Rubin v. United States (2d Cir. 2025): Right-of-Way, Micromobility, and Summary Judgment in FTCA Traffic Litigation

I. Introduction

Rubin v. United States, No. 24-2871 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 2025) (summary order), arises from a collision in Brooklyn between an electric scooter ridden by Louis Rubin and a vehicle owned by the United States and driven by a federal employee, John Valdes. Rubin sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence by Valdes in executing a left turn across Rubin’s path.

The case sits at the intersection of several important legal themes:

• The FTCA’s incorporation of state tort and traffic law when adjudicating negligence claims against the federal government.
• The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) on right-of-way for left-turning drivers (§ 1141), the duty of due care to avoid collisions with vulnerable road users (§ 1146), and the treatment of electric scooters as vehicles with the same rights and duties as bicycles and motor vehicles (§§ 1234, 1281, 1284).
• The rigorous federal standard governing summary judgment and the limits of resolving negligence disputes on a paper (and video) record, especially where factual inferences about speed, distance, and visibility remain contestable.

The district court (E.D.N.Y., DeArcy Hall, J.) granted summary judgment to the United States, holding that Valdes had the right-of-way and that Rubin’s failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Second Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded for a bench trial, concluding that there are at least two genuine disputes of material fact:

1. Who had the right-of-way at the moment of the collision under VTL § 1141.
2. Whether Valdes, even assuming he had the right-of-way, was comparatively negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout and avoid the collision, particularly given his obstructed view of the area where scooters and bicycles travel.

Although the decision is a summary order and “does not have precedential effect” under the Second Circuit’s rules, it is citable and offers significant persuasive guidance on how federal courts should handle FTCA traffic cases involving micromobility devices like electric scooters, and on the proper application of New York’s traffic statutes at the summary judgment stage.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The collision occurred at the intersection of Avenue K and East 36th Street in Brooklyn, New York. Relevant features:

• Avenue K had a single lane of traffic in each direction.
• The intersection at East 36th Street had no traffic lights or stop signs.
• Several vehicles were stopped in the eastbound Avenue K lane; to their right were parked cars.

Rubin was riding an electric scooter eastbound on Avenue K, traveling in the narrow space between the stopped eastbound vehicles and the parked cars. He was below the legal speed limit for electric scooters but moving faster than the stopped or slowing eastbound traffic. As he approached the intersection, he passed three stopped vehicles on his left and parked vehicles on his right.

Among the three stopped eastbound vehicles was a large white van positioned behind a white SUV, both just before the intersection. The white SUV proceeded through the intersection; the white van remained stopped—apparently either waiting for a traffic light a block ahead or yielding to allow Valdes to turn.

Valdes was driving a government-owned car westbound on Avenue K. On reaching the intersection, he paused for three to four seconds in the westbound lane before initiating a left turn across the eastbound lane to head south on East 36th Street. When he began turning:

• His view of the right-hand portion of the eastbound lane (where scooters and bicycles travel) was obstructed by the white van.
• Rubin was approximately two car-lengths away from the intersection, traveling to the right of the white van.

As Valdes turned, Rubin—seeing only that the white SUV had safely passed through the intersection and unable to see Valdes’s vehicle behind the stopped white van—continued at speed and entered the intersection to the right of the van. Just before the collision, Valdes’s car was nearly perpendicular to Avenue K, having mostly entered East 36th Street but not yet fully cleared the intersection. Rubin’s scooter then struck the right rear quarter of Valdes’s vehicle, causing Rubin to be thrown forward into the intersection.

B. Procedural History

• Rubin exhausted his FTCA administrative remedies and filed suit on January 24, 2022.
• After discovery, the United States moved for summary judgment.
• The district court granted the motion, holding that:
  • Valdes had the right-of-way when he was “fully in the intersection” and had nearly completed his turn.
  • Rubin’s failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
• Rubin appealed, arguing, among other things, that:
  • He had the right-of-way under VTL § 1141.
  • Valdes was negligent as a matter of law in turning left across his path, or at least comparatively negligent.
  • Valdes failed in his duty to watch for scooters before turning.

C. Holding and Disposition

The Second Circuit, reviewing de novo, vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded for a bench trial. It held that:

1. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to who had the right-of-way under VTL § 1141. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Rubin was “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” when Valdes initiated his turn, which would give Rubin the right-of-way.
2. There is a separate, genuine dispute as to whether Valdes was comparatively negligent even if he had the right-of-way, because a reasonable factfinder could find that he failed to keep a proper lookout—particularly since he turned despite an obstructed view of the scooter/bicycle portion of the lane.

The court emphasized that these fact-intensive issues cannot be resolved as a matter of law on the current record, even with video evidence, and must instead be resolved by the trial judge sitting as factfinder under the FTCA.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. FTCA and State Law: Hamm, Martin, Carlson, and the Statutory Framework

The court begins by situating the case within the FTCA’s framework:

• Hamm v. United States, 483 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), is cited for the proposition that the FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing tort suits against the United States in specified circumstances.
• Martin v. United States, 605 U.S. 395 (2025), is cited for the rule that “the FTCA’s liability rule incorporates state law”: federal courts apply the substantive law of the state where the misconduct occurred.
• Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), reinforces that an FTCA action exists only if the state where the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct.
• The controlling statutes include:
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) – jurisdiction for FTCA claims based on state law negligence.
  • 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. – definitional and procedural provisions of the FTCA.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2402 – FTCA cases are tried by the court without a jury.

As the accident occurred in Brooklyn, the applicable substantive law is New York tort law, including the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.

B. New York Vehicle and Traffic Law and Negligence Per Se: Dooley and the VTL Provisions

The opinion relies heavily on New York’s statutory traffic scheme and on prior Second Circuit recognition of how those statutes define negligence:

• Dooley v. United States, 83 F.4th 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2023) – holds that a violation of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law is negligence as a matter of law (often termed negligence per se). This elevates the importance of determining whether either party violated a VTL provision.

Key VTL provisions invoked:

• VTL § 1141 – Left-turn right-of-way:

  A driver intending to turn left through an intersection must “yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.”

• VTL § 1146 – Duty of due care to avoid collision with pedestrians, bicyclists, and (by extension, through § 1281) scooter riders. It reinforces that right-of-way does not relieve a driver of the obligation to avoid collisions where reasonably possible.
• VTL § 1281(1) – Provides that riders of electric scooters are:

  “granted all of the rights and subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle and the rider of a bicycle.”

  Thus, scooters are legally assimilated to vehicles and bicycles for traffic-law purposes.
• VTL § 1234(a) – Requires bicycles to travel near the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, subject to exceptions.
• VTL § 1284(1) – Extends similar lane-positioning rules to riders of electric scooters, placing them in the same right-hand portion of the lane as bicycles.

Together, these provisions frame the duties of both Valdes and Rubin:

• Valdes, as a left-turning driver, had to yield to oncoming traffic that was “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.”
• Whatever his right-of-way status, he had to exercise due care and keep a proper lookout, particularly for scooters/bikes traveling in the right-hand portion of the lane he was crossing.
• Rubin, as a scooter rider, had both the rights and the duties of a vehicle driver and bicyclist—including the duty to keep a proper lookout and to travel lawfully in the right-hand portion of the road.

C. Summary Judgment Standards: Anderson, Borley, Bey, R.B. Ventures, and Hayes

The Second Circuit invokes the familiar federal standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56:

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) – Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) – A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome under the governing law; a dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury (or factfinder) could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
• Borley v. United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021) – Clarifies that appellate review of summary judgment is de novo.
• Bey v. City of New York, 999 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2021) – Reaffirms that the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
• R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1997) – Emphasizes that if “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” or if any evidence supports a reasonable inference for the nonmovant, summary judgment is improper.
• Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996) – Underscores that it is the factfinder’s role to weigh the evidence, which cannot be usurped at the summary judgment stage when material facts are in dispute.

These citations frame the Second Circuit’s core conclusion: on the disputed issues of right-of-way and comparative negligence, “reasonable minds could differ” based on the evidence (including the video). Consequently, those issues must be resolved by the trial judge, not on summary judgment.

D. Comparative Negligence and Multiple Proximate Causes: Carias

The court cites:

• Carias v. Grove, 186 A.D.3d 1484, 1484 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) – Stands for the proposition that:

  “Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant moving for summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from fault.”

  This case anchors the court’s insistence that the United States, as the summary judgment movant, had to show that Valdes was not merely less negligent than Rubin, but “free from fault.”

In the Second Circuit’s view, the record does not compel a finding that Valdes was free from fault. The possibility that his conduct was a contributing proximate cause is enough to defeat summary judgment.

E. Appellate Practice and Bench Trial: Eastman Kodak and 28 U.S.C. § 2402

Two additional authorities are noteworthy:

• Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 2006) – Cited for the principle that appellate courts may consider “additional support that a party provides for a proposition presented below.” The Second Circuit uses this to hold that Rubin’s reliance on VTL § 1141 on appeal is not waived, because his underlying contention—that Valdes’s left turn was unsafe and improper—was presented to the district court even if that specific section number was not.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2402 – Provides that claims under the FTCA “shall be tried by the court without a jury.” The court links this to 32 C.F.R. § 750.32(b), reinforcing that a district judge will serve as factfinder on remand.

This has practical significance: while the summary judgment standard remains the same, the nature of the factfinder (judge rather than jury) may influence trial strategy and the way evidence is presented and evaluated in FTCA traffic cases.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. FTCA and the Choice of Law

The court first confirms that:

• The FTCA provides only a limited waiver of sovereign immunity; Congress did not create a standalone federal tort regime.
• Under Martin and Carlson, FTCA liability mirrors the liability of a private person under the law of the place where the act or omission occurred—in this case, New York.
• Therefore, New York’s negligence law and its vehicular statutes (VTL) define the scope of Valdes’s and Rubin’s duties and the conditions under which the United States may be liable.

From this, the court moves directly to the New York VTL provisions governing left turns, right-of-way, and the treatment of scooters and bicycles.

B. Genuine Dispute 1: Right-of-Way Under VTL § 1141

The first central issue is: who had the right-of-way at the moment of collision?

The district court had reasoned, based on unspecified New York case law, that when a left-turning vehicle is already “fully in the intersection” and has nearly completed its turn, it acquires the right-of-way, and the oncoming driver must yield and avoid collision. On that reasoning, because Valdes’s car was almost perpendicular to Avenue K and nearly clear of the intersection when struck in the rear quarter, Valdes was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Second Circuit disagrees with resolving that question on summary judgment, for two reasons:

1. Statutory focus on the time the turn is initiated. The court treats VTL § 1141 as the “critical law” for left-turn cases: it imposes a duty on a driver intending to turn left to yield to any oncoming vehicle that is either:
   • already within the intersection, or
   • “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.”
   The key inquiry is whether Rubin’s scooter met that standard when Valdes began his turn, not merely where their respective vehicles were at the split-second of impact.
2. Disputed factual inferences from the video. While certain facts are undisputed (e.g., Rubin was about two car-lengths away as Valdes started to turn, the white van blocked the mutual view), the import of these facts is debatable. A reasonable factfinder could conclude:
   • That Rubin’s proximity and speed made him an “immediate hazard” when Valdes commenced his turn, thus giving Rubin the right-of-way under § 1141; or
   • That Rubin was sufficiently distant or moving in a way that did not constitute an immediate hazard, leaving Valdes with the right-of-way once his turn was substantially underway.

The Second Circuit underscores that even with video evidence, the question of whether Rubin was “so close as to constitute an immediate hazard” is a classic fact question—involving assessments of distance, speed, timing, and reasonable perception— that cannot be resolved as a matter of law where multiple reasonable inferences are possible.

The court also implicitly corrects an overly rigid use of the “fully in the intersection” line of case law:

• Right-of-way analyses must be grounded in the statute’s “immediate hazard” language.
• The mere fact that a left-turning car has almost completed its turn does not by itself retroactively erase any potential violation of § 1141 at the moment the turn was initiated.

C. Genuine Dispute 2: Comparative Negligence and the Duty to Keep a Proper Lookout

The second central issue is whether Valdes was comparatively negligent, even if he ultimately had the right-of-way.

Two key principles drive the court’s analysis:

1. Right-of-way is not an absolute license. New York law, reflected in Carias and grounded in §§ 1146 and 1281, makes clear that:
   • A driver with the right-of-way still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision, including keeping a proper lookout and using their senses reasonably.
   • There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Thus, proving that the other party was negligent does not automatically absolve the right-of-way holder of fault.
2. Obstructed view and micromobility users. It is undisputed that:
   • Valdes’s view of the right-hand portion of the eastbound lane (where bicycles and scooters must ride under §§ 1234(a) and 1284(1)) was obstructed by the stopped white van when he initiated his turn.
   • Despite this, he proceeded with his turn after only a brief pause.
   The Second Circuit reasons that a factfinder could plausibly conclude that a reasonably prudent driver in Valdes’s position should have:
   • Proceeded more slowly, or
   • Adjusted the manner of turning in order to ensure that the right-hand portion of the lane—where scooters and bicycles are expected and required to travel—was clear.

In other words, the court views it as potentially negligent for a left-turning driver to proceed at ordinary speed into an intersection when his view of the likely path of scooters and bicycles is blocked, especially where those road users are statutorily entitled to the same rights as other vehicles. That potential negligence suffices to create a material dispute.

The opinion explicitly notes that Rubin himself is subject to a similar comparative negligence analysis: if he had the right-of-way, he still had a duty to keep a proper lookout and avoid collision where reasonably possible; his failure to do so could also be found negligent. The case thus demonstrates how New York’s comparative fault regime allows liability to be apportioned between multiple negligent actors.

D. Treatment of the Video Evidence

Although the core facts are “captured in a video of the traffic accident,” the Second Circuit does not treat the video as dispositive for summary judgment purposes. This is significant:

• Video evidence may clarify what happened (e.g., positions of vehicles, timing, approximate distances).
• But where the video does not unequivocally resolve key issues such as relative speed, perception, and reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, it cannot substitute for the factfinder’s role.
• The court’s approach implicitly contrasts with situations where a video “utterly discredits” the nonmovant’s version of events; here, the video leaves room for reasonable minds to differ.

Thus, even a seemingly objective recording does not automatically justify summary judgment where material inferences (not just raw facts) remain for the factfinder.

E. Bench Trial and the Role of the Factfinder

The court ends by emphasizing that, because this is an FTCA action, the case will be tried to a judge without a jury. Still, the fundamental division of labor remains:

• The district judge, as factfinder, must “weigh evidence in the first instance” (quoting Hayes).
• The judge must determine:
  • Who had the right-of-way under § 1141 at the relevant moment; and
  • Whether the person with the right-of-way nevertheless breached a duty of care by failing, when reasonably possible, to avoid the collision.
• Any of several outcomes is legally possible:
  • Valdes solely negligent;
  • Rubin solely negligent;
  • Both comparatively negligent, with fault apportioned between them.

The decision thus preserves the trial court’s evaluative function and rejects an overly aggressive use of summary judgment in complex traffic accident cases involving shared fault and micromobility.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For FTCA Traffic Litigation

This decision, though nonprecedential, has important practical consequences for FTCA cases:

• Difficulty of summary judgment for the United States in contested negligence cases:
  • Where right-of-way and comparative fault are both fairly disputable, courts will often require a full bench trial.
  • Government defendants cannot rely solely on the existence of a video or the assertion of right-of-way to obtain judgment as a matter of law.
• Centrality of state traffic statutes:
  • As Martin and Dooley emphasize, FTCA liability is driven by state negligence law and traffic codes, here the VTL.
  • Violation of a VTL provision (e.g., § 1141) can amount to negligence per se, making careful statutory analysis critical to FTCA defense and plaintiffs’ strategy.

B. For New York Traffic Law and Micromobility

The case is particularly significant in the context of electric scooters and other micromobility devices:

• Affirmation of scooter status as “vehicles”:
  • By citing VTL § 1281(1), the court reinforces that scooters are fully part of the vehicular traffic system, with the same rights and duties as bicycles and motor vehicles.
  • Motorists must therefore be aware of, and look for, scooters in the same way they look for other vehicles.
• Obligations where the scooter/bicycle area is obstructed:
  • The opinion suggests that left-turning drivers cannot safely rely on the visible portion of the main traffic lane when their view of the right-hand edge—where bicycles and scooters are expected—is blocked.
  • Reasonable care may require slowing significantly, inching forward, or otherwise adjusting one’s maneuver to ensure that the scooter/bicycle path is clear before turning.
• Shared responsibility:
  • Scooter riders, like bicyclists and drivers, must keep a proper lookout and adapt their speed to conditions (e.g., stopped traffic and blocked sightlines).
  • This underscores the mutual nature of duties on the road and the likelihood of comparative fault apportionment in collision litigation.

C. For Litigation Strategy

The opinion carries several strategic lessons for practitioners:

• Preservation and development of legal theories:
  • Even where a particular statutory citation (like § 1141) is not made below, arguments rooted in the same factual and legal theory (e.g., improper left turn) may be sufficiently preserved for appeal, especially under Eastman Kodak.
• Use of video evidence:
  • Videos are powerful but not inherently dispositive. Counsel should:
    • Use expert testimony and careful analysis to explain what the video shows (and does not show) regarding distances, speeds, and perception.
    • Be prepared to argue that the inferences from the video remain for the factfinder.
• Summary judgment motions:
  • Defendants in New York traffic cases must anticipate that courts will be reluctant to grant summary judgment when:
    • Visibility is contested or obstructed;
    • Micromobility users are involved; and
    • There is a colorable argument that both parties may have violated duties under the VTL.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Sovereign Immunity

The United States is generally immune from lawsuits unless it consents to be sued. The FTCA is one such consent: it allows private parties to sue the federal government for certain torts (like negligence) committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Crucially:

• The FTCA says: treat the United States “like a private person” under state law in the place where the wrong occurred.
• There is no jury; the case is tried before a federal judge (28 U.S.C. § 2402).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a way to decide a case (or part of a case) without a trial. It is appropriate only if:

• There is no genuine dispute about any fact that matters to the outcome, and
• The law is clearly on the moving party’s side.

If there are conflicting reasonable interpretations of the evidence—e.g., different views on who had the right-of-way or whether a driver acted reasonably—then those issues must be decided at trial, not on summary judgment.

C. Right-of-Way and VTL § 1141 (“Immediate Hazard”)

“Right-of-way” refers to who has the legal right to proceed first in a traffic situation. Under VTL § 1141:

• A driver turning left must yield to oncoming vehicles that are already in the intersection or so close that they pose an immediate danger of collision.
• If the oncoming vehicle is an “immediate hazard” when the left turn begins, the oncoming driver has the right-of-way; if not, the left-turning driver may enjoy the right-of-way as the turn progresses.

Determining whether a vehicle was an “immediate hazard” often involves careful fact-finding: How fast was it moving? How far away was it? How clear was the view?

D. Comparative Negligence and Proximate Cause

Comparative negligence means that if more than one person’s negligence contributed to an accident, each person’s fault is weighed, and damages are apportioned accordingly.

• Proximate cause is a legal concept describing a cause that is sufficiently connected to the harm to justify liability.
• There can be many proximate causes of the same accident: for example, both a scooter rider’s speed and a driver’s improper left turn may each be proximate causes of the collision.

Under New York law, a defendant moving for summary judgment must show that they are entirely free from fault to prevail (Carias). It is not enough to argue that the plaintiff was more negligent.

E. Negligence Per Se from VTL Violations

Negligence per se occurs when a person violates a statute designed to protect a class of persons from a particular type of harm. In New York, violating the VTL generally constitutes negligence as a matter of law (Dooley). This simplifies part of the negligence analysis:

• If a driver violates VTL § 1141 by failing to yield while turning left to an oncoming “immediate hazard,” that violation itself is treated as negligence, leaving only questions like causation and damages to be resolved.

F. Bench Trial vs. Jury Trial

In ordinary civil cases, a jury usually decides disputed facts. But under the FTCA:

• The judge serves as both factfinder and law-giver.
• Although the summary judgment standard is the same, the eventual trial will involve the judge directly assessing credibility, weighing evidence, and making factual findings about right-of-way and comparative negligence.

VII. Conclusion

Rubin v. United States underscores several important points in modern traffic and FTCA jurisprudence:

• In FTCA cases, state law controls the substantive negligence analysis, and New York’s VTL provisions—especially § 1141 (left turns) and § 1146 (due care)—are central in assigning fault in vehicle–scooter collisions.
• Right-of-way is not an absolute shield: even a driver who enjoys the right-of-way may be held comparatively negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout or to proceed with appropriate caution, particularly where sightlines are obstructed and micromobility users are likely to be present.
• Electric scooter riders, by virtue of VTL § 1281, are fully integrated into the vehicular traffic regime. They have the same rights—and the same duties—as drivers and bicyclists, and litigation will treat them accordingly.
• Claims of “no genuine dispute of material fact” are difficult to sustain in nuanced traffic collisions where video evidence still allows competing reasonable inferences about distance, speed, hazard, and reasonable behavior.

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the Second Circuit’s decision in Rubin offers a detailed and instructive approach to handling FTCA traffic accidents in the era of micromobility. It emphasizes rigorous adherence to state traffic statutes, caution in granting summary judgment on contested negligence issues, and an appreciation of the shared duties of all road users—drivers, bicyclists, and electric scooter riders alike.