Rooker-Feldman Does Not Bar Defamation Suits Targeting Opposing Counsel’s Litigation Statements: The Fifth Circuit’s Clarification in English v. Crochet

Introduction

In English v. Crochet, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the jurisdiction-stripping Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a defamation suit brought in federal court against opposing counsel, where the allegedly defamatory statements were made during state sanctions proceedings. The Court held it does not. The panel, led by Chief Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod and joined by Judges Clement and Haynes, affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of attorney Larry English’s Louisiana tort claims against attorneys Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton and their firm, Taylor Porter Brooks & Phillips, L.L.P., who served as outside counsel to the LSU Board of Supervisors.

The opinion arises from high-profile litigation involving Sharon Lewis, an LSU employee who reported allegations of sexual misconduct by football coach Les Miles. In related state-court proceedings, Crochet and Barton successfully pursued sanctions against Lewis and her counsel, Larry English. English then sued Crochet, Barton, and their firm in federal court, asserting defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, reasoning that Rooker-Feldman barred the defamation claim and that the IIED allegations were insufficiently extreme or outrageous.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with English that Rooker-Feldman does not bar his defamation claim, vacating that dismissal and remanding for the district court to consider other, fact-bound defenses in the first instance. At the same time, the Court affirmed the dismissal of English’s IIED claim and, in light of its defamation ruling, also vacated the dismissal of the dependent civil conspiracy claim. The Court further clarified that jurisdictional dismissals under Rooker-Feldman must be without prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

Rooker-Feldman is narrow. It bars federal suits only when a state-court loser seeks redress for injuries caused by the state-court judgment itself and invites federal review and rejection of that judgment. (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.).
English’s defamation claim is an “independent” claim because the source of his alleged injury is the defendants’ conduct—statements made by opposing counsel during sanctions proceedings—not the state-court sanctions order itself. Therefore, Rooker-Feldman does not apply.
The district court erred by dismissing the defamation claim with prejudice on Rooker-Feldman grounds. Because the doctrine is jurisdictional, any dismissal on that basis must be without prejudice.
The Court vacated the dismissal of the defamation claim and remanded for the district court to consider five other defense grounds that it had not reached.
The Court affirmed dismissal of the IIED claim under Louisiana law because the alleged conduct—calling English “sophomoric” and “ignorant,” accusing him of fabricating evidence during litigation, and subjecting him to a judgment debtor examination—does not meet the “extreme and outrageous” threshold, and insisting on one’s legal rights in a permissible way cannot support IIED.
Because the conspiracy claim requires an underlying tort, the Court vacated its dismissal as well, in light of the surviving defamation claim.
The denial of leave to amend (based on futility) was also vacated because it depended on dismissal rulings that were vacated.

Detailed Analysis

Background and Procedural Context

The case grew out of the LSU sexual misconduct controversy. In 2013, Sharon Lewis reported students’ allegations involving Les Miles, prompting a Title IX investigation led, on behalf of the LSU Board, by outside counsel Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton. Represented by Larry English, Lewis later brought federal and state racketeering claims. In state court, Crochet and Barton pursued sanctions against Lewis and English, resulting in a joint and several sanctions award exceeding $330,000. The state court attributed to English, among other things, making unsupported criminal allegations, failing to investigate, fabricating evidence (including mischaracterizing law firm billing entries), and abusive litigation tactics.

English then sued Crochet, Barton, and their firm in federal court (diversity jurisdiction) for defamation, NIED, IIED, and conspiracy. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), basing the defamation dismissal on Rooker-Feldman and finding the IIED allegations inadequate as a matter of law. English appealed, challenging the Rooker-Feldman ruling and the IIED dismissal; he did not challenge the NIED dismissal.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005): The Supreme Court’s canonical narrowing of Rooker-Feldman. It confines the doctrine to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments and seeking federal district court review and rejection of those judgments. English’s claim, the panel explained, does not fit this description.
Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2013): The Fifth Circuit’s “source of injury” test. If the injury stems from the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman applies; if it stems from the defendant’s independent conduct (even if it occurred during litigation), it does not. The Court applied this test to hold English’s defamation claim independent of the sanctions order.
Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2004) and Reitnauer v. Tex. Exotic Feline Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1998): General statements of Rooker-Feldman’s core limitation on inferior federal courts’ ability to modify or reverse state-court judgments absent congressional authorization.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006): Clarifies that Rooker-Feldman is not “preclusion by another name.” Even if preclusion doctrines might limit a claim, that is a merits issue and does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction.
Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. Burnham Mortgage, Inc., 569 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2009): Emphasizes that disputes about a judgment’s preclusive effect are not transformed into jurisdictional bars under Rooker-Feldman.
Davani v. Virginia Department of Transportation, 434 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2006); Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007): Sister-circuit authority explaining that the phrase “inextricably intertwined” does not expand Rooker-Feldman beyond its limited scope and is, at best, a descriptive label.
Avdeef v. Royal Bank of Scotland, 616 F. App’x 665 (5th Cir. 2015): Confirms that suits seeking damages for injuries caused by a defendant’s actions during litigation are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991): Louisiana Supreme Court’s leading IIED case, setting out the “extreme and outrageous” conduct requirement, the “severe” distress requirement, and the intent/knowledge element.
LaBove v. Raftery, 802 So. 2d 566 (La. 2001): Illustrates the high bar for IIED; even severe workplace insults and false accusations typically do not meet the “extreme and outrageous” threshold.
Fort Bend County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 59 F.4th 180 (5th Cir. 2023); Mitchell v. Bailey, 982 F.3d 937 (5th Cir. 2020); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001): Remind that jurisdictional dismissals are without prejudice and are not determinations on the merits.
Jim S. Adler, P.C. v. McNeil Consultants, L.L.C., 10 F.4th 422 (5th Cir. 2021): De novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals; also cited for vacating denial of leave to amend predicated on erroneous merits conclusions.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 96 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2024): Supports the Court’s decision to remand fact-bound defenses for the district court to consider in the first instance.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rooker-Feldman: “Source of Injury” and the Independence of the Defamation Claim

The Court framed the dispositive question under Exxon Mobil and Truong as: What is the source of the injury alleged in the federal complaint? If the injury is the state-court judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal court of jurisdiction. But if the injury is caused by a defendant’s conduct—even conduct that occurred during state litigation—the claim is “independent” and not barred.

English pleaded that Crochet and Barton (through their counsel) “published statements in federal and state court that Larry English… fabricated evidence,” including that his descriptions of communications and billing entries were fabricated. Although the state court’s sanctions order found that English had “fabricated evidence” and mischaracterized Taylor Porter billing entries (e.g., “Email on the status of scheme to hide Miles investigation” versus the entry’s actual “Correspondence with Ginsberg, Segar”), the Fifth Circuit emphasized that English was not seeking to overturn the sanctions order. Instead, he sought damages for injuries allegedly caused by the defendants’ statements themselves.

Because the alleged harm flowed from the defendants’ conduct (the statements), not the judgment, the claim is independent. The Court underscored that calling a federal claim “inextricably intertwined” with a state judgment does not alter this analysis; that label does not broaden Rooker-Feldman beyond Exxon Mobil’s narrow rule. In other words:

Independent claims that deny or contest a legal conclusion reached by a state court are still cognizable in federal court, even if similar issues were litigated previously. The remedy for duplication or inconsistency is preclusion (a merits defense), not jurisdictional dismissal.
Preclusion concerns—e.g., whether a state court’s “fabrication” finding forecloses falsity or fault elements of defamation—are for the district court to address on remand, not for jurisdictional dismissal under Rooker-Feldman.

2) Jurisdictional Dismissals Must Be Without Prejudice

The panel further noted a procedural error: because Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional, any dismissal on that basis must be without prejudice. A jurisdictional dismissal is not a merits adjudication and does not preclude re-filing in a court that does have jurisdiction. The district court’s with-prejudice dismissal was therefore incorrect as a matter of law.

3) IIED: Louisiana’s Demanding “Extreme and Outrageous” Standard

English’s IIED claim rested on three categories of conduct: (1) accusing him of fabricating evidence; (2) calling him “sophomoric” and “ignorant” in court and filings; and (3) compelling him to undergo a judgment debtor examination. Applying White v. Monsanto and LaBove v. Raftery, the Court held these allegations, even if accepted as true, do not constitute conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Insults and even harsh litigation rhetoric are not actionable IIED. Nor can insisting on one’s legal rights through lawful procedures (such as a judgment debtor examination) supply the requisite outrageousness. The IIED dismissal was therefore affirmed.

4) Conspiracy: Dependent on an Underlying Tort

Louisiana conspiracy claims require an agreement to commit an unlawful act and a cognizable underlying tort. The district court dismissed conspiracy after dismissing all tort claims. Because the defamation claim survives (jurisdictionally) and is remanded for further proceedings, the conspiracy dismissal was vacated as well.

5) Remand to Consider Fact-Bound Defenses

The defendants raised five additional grounds to defeat defamation that the district court did not reach. The Fifth Circuit declined to address them in the first instance, citing the fact-intensive nature of such defenses and remanding under the familiar principle of first-instance consideration by the district court. Although the opinion does not enumerate these defenses, in cases of this kind they frequently include:

Issue and claim preclusion arising from state-court findings (e.g., whether a sanctions finding precludes relitigation of “falsity” or “actual malice”).
Litigation privilege/absolute or qualified privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings and filings, to the extent recognized under Louisiana law when the statements are pertinent to the proceeding.
Truth, substantial truth, and opinion/hyperbole defenses.
Fault standards (negligence or actual malice) and damages.
Any First Amendment or petitioning immunities that may apply to litigation conduct.

The panel also vacated the denial of leave to amend, which had been premised on the futility of claims that are now revived in part.

Impact and Practical Implications

Clarified boundary of Rooker-Feldman in sanctions-adjacent defamation suits: The Fifth Circuit reinforces that defamation claims targeting opposing counsel’s litigation statements are not jurisdictionally barred simply because a state court also sanctioned the plaintiff on similar grounds. The key is the source of the injury—defendants’ conduct, not the state judgment.
Preclusion and privileges move to the forefront: By rejecting jurisdictional dismissal, the opinion channels disputes into the merits. On remand, the district court will need to engage with preclusion doctrines and privileges under Louisiana law for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, along with classic defamation defenses. This ensures that federal courts do not avoid hard merits questions by misapplying Rooker-Feldman.
Procedural correctness: The Court’s reminder that jurisdictional dismissals must be without prejudice helps maintain procedural integrity and avoids unintended claim-preclusion effects from jurisdictional rulings.
IIED remains a narrow remedy in Louisiana: The affirmation of the IIED dismissal reiterates the steep “extreme and outrageous” threshold and the principle that zealous (even sharp-elbowed) litigation conduct, without more, rarely suffices.
Strategic considerations for litigants and counsel:
- Plaintiffs contemplating litigation-based defamation claims should anticipate that jurisdiction will likely exist but that success will hinge on overcoming preclusion and privilege defenses, as well as proving falsity, fault, and damages.
- Defendants should prepare comprehensive merits defenses (privilege, truth, opinion, preclusion) rather than relying on Rooker-Feldman as a one-step jurisdictional bar.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A narrow rule that bars lower federal courts from sitting in review of state-court judgments. It applies only when the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment and asks the federal court, in substance, to overturn that judgment. It does not apply to independent claims seeking damages for a defendant’s conduct, even if that conduct occurred in state court.
“Independent Claim” vs. “Inextricably Intertwined”: Courts focus on whether the injury flows from the judgment (barred) or from a defendant’s acts (not barred). The phrase “inextricably intertwined” is descriptive and does not expand the doctrine’s scope.
Preclusion vs. Jurisdiction: Even if a prior state judgment may preclude a later claim or issue (e.g., a finding that a party “fabricated evidence”), that is a merits question governed by claim/issue preclusion—not a basis to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional Dismissal Without Prejudice: When a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction (e.g., under Rooker-Feldman), it must dismiss without prejudice, leaving the plaintiff free to bring the claim in a court that does have jurisdiction.
IIED Under Louisiana Law: Requires conduct that is “extreme and outrageous,” distress that is “severe,” and intent or knowledge that severe distress would result. Mere insults, harsh language, or insisting on lawful rights (like enforcing a judgment) typically cannot support IIED.
Judgment Debtor Examination: A lawful post-judgment process to obtain information to aid collection of a judgment. Using this process ordinarily cannot be the basis for IIED liability.

Conclusion

English v. Crochet makes two important points for federal litigation arising out of contentious state proceedings. First, the Fifth Circuit reinforces that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow jurisdictional doctrine: a federal defamation suit alleging harm from opposing counsel’s litigation statements is an independent claim, not a de facto appeal of a state-court sanctions order. Second, the Court reiterates that Louisiana’s IIED cause of action remains tightly cabined; routine or even intemperate litigation conduct generally will not satisfy the “extreme and outrageous” requirement, and lawful enforcement procedures cannot be recast as IIED.

On remand, the district court will address fact-intensive defenses—preclusion, privilege, truth, and fault—underscoring that the proper battleground for such disputes is the merits, not jurisdiction. The decision thus contributes to doctrinal clarity: federal courts must resist overextending Rooker-Feldman, while parties must be prepared to litigate the substantive defenses that defamation and related tort claims entail.