Robinson v. State: Georgia Supreme Court Clarifies Direct-Evidence Sufficiency, Limits on Accomplice-Corroboration Charges, and the Involuntary Manslaughter Pathway for Underage Firearm Defendants

Introduction

In Robinson v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia, Sept. 30, 2025), the Court affirmed Spencer Robinson’s convictions for felony murder (of 15-year-old Darious Anderson) and aggravated assault (of 15-year-old Stanley Winston), rejecting a suite of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the absence of an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction, several ineffective assistance claims, and a cumulative-error argument.

The case arose from a fatal shooting during a failed attempt by two teenagers to sell a revolver, with Robinson, then 17, acting as facilitator. When the prospective purchaser was unavailable, Robinson retained the gun, and as the trio walked through a wooded cut-through, Robinson told the boys to run “before I start shooting,” then fired multiple rounds as they fled, striking Anderson. Robinson fled from police, hid, and then gave inconsistent statements, culminating in a story that the gun accidentally fired twice while in Winston’s hands.

On appeal, Robinson raised four principal issues:

Insufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated assault of Winston (Count 4).
Plain error based on the omission of an accomplice-corroboration instruction and the court’s “single-witness” instruction.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) not requesting the correct form of involuntary manslaughter instruction, (b) not requesting lesser-included instructions on reckless conduct and pointing a pistol, and (c) not objecting to portions of the State’s closing argument.
Cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors.

The Court affirmed on all grounds, offering notable clarifications on direct vs. circumstantial evidence sufficiency, the evidentiary predicate required before a jury may be instructed on accomplice corroboration, the availability of involuntary manslaughter theories when the defendant’s firearm possession is per se unlawful due to age, and the proper context for evaluating prosecutors’ closing arguments.

Summary of the Opinion

Sufficiency (Aggravated Assault of Winston): Winston’s eyewitness testimony that Robinson announced he would shoot, fired multiple times as both boys fled, and struck Anderson constituted direct evidence that Robinson shot toward both boys; the circumstantial-evidence statute (OCGA § 24-14-6) therefore did not apply. The conviction was also sufficient under federal due process precedents.
No Plain Error (Accomplice-Corroboration Instruction): There was no evidence that Winston shared Robinson’s criminal intent to commit aggravated assault or murder; at most, Robinson’s theory was that Winston committed the crimes alone. Under these facts, an accomplice-corroboration instruction was unwarranted, and omitting it was not “clear and obvious” error.
Ineffective Assistance:
- Involuntary manslaughter instruction: Because Robinson was under 18, his possession of a handgun was unlawful; the “lawful-act/unlawful-manner” subsection (OCGA § 16-5-3(b)) was unavailable. Even assuming counsel should have sought “unlawful act” involuntary manslaughter (OCGA § 16-5-3(a)) predicated on underage handgun possession, Robinson failed to show prejudice in light of strong evidence of intentional shooting.
- Reckless conduct and pointing a pistol as lesser-included offenses: Any failure to request a reckless conduct charge was not prejudicial; the “pointing a pistol” charge was not adjusted to the evidence because it showed either an intentional aggravated assault or no assault by Robinson.
- Closing argument: The prosecutor’s remarks, viewed in context, did not reduce the State’s burden and permissibly rebutted defense emphasis on “lack of evidence.” No deficiency in failing to object.
No Cumulative Error: Even presuming two instructional omissions by trial counsel, the combined effect was non-prejudicial given the strength of the evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489 (2024), and Dillard v. State, 321 Ga. 171 (2025), reaffirm that once the State presents any direct evidence, the heightened circumstantial-evidence rule in OCGA § 24-14-6 does not govern sufficiency review. Here, Winston’s testimony that Robinson stated an intent to shoot and immediately fired as both boys fled was direct evidence.
Aggravated Assault Sufficiency with Eyewitness Perception Limits: Sears v. State, 298 Ga. 400 (2016), confirms sufficiency even when the victim could not see the shot or precise aim, so long as the evidence supports that the defendant fired toward the victim.
Plain Error Framework: Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 653 (2025), describes the four-prong plain-error standard and its demanding nature.
Accomplice-Corroboration Instruction: OCGA § 24-14-8 (single-witness rule and exceptions) requires corroboration when the only witness is an accomplice. Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131 (2018), defines an accomplice as one who shares the perpetrator’s criminal intent. Dillard (2025) and Thornton v. State, 307 Ga. 121 (2019), hold that where the defense theory is that the witness was the sole perpetrator (or an accomplice only to an uncharged offense), an accomplice instruction is not warranted. Baker v. State, 320 Ga. 156 (2024), underscores that omission of an unrequested instruction is not “clear and obvious” error absent trial evidence that plainly calls for it. Nabors v. State, 320 Ga. 43 (2024), explains corroboration may be slight and circumstantial.
Ineffective Assistance: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs. Georgia cases—Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322 (2022); Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 568 (2023); Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402 (2024); Smith v. State, 303 Ga. 643 (2018)—reiterate the strong presumption of reasonableness and the need to show both deficiency and prejudice.
Involuntary Manslaughter Pathways: McIver v. State, 314 Ga. 109 (2022), frames the two pathways: “unlawful act” (OCGA § 16-5-3(a)) and “lawful act in an unlawful manner” (OCGA § 16-5-3(b)). The Court here clarifies that when firearm possession is per se unlawful due to the defendant’s age (OCGA § 16-11-132(b)), subsection (b) is unavailable as a matter of law. Prejudice analysis draws on Barrett v. State, 292 Ga. 160 (2012), and Hill v. State, 290 Ga. 493 (2012).
Lesser-Included Offenses: Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517 (2018), and McIver recognize reckless conduct can be a lesser-included when supported by slight evidence of criminal negligence. Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712 (2023), and Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga. 400 (2020), caution that when the evidence shows either the completed offense or no offense by the accused, lesser-included instructions are not required.
Closing Argument Boundaries: Debelbot v. State, 308 Ga. 165 (2020), condemns quantification or dilution of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pyne v. State, 319 Ga. 776 (2024), emphasizes wide latitude in rebuttal. Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706 (2025), and Thompson v. State, 318 Ga. 760 (2024), instruct courts to evaluate the argument as a whole and in light of the jury charge. Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218 (2023), limits Debelbot to similar factual contexts.
Sentencing Merger Note: Although not outcome-determinative here, the Court noted that firearm-possession counts against distinct victims do not merge (Silah v. State, 315 Ga. 741 (2023)), but declined to correct a merger error that benefitted the defendant absent a State cross-appeal (Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (2017)).

Legal Reasoning Applied

1) Sufficiency for Aggravated Assault of Winston

Robinson argued the evidence was purely circumstantial and failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that he aimed only at Anderson. The Court rejected this, holding that Winston’s testimony—Robinson announced he would shoot, the boys ran, and Robinson fired four or five shots as both fled—was direct evidence that Robinson shot “toward” both boys. Because direct evidence existed, OCGA § 24-14-6 did not apply. Under federal due process standards, Winston’s testimony likewise sufficed. The Court cited Sears to underscore that precision about the shooter’s aim is not required when the evidence supports that shots were fired in the victim’s vicinity.

2) No Plain Error in Omitting an Accomplice-Corroboration Charge

Georgia’s single-witness rule (OCGA § 24-14-8) generally permits conviction on the testimony of one witness, subject to the accomplice exception. The defense posited that Winston might be an accomplice because the three were jointly marketing a gun. The Court held that this theory does not show even slight evidence that Winston shared a “common criminal intent” with Robinson to commit the shootings—the relevant charged crimes. At most, Robinson’s story is that Winston alone fired the shots. Under Dillard and Thornton, that does not trigger the accomplice corroboration instruction. Because the evidence did not obviously call for the instruction, the trial court’s omission was not “clear and obvious” error under Baker (2024).

3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

a) Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction

Trial counsel sought involuntary manslaughter under the “lawful act/unlawful manner” subsection (OCGA § 16-5-3(b)) but, given Robinson’s age, his handgun possession could not be lawful (OCGA § 16-11-132(b)). The Court explained that subsection (b) was categorically unavailable; only subsection (a) (“unlawful act other than a felony”) was potentially in play, predicated on underage handgun possession as the unlawful act. Even assuming counsel performed deficiently by not pivoting to subsection (a), Robinson failed to show prejudice because the State presented strong indicia of intentional shooting—flight, concealment, and repeated lies—and the only evidence supporting the “accident in Winston’s hands” narrative was Robinson’s self-serving and inconsistent testimony. Under Barrett and Hill, such an omission did not undermine confidence in the verdict.

b) Lesser-Included Instructions: Reckless Conduct and Pointing a Pistol

Reckless Conduct: Even if slight evidence existed (e.g., handing a cocked revolver to a 15-year-old), the Court found no prejudice in omitting the instruction, given the strength of the evidence supporting intentional firing and the weakness and inconsistency of the “accidental discharge by Winston” theory. Haufler guided the no-prejudice conclusion.
Pointing a Pistol at Another: This misdemeanor requires proof that the defendant intentionally pointed a gun at another without justification. The trial evidence showed either that Robinson deliberately fired at the fleeing boys (the completed aggravated assault) or he did not commit an assault at all because Winston possessed and fired the gun. There was no evidentiary middle ground showing Robinson “only” pointed without firing. Under Stepp-McCommons, the trial court would not have been required to give this lesser-included instruction, so counsel was not deficient for not requesting it.

c) Failure to Object to Closing Argument

The prosecutor told jurors that if, “in your head,” “heart,” and “gut,” they knew Robinson did it, then they did not have reasonable doubt, and urged jurors not to say “we just didn’t have enough evidence” if they “know he did it.” Viewed in context, these comments rebutted the defense’s emphatic “lack of evidence” theme (no gun recovered, GSR negative, etc.) and urged jurors to decide based on the evidence actually presented. The prosecutor did not quantify reasonable doubt or relieve the State’s burden. Given the trial court’s correct reasonable-doubt charge and the rebuttal posture approved in Pyne, Burke, and Thompson, counsel was not deficient for declining to object. The Court distinguished Debelbot, which involved explicit percentage-based dilution of the standard.

4) No Cumulative Error

Even presuming two instructional omissions (unlawful act involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct), the Court found no cumulative prejudice: both failed the prejudice prong of Strickland largely for the same reasons—the strong evidence of intentional shooting and the weakness of the alternative narrative.

Impact and Significance

Direct Evidence Clarification in Multi-Victim Shootings: When an eyewitness testifies that the defendant announced an intent to shoot and immediately fired as multiple victims fled, that testimony is direct evidence that the defendant shot “toward” each victim within range. This framing avoids the circumstantial-evidence exclusion of reasonable hypotheses (OCGA § 24-14-6), streamlining sufficiency review for aggravated assaults against non-struck victims.
Accomplice-Corroboration Boundaries: Joint participation in a nonviolent venture (e.g., trying to sell a gun) does not make a witness an “accomplice” to later violent crimes absent evidence of shared criminal intent to commit those crimes. Defense theories that “the witness did it alone” do not justify the accomplice-corroboration instruction. Trial counsel must build a record of shared intent to trigger OCGA § 24-14-8’s accomplice exception.
Underage Defendants and Involuntary Manslaughter: The opinion cleanly channels underage firearm cases into the “unlawful act” lane (OCGA § 16-5-3(a)), foreclosing “lawful act/unlawful manner” (OCGA § 16-5-3(b)) when possession is categorically unlawful due to age (OCGA § 16-11-132(b)). Practitioners representing minors should tailor lesser-included requests accordingly.
Lesser-Included Instructions Must Be Adjusted to Evidence: “Pointing a pistol” will not be charged where the record shows either an intentional shooting (completed aggravated assault) or no assault by the accused. Reckless conduct remains theoretically available when slight evidence supports criminal negligence, but absent a reasonable probability of a different result, omission is unlikely to warrant reversal.
Closing Argument Guidance Post-Debelbot: Prosecutors may forcefully rebut “lack of evidence” arguments by urging jurors to focus on the record evidence and the standard instruction on reasonable doubt, so long as they do not quantify or dilute the burden. References to jurors’ collective judgment (“head/heart/gut”) were acceptable here in context and alongside correct jury charges.
Merger Reminder: Although not corrected in this appeal, the Court reiterated that firearm offenses against different victims do not merge. Appellate practitioners should consider cross-appeals to correct merger errors that disadvantage the State.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence, like an eyewitness saying “I saw him shoot toward us,” does not require inferences; circumstantial evidence does. The special rule requiring exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence applies only when the State’s case is wholly circumstantial.
Single-Witness Rule and Accomplice Exception (OCGA § 24-14-8): Normally, one credible witness is enough to prove a fact. But if the only witness is an accomplice (someone who shared the criminal intent for the charged offense), their testimony must be corroborated by other evidence. Evidence that a witness was only involved in some other, uncharged wrongdoing does not trigger this exception.
Plain Error: A rare form of reversible error requiring a showing that (1) there was no waiver, (2) the error was clear and obvious, (3) it likely affected the outcome, and (4) it seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Ineffective Assistance (Strickland): The defendant must show counsel performed unreasonably and that this likely affected the verdict. Courts often reject claims that fail either prong.
Involuntary Manslaughter:
- OCGA § 16-5-3(a) (“unlawful act”): Death caused without intent while committing a non-felony unlawful act (e.g., underage handgun possession).
- OCGA § 16-5-3(b) (“lawful act/unlawful manner”): Death caused without intent while performing a lawful act in a dangerous way. If the underlying act (handgun possession by a minor) is itself unlawful, subsection (b) does not apply.
Lesser-Included Offense “Adjusted to the Evidence”: A trial court instructs only on lesser crimes that the evidence could reasonably support; if the evidence shows either the charged crime or no crime by the defendant, a lesser instruction is inappropriate.
Reasonable Doubt in Closing: Lawyers may argue about reasonable doubt but must not quantify it (e.g., “51%”). Courts assess alleged burden-shifting by looking at the entire argument and the jury instructions as a whole.

Conclusion

Robinson v. State reinforces several important evidentiary and instructional principles in Georgia criminal practice. Eyewitness testimony that a defendant announced an intent to shoot and fired as multiple victims fled is direct evidence sufficient to sustain aggravated assault against each victim within the danger zone, obviating circumstantial-only review. The opinion also tightens the gateway to accomplice-corroboration instructions: shared criminal intent for the charged violent offense—not merely participation in related but nonviolent conduct—is required. For underage defendants, the Court provides a clean doctrinal channel: involuntary manslaughter, if viable at all, proceeds under OCGA § 16-5-3(a), not § 16-5-3(b), because handgun possession is per se unlawful.

On the ineffective assistance and closing argument issues, the Court’s analysis underscores two practical lessons: trial records should be developed to justify lesser-included and corroboration instructions, and closing arguments are judged in context and in tandem with the court’s instructions. Ultimately, the Court found the State’s case substantially corroborated by Robinson’s flight, concealment, and false statements, and the defense’s alternative theories too weak to warrant reversal. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.