Rule 15(b) Suppression Deadline Tied to the Sole Dispositional Conference—Later Status/Scheduling Orders Do Not Restart the Clock

Introduction

In State of New Hampshire v. John Santiago (No. 2023-0647), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the defendant’s convictions for possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell and conspiracy to sell a controlled drug (RSA 318-B:2, I (2025); RSA 629:3 (2016)). Decided by order under Supreme Court Rule 20(3) on August 28, 2025, the case presents a practical clarification with significant procedural consequences: under New Hampshire Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(b), the fifteen-day deadline for filing a motion to suppress keyed to “the dispositional conference” is triggered by the actual dispositional conference held in the case and is not reset by later status or scheduling events—even when those later orders are generated on court forms labeled “dispositional conference order.”

The appeal also raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on counsel’s failure to timely file a motion to suppress wiretap evidence under RSA 570-A:9, IX(a), focusing on whether the interception order’s requirement that communications be “first heard” in the Northern District of Hillsborough County was violated. The Court reached the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal because the pertinent facts appeared in the record, ultimately rejecting the claim on the ground that the suppression motion would not have succeeded on the merits.

The opinion is noteworthy for three reasons:

It clarifies how Rule 15(b)’s suppression-motion deadline operates when a case has multiple post-plea conferences and administrative orders over several years.
It reinforces trial courts’ broad discretion to enforce scheduling deadlines and deny untimely suppression motions without a hearing.
It demonstrates that ineffective assistance claims predicated on the failure to file a suppression motion will fail when the record shows the motion lacked merit, here aided by judicial notice of geographic facts (N.H. R. Ev. 201).

Summary of the Opinion

Timeliness under Rule 15(b): The Court held that Santiago’s motion to suppress—filed June 22, 2023—was untimely. The sole “dispositional conference” occurred on December 17, 2019. Later proceedings in 2021–2023 were status or scheduling conferences and did not constitute new dispositional conferences; court forms bearing the title “dispositional conference order” did not change that. Because the motion came well outside “fifteen days after the dispositional conference,” it was untimely under N.H. R. Crim. P. 15(b)(1).
Enforcement of deadlines/denial without hearing: The trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in denying the untimely motion without scheduling an evidentiary hearing. Courts have a legitimate interest in enforcing scheduling deadlines, and the motion was roughly 3.5 years late.
Ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal: The Court addressed the claim on direct appeal because all necessary facts were in the record. The claim failed because the proposed suppression motion would not have succeeded on the merits; thus no prejudice under the state and federal ineffective assistance standards.
Wiretap “first heard” requirement: The record established that intercepted calls were monitored at the DEA office in Bedford, New Hampshire. The Court took judicial notice that Bedford lies within the Northern District of Hillsborough County (N.H. R. Evid. 201), satisfying the order’s “first heard” requirement. Generic testimony about how monitoring could occur across New England did not undermine the case-specific testimony.
Unresolved statutory-rule interplay: The Court declined to address the defendant’s argument that RSA 570-A:9, IX(a) (motion must be made “before the trial”) “preempts” Rule 15(b)’s tighter deadline, finding the argument inadequately briefed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Indicted September 19, 2019, for drug charges under RSA 318-B:2, I and RSA 629:3.
Initial trial in March 2023 ended in mistrial due to a deadlocked jury; retrial dates moved from May to August and then to September 2023.
On June 22, 2023, Santiago filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap order, asserting noncompliance with the order’s requirement that intercepted communications be first heard in the Northern District of Hillsborough County (RSA 570-A:9, IX(a)).
The trial court denied the motion in a margin order as untimely under Rule 15(b), emphasizing that a new trial date was not an opportunity to litigate issues that could have been raised earlier.
At the September 2023 retrial, Santiago was convicted on both counts.
On appeal, he challenged the denial of the suppression motion, sought plain-error review, and alternatively argued ineffective assistance of counsel based on untimely filing.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Knight, 161 N.H. 338 (2011): The Court relied on Knight to underscore courts’ “legitimate interest in the enforcement of scheduling deadlines,” supporting the trial court’s discretion to deny an untimely suppression motion and to maintain credibility of deadlines across cases.
State v. Spaulding, 172 N.H. 205 (2019): Provided the “unsustainable exercise of discretion” framework: a decision is unsustainable only if “clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice” of the party’s case. The Court used this standard to affirm the denial without a hearing.
State v. Thompson, 161 N.H. 507 (2011): Recognized that direct review of ineffective assistance claims is “strongly disfavor[ed]” but allowed in “limited circumstances” when the record suffices. Applied here to reach Santiago’s claim on direct appeal.
State v. Fitzgerald, 173 N.H. 564 (2020): Set out the two-pronged ineffective assistance standard (deficiency and prejudice) under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, looking to federal law for guidance.
State v. Carnevale, 172 N.H. 700 (2019): Clarified the prejudice standard: a “reasonable probability” of a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
State v. McGurk, 157 N.H. 765 (2008): Key for rejecting the IAC claim: failure to file a suppression motion that would not have succeeded cannot constitute ineffective assistance.
State v. Chandler, 176 N.H. 216 (2023): Confirmed that the ineffective assistance standard is the same under the State and Federal Constitutions, leading the Court to the same result under both.

Legal Reasoning

1) Timeliness and the meaning of “dispositional conference” under Rule 15(b)

Rule 15(b)(1) fixes the deadline for suppression motions as the later of sixty days after a not-guilty plea in superior court or fifteen days after “the dispositional conference.” Santiago argued his June 22, 2023 filing was timely because it was within 15 days of a July 10, 2023 proceeding he characterized as the “last dispositional hearing.” The State countered that the case had a single dispositional conference in 2019 and that later events were status/scheduling conferences despite being memorialized on forms labeled “dispositional conference order.”

Examining the trial court docket appended to Santiago’s brief, the Supreme Court agreed with the State: the only dispositional conference occurred on December 17, 2019. By tethering the operative trigger to the actual nature of the proceeding shown on the docket rather than the caption on administrative forms, the Court clarified that:

“Dispositional conference” in Rule 15(b) refers to the bona fide dispositional conference.
Subsequent status or scheduling conferences do not reset the fifteen-day clock—even if the court’s forms bear the label “dispositional conference order.”

Santiago’s motion, filed roughly three and a half years after the 2019 dispositional conference, was therefore untimely under Rule 15(b).

2) Trial court discretion to deny an untimely suppression motion without a hearing

The Court reviewed the denial for an unsustainable exercise of discretion and affirmed. Citing Knight, it emphasized courts’ strong interest in enforcing deadlines to manage cases and preserve the credibility of scheduling orders. Given the extreme lateness (years beyond the Rule 15(b) deadline), the trial court’s refusal to hold a hearing was not “clearly untenable or unreasonable,” satisfying Spaulding’s framework.

3) Interplay between RSA 570-A:9, IX(a) and Rule 15(b)

Santiago argued that the wiretap statute’s broader “before the trial” language superseded Rule 15(b)’s specific, earlier deadline. The Court declined to address this potentially important statutory-rule interaction, finding the argument inadequately briefed. Practically, this leaves the question open in New Hampshire: whether RSA 570-A:9, IX(a) imposes an independent, statutory timeliness rule that “preempts” or otherwise affects Rule 15(b) remains unresolved. Litigants raising this issue must brief it thoroughly to obtain a ruling.

4) Ineffective assistance of counsel—prejudice first

Applying Fitzgerald and Carnevale, the Court addressed prejudice as a threshold matter. Under McGurk, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion that would not have succeeded. The merits question focused on whether the interception order’s “first heard in the Northern District of Hillsborough County” requirement was violated.

Santiago’s suppression motion relied on generic testimony from a DEA technical operations supervisor describing how intercepted calls could be monitored at various DEA offices across New England (including Boston and New Haven). But the case-specific DEA special agent assigned to the Manchester district office testified that the monitoring in this case occurred “at our DEA office in Bedford, New Hampshire.” The Court took judicial notice (N.H. R. Evid. 201) that Bedford lies within the Northern District of Hillsborough County. The agent’s testimony at both trials was consistent; the Court deemed it improbable that a different account would have emerged at a suppression hearing.

Because the record established compliance with the “first heard” requirement, a suppression motion would have failed. Without a reasonable probability of a different outcome, the ineffective assistance claim fails under both the State and Federal Constitutions (Chandler).

Impact and Implications

Procedural clarity for suppression deadlines: The decision clarifies that Rule 15(b)’s “dispositional conference” trigger points to the actual dispositional conference reflected on the docket. Later status or scheduling proceedings—even when memorialized on forms titled “dispositional conference order”—do not restart the suppression-motion clock. Defense counsel must track the true procedural landmarks; the safest practice is to file within sixty days of plea or within fifteen days of the actual dispositional conference, whichever is later.
Judicial management and late motions: Trial courts may enforce Rule 15(b) strictly and deny untimely motions without hearings, especially when delay is substantial. Parties should not expect a second trial setting to re-open suppression litigation that was available earlier.
Wiretap challenges and proof of monitoring location: For wiretap suppression arguments premised on “first heard” requirements, generic testimony about how interception systems can operate is insufficient to suggest noncompliance. Case-specific testimony identifying the actual monitoring location carries decisive weight, and appellate courts may take judicial notice of geographic facts to assess compliance.
Ineffective assistance litigation: The Court reaffirms that ineffective assistance claims can be decided on direct appeal when the record is complete, but such claims will fail absent a showing that the lost motion had merit. Counsel’s strategic or procedural missteps will not support reversal without demonstrable prejudice.
Unsettled statutory-rule tension: The question whether RSA 570-A:9, IX(a)’s “before trial” timing supersedes or interacts with Rule 15(b)’s specific deadline is left open. Future litigants should comprehensively brief the statutory text, Rule 15(b)’s purpose and history, separation-of-powers principles, and any relevant precedent to obtain guidance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dispositional conference: A formal, early case-management event in superior court at which the parties and court address case posture, discovery, and potential resolution. Under Rule 15(b), it can trigger the deadline for suppression motions. Not every later status or scheduling check-in is a “dispositional conference.”
Unsustainable exercise of discretion: An appellate standard that respects trial judges’ case-management authority. A ruling is reversed only if it is clearly untenable or unreasonable and prejudices the complaining party.
Wiretap “first heard” condition: Interception orders often specify where intercepted communications must be initially monitored or “first heard” to ensure jurisdictional compliance. Proving compliance generally turns on where law enforcement actually monitored the calls in the specific case.
Judicial notice (N.H. R. Evid. 201): Courts may accept certain facts as true without evidence because they are not reasonably disputable—e.g., widely known geographic facts such as the location of a municipality within a county district.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: A two-part test: (1) deficiency—counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice—a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Failure to file a meritless motion cannot meet the prejudice requirement.
Plain error: A doctrine allowing review of unpreserved errors that are clear, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. The Court did not need to apply it here because it rejected the timeliness and merits arguments even assuming preservation.

Conclusion

State v. Santiago provides a practical and significant clarification for New Hampshire criminal practice. The Supreme Court held that the Rule 15(b) suppression-motion deadline keyed to “the dispositional conference” is triggered by the actual dispositional conference shown on the docket; later status or scheduling events—even those memorialized on “dispositional conference” form orders—do not restart the clock. Trial courts may enforce these deadlines strictly and deny stale suppression motions without hearings.

On the merits of the ineffective assistance claim, the Court concluded that the suppression motion would not have succeeded because case-specific testimony established that the monitored intercepts were first heard in Bedford, within the Northern District of Hillsborough County, satisfying the wiretap order’s requirement—a conclusion strengthened by judicial notice of geographic facts. Without prejudice, the ineffective assistance claim fails under both state and federal standards.

The opinion underscores disciplined case management and evidentiary rigor in suppression practice, while leaving open an important question for future briefing: the interaction between RSA 570-A:9, IX(a)’s “before trial” timing and the more specific deadlines in Rule 15(b). For now, Santiago’s core message to practitioners is straightforward: know when your dispositional conference actually occurred, and file suppression motions accordingly—or risk forfeiture.

Concurrences: DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred; ABRAMSON, J., retired superior court justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, II, concurred.