Introduction

In Row v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of Robin Lee Row’s sixth petition for post-conviction relief in a capital case, filed more than three decades after her 1993 death sentence for the murders of her husband and two children. At the heart of the appeal was whether Idaho’s strict 42-day filing window for capital post-conviction claims (Idaho Code section 19-2719) permits a successive petition based on newly developed mitigation evidence of alleged organic brain dysfunction, especially after evolving federal habeas doctrine culminating in Shinn v. Ramirez (2022).

Row argued that (1) Shinn was a “triggering event” that reopened her opportunity to file a new state petition because it restricted federal evidentiary development; (2) the ineffectiveness of her original state post-conviction counsel should excuse her failure to earlier assert trial-counsel mitigation claims; and (3) Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 and various constitutional provisions entitled her to effective post-conviction counsel and state-court review notwithstanding section 19-2719’s bar.

The Court rejected each argument. It held that Shinn does not restart Idaho’s statutory clock; that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a ground for successive relief; that Hall v. State did not create a right to effective post-conviction counsel; and that Idaho Code section 19-2719 remains a constitutional statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional limit, consistent with due process and separation of powers.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Row’s sixth post-conviction petition as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719, which requires capital defendants to raise all claims known or reasonably knowable within 42 days of the death judgment and deems unraised claims waived.
• Shinn v. Ramirez is not a “triggering event” that restarts the time to file state post-conviction petitions; it altered federal habeas evidentiary rules but did not announce a new constitutional rule binding on state courts or reopen state deadlines.
• Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not excuse a petitioner’s failure to timely assert ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IAC) claims in the initial state petition.
• Hall v. State recognizes a right to conflict-free post-conviction counsel under Rule 44.2, but it does not establish a right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel or an exception to section 19-2719’s time bar.
• Idaho Code section 19-2719 is a statute of limitations (not jurisdictional) and does not violate due process or separation of powers; the Court also reiterated that Idaho’s right to counsel mirrors the federal Sixth Amendment Strickland standard.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

Idaho authorities

• Idaho Code section 19-2719: Special capital procedures requiring that all known or reasonably knowable claims be brought within 42 days of the death judgment; unraised claims are waived, with a narrow exception for claims that were not and could not reasonably have been known. Successive claims must be asserted within a reasonable time after discovery.
• State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795 (1991): Established Idaho’s “one opportunity” rule in capital cases and approved the statute’s due-process sufficiency. Clarified that IAC of trial counsel is a claim that should be reasonably known immediately after trial.
• McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695 (1999): Section 19-2719 supersedes UPCPA to the extent of conflict; the waiver provision is strictly construed; ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not an excuse to present belated claims.
• Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469 (1995); Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 155 (2010): Reinforced Idaho’s special capital post-conviction framework and its constitutionality under due process. An IAC claim is one that should be known immediately post-trial.
• Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758 (1993): Even unknown claims must be asserted within a reasonable time after they become known or reasonably knowable.
• Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35 (2010): Section 19-2719 operates as a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar; no separation-of-powers violation.
• Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196 (1992): Grounds for post-conviction relief are limited to challenges to the conviction or sentence; ineffectiveness of post-conviction appellate counsel is not a cognizable ground.
• Row I, 131 Idaho 303 (1998): Affirmed denial of Row’s initial post-conviction relief; highlighted trial counsel’s mitigation efforts and found no prejudice from alleged omissions.
• Row II, 135 Idaho 573 (2001): Dismissed Row’s second state petition under section 19-2719; brain-damage mitigation IAC claim was waived; ineffective post-conviction counsel is not a ground for successive relief.
• Row III, 145 Idaho 168 (2008): Ring claims were not retroactive on collateral review; Brady claim was untimely and did not meet section 19-2719’s threshold to cast doubt on reliability.
• Creech v. State (2024), 173 Idaho 464, 543 P.3d 494: Held that Shinn v. Ramirez is not a “triggering event” for Idaho post-conviction timing and reiterated that Idaho’s right-to-counsel standard is equivalent to Strickland under the U.S. Constitution.
• Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610 (2013): On interlocutory review, recognized a right to conflict-free post-conviction counsel under Rule 44.2 and set a procedure for addressing potential conflicts. It did not recognize a state right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Federal authorities

• Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004): Ring’s jury finding requirement for aggravators is not retroactive on collateral review.
• Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012): In federal habeas, ineffective assistance of initial-review post-conviction counsel can excuse procedural default of a “substantial” trial IAC claim. This is a federal cause doctrine, not a state-created right to effective post-conviction counsel.
• Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), abrogated by Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022): Concerning fundamentally altered claims; later limited by Shinn’s evidentiary restrictions, as recognized in Hampton v. Shinn, 143 F.4th 1047 (2025).
• Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022): Federal habeas courts generally may not expand the record (e.g., hold evidentiary hearings) to support a Martinez claim; they are confined to the state-court record absent narrow exceptions (new, retroactive constitutional rule; or due diligence plus a compelling actual-innocence theory).
• Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976): No constitutional right to collateral review; states have broad discretion in designing post-conviction regimes.
• Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009): State post-conviction processes violate due process only if fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the rights provided.
• Johnson v. Railway Express, 421 U.S. 454 (1975): Statutes of limitations reflect judgments about balancing valid claims against the societal interest in finality.
• Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001); Rhoades v. Henry, 611 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010): Ninth Circuit decisions upholding Idaho’s capital post-conviction framework (including section 19-2719), when certain safeguards like new counsel are provided.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Strict operation of section 19-2719 as a statute of limitations:
   • Idaho’s capital post-conviction scheme gives one opportunity to raise all known or reasonably knowable claims within 42 days of the death judgment, with strictly construed waiver thereafter.
   • There is a narrow exception for issues that were not and could not reasonably have been known; even then, a successive petition must be filed within a reasonable time after discovery.
   • Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are, by Idaho precedent, among the claims that are “reasonably knowable” immediately after trial and must be raised in the initial petition.
2. Application to Row’s sixth petition:
   • Row’s mitigation claim—trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and present brain-damage evidence—was already defaulted under Row II because it was reasonably knowable in 1994 but not raised; consequently, it is time-barred.
   • Row’s attempt to repackage the claim after federal habeas proceedings cannot overcome Idaho’s earlier waiver determination.
3. Shinn v. Ramirez is not a “triggering event” for state deadlines:
   • Following Creech (2024), the Court held that Shinn, which constrains federal habeas evidentiary development, does not announce a new constitutional rule binding on states and, therefore, cannot restart Idaho’s section 19-2719 clock.
   • Shinn reinforces the primacy of state court proceedings; it does not open new state-court avenues for claims that are already time-barred.
4. Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a ground for successive relief:
   • Consistent with McKinney and Row II, alleged ineffectiveness of initial post-conviction counsel neither constitutes an independent claim for relief nor excuses a claimant’s failure to timely raise trial-level IAC claims in the first petition.
   • Allowing such a theory would create an endless cycle of successive petitions—the result section 19-2719 was designed to prevent.
5. Hall v. State did not create a right to effective post-conviction counsel:
   • Hall recognized a procedural right to conflict-free post-conviction counsel under Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 and prescribed a method to address potential conflicts.
   • Hall did not recognize a substantive right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel; it did not—and could not—silently carve out a new exception to section 19-2719’s time bar.
6. Constitutional challenges fail:
   • Due Process: Section 19-2719 is a statute of limitations providing a meaningful opportunity to be heard; Idaho and Ninth Circuit precedents uphold its constitutionality.
   • Separation of Powers: Section 19-2719 regulates timing (a classic legislative function) and is not a jurisdictional limit; consistent with Stuart, it does not deprive courts of inherent power.
   • Idaho Right to Counsel: Mirroring Creech (2024), the Court reiterates that Idaho’s right to effective assistance equates to the federal Strickland standard; there is no broader state right at issue here.

C. Practical and Prospective Impact

• Reinforced finality in Idaho capital post-conviction practice: The decision doubles down on Idaho’s strict one‑petition rule and rigid waiver doctrine, leaving little room for state-court relitigation of mitigation-IAC theories long after the 42-day window.
• No state-court “Shinn workaround”: Litigants cannot use Shinn’s federal evidentiary restrictions to reopen state post-conviction windows. Counsel must fully develop the factual basis for mitigation and other IAC claims in the initial Idaho post-conviction proceeding.
• Limited role for post-conviction counsel ineffectiveness: Alleged deficiencies by initial post-conviction counsel remain non-cognizable as grounds for successive state relief. This preserves the Legislature’s design to avoid serial petitions.
• Clarification of Hall’s scope: Courts and practitioners should treat Hall as a conflict-management decision, not a source of a substantive right to effective post-conviction counsel or an implied exception to section 19-2719.
• Federal habeas strategy recalibration: After Shinn, petitioners must prioritize factual development in state court; however, Idaho’s 42-day rule means that development must occur immediately in the initial petition. Reliance on later federal development is precarious and likely futile absent the narrow Shinn exceptions (new retroactive constitutional rule or compelling actual-innocence showing with due diligence).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Post-conviction relief (PCR): A civil process for challenging a conviction or sentence after direct appeal ends. In Idaho capital cases, PCR is governed by a special statute (section 19-2719) with very short deadlines and a one‑petition rule.
• Statute of limitations vs. jurisdictional bar: A statute of limitations sets a deadline to file claims; missing it typically waives the claim. A jurisdictional bar deprives a court of power to hear a case at all. Idaho treats section 19-2719 as a statute of limitations, not jurisdictional.
• Triggering event: A decision (usually constitutional and retroactive) that can reopen the time to file new claims. The Court holds Shinn is not a triggering event because it altered federal habeas procedure, not underlying constitutional rights binding state courts.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC): Under Strickland, a defendant must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Idaho holds that trial-level IAC claims are usually knowable immediately after trial and must be raised promptly in the initial PCR.
• Martinez v. Ryan: A federal habeas doctrine allowing ineffective assistance of initial state post-conviction counsel to excuse procedural default of a substantial trial IAC claim. It does not create a state-law right to effective post-conviction counsel or expand state PCR remedies.
• Shinn v. Ramirez: Limits federal habeas courts from considering new evidence not presented in state court to support a Martinez claim, absent narrow exceptions. It emphasizes the primacy of state-court fact development.
• Mitigation evidence: Information presented at capital sentencing to reduce culpability (e.g., brain damage, mental illness, childhood trauma). Failure to investigate/present mitigation is a common IAC theory—but in Idaho it must be raised and developed in the first PCR within 42 days.

Conclusion

Row v. State reinforces three core principles of Idaho capital post-conviction law. First, Idaho’s 42-day deadline for capital PCR filings is a strict statute of limitations: known or reasonably knowable claims not raised in the initial petition are waived. Second, Shinn v. Ramirez—which confines federal habeas evidentiary development—does not trigger a new window for state post-conviction filings. Third, Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 ensures conflict-free, not effective, post-conviction counsel and does not create an exception to section 19-2719’s time bar.

The decision thus advances finality, clarifies the limited scope of Hall, and aligns Idaho post-conviction practice with the post-Shinn federal landscape by emphasizing the primacy of timely state-court factual development. For capital practitioners in Idaho, the message is unequivocal: investigate and present all reasonably knowable claims—especially mitigation-related IAC—immediately in the initial 42-day post-conviction window, or risk permanent waiver.