Rooker-Feldman Reaffirmed: Federal Courts Have No Jurisdiction to Undo Colorado Rule 120 Foreclosure Orders

1. Introduction

Case: Viegas v. Kane, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, No. 24-1368, filed 25 July 2025.
Parties:

• Plaintiffs-Appellants: Keri Lynn Viegas and James Viegas (self-represented)
• Defendants-Appellees: Judge Thomas K. Kane (state judge), Chuck Broerman (county treasurer), Scott D. Toebben & Aricyn Dall (private attorneys), Matrix Financial Services Corp., RoundPoint Mortgage Servicing LLC, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)

Background: The Viegases lost their home through a Colorado Rule 120 non-judicial foreclosure proceeding (Case 2023CV31029, El Paso County). In federal district court they alleged, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the defendants colluded to seize their property via a fraudulent deed of trust, infringing their Fourth Amendment rights (unreasonable seizure) and Fifth Amendment rights (lack of due process). They also asserted violations of TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), and several federal criminal statutes, and demanded damages, quiet title, and rescission of the deed of trust.

The district court dismissed all claims—some with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and those against Judge Kane without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1). The Tenth Circuit now affirms in part, but vacates the constitutional rulings and remands with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice for want of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Tenth Circuit determined sua sponte that Rooker-Feldman applies because the Viegases are “state-court losers” seeking to overturn a state foreclosure judgment.
• All Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims—against every defendant—must therefore be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
• The remainder of the district court’s order—dismissal of TILA and “federal criminal law” claims for failure to state a claim, and denial of requests for discovery and jury trial—was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) & District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
   The foundational cases limiting federal district court review of state-court judgments.
2. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)
   Clarified that Rooker-Feldman is confined to cases where state-court losers complain of injuries caused by state judgments, seeking federal review.
3. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986)
   Imposes a “special obligation” on appellate courts to assure subject-matter jurisdiction, leading the panel to raise Rooker-Feldman sua sponte.
4. Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012) & Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2020)
   Recent circuit applications of Rooker-Feldman, quoted for the rule that federal relief cannot “re-examine” or “undo” state judgments.
5. Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2006) & Mayotte v. U.S. Bank, 880 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2018)
   Emphasize that reframing claims as constitutional or due-process challenges does not avoid Rooker-Feldman.
6. Procedural precedents for discovery (Workman v. USPS, 127 F.4th 237 (10th Cir. 2025)), jury trial (Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1997)) and finality (Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, 273 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2001); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992>)).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning unfolds in four steps:

1. Jurisdictional Duty. The appellate court invoked Bender to scrutinize jurisdiction even though the district judge mentioned Rooker-Feldman only in a footnote.
2. Applicability of Rooker-Feldman. Applying Exxon Mobil and circuit precedent, the court found:
   • The injury complained of (loss of property) was caused by the state foreclosure judgment.
   • The requested federal relief (quiet title, rescission of deed of trust, return of payments) would necessarily “reverse or undo” that judgment.
   Therefore, the federal courts lack power to hear the constitutional claims.
3. Remedy—Dismissal Without Prejudice. Because jurisdiction is absent, the appropriate disposition is dismissal without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to pursue any available relief in state court or through state-court appeals.
4. Remaining Claims Analyzed Under 12(b)(6). The panel affirms dismissal of TILA and “federal criminal law” claims because the complaint failed to allege facts showing a statutory violation and criminal statutes do not create private civil remedies. Procedural objections about discovery and jury trial fall when the complaint itself fails to state a claim.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Rule 120 Foreclosures. Litigants can no longer expect federal district courts in the Tenth Circuit to entertain § 1983 suits aimed at overturning Colorado Rule 120 orders; such challenges must proceed through Colorado appellate or post-judgment processes.
• Heightened Gatekeeping. The decision underscores the appellate courts’ mandate to police subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even where district courts give Rooker-Feldman scant attention.
• TILA & Mortgage Servicing Claims. By affirming dismissal of § 1641(g) claims, the court signals that plaintiffs must plead specific facts identifying a post-origination loan transfer and statutory notice failure—mere conclusory allegations will not survive.
• Pro se Litigants. Although filings are liberally construed, pro se mortgage-foreclosure plaintiffs remain bound by jurisdictional and pleading standards.
• Precedential Weight. The order is “non-precedential” under 10th Cir. R. 32.1; nevertheless it will be citable for persuasive value, particularly in foreclosure-related § 1983 litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

A rule that bars federal district and circuit courts (except the U.S. Supreme Court) from reviewing or overturning final state-court judgments. If your injury flows from a state-court decision, federal district court is not the place to relitigate it.

Colorado Rule 120 Proceeding

A specialized, fast-track process where a state judge determines whether a lender may conduct a foreclosure sale. Though limited in scope, the order authorizing sale is a state-court judgment for Rooker-Feldman purposes.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

A federal statute allowing people to sue “state actors” for constitutional violations. Private companies (e.g., lenders or servicers) usually are not “state actors” unless they conspire with or are controlled by the state.

Dismissal With vs. Without Prejudice

“With prejudice” ends the claim permanently; “without prejudice” means the plaintiff may refile—if a proper court has jurisdiction.

TILA § 1641(g)

Requires that when a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred, the new owner must notify the borrower in writing within 30 days. Violations create statutory damages but must be pled with factual specificity.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Viegas v. Kane powerfully reinforces the jurisdictional bulwark created by Rooker-Feldman. Even creative constitutional or civil-rights framing cannot transform a state-court foreclosure defeat into a federal claim where the requested relief would nullify the state judgment. For practitioners, the opinion is a critical reminder to:

• Assess whether the client’s injury truly arises from a state-court decision, and if so, pursue state remedies first.
• Plead TILA and similar statutory claims with concrete factual allegations, not mere conclusions.
• Recognize that discovery and jury-trial rights do not attach until a complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

In the broader landscape, Viegas shores up the jurisdictional boundaries between state foreclosure processes and federal courts, curbing forum-shopping and ensuring finality of state-court foreclosure judgments within the Tenth Circuit.