Robinson v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2025)
“No Presumed Prejudice for Silent Counsel at Non-Capital Sentencing & Strict Waiver of Un-Preserved Sentencing Claims”

1. Introduction

Robinson v. State is a wide-ranging appeal stemming from a 2008 gang-related double-murder plot that left 11-year-old Devontae Jones and the family dog dead, and his mother, Charmisa Witherspoon, seriously endangered. Kenneth Robinson, 14 at the time, was tried with four adult co-defendants and ultimately received life plus 45 consecutive years.

On direct appeal Robinson raised four clusters of issues:

• Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for allegedly undisclosed plea offer.
• Multiple constitutional and statutory errors at sentencing, including the claim that his lawyer was effectively silenced.
• Abuse of discretion in running a firearm sentence consecutively.
• An asserted merger error involving aggravated assault and conspiracy counts.

Justice Colvin, writing for a unanimous court (with Justice LaGrua concurring specially), affirmed in full. The decision clarifies when prejudice is, and is not, presumed under United States v. Cronic, restricts reliance on plain-error review of un-preserved sentencing complaints, and reinforces trial courts’ broad discretion to stack sentences consecutively in non-capital cases.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Plea-Offer IAC: Trial counsel’s testimony about his habitual practice to relay offers, credited by the trial court, defeated the deficiency prong of Strickland v. Washington.
• Sentencing-Stage Claims
  • No presumed prejudice under Cronic or Bell v. Cone where counsel was present but silent during a brief, non-capital sentencing hearing.
  • No due-process violation because neither counsel nor defendant requested to speak.
  • No OCGA § 17-10-2 error preserved; plain-error review unavailable outside enumerated contexts.
• Consecutive Firearm Sentence: Claim waived because not objected to below and sentence fell within the statutory range; plain-error doctrine inapplicable.
• Merger: Aggravated assault on Witherspoon did not merge with a conspiracy count that had itself merged into felony murder of a different victim.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Benchmark test for IAC.
• Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) & Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) – Duty to convey favorable plea offers.
• United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) – Three scenarios of automatic prejudice.
• Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) – Interprets Cronic’s “meaningful adversarial testing” prong.
• Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) & Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) – Counsel shutdown cases; distinguished here.
• Georgia authority restricting plain error: Miller v. State, 309 Ga. 549 (2020).
• Trial-court discretion on concurrency: State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63 (2017).
• Merger principles: Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305 (2004).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Plea-Negotiation Issue – Strickland analysis only.
   • The trial court’s factual finding that counsel did convey the plea was not clearly erroneous.
   • Without deficiency, the Strickland inquiry ends; no need to discuss prejudice.
2. Sentencing-Stage Counsel Silence – No Cronic shortcut.
   • Cronic § (1) “complete denial” not triggered because counsel was physically present, even if silent.
   • Cronic § (2) “failure to test the prosecution’s case” requires total strategic abandonment across the proceeding. Georgia’s brief, non-capital sentencing hearings are unlike capital penalties in Bell; thus standard Strickland prejudice applies.
   • Robinson could not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome; the trial judge already recognized youth and mitigation.
3. No Due-Process/In-Person Right Violations.
   • Key element of due process is opportunity to be heard, not an affirmative obligation on the court to invite comments. Absence of a request equaled waiver.
4. Statutory Presentence Hearing Claim Waived.
   • Failure to object at trial plus limited scope of Georgia plain-error doctrine = forfeiture.
5. Consecutive Sentencing Discretion.
   • The firearm sentence fell within statutory parameters; without objection below the claim is barred under waiver jurisprudence.

C. Impact of the Decision

• Narrows Cronic application in Georgia: Silent or passive counsel at a non-capital sentencing hearing will ordinarily face ordinary Strickland review; defendants must prove prejudice.
• Re-affirms strict preservation rules: Litigants must object contemporaneously to sentencing-phase irregularities; plain error remains confined to death cases, judge-comment violations, jury instructions, and (post-2013) evidentiary rulings.
• Signals to trial judges: Although judges retain vast discretion, they are encouraged (but not constitutionally required) to solicit defense argument to avoid later controversy.
• Guides defense counsel: If the court seems poised to pronounce sentence prematurely, counsel must object to preserve error and develop mitigation on record.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Strickland Test: Two-part inquiry—(1) lawyer’s conduct fell below professional norms (deficiency) and (2) reasonable probability of different outcome but for the errors (prejudice).
• Cronic Presumption: A “shortcut”—in rare settings courts presume prejudice without proof, e.g., total absence of counsel, counsel prevented from speaking, or counsel given zero prep time.
• Plain-Error Review: An appellate safety-valve letting courts correct obvious errors even without objection. Georgia limits it to very specific contexts; sentencing in non-capital cases is not one of them.
• Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentences: Judges can stack sentences (consecutive) or let them run together (concurrent). Discretion is broad unless a statute mandates otherwise.
• Merger Doctrine: Prevents duplicative punishment when the same conduct proves multiple offenses. Merger depends on statutory elements and victim identity.

5. Conclusion

Robinson v. State crystallizes several doctrinal points: (1) Strickland, not Cronic, governs most claims that counsel failed to advocate during non-capital sentencing; (2) Georgia’s appellate courts will not engage in plain-error rescue missions for ordinary, un-objected sentencing missteps; and (3) sentencing judges possess, and are presumed to understand, broad discretion to impose consecutive terms.

For practitioners, the message is twofold: speak up—a silent record waives powerful appellate claims—and build mitigation proactively, even in brief state sentencing hearings. For courts, ensuring the defense is expressly invited to allocute may reduce later litigation, but Robinson confirms that failure to do so does not automatically undermine a sentence. The decision thereby balances efficiency in Georgia trial practice with constitutional safeguards, drawing a firm line against expanding presumed-prejudice doctrines outside the most egregious circumstances.