1984 federal approach and its own precedent in Ramangmou. The decision offers clear guidance to judges and advocates: build or assess Rule 35(b) motions on compassion, equity, and genuinely new material information, not on claims of legal defect. It is a consequential clarification that will shape sentencing-review practice, promote consistency, and ensure that the discretionary mercy contemplated by Rule 35(b) is exercised under the correct legal lens.