Rogers v. Cedar Bluff: Alabama Supreme Court Clarifies Municipal Vicarious Immunity for Volunteer Firefighters and the Status of Municipal Volunteer Fire Departments

Rogers v. Cedar Bluff: Alabama Supreme Court Clarifies Municipal Vicarious Immunity for Volunteer Firefighters and the Status of Municipal Volunteer Fire Departments

Introduction

In Carol Rogers, as administratrix of the Estate of Susan Bonner, deceased v. Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department (Supreme Court of Alabama, Aug. 29, 2025), the Court reaffirmed and sharpened key principles at the intersection of municipal liability and volunteer immunity under Alabama’s Volunteer Service Act (VSA), § 6-5-336, Ala. Code 1975. The case arose from a tragic accident in Cherokee County in which Susan Bonner’s vehicle left the roadway and submerged in a creek. A volunteer firefighter and EMT, Howard Guice, affiliated with the Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department (CBVFD), responded after hearing a radio call. According to the estate, Guice advised cessation of CPR before EMS arrived; paramedics later restored circulation, but Bonner died two days after from anoxic encephalopathy.

The estate sued Guice, the CBVFD, and the Cherokee County Association of Volunteer Fire Departments, alleging that Guice’s negligent or wanton response caused Bonner’s death and that the CBVFD (and, by extension, the Town of Cedar Bluff) was vicariously liable. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Town/CBVFD, holding that volunteer firefighters are immune under the VSA and that municipalities operating volunteer fire departments are not vicariously liable for volunteers’ negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, relying heavily on Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135 (Ala. 2004), and clarifying how to classify a volunteer fire department for VSA purposes when it is operated by a municipality.

Summary of the Judgment

  • The CBVFD is a subordinate entity (a political subdivision) of the Town of Cedar Bluff, not a separate incorporated nonprofit. Consequently, any claim against CBVFD is effectively a claim against the Town.
  • Under Hollis and the VSA, volunteer firefighters are immune from negligence claims if acting in good faith within the scope of their volunteer duties. Because a servant’s immunity leaves no liability to “be visited upon” a master, the municipality cannot be vicariously liable for volunteers’ negligence.
  • Although the VSA denies immunity to volunteers for wantonness, Alabama law does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities for wanton conduct (§ 11-47-190; Town of Loxley v. Coleman; Hilliard v. City of Huntsville). Thus, alleging wantonness does not create municipal liability.
  • The Town did not waive its immunity defenses; asserting immunity generally in pleadings and specifically at summary judgment sufficed.
  • On this record, there was no genuine issue of material fact: Guice was a volunteer; the CBVFD was a municipal subordinate entity; and the Town was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135 (Ala. 2004): The cornerstone case. Hollis held that:
    • Volunteer firefighters who receive no compensation are immune from negligence under the VSA.
    • Because a volunteer’s negligence is immune, there is no negligence liability to impute to the municipality under respondeat superior.
    • Municipalities cannot be liable for wanton conduct; a plaintiff cannot circumvent immunity by re-labeling negligence as wantonness.
    • Creating a volunteer fire department does not impose on a municipality a legally enforceable duty to provide skillful fire protection (no direct duty for “skillful fire protection”).
    This framework directly controlled and led to affirmance here.
  • Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 181 So. 3d 325 (Ala. 2015): Clarified that an incorporated 501(c)(3) volunteer fire department falls within § 6-5-336(e)’s rule that nonprofits and hospitals can be vicariously liable for volunteers’ negligence notwithstanding volunteer immunity. Rogers invoked Dixon Mills to argue CBVFD was a separate nonprofit. The Court distinguished Dixon Mills because CBVFD was not incorporated as a 501(c)(3), received municipal funding, and reported to the mayor—indicia of a municipal subordinate entity, not an independent nonprofit.
  • Ex parte Labbe, 156 So. 3d 368 (Ala. 2014): Confirmed that a fire department can remain “volunteer” despite municipal funding and agreements; such connections do not transform volunteer firefighters into compensated professionals or negate volunteer status under the VSA.
  • Industrial Dev. Bd. of City of Montgomery v. Russell, 124 So. 3d 127 (Ala. 2013): Emphasized that where the Legislature expressly preserves vicarious liability for certain entities (e.g., nonprofits and hospitals in § 6-5-336(e)) but not for governmental entities, courts respect that textual distinction. Here, governmental entities were not included in § 6-5-336(e)’s carve-out, supporting municipal vicarious immunity when the volunteer is immune.
  • Respondeat Superior Line:
    • Larry Terry Contractors, Inc. v. Bogle, 404 So. 2d 613 (Ala. 1981), and Louisville & N.R.R. v. Maddox, 236 Ala. 594, 183 So. 849 (1938): If the servant is not liable (because innocent or immune), the master has no vicarious liability to shoulder.
    • Gore v. City of Hoover, 559 So. 2d 163 (Ala. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1995): A city cannot be vicariously liable for an act of a servant who is immune.
  • Municipal Wantonness Immunity: Town of Loxley v. Coleman, 720 So. 2d 907 (Ala. 1998), and Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1991): Municipalities are not liable for wanton acts of agents under § 11-47-190. Hollis applied this, and the Court applied it again here.
  • Pleading/Waiver:
    • City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So. 2d 747 (Ala. 1998): Failure to raise municipal immunity before judgment can amount to waiver.
    • Marlow v. Mid South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988): An affirmative immunity defense is not waived if raised at summary judgment before judgment enters. The Town timely asserted immunity here.
  • Subordinate Entities’ Capacity to be Sued: Ex parte Dixon, 55 So. 3d 1171 (Ala. 2010): Departments and subordinate municipal entities lacking separate legal status generally cannot be sued absent specific statutory authorization. This supported the Court’s conclusion that suit against CBVFD was, in effect, against the Town.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Classifying the Fire Department: Nonprofit versus Municipal Subordinate

Alabama law allows volunteer fire departments to be organized as either nonprofit corporations or as authorities of municipalities or other governmental subdivisions. Section 9-3-17(a)(1). Classification matters because § 6-5-336(e) expressly preserves vicarious liability against nonprofits and hospitals “notwithstanding” volunteer immunity; it says nothing comparable about governmental entities.

The estate’s core move was to place CBVFD in the nonprofit box (triggering § 6-5-336(e)). The Court rejected that argument on several factual-legal indicia:

  • No incorporation as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit; appellant conceded CBVFD is “not [a] separately incorporated legal entity.”
  • Partial municipal funding, with allocation through the county Association.
  • Operational control and reporting: the fire chief reports to the mayor.
  • Statutory authority, § 11-43-140, expressly empowers municipalities to “maintain and operate a volunteer or paid fire department,” consistent with CBVFD’s structure.

These features aligned CBVFD with a municipal “governmental entity” rather than a nonprofit. That classification unlocked Hollis: if volunteers are immune, there is nothing to impute to the municipality.

b) Volunteer Immunity and Respondeat Superior

Under § 6-5-336(d), a “volunteer” is immune from civil liability for acts/omissions if:

  • Acting in good faith;
  • Within the scope of official volunteer functions and duties for, among others, a governmental entity; and
  • The injury was not caused by willful or wanton misconduct.

Guice satisfied the statutory definition of a “volunteer” (§ 6-5-336(c)(4)): he performed services without compensation (beyond expense reimbursement) for a governmental entity. Evidence included his volunteer certification, use of CBVFD-issued radio, regular training, provision of equipment by CBVFD, and lack of compensation except fuel reimbursement (which, under Hollis, does not convert a volunteer into a paid professional).

Because a master’s vicarious liability depends on an underlying servant’s liability, immunity for the volunteer eliminates the negligence-liability foundation necessary to impute fault to the Town.

c) The Wantonness Fork: Why It Does Not Reopen Municipal Liability

The estate argued that a jury could find Guice acted wantonly and thus fell outside VSA immunity. Even if a volunteer’s wanton conduct defeats the volunteer’s immunity under § 6-5-336(d)(2), Alabama’s municipal liability statute (§ 11-47-190) prevents vicarious municipal liability for wanton or intentional acts. Hollis, Loxley, and Hilliard cement this rule; the Court re-applied it here. Plaintiffs cannot sidestep Hollis by relabeling negligent volunteer conduct as wanton and then imputing it to the city: the wanton label severs municipal vicarious liability under § 11-47-190.

d) The “Scope/Good Faith” Fork: Why It Also Fails to Create Municipal Liability

If a volunteer acted outside the scope of official duties or in bad faith, the volunteer may lose VSA immunity. But § 11-47-190 imposes municipal liability only for “neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness” of an agent “acting in the line of his or her duty.” Conduct outside the line and scope, or intentional/willful misconduct, does not generate municipal liability. Thus:

  • Negligent, in-scope volunteer conduct: volunteer is immune under VSA; municipality has nothing to impute (Hollis).
  • Wanton/intentional conduct: volunteer may lose immunity, but municipality is not vicariously liable for wantonness (§ 11-47-190; Hilliard; Loxley).
  • Out-of-scope conduct: no municipal liability because the agent was not acting in the line and scope as the statute requires.

The Court expressly highlighted this structural logic in a footnote, explaining that even if “good faith” were lacking, municipal liability would not arise because § 11-47-190 does not impose liability for intentional or out-of-scope acts.

e) Preservation of Immunity Defenses

The estate contended the Town waived its immunity defense by not specifically pleading “vicarious immunity via the VSA.” The Court rejected that procedural argument, reiterating that municipal immunity is not waived if asserted before judgment (Marlow), and that a general assertion of immunity, followed by a specific VSA-respondeat superior argument at summary judgment, suffices. The Town did so here; no waiver occurred.

f) Summary Judgment Standard and the Record

Applying de novo review, the Court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact:

  • CBVFD is a municipal subordinate entity, not a nonprofit corporation.
  • Guice was a “volunteer” within the VSA, with only expense reimbursement.
  • Under Hollis and § 11-47-190, the Town could not be vicariously liable for negligent acts of immune volunteers, nor for wanton acts at all.

The Town supported its motion with deposition and documentary evidence; the estate did not produce contrary evidence to create a triable issue.

3) Impact and Implications

a) Doctrinal Clarifications and Practical Effects

  • Classification matters: Whether a volunteer fire department is a separate nonprofit or a municipal subordinate entity determines vicarious liability exposure. Incorporation as a 501(c)(3) and independence (as in Dixon Mills) preserve vicarious liability under § 6-5-336(e). A municipal subordinate department (as here) does not.
  • Municipal vicarious liability for volunteer firefighting is narrow to nonexistent: Hollis, as reaffirmed, effectively insulates municipalities from vicarious negligence claims arising out of volunteer firefighting services and forecloses wantonness-based vicarious claims.
  • Volunteer recruitment policy vindicated: The VSA’s “Good Samaritan” purpose—encouraging volunteer public service—remains robust. Volunteers are shielded from negligence claims; municipalities aren’t exposed to derivative liability for volunteers’ actions.
  • Litigation strategy recalibrated: Plaintiffs seeking recovery must identify non-volunteer municipal agents acting negligently within scope, or separate nonprofit entities with respondeat superior exposure, or other viable defendants (e.g., paid EMS providers). Attacking scope/good faith may defeat the volunteer’s immunity but rarely generates municipal exposure due to § 11-47-190’s limitations.
  • Municipal governance considerations: Cities may prefer to “maintain and operate” volunteer fire departments as subordinate units (authorized by § 11-43-140) rather than contracting with independent nonprofits, given the liability contours highlighted by this decision.

b) What Remains Open

  • Direct municipal liability theories unrelated to firefighting services: Hollis forecloses a general duty to provide “skillful fire protection” via volunteers, but claims involving non-firefighting municipal functions by paid employees remain governed by § 11-47-190.
  • Insurance/indemnity dynamics: The later consent judgment between the estate and Guice (for negligence only) was noted in the procedural history but did not alter the legal analysis or the Town’s summary judgment. The interaction between such consent judgments, insurance coverage, and VSA immunity was not decided here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Volunteer Service Act (VSA): Alabama’s “Good Samaritan” statute, § 6-5-336, giving volunteers immunity from negligence if they act in good faith and within the scope of volunteer duties for specified entities. Volunteers are not immune for willful or wanton misconduct.
  • Respondeat Superior (Vicarious Liability): A legal doctrine that holds an employer (master) liable for torts of an employee (servant) committed within the scope of employment. If the servant is not liable (because innocent or immune), there is nothing to impute to the master.
  • Governmental Entity vs. Nonprofit: Under the VSA, nonprofits and hospitals can be vicariously liable even when their volunteers are immune (§ 6-5-336(e)). Governmental entities (municipalities) are not in that carve-out, so they can benefit from the volunteer’s immunity under respondeat superior.
  • Wantonness vs. Negligence: Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care; wantonness involves conscious disregard of known risk. Volunteers are not immune from wantonness, but municipalities are not vicariously liable for wanton acts under § 11-47-190.
  • Scope of Duties/Good Faith: VSA immunity requires conduct within the volunteer’s official functions and duties and in good faith. Acts outside scope or in bad faith may defeat the volunteer’s immunity but usually also defeat municipal vicarious liability (either because the act was out-of-scope or because § 11-47-190 bars liability for intentional/wanton acts).
  • Subordinate Municipal Entity: A department or unit that lacks separate incorporation and legal identity; suits against it are treated as suits against the municipality itself. Such entities typically cannot be sued absent statutory authorization.

Practical Checklists

For Plaintiffs

  • Obtain and scrutinize incorporation documents. If the fire department is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, § 6-5-336(e) may preserve vicarious liability against that nonprofit.
  • Identify whether the responders were paid municipal employees or volunteers. Paid employees are not shielded by the VSA.
  • Assess scope-of-duty facts. If responders acted outside line and scope, municipal vicarious liability likely fails under § 11-47-190.
  • Consider alternative defendants (e.g., non-municipal EMS providers, other agencies, product manufacturers).

For Municipalities and Volunteer Fire Departments

  • Clarify and document the department’s legal status. If it operates as a municipal subordinate entity, maintain records of oversight (reporting lines, funding, policies).
  • Maintain training records and written protocols, both for public safety and to support the “official functions and duties” inquiry.
  • In pleadings, assert immunity defenses early and consistently. A general immunity assertion followed by specific VSA arguments at summary judgment preserves defenses.

Conclusion

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Rogers v. Cedar Bluff reaffirms and elaborates Hollis’s framework: when a municipality “maintains and operates” a volunteer fire department as a subordinate entity, its volunteer firefighters are immune from negligence under the VSA, and the municipality faces no vicarious liability for their negligence. Allegations of wantonness do not alter the outcome; municipalities are not vicariously liable for wanton conduct under § 11-47-190. Equally important, the Court clarifies how to classify a volunteer fire department for VSA purposes: absence of nonprofit incorporation, municipal funding, operational oversight, and statutory authorization (§ 11-43-140) weigh decisively toward a governmental entity classification.

Practically, this decision narrows plaintiff pathways against municipalities for harms arising out of volunteer firefighting responses and underscores the Legislature’s policy choice to encourage volunteer service through robust immunity. The takeaways are clear: classification drives liability; volunteers’ immunity often insulates municipalities; and wantonness allegations do not create municipal vicarious liability. Rogers thus stands as a significant, clarifying precedent in Alabama’s municipal liability and volunteer immunity jurisprudence.

Case Details

Comments