Rule 1.4 – Arkansas’s New Framework for the Immediate Interim Suspension of Judges Accused of “Serious Crime” or Other Conduct Endangering the Administration of Justice

Introduction

On 12 June 2025, the Arkansas Supreme Court, acting per curiam, adopted a sweeping new provision—Rule 1.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Judicial Conduct—governing the interim suspension of judges. Prompted by a request from the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (JDDC) and modeled, in part, on the American Bar Association’s Model Rule, the Court simultaneously amended Rule 2.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities) to criminalize intimidation or retaliation against witnesses.

The decision arises against a backdrop of highly publicized disciplinary emergencies involving Arkansas judges over the last decade and the Court’s recent dialogue on due-process expectations for interim professional suspensions. The principal issues confronted in the opinion (and in two vigorous separate writings) include:

Whether the Court should bypass existing JDDC interim-suspension procedures and act directly;
The scope of conduct—labeled “serious crime” and “other misconduct”—that will trigger immediate removal from the bench with pay;
The level of procedural due process required for a temporary but potentially lengthy suspension;
Retroactivity and potential ex post facto concerns; and
The comparative treatment of attorneys and judges under Arkansas’s professional-disciplinary regimes.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court unanimously acknowledged the need for a codified interim-suspension mechanism but divided on its breadth and procedural safeguards:

Adoption of Rule 1.4. The new rule empowers the Supreme Court, on its own initiative or upon JDDC recommendation, to suspend a judge with pay immediately upon:
- Formal criminal charging with a “serious crime” (felony or specified misdemeanors); or
- A showing of “other misconduct” that poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or the administration of justice, including witness intimidation or retaliation.
Amendment of Rule 2.16. Judges are now expressly forbidden to “engage in intimidation or retaliation” against anyone cooperating with a JDDC investigation.
Immediate effectiveness & supremacy. Rule 1.4 applies to all pending and future complaints and controls over conflicting JDDC procedural rules.
Concurring view (Wood, J.). Emphasizes the rule’s added clarity, historical examples of summary suspensions without guidelines, and argues that due-process protections are enhanced, not reduced.
Dissenting view (Hudson, J.; joined by Baker, C.J.). Criticizes the rule for inadequate notice-and-hearing guarantees, vagueness, possible ex post facto application, and inconsistency with the Court’s recent pro-due-process stance in Hutchinson (2023) and Spencer (2025).

Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

ABA Model Rule on Interim Suspension. Provides the structural template, though Arkansas inserted expansive “other misconduct” language.
Historical Arkansas Orders (Boeckmann 2015; Maggio 2014). Cited by the concurrence to illustrate prior ad hoc suspensions without codified standards.
Hutchinson v. Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 2023 Ark. 86. The Court demanded greater due-process safeguards for attorneys facing interim suspension; the dissent argues parity should extend to judges.
Spencer v. State, 2025 Ark. 91. The Court’s emphasis on open proceedings and the public’s right to know is contrasted with Rule 1.4’s option to seal records and conduct in camera hearings.
Cambiano v. Arkansas State Bd. of Law Examiners, 357 Ark. 336 (2004). Recognizes potential ex post facto issues when disciplinary sanctions are enlarged.
Federal and sister-state due-process cases, most notably Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), referenced by the dissent.

2. Legal Reasoning

The per curiam opinion is concise, signaling that:

“The integrity of the judicial system demands prompt action whenever a judge has been formally charged with a serious crime … Almost all cases in which a judge is charged with a felony will result in an interim suspension; however, these rules give the Supreme Court discretion …”

Key elements of the Court’s reasoning include:

Protective—not punitive—purpose. By labeling the suspension “with pay,” the Court frames the measure as administrative, aimed at shielding the judiciary and public confidence rather than punishing the judge.
Need for flexibility. Mandatory suspension for any felony could invite political misuse; thus, the Court preserves discretionary authority.
Separation of investigative and adjudicative functions. The JDDC continues its fact-finding role while the Court alone wields suspension power, reducing delay in urgent situations.
Supremacy clause. To avoid procedural paralysis, Rule 1.4 explicitly overrides conflicting JDDC rules.

Notably absent, and highlighted by the dissent, is a detailed procedural roadmap (notice, hearing, timelines) equivalent to Arkansas attorney-discipline Rule 16. The majority’s silence implies reliance on the Court’s inherent supervisory power and the possibility of ad hoc procedural orders in individual cases.

3. Likely Impact

Immediate clarity and rapid response. Clerks, prosecutors, and the JDDC now possess a clear trigger for seeking urgent relief if a judge’s conduct jeopardizes justice or public safety.
Expanded substantive reach. The “other misconduct” category (e.g., witness intimidation) permits intervention even in the absence of criminal charges—significantly broadening disciplinary exposure.
Procedural litigation ahead. Expect constitutional challenges on (a) due-process adequacy, (b) ex post facto application to pre-2025 conduct, and (c) equal-protection parity with attorney discipline.
Comparative jurisprudence pressure. Sister states may consider Arkansas’s model but will weigh the dissent’s cautionary notes; conversely, Arkansas may face pressure to amend Rule 1.4 to insert formal notice-and-hearing timelines.
Cultural shift in judicial ethics enforcement. The prominence given to witness-intimidation prohibitions reflects a nationwide focus on whistle-blower protection within the judiciary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interim Suspension with Pay: A temporary removal from judicial duties where the judge continues receiving salary. It is designed to protect the system while avoiding premature financial punishment.
Serious Crime: Any felony, or misdemeanor involving dishonesty or obstruction (e.g., fraud, bribery, false swearing).
Other Misconduct: Non-criminal behavior that nevertheless endangers the administration of justice—chiefly actions that intimidate or retaliate against witnesses.
Cease-and-Desist Letter: A formal demand from JDDC counsel ordering the judge to stop specified conduct immediately, used as a preliminary, non-judicial remedy.
In Camera Hearing / Filing Under Seal: Proceedings or documents kept confidential, accessible only to the Court and parties, invoked here to balance transparency with investigative sensitivity.
Ex Post Facto Concern: The constitutional prohibition on retroactively imposing harsher penalties for conduct that predates the rule.

Conclusion

Rule 1.4 inaugurates a decisive—and controversial—era in Arkansas judicial discipline. By codifying an express mechanism for the immediate suspension of judges charged with serious crimes or implicated in harmful misconduct, the Supreme Court has fortified public confidence in the short term and provided long-requested guidance to the JDDC.

Yet the ruling’s brevity on procedural safeguards sets the stage for future constitutional litigation and possible rule amendments. The Court must eventually reconcile Rule 1.4 with its own due-process jurisprudence in Hutchinson and transparency commitments in Spencer. Stakeholders in the bench and bar should closely monitor implementation, propose clarifying modifications, and prepare for live disputes over notice, hearing rights, duration of suspensions, and retroactivity.

Ultimately, the decision signals the Court’s willingness to wield its supervisory power swiftly to protect the integrity of the judiciary, but invites the very deliberation and public comment that the dissent deems essential for lasting legitimacy.