Roussel v. State (2025 UT 5): Nonjusticiability of Facial Challenges to Nonoperative Statutes and General Government Conduct

Introduction

In Roussel v. State (2025 UT 5), the Utah Supreme Court confronted a youth‐led challenge to various statutory provisions and general governmental actions designed to promote fossil fuel development. Seven minors—each represented by a guardian—alleged that Utah statutes and executive agencies’ conduct maximizing fossil fuel extraction violated their rights to life and liberty under the Utah Constitution (art. I, §§ 1, 7). They sought a declaratory judgment invalidating select statutory “policy” provisions and directing state actors to cease conduct that, they claimed, exacerbates climate change and harms their health. On direct appeal from the Third District Court’s dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, restating the limits on declaratory relief, justiciability, and advisory opinions.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Hagen, writing for a unanimous court (Chief Justice Durrant, Justices Petersen, Pohlman, Judge Harris), affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal. The court held:

Mootness: One challenged provision—the 2022 energy-policy directive (“Utah will promote the development of … nonrenewable energy resources”)—had been substantively amended in 2024. Declaring the outdated language unconstitutional would be legally ineffective.
Standing / Redressability: Four remaining statutory provisions (coal‐mining findings, surface-mining performance standard, oil‐and‐gas public interest declaration, and rule of construction limiting production-restrictions) are nonoperative policy statements. Striking those provisions would not appreciably constrain permit decisions or reduce fossil fuel output, so plaintiffs lacked redressability.
Advisory Opinions: Plaintiffs’ request for broader guidance on “constitutional parameters” of future conduct was an impermissible advisory opinion.
Concrete Facts Required: Challenges to generalized government conduct must be tied to specific decisions or permits to present a justiciable controversy.

Because subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking, the Supreme Court vacated the “with prejudice” dismissal and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to replead.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983): Established that declaratory‐judgment actions must meet ordinary standing requirements—injury, causation, and redressability.
Salt Lake County v. State, 2020 UT 27, 466 P.3d 158: Reaffirmed prohibition on advisory opinions and the need for controversies to be “definite and concrete.”
Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951): Classic statement against issuing advisory opinions on abstract questions.
Bennion v. ANR Production Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991): Described—but did not transform—public‐interest declarations into binding statutory mandates.
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, 289 P.3d 502: Courts without subject-matter jurisdiction may only determine their power, not the merits.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Mootness. When a statute is amended, challenges to its prior text become moot if invalidating the old text has no bearing on the current law. Here, the 2024 amendments to Utah Code § 79-6-301 materially altered the policy statement, rendering the old language nonbinding.

b. Standing and Redressability. Even facially unconstitutional provisions must be capable of redressing plaintiffs’ injuries. The court viewed the four challenged provisions as policy context, not operative controls on permitting agencies. Striking them would not force agencies to deny new permits or compel reduced production, failing the redress prong of traditional standing.

c. Advisory‐Opinion Doctrine. Plaintiffs sought an injunction‐style declaration directing state actors how to regulate in the future. That request collided with Utah’s ban on advisory opinions—courts cannot issue constitutional instructions untied to a specific case or permit.

d. Requirement of Concrete Facts. General allegations about “ongoing patterns” of fossil fuel promotion do not present a specific controversy. A justiciable controversy requires a real dispute over a concrete set of facts—e.g., a particular permit application or administrative decision.

3. Impact

Roussel tightens the requirements for environmental and climate‐related litigation in Utah by emphasizing:

Rigorous application of standing—especially redressability—when challenging broad statutory schemes or executive strategies.
A prohibition on abstract or advisory opinions, safeguarding separation of powers and precluding courts from prescribing general policy to the executive.
Necessity of linking constitutional claims to concrete government actions (e.g., permitting decisions) to create a justiciable controversy.

Future climate advocates in Utah must identify specific administrative decisions or binding legal mandates they wish to overturn, rather than challenging policy statements or generalized conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Justiciability: The requirement that a court may decide only real, concrete disputes—no hypotheticals or abstract questions.
Advisory Opinion: An opinion on what the law would be in a hypothetical situation. Utah law forbids courts from issuing such opinions.
Standing (Redressability): Plaintiffs must show that a favorable ruling is likely to fix some part of their injury. Invalidating nonoperative “policy” text that does not bind agencies fails this test.
Mootness: An issue is moot when intervening changes—such as legislative repeal or amendment—make the court’s ruling have no practical effect.
Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge: A facial challenge asserts a statute is unconstitutional in all applications. An as-applied challenge targets how a law operates in a specific factual context. Courts will hear facial challenges to statutes but require concrete facts for conduct claims.

Conclusion

Roussel v. State reaffirms that Utah courts cannot grant declaratory relief unless plaintiffs face a concrete injury that is likely to be redressed by the court’s decision. Policy‐statement provisions that do not constrain executive discretion cannot be struck down in ways that reduce agency actions on the ground. Nor may courts issue broad constitutional mandates on future conduct in the absence of a specific factual dispute. Because the youth plaintiffs failed to meet these threshold requirements, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and instructed the district court to dismiss without prejudice.