Ruelas v. State: Nevada Clarifies that Motive-to-Lie Inquiries Are Not Vouching and Endorses Mid‑Trial Date‑Range Amendments Absent Prejudice

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Date: October 30, 2025

Case No.: 88530

Disposition: Order of Affirmance

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Ruelas (Jose) v. State, an appeal from convictions for four counts of lewdness with a child under 14 and one count of sexual assault of a minor under 14 arising from the abuse of the defendant’s stepdaughter over a six-year period. The appellant, Jose de Jesus Ruelas, challenged his convictions on multiple grounds, including the propriety of a mid-trial amendment to the information that removed narrower date ranges for charged acts, alleged prosecutorial vouching through expert testimony and closing argument, an indirect reference to his decision not to testify, improper prosecutorial bolstering, the correctness of a no-corroboration instruction, the sufficiency of the evidence, and cumulative error.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the Court delivers several clarifications of practical importance in child sexual abuse prosecutions: it confirms that (1) a mid-trial amendment removing specific time frames but keeping the overall charge window is permissible where no new offenses are added and the defense’s substantial rights are not prejudiced; (2) eliciting from a forensic interviewer whether the child disclosed for an ulterior motive is not the same as vouching for the child’s truthfulness; (3) a “two people know what happened” argument indirectly references a defendant’s silence and is improper, but can be harmless where isolated, cured by instructions, and the evidence is strong; and (4) Nevada’s no-corroboration instruction for sexual assault victims remains good law.

Summary of the Opinion

Mid-trial amendment to the information: Upheld. The State amended on day five of a seven-day trial by removing specific time frames for acts while leaving a six-year period intact. Under NRS 173.095(1), the amendment charged no additional or different offenses and did not prejudice substantial rights. The State’s theory remained constant, and the overall time span was unchanged.
Alleged prosecutorial vouching: Rejected. Neither the forensic interviewer’s testimony about lack of ulterior motive nor the State’s rebuttal pointing to the absence of motive to lie constituted vouching. Both were contextual responses to credibility attacks.
Indirect comment on the defendant’s failure to testify: The Court held the “two people” remark was an improper indirect reference to silence under Gunera-Pastrana v. State but concluded the error was harmless under plain-error review given its isolated nature, curative instructions, burden-of-proof reminders, and substantial evidence.
Prosecutorial bolstering: Rejected. The prosecutor’s explanation that some counts were not submitted because the State did not believe it had proven them beyond a reasonable doubt did not improperly invoke personal authority or experience; it was a fair response grounded in the record.
No-corroboration instruction: Approved. The instruction that a sexual assault victim’s testimony alone, if believed beyond a reasonable doubt, can sustain a conviction remains a correct statement of Nevada law under Gaxiola v. State.
Sufficiency of the evidence: Affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, especially under LaPierre’s “reliable indicia” standard for child witnesses.
Cumulative error: Denied. With only one harmless constitutional error identified, there were no errors to accumulate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

NRS 173.095(1): Authorizes amendment of an information “at any time before verdict” so long as it does not add a new or different offense and does not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights. The backbone for upholding the mid-trial amendment.
Viray v. State, 121 Nev. 159, 111 P.3d 1079 (2005): Approved mid-trial amendments conforming to the victim’s testimony where no new facts or charges were added. The Court analogized to Viray in supporting the amendment here.
Shannon v. State, 105 Nev. 782, 783 P.2d 942 (1989): Cited to reinforce Nevada’s tolerance for amendments absent prejudice. Although factually distinguishable, its essence supported the result.
Cunningham v. State, 100 Nev. 396, 683 P.2d 500 (1984): Clarifies that time is not an essential element unless otherwise specified; the State need only provide a date or range “as close as possible.” Recognizes child victims’ limited precision. Guided the acceptance of a broad date range spanning the charged period.
Jennings v. State, 116 Nev. 488, 998 P.2d 557 (2000): Emphasizes that fair notice of the prosecution’s theory and adequate time to prepare a defense is the core concern. The Court noted the State’s theory remained consistent here.
Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 80 P.3d 93 (2003): Provides the plain-error framework when no objection was made at trial for alleged vouching.
Perez v. State, 129 Nev. 850, 313 P.3d 862 (2013): A witness cannot vouch for another witness’s truthfulness. The Court distinguished the challenged forensic interviewer testimony from Perez because it probed motive, not veracity.
Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 118 P.3d 184 (2005): Prosecutorial misconduct analysis requires contextual evaluation; isolated comments generally do not warrant reversal. Applied in rejecting the vouching claim from rebuttal argument.
Harkness v. State, 107 Nev. 800, 820 P.2d 759 (1991) and United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968): Define indirect comments on silence—those a jury would “naturally and necessarily” take as referencing the defendant’s failure to testify.
Gunera-Pastrana v. State, 137 Nev. 295, 490 P.3d 1262 (2021): Held that “Two people know what happened, and [the victim] told you what happened” is an improper indirect reference to a defendant’s silence. The same substantive statement appeared here; the Court followed Gunera-Pastrana to find error but not prejudice.
Barlow v. State, 138 Nev. 207, 507 P.3d 1185 (2022) and Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 163 P.3d 408 (2007): Plain-error prejudice standards; the Court used these to evaluate whether the silence-related error affected the verdict or the integrity of proceedings.
Coleman v. State, 111 Nev. 657, 895 P.2d 653 (1995) and Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 17 P.3d 397 (2001): Frequency/intensity of improper statements matters, and curative instructions can mitigate prejudice—factors the Court credited here.
State v. Rodriquez, 31 Nev. 342, 102 P. 863 (1909); Collier v. State, 101 Nev. 473, 705 P.2d 1126 (1985), modified by Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 800 P.2d 175 (1990): Prosecutors must avoid injecting personal beliefs or invoking their authority/experience to sway a jury. The Court held the rebuttal remarks stayed within proper bounds.
Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 119 P.3d 1225 (2005): Affirms that a sexual assault victim’s uncorroborated testimony, if believed beyond a reasonable doubt, can sustain a conviction. The Court reaffirmed Gaxiola and declined to revisit it.
Martinez v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 70, 558 P.3d 346 (2024): Cited for plain-error review of unpreserved instruction challenges.
McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 825 P.2d 571 (1992): The sufficiency standard—any rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt when evidence is viewed in the State’s favor.
LaPierre v. State, 108 Nev. 528, 836 P.2d 56 (1992): In sexual assault cases, a victim’s testimony can suffice; for child victims, the Court requires “reliable indicia” that the charged number of acts occurred, acknowledging the difficulty of precise timing.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Conclusions

1) Mid-Trial Amendment of the Information

Under NRS 173.095(1), the State may amend the information anytime prior to verdict if no new/different offense is charged and the defendant’s substantial rights are not prejudiced. The Court emphasized two Cunningham principles relevant to child sex cases: time is rarely an element of the offense, and child victims often cannot pinpoint dates, so the State’s obligation is to allege dates “as close as possible.” The State’s second amended information removed specific sub-ranges tied to individual acts but preserved the same six-year overall charging window and did not alter the prosecution’s theory or add charges. In reliance on Viray and Shannon, the Court found no abuse of discretion: the defendant had adequate notice and time to prepare a defense, and the amendment conformed to the realities of child testimony without compromising substantial rights. The mistrial denial was also proper on the same grounds.

2) Alleged Vouching Through Forensic Interviewer and Rebuttal Argument

On cross, defense counsel pressed the forensic interviewer (Espinoza) on her ability to assess truthfulness; she clarified she does not opine on veracity but considers potential ulterior motives for disclosures. On redirect, the State asked whether Espinoza uncovered an ulterior motive. The Court drew a careful line from Perez: asking about motive to lie is not the same as opining on truthfulness; the former is a classic credibility inquiry, the latter an impermissible expert endorsement of a witness’s veracity. Hence, no vouching occurred.

As to closing, the prosecutor argued that the Child Advocacy Center was designed to elicit truthful disclosures and posed rhetorical questions about why the child would lie or testify years later if she fabricated events. Evaluated in context under Anderson, these statements were fair rebuttal to defense attacks on credibility and did not imply personal knowledge of truth or otherwise vouch for the witness. No prosecutorial misconduct was found.

3) Indirect Reference to the Defendant’s Silence—Error, But Harmless

The Court identified one constitutional error: the rebuttal statement that these crimes happen in secret between two people, “and one of those people has told you the details,” mirrors the language condemned in Gunera-Pastrana as an indirect reference to a defendant’s failure to testify. Under Harkness/Lyon, jurors would “naturally and necessarily” understand the remark as highlighting that the defendant did not take the stand and shifting a burden to “disprove” the crimes. However, because trial counsel did not object, plain-error review governed. On prejudice, the Court pointed to:

Isolated occurrence: The comment was made once, limiting potential impact (Coleman).
Curative instructions: The jury was expressly told to draw no adverse inference from the defendant’s silence and reminded that the State bears the burden beyond a reasonable doubt; the prosecutor also reiterated that burden (Barlow; Leonard).
Strength of the evidence: The victim’s testimony, her mother’s corroborative testimony (reporting at age six; discovery of abuse-related text messages at age twelve; therapy and police report), and the forensic interview testimony provided substantial support for the verdicts.

Given these factors, the improper comment did not have a prejudicial impact on the verdict or seriously affect the integrity of the proceedings; reversal was unwarranted.

4) Alleged Improper Bolstering of Prosecutorial Authority

Defense argued that by explaining some counts were not submitted because the State did not feel it had met the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, the prosecution improperly invoked its authority and experience, inviting undue reliance (Collier; Howard). The Court disagreed: in context, the remarks connected directly to the evidentiary record and the State’s screening role, rebutting defense credibility attacks without asserting personal belief divorced from the evidence. No plain error occurred.

5) No-Corroboration Jury Instruction

Ruelas asked the Court to overturn or broaden Gaxiola’s no-corroboration instruction for sexual assault victims. The Court declined. The instruction—“There is no requirement that the testimony of a victim of Sexual Assault be corroborated, and his/her testimony standing alone, if believed beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty”—remains an accurate statement of Nevada law and was properly given. Martinez supplied the plain-error standard for this unpreserved challenge.

6) Sufficiency of the Evidence

Applying McNair, the Court assessed whether any rational juror could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the State’s favor. Under LaPierre, a child’s testimony can sustain a conviction provided there are “reliable indicia” that the charged acts occurred, even if the child cannot recall specific dates. Despite memory gaps, the victim’s testimony—combined with corroboration from her mother and the forensic interview—supplied sufficient particularity and indicia to support the counts of conviction. The jury’s role in parsing which counts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt was respected, and the verdicts were affirmed.

7) Cumulative Error

Because the only error identified (the indirect comment on silence) was harmless, there were no errors to aggregate. The cumulative error claim failed.

Impact: Why This Opinion Matters

Amendments in child sexual abuse prosecutions: Ruelas reinforces prosecutorial flexibility to amend date ranges mid-trial to conform to testimony, so long as the overall case theory and charging window remain consistent and the defense is not prejudiced. Defense strategies that hinge on narrow date ranges should anticipate this possibility and prepare material prejudice showings.
Vouching boundaries clarified: The Court draws a functional distinction between (i) an expert testifying about truthfulness (forbidden) and (ii) exploring a witness’s motive to fabricate (permissible). Forensic interviewers can be questioned about ulterior motive without crossing into vouching.
Closing argument caution: The “two people know” trope remains improper under Gunera-Pastrana and now again under Ruelas. Prosecutors should avoid formulations that implicitly highlight a defendant’s silence. Safer alternatives include focusing on the internal consistency of the complainant’s account and circumstantial corroboration without referencing the dyadic nature of the alleged events.
No-corroboration instruction stays intact: Nevada continues to allow sexual assault convictions based solely on the victim’s testimony if believed beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense attacks must therefore focus on credibility, particularity under LaPierre, and any inconsistencies or external impeachment.
Standards of review are outcome determinative: Many claims failed under plain-error review due to lack of objections. Preservation at trial remains essential for meaningful appellate relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Amending an information: The formal charging document can be adjusted before verdict, but only if it does not add new/different offenses and does not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights (e.g., by unfair surprise or undermining preparation).
Vouching: When a witness (or prosecutor) tells the jury another witness is telling the truth. Experts can discuss interview protocols and potential motives to lie, but cannot endorse a witness’s veracity.
Prosecutorial bolstering: When a prosecutor uses their personal authority, experience, or beliefs to suggest guilt independently of the evidence. It invites jurors to trust the prosecutor rather than their own evaluation of the record.
Indirect comment on silence: Statements that, in context, would lead a jury to notice or penalize the defendant for not testifying (e.g., “only two people know what happened, and one told you”). These violate the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Plain error: A stringent appellate standard applied when no trial objection was made. The appellant must show a clear error that affected substantial rights and impacted the verdict or the integrity/reputation of the proceedings.
Harmless error: Even constitutional errors can be affirmed if the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt (or under the applicable standard) that the error did not affect the outcome.
No-corroboration instruction: A directive telling jurors they may convict on a sexual assault victim’s uncorroborated testimony if they believe it beyond a reasonable doubt.
Particularity and reliable indicia (LaPierre): In child sexual assault cases, while exact dates may be unavailable, the testimony must reliably indicate the number and nature of the acts alleged.

Practice Pointers

For prosecutors:
- When amending time frames mid-trial, document that the overall timeline and theory are unchanged and ensure defense has fair notice.
- Avoid “two people know” rhetoric. Prefer arguments rooted in the internal coherence of testimony, corroborative circumstances, and the State’s burden.
- When addressing credibility, focus on motive to fabricate and the consistency of disclosures; avoid personal assurances of truthfulness.
For defense:
- Preserve objections to amendments, vouching, and silence-related comments to avoid plain-error hurdles.
- On date-range amendments, be prepared to articulate concrete prejudice (e.g., alibi, lost evidence tethered to specific dates, surprise undermining cross).
- Use LaPierre’s “reliable indicia” requirement to probe the specificity and number of acts, particularly where memory is limited.
For trial courts:
- When permitting amendments, make findings on notice, theory consistency, and prejudice.
- Give no-adverse-inference and burden-of-proof instructions; consider contemporaneous curatives if closing argument skirts silence comments.
- Police the vouching line by allowing motive-to-fabricate evidence while precluding expert assessments of veracity.

Conclusion

Ruelas v. State affirms convictions while offering several doctrinal clarifications with recurring significance in child sexual abuse litigation. The Court confirms that mid-trial date-range amendments remain permissible under NRS 173.095(1) where the State’s theory and overall timeline are constant and no prejudice is shown, underscoring Nevada’s sensitivity to the evidentiary realities of child victim testimony. It meaningfully distinguishes proper credibility rebuttal—probing for motive to lie—from prohibited vouching, and it reiterates that the oft-used “two people know” trope is an improper indirect reference to a defendant’s silence. Yet, such error can be harmless when isolated, counterbalanced by instructions, and accompanied by substantial evidence.

Finally, the Court reaffirms two pillars of Nevada sexual assault jurisprudence: the continued validity of the no-corroboration instruction (Gaxiola) and LaPierre’s flexible “reliable indicia” standard for child witnesses. The opinion thus provides pragmatic guidance to prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial judges alike on amendments, closing argument boundaries, and jury instruction practice—while reinforcing the centrality of notice, the burden of proof, and the jury’s role in resolving credibility.