RPC 3.4(c) Reaches Verbal Court Orders—but Discipline Requires a Clear Order and Clear Proof of “Knowing” Disobedience

I. Introduction

In re Clark, 374 Or 683 (2025), is an Oregon attorney-discipline decision arising from a disputed verbal directive issued at the end of a July 2016 trust-related hearing. The Oregon State Bar charged attorney Anne-Marie W. Clark (respondent) with knowingly disobeying a court order in violation of RPC 3.4(c), based on an allegation that a trial judge ordered respondent—then serving as trustee of a special needs trust for her cousin, Allen—to electronically deposit $20 per month into Allen’s bank account, and that respondent failed to do so.

The case presented two core issues:

Scope of RPC 3.4(c): Does the rule apply to the knowing violation of a verbal court order, or only to written orders?
Proof of “knowing disobedience”: Did the Bar prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the judge actually ordered $20-per-month deposits and that respondent understood the order to require that?

On de novo review of a divided trial-panel decision, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that although RPC 3.4(c) does reach verbal orders, the Bar failed to prove a violation by clear and convincing evidence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court made two principal holdings:

Legal holding (rule interpretation): RPC 3.4(c) prohibits knowingly disobeying both written and verbal court orders. The text does not distinguish between the two, and limiting the rule to written orders would undermine its purpose.
Disposition (proof failure): The Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence either (a) that the trial court’s oral directive required respondent to provide $20 per month, or (b) that respondent actually knew she was required to do so. The transcript was ambiguous; respondent’s and her counsel’s contemporaneous understanding plausibly differed from the Bar’s interpretation; and respondent’s post-hearing conduct aligned with that understanding.

Result: “The complaint is dismissed.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The court’s analysis draws on interpretive methodology, uniform-rule context, discipline burdens of proof, and credibility/knowledge frameworks. Each cited authority plays a distinct role.

1. Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists, 353 Or 85, 96-97, 293 P3d 1023 (2012)

The court invoked Weldon for an interpretive principle: when a title is adopted as part of the enacted text, it “may offer interpretive assistance.” Here, RPC 3.4’s title—“Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel”—supported a broad reading of RPC 3.4(c) that is not artificially limited to written orders. The court used that title to reinforce the rule’s protective function within adversarial proceedings: parties should be able to rely on court rulings without repeated enforcement motions.

2. State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340, 354, 537 P3d 503 (2023)

Although Hubbell is a statutory/uniform-act case, the court relied on it by analogy to justify considering out-of-state interpretations of a model provision: when Oregon adopts text derived from a uniform or model source, prior interpretations from other jurisdictions can be informative context. The court used this reasoning to consult other jurisdictions’ treatment of Model Rule 3.4(c) (upon which Oregon’s RPC 3.4(c) tracks) to confirm that similar rules have been applied to violations of court orders (including oral directives).

3. Out-of-state Model Rule applications confirming orders (including oral directives) can support Rule 3.4(c) discipline

State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Braswell, 975 P2d 401, 408 (Okla 1998): Cited as an example of applying the model-derived rule to a lawyer who knowingly violated a court order. The case supports the proposition that the “obligation under the rules of a tribunal” includes court orders.
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ratzel, 218 Wis 2d 423, 432, 578 NW2d 194, 198 (1998): Similarly cited to show that other jurisdictions apply the model rule to court-order violations.
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mininsohn, 380 Md 536, 569-70, 846 A2d 353, 373 (Md Ct App 2004): Another example of a model-rule jurisdiction treating a court order as an enforceable tribunal obligation for professional discipline.
Ligon v. Stilley, 2010 Ark 418, 26-27, 104, 371 SW3d 615, 645, 673 (2010): Particularly important to the verbal-order question. The court cited Ligon as an example where a violation was found when a lawyer issued subpoenas and deposition notices after a judge orally directed the lawyer not to do so. This supported Oregon’s conclusion that RPC 3.4(c) is not limited to written orders.

4. Standards of review and proof in Oregon discipline

In re Munn, 372 Or 589, 591 n 1, 553 P3d 1039 (2024): Cited for the de novo posture: on review, the Supreme Court “sits as factfinder based on the record developed by the trial panel.” This framing matters because the court independently assessed ambiguity and knowledge rather than deferring to the panel majority.
In re Gregory Mark Abel, 374 Or 350, 357, 577 P3d 777 (2025): Used for (a) defining “clear and convincing” as “highly probable,” and (b) supplying a structured framework for assessing whether the Bar proved “actual knowledge” when the respondent testifies to the contrary (credibility analysis using subjective and objective factors).
In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or 86, 104, 162 P3d 260 (2007): Quoted (through Abel) for the list of “objective factors” in credibility evaluation, such as consistency, corroboration, and inherent probability.
In re Long, 368 Or 452, 472, 491 P3d 783 (2021): Cited as an example of rejecting a respondent’s account where other evidence better aligned with contemporaneous communications. Here, the court contrasted that scenario with this record: respondent’s understanding was plausible, shared by counsel, and consistent with subsequent drafting and conduct.
In re Peterson, 348 Or 325, 339, 232 P3d 940 (2010): Cited for the proposition that clear-and-convincing “demands more than merely a suspicion” that a fact is true. This helped the court explain why ambiguity plus competing plausible interpretations is insufficient for discipline.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Interpreting “obligation under the rules of a tribunal” to include verbal orders

The court began with text: RPC 3.4(c) forbids “knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal,” and the rule’s language does not distinguish between written and oral orders. From there, the court reinforced purpose: RPC 3.4 is titled “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel,” and the court viewed paragraph (c) as part of a broader set of protections against abusive or obstructive tactics. If lawyers could ignore oral rulings without discipline risk, opposing parties would be forced to return to court repeatedly to “enforce” what the judge already directed—undermining fairness and orderly adjudication.

Importantly, the court tempered this breadth with a limiting principle: an oral order must be sufficiently clear to be “knowingly disobeyed.” Misunderstanding an ambiguous directive does not satisfy the “knowing” element.

2. The decisive evidentiary point: ambiguity of the order and failure of proof of actual knowledge

The court treated two factual predicates as essential to the Bar’s case:

That the trial judge’s oral directive required $20 per month deposits (scope of the order).
That respondent actually understood the directive to require $20-per-month deposits (knowledge).

The court’s reasoning is notable in two respects:

Scope is determined by what was said, not what was intended. Even though the judge testified she intended to compel $20/month, the court held “the scope of the order is not determined by the judge’s intent, but by the order itself.” On the transcript, the directive—“direct-deposit into that account… So that is how you’re to do it”—could reasonably be read as addressing method (direct deposit vs. checks), not amount/frequency.
Knowledge requires actual knowledge; ambiguity defeats “highly probable” proof. Under RPC 1.0(h), “knowingly” generally means “actual knowledge of the fact in question.” Applying the Abel credibility framework, the court found respondent’s testimony plausible and not undermined by demeanor findings, and found significant corroboration: respondent’s counsel shared the same understanding; counsel drafted a proposed written order reflecting method-only; and for nearly two years the other side did not press a $20/month obligation.

The court rejected the Bar’s reliance on respondent’s hearing statement—“I will deposit it into her account myself”—because “it” was ambiguous and could refer to whatever distributions might be made, not necessarily a fixed $20/month obligation.

C. Impact

1. A clear doctrinal clarification: RPC 3.4(c) applies to oral orders

In re Clark squarely resolves a practical disciplinary question: a lawyer cannot avoid RPC 3.4(c) exposure merely because a court’s directive was oral rather than written. In future cases, the Bar may charge RPC 3.4(c) based on oral directives, particularly where the transcript shows an unequivocal command (or where the oral ruling is memorialized in a clear minute entry or other record).

2. A significant limiting safeguard: ambiguity and knowledge

The opinion simultaneously erects an important barrier against overreach: when an oral directive is ambiguous, and the respondent’s understanding is plausible and corroborated, the Bar may fail to meet the clear and convincing burden on both the order’s scope and the lawyer’s actual knowledge. The decision thus encourages careful attention to:

creating a clear record of oral rulings (e.g., asking for clarification on the record);
memorializing directives in written orders promptly; and
avoiding discipline findings where “knowing” is inferred from equivocal transcripts alone.

3. Practical consequences for Oregon disciplinary litigation

Expect the Bar, respondents, and trial panels to treat clarity of the underlying directive as a threshold evidentiary issue in RPC 3.4(c) cases, especially where the alleged order was oral and the post-hearing course of conduct supports multiple interpretations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

RPC 3.4(c): A professional conduct rule that bars lawyers from “knowingly” disobeying tribunal obligations (including court orders), unless the lawyer openly refuses on the ground that no valid obligation exists.
Verbal (oral) order: A directive issued by a judge in open court that may or may not later be reduced to writing. Clark confirms such directives can count for RPC 3.4(c), but only if clear enough to support a “knowing” violation.
“Knowingly” / actual knowledge (RPC 1.0(h)): Not “should have known.” It generally means the lawyer truly understood the relevant fact—here, what the judge required.
Clear and convincing evidence (BR 5.2): A heightened standard requiring the asserted facts to be “highly probable,” more than suspicion or possibility.
De novo review (ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6): The Supreme Court independently reviews both law and facts from the trial-panel record and may adopt, modify, or reject the panel’s decision.
Order’s “scope” vs. judge’s “intent”: The legally operative content is what the judge actually ordered on the record, not what the judge later says she meant to order.

V. Conclusion

In re Clark establishes and sharpens two companion principles in Oregon lawyer discipline: (1) RPC 3.4(c) covers verbal as well as written court orders; but (2) discipline for “knowing disobedience” cannot rest on ambiguity. The Bar must prove—by clear and convincing evidence—both the clear content of the order and the lawyer’s actual knowledge of that content. Where the transcript reasonably supports competing interpretations and the respondent’s understanding is plausible and corroborated, the complaint must be dismissed.