Rooker–Feldman Bars Federal Damages Claims That Depend on Undoing a State Foreclosure Judgment; Futility and Willful Noncompliance Justify Dismissal With Prejudice

1. Introduction

In Roy Dixon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, the Eleventh Circuit (non-precedential, “Not for Publication”) affirmed the Southern District of Florida’s dismissal with prejudice of pro se plaintiff Roy Dixon Jr.’s third amended complaint, as well as the denial of his motion to vacate that dismissal.

The dispute arose from a Florida state-court foreclosure judgment entered on September 26, 2019, concerning a house Dixon claimed he rightfully owned. Dixon filed this federal action on September 27, 2024 against (among others) Federal National Mortgage Association and NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, asserting federal civil RICO and state-law tort/property claims seeking, in substance, the foreclosure-sale proceeds and relief premised on the idea that the foreclosure was wrongful.

The key issues on appeal were (i) whether the district court properly dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice, including on jurisdictional grounds under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and for pleading deficiencies, and (ii) whether Dixon was entitled to an additional opportunity to respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss before dismissal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that Dixon’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they invited federal review and rejection of a final state-court foreclosure judgment entered before the federal suit commenced. The court also agreed that further amendment would be futile and that Dixon willfully failed to comply with prior pleading instructions, supporting dismissal with prejudice. Finally, it rejected Dixon’s procedural argument that he should have been given another opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: The opinion relies on these canonical pleading cases for the “plausibility” standard and the rule that “labels and conclusions” or formulaic recitations do not state a claim. They frame why Dixon’s conclusory allegations could not survive dismissal.
Newbauer v. Carnival Corp. and Nicholson v. Shafe: Cited for standards of review—dismissals for failure to state a claim and dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, with allegations taken as true and construed in the plaintiff’s favor at that stage.
Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Brd. Edu.: Establishes that district courts must explain deficiencies to a pro se litigant and provide at least one opportunity to amend before dismissal. The panel used this as the baseline procedural protection Dixon received (and exceeded) through multiple amendments.
Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit (and the opinion’s later reference to “Silberman”): Used for two points: (i) Rule 15’s “justice so requires” standard does not mandate endless amendments; and (ii) dismissal with prejudice is proper when amendment would be futile—critical once the court concluded Rooker-Feldman eliminated federal jurisdiction regardless of how well pleaded.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2): Provides the doctrinal basis for discretionary leave to amend, which the panel treated as overcome by futility and repeated noncompliance.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.: The cornerstone for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as applied here—federal district courts lack jurisdiction over claims that effectively seek review and rejection of a state-court judgment entered before federal proceedings began.
United Tech. Corp. v. Mazer: Supplies the elements of Florida civil theft and supports the panel’s conclusion that Dixon’s pleading—especially on felonious intent—remained conclusory.
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm. and Cisneros v. Petland, Inc.: These RICO “pattern” cases guided the court’s analysis of Dixon’s civil RICO pleading defects. The panel emphasized that predicate acts too close in time (and arising from a single transaction) generally do not establish continuity or an ongoing pattern.
Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Recs., Inc.: Sets out the elements of fraud and fraudulent inducement under Florida law, used to demonstrate why Dixon’s “element parroting” without supporting facts was insufficient.
Gratton v. Great Am. Commc'n: Supports dismissal with prejudice as a sanction where a litigant willfully fails to comply with court instructions and where the court finds (explicitly or implicitly) that lesser sanctions would be inadequate.
Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found.: Used to reject Dixon’s due process/procedure argument; where the court has identified pleading deficiencies and the plaintiff does not cure them, the district court need not provide another opportunity to respond before dismissing.
Dixon v. Green Tree Serv., LLC: The panel relied on Dixon’s prior, similar pleading failures (including RICO-pattern deficiencies and conclusory civil theft/fraud allegations) as evidence that his noncompliance in this case was willful and persistent.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdictional bar: Rooker-Feldman as the decisive threshold

The court’s central move is jurisdictional: it characterizes each federal count (civil RICO, civil theft, fraud/fraudulent misrepresentation) as premised on the proposition that Dixon “rightfully” owned the foreclosed property and that the state court’s contrary foreclosure judgment was wrong. Because Dixon also “explicitly asks” for the foreclosure-sale payment, his requested relief necessarily requires treating the state judgment as invalid.

Applying Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., the panel concluded (1) Dixon sought federal review/rejection of the state foreclosure judgment, and (2) the state judgment preceded the federal case (2019 judgment; 2024 federal filing). Those two features triggered Rooker-Feldman and barred all claims, regardless of how well they might be pleaded.

B. Futility justifies dismissal with prejudice after multiple amendments

Because Rooker-Feldman eliminated jurisdiction, amendment could not cure the fundamental defect; therefore, further leave to amend was futile under Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit and Rule 15(a)(2). This is important: the opinion frames futility not merely as “failure to plead enough facts,” but as “no jurisdiction to entertain the theory of relief at all,” which is the strongest form of futility.

C. Willful noncompliance as an independent basis for with-prejudice dismissal

The panel also affirmed on an alternative, conduct-based rationale under Gratton v. Great Am. Commc'n: Dixon repeatedly failed to follow explicit instructions on how to plead each claim.

RICO continuity/pattern: The panel pointed to Dixon’s allegations being only about two months apart, invoking Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm. (nine months held insufficient in that case) and to the “single transaction” nature of the alleged wire fraud under Cisneros v. Petland, Inc..
Civil theft intent: Under United Tech. Corp. v. Mazer, “felonious intent” must be plausibly supported. Dixon’s insistence on asserting intent as a conclusion, contrary to instructions, remained inadequate under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
Fraud pleading: Under Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Recs., Inc., fraud requires factual allegations supporting each element. Dixon instead repeated the elements as bare conclusions, which Iqbal/Twombly disallow.

The court found the noncompliance “willful,” emphasizing that Dixon repeated the same categories of defects this Court had already identified in Dixon v. Green Tree Serv., LLC. It also treated the district court’s statement that there was “no basis” to believe Dixon could state a viable cause of action as an implicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.

D. No entitlement to another response opportunity

Dixon argued he should have been allowed to respond before dismissal. The panel rejected this by relying on Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found.: where deficiencies were explained and then ignored in the amended pleading, the district court need not provide an additional chance to respond before dismissing.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the decision provides a clear roadmap for how foreclosure-related federal suits can fail when the plaintiff repackages a challenge to a state foreclosure judgment as federal civil RICO or state-law tort claims seeking money damages tied to ownership.

Foreclosure collateral attacks: Litigants who ask federal courts to award foreclosure proceeds or declare that a foreclosure was “fraudulent” will face jurisdictional dismissal when success depends on rejecting the state judgment.
Pleading discipline for pro se litigants: The opinion reinforces that pro se status earns an explanation and at least one amendment opportunity (Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Brd. Edu.), but not unlimited attempts—especially where defects are repeated and jurisdiction is lacking.
RICO “pattern” constraints: The panel’s reliance on Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm. and Cisneros v. Petland, Inc. underscores that “pattern” is often the decisive barrier in civil RICO cases built around a single transaction or short-lived conduct.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman doctrine: A rule that federal trial courts (district courts) generally cannot act like appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments. If a federal claim would succeed only by deciding the state court got it wrong, the federal court usually lacks jurisdiction.
“Plausibility” pleading: Under Iqbal and Twombly, a complaint must allege specific facts that make the claim believable—not just recite legal elements or assert conclusions.
Dismissal “with prejudice”: A final dismissal that ends the case and bars refiling the same claim in that court. Courts do this when amendment would be pointless (futile) or when repeated noncompliance shows the case cannot be properly pleaded.
Civil RICO “pattern”: Civil RICO requires more than two alleged bad acts; it generally requires continuity—conduct that shows an ongoing threat rather than a one-off dispute arising from a single transaction.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice because Dixon’s claims—though styled as civil RICO, civil theft, and fraud—depended on undoing a prior state foreclosure judgment and thus were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine under Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.. Independently, the court held further amendment was futile and that Dixon willfully failed to comply with repeated pleading instructions, justifying a with-prejudice dismissal under Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit and Gratton v. Great Am. Commc'n. The decision illustrates the sharp limits on using federal litigation to relitigate state foreclosure outcomes and the judiciary’s willingness to end serial, conclusory pleadings after multiple opportunities to amend.