Robinson v. Kotler: Pending State Appeals Defeat Rooker-Feldman, but Absolute Judicial Immunity and § 1983’s Injunction Limits Foreclose Suits Against Judges

Introduction

This Second Circuit summary order addresses a recurring set of issues at the intersection of federal jurisdiction and judicial immunity. In Gina Robinson v. Hon. Lynn R. Kotler, J.S.C., No. 24-555 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2025), a pro se litigant who was dissatisfied with New York state-court rulings in her product-dispute lawsuit sued the presiding state judge in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged constitutional violations. The district court (S.D.N.Y., Woods, J.) dismissed the case at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, citing both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. On appeal, a panel consisting of Circuit Judges Dennis Jacobs, Steven J. Menashi, and Myrna Pérez affirmed the judgment.

The panel held that the district court erred in applying Rooker-Feldman because the plaintiff’s state-court appeal was still pending when she filed in federal court. Nevertheless, the panel affirmed on the alternative ground that absolute judicial immunity barred the damages claims and that § 1983 foreclosed injunctive relief absent the statutorily specified prerequisites. The order is unpublished and nonprecedential but clarifies (and reinforces) important doctrinal boundaries for litigants and courts.

Case Background and Key Issues

• Parties: Gina Robinson (pro se appellant) sued New York Supreme Court Justice Lynn R. Kotler.
• State case: Robinson filed a New York state-court action against the manufacturer of a dental device, alleging nonconformity to her specifications. Justice Kotler presided and largely ruled for the defendants.
• Federal suit: While Robinson’s appeal from the adverse state-court order was pending, she filed a federal § 1983 suit against Justice Kotler, alleging constitutional violations stemming from Kotler’s rulings and seeking damages and injunctive relief.
• District court disposition: Dismissed sua sponte under § 1915 as barred by Rooker-Feldman and judicial immunity (No. 23-cv-10623).
• Issues on appeal: (1) Whether Rooker-Feldman barred jurisdiction when a state appeal was pending; and (2) whether judicial immunity (including § 1983’s statutory limits on injunctive relief against judicial officers) required dismissal.

Summary of the Opinion (Holding)

• Rooker-Feldman: The panel held the doctrine did not apply because Robinson’s state-court appeal was still pending when she filed the federal complaint. Under Second Circuit precedent, Rooker-Feldman applies only when the state proceedings have “ended.”
• Judicial immunity (damages): Absolute judicial immunity bars suits for damages arising from judicial acts, even if alleged to be erroneous, malicious, or in excess of authority. Robinson’s claims targeted case-management and merits rulings—quintessential judicial functions—so damages are barred.
• Injunctive relief under § 1983: Section 1983 authorizes injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Robinson alleged neither, so injunctive relief is foreclosed.
• Disposition: Judgment affirmed on judicial immunity grounds despite the district court’s Rooker-Feldman error.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Rooker-Feldman line:
  • Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018): Articulates the modern, narrow Rooker-Feldman test: it applies to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before federal proceedings commenced and seeking review/rejection of those judgments.
  • Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 65–71 (2d Cir. 2023): Clarifies that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when a state appeal is pending because the state proceedings have not “ended.” The panel in Robinson leans on Hunter to correct the district court’s jurisdictional ruling.
• Judicial immunity core authorities:
  • Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871): Classic statement of policy: judges must be free to act upon their convictions “without apprehension of personal consequences.”
  • STUMP v. SPARKMAN, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978): Judicial immunity protects judicial acts even if in error, malicious, or in excess of authority; only acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” fall outside immunity.
  • PIERSON v. RAY, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967): Immunity is not defeated by allegations of malice or corruption.
  • FORRESTER v. WHITE, 484 U.S. 219, 227–29 (1988): Focus on the “nature of the function performed,” not the actor; judicial immunity covers judicial acts but not administrative/employment decisions.
  • OLIVA v. HELLER, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988), and BLIVEN v. HUNT, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009): Restate the Second Circuit’s consistent application of absolute judicial immunity to judicial acts.
  • GROSS v. RELL, 585 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2009): Reiterates that even malicious or erroneous judicial actions remain immune unless taken in clear absence of all jurisdiction.
• Injunctive relief against judges under § 1983:
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as amended in 1996): Injunctive relief against a judicial officer is available only where a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. This amendment narrowed the holding of Pulliam v. Allen (1984), which had allowed broader injunctive relief against judges.
  • MONTERO v. TRAVIS, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999): Applies the 1996 amendment to deny injunctive relief against a parole board official acting in a quasi-judicial capacity where the plaintiff did not allege a violated declaratory decree or unavailability of declaratory relief.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: first, it corrects the jurisdictional foundation by explaining why the district court misapplied Rooker-Feldman; second, it endorses dismissal on immunity grounds.

1. Rooker-Feldman’s inapplicability given a pending state appeal: The panel follows Hunter v. McMahon in emphasizing that federal jurisdiction is assessed when the complaint is filed, and that Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings have “ended.” If an appeal is pending in state court, the state process is ongoing, and the federal suit is not jurisdictionally barred by Rooker-Feldman. This limitation is critical to avoid over-broad use of Rooker-Feldman as a catch-all preclusion device. In Robinson’s case, public records showed her state appeal was pending at the time she filed the federal action, so the doctrine did not apply.
2. Judicial immunity bars damages and forecloses injunctive relief: Turning to the merits of the § 1915 screening dismissal, the panel concludes that Robinson’s claims derive from classic judicial acts—case management and merits rulings alleged to be biased and contrary to law. Under Stump and its progeny, judges are absolutely immune from damages for such acts, even if the litigant claims the judge acted maliciously or in excess of authority. The only exception—acts taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”—is not plausibly implicated where a New York Supreme Court justice is presiding over a civil action within the court’s general jurisdiction.
   
   As to prospective remedies, the panel reiterates the statutory limits on injunctive relief against judicial officers: absent a violated declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief, § 1983 does not authorize injunctive orders against judges. Robinson neither identified any declaratory decree that Justice Kotler violated nor established that declaratory relief was unavailable. Therefore, the injunctive claims fail as a matter of law.

Impact and Implications

• Rooker-Feldman remains narrow—and timing matters: The decision reinforces the Second Circuit’s post-Exxon Mobil narrowing of Rooker-Feldman (consistent with Sung Cho and Hunter). Practitioners should not invoke Rooker-Feldman reflexively where state proceedings continue on appeal; jurisdiction must be analyzed at the moment of the federal filing.
• Judicial immunity is robust: Attempts to recharacterize adverse rulings as constitutional torts against judges will almost always fail. The function-based test protects judicial acts even when a litigant alleges bias, bad faith, or error. The immunity promotes judicial independence and finality by channeling grievances into appellate review rather than collateral damages suits.
• Injunctive relief against judges is sharply circumscribed: The 1996 amendment to § 1983 significantly limits injunctive relief against judicial officers. Litigants must plead and prove either that a declaratory decree has been violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable. Routine dissatisfaction with ongoing or completed rulings does not suffice; the appropriate remedy is appeal or, where available, recusal motions and supervisory review within the state judiciary.
• Screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B): The decision illustrates that district courts may (and must) dismiss sua sponte in forma pauperis complaints seeking monetary relief from immune defendants. Even where a jurisdictional theory like Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable, dismissal can (and should) rest on alternative, dispositive doctrines such as absolute immunity.
• Nonprecedential but persuasive: While the order is nonprecedential under Local Rule 32.1.1, it is citable under FRAP 32.1 as a “summary order.” It persuasively synthesizes controlling precedents and can guide district courts in avoiding overbroad Rooker-Feldman dismissals while faithfully applying judicial immunity and § 1983’s injunctive limits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rooker-Feldman doctrine: A narrow rule barring lower federal courts from acting as appellate tribunals over final state-court judgments. It applies only when (1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the injury complained of was caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the state judgment was rendered before the federal case began; and (4) the plaintiff invites federal court review and rejection of that judgment. If the state case is still on appeal when the federal suit is filed, Rooker-Feldman does not apply in the Second Circuit.
• Absolute judicial immunity: Judges are immune from suits for money damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity, even if the actions are alleged to be wrong, malicious, or in excess of authority. The only narrow exception is when a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction (for example, a probate judge trying a criminal case).
• Judicial vs. non-judicial acts: Courts look to the “nature of the function,” not the identity of the actor. Rulings, orders, scheduling, and discovery management are judicial acts. Administrative acts (e.g., hiring/firing court staff) may fall outside absolute immunity under Forrester.
• § 1983 injunctive relief against judges: Since 1996, § 1983 allows injunctions against judicial officers only when a declaratory decree has been violated or declaratory relief is unavailable. Merely disliking a judge’s rulings does not meet this standard. Appellate and recusal procedures are the appropriate channels.
• “Sua sponte” dismissal under § 1915: When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from an immune defendant. This protects courts and defendants from the burdens of meritless litigation.
• Standard of review—de novo: The court of appeals reviews § 1915 dismissals without deference to the district court’s legal conclusions, but can affirm on any ground supported by the record.
• Nonprecedential “summary order”: In the Second Circuit, summary orders do not have precedential effect but can be cited as persuasive authority if labeled as a “summary order” and served on unrepresented parties, per FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.

What This Decision Does—and Does Not—Decide

• Does: Clarify that Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal jurisdiction when a state appeal is pending; confirm that judicial immunity bars damages claims for judicial acts and that § 1983 restricts injunctive relief against judges absent specific statutory conditions.
• Does not:
  • Adjudicate the merits of Robinson’s underlying dispute with the dental device manufacturer.
  • Determine the propriety of any particular state-court rulings (that remains for the state appellate courts).
  • Address other doctrines (e.g., Younger abstention, claim/issue preclusion), which were not the basis for dismissal here.
  • Define the outer limits of what counts as a “non-judicial” act; it simply holds that the acts alleged were judicial.

Practice Pointers

• Challenging state-court rulings: The appropriate avenue is appellate review within the state system, not a collateral damages action against the judge in federal court.
• Pleading against judicial officers: To survive screening on injunctive claims, a plaintiff must plausibly allege either (a) a violated declaratory decree or (b) that declaratory relief is unavailable; bare allegations of bias or legal error will not suffice.
• Assessing jurisdiction: Before raising Rooker-Feldman, confirm whether the state case has “ended.” If an appeal is pending, consider other doctrines (e.g., immunity, failure to state a claim) rather than Rooker-Feldman.
• Function-based analysis: When suing government actors, frame allegations around non-judicial functions if immunity is an issue; however, recognize that case-related rulings are almost invariably judicial acts protected by absolute immunity.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Robinson v. Kotler provides a clear, two-part message. First, it reinforces the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: a federal court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely because a state appeal is ongoing at the time of filing. Second, it underscores the formidable barrier of absolute judicial immunity (and § 1983’s strict limits on injunctive relief against judges) to suits that seek to transform dissatisfaction with judicial rulings into personal liability for the judge. The appropriate remedy for alleged judicial error or bias is almost always found within the state appellate process, not in collateral federal litigation against the judge. Although nonprecedential, the order closely tracks and applies controlling precedent, offering persuasive guidance to district courts and litigants confronting similar claims.

Key Citations

• Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023)
• Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639 (2d Cir. 2018)
• STUMP v. SPARKMAN, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)
• FORRESTER v. WHITE, 484 U.S. 219 (1988)
• BLIVEN v. HUNT, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009)
• GROSS v. RELL, 585 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2009)
• MONTERO v. TRAVIS, 171 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999)
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (post-1996 amendment limiting injunctive relief against judicial officers)
• 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)