Introduction

In Michael Isreal Robin, Sr. v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 118 (Wyo. Nov. 3, 2025), the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a jury conviction for robbery and, in doing so, provided clear guidance on two recurring evidentiary and constitutional questions: (1) when statements made during a 911 call are “testimonial” for Sixth Amendment purposes, and (2) when such statements satisfy the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule under W.R.E. 803(2). The Court held that the victim’s statements to a 911 dispatcher, made within minutes of a violent robbery and while the perpetrators were at large and believed to be armed, were nontestimonial under the Confrontation Clause and admissible as excited utterances.

The decision situates Wyoming doctrine firmly within U.S. Supreme Court precedent—especially Davis v. Washington and Michigan v. Bryant—and explicitly notes the Supreme Court’s recent re-emphasis in Smith v. Arizona (2024) that the Confrontation Clause is concerned solely with testimonial hearsay. For trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel, the opinion offers a practical, factor-based roadmap to evaluate 911 recordings, including the importance of ongoing emergency, the declarant’s emotional state, timing, and the informality of the exchange.

Background and Parties

The case stems from a June 1, 2023 incident in Cheyenne. After leaving a gaming establishment, Michael Robin and Keil Muir offered a ride to John Grier, an older man who had mentioned possessing money orders. Once at Grier’s apartment, Robin reached over from the back seat, grabbed Grier by the collar, and demanded the money orders. Whether Robin was armed was disputed: Muir testified at trial that he saw no gun, though his earlier statements to police asserted Robin used a firearm against both men. Grier surrendered the money orders, exited the vehicle, went inside his apartment, and placed a 911 call “within approximately five minutes” of the robbery. He was crying, described being robbed at gunpoint, said he had been struck with a gun, and indicated the perpetrators had fled.

The State charged Robin with aggravated robbery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‑2‑401(c). Before trial, the State disclosed uncertainty about Grier’s memory and elected not to call him as a witness, but sought to admit Grier’s out-of-court statements, including the 911 recording. The district court ruled the recording admissible as both a present sense impression and an excited utterance, and also nontestimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. At trial, the jury convicted Robin of robbery, acquitting him of aggravated robbery.

Issues Presented

• Confrontation Clause: Did admitting the recording of the victim’s 911 call violate Robin’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses?
• Hearsay: Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the 911 call under W.R.E. 803(2) (excited utterance)?

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, District Judge McGrady (sitting by designation) affirmed the conviction and upheld the admission of the 911 recording. The Court concluded:

• Confrontation Clause: The victim’s statements during the initial portion of the 911 call were nontestimonial because, applying the primary purpose test from Davis and Bryant, the objective circumstances showed the exchange was aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency—the perpetrators had just fled, were believed armed, and posed a continuing threat. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment posed no bar.
• Hearsay (W.R.E. 803(2)): The statements were admissible as excited utterances. The robbery was startling and violent; Grier’s audible distress (crying, shaky voice) indicated ongoing stress; the call followed within about five minutes; and the fact that the statements were in response to dispatcher questions did not defeat the exception.

Because the excited utterance exception sufficed, the Court did not reach the present sense impression ground. Notably, the Court observed that the jury’s verdict—acquitting on aggravated robbery but convicting on simple robbery—demonstrated that the jury weighed the evidence, including any inconsistencies in witness accounts.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006):

  Established the “primary purpose” test for determining whether statements are testimonial: if made to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, they are nontestimonial; if to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, they are testimonial. The Wyoming Supreme Court used this framework to evaluate the 911 call’s purpose.

• Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011):

  Elaborated the primary purpose test and emphasized that an “ongoing emergency” can persist even after a victim reaches a place of apparent safety when an armed assailant remains at large. The Court expressly analogized to Bryant, reasoning that armed perpetrators who had just fled posed a real-time threat to the victim, police, and the public, thus making the dispatcher’s questions safety-oriented rather than prosecutorial.

• Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024):

  Reaffirmed that the Confrontation Clause applies solely to testimonial hearsay. The citation signals Wyoming’s alignment with the Supreme Court’s most recent articulation: if statements are nontestimonial, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated, even if hearsay concerns remain. That framing clears the path for trial courts to conduct separate, sequential analyses—constitutional first (testimonial or not), and hearsay second (exception or not).

• Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, 346 P.3d 909:

  Wyoming authority applying Davis/Bryant to assess the testimonial nature of emergency communications and laying out the five-factor test for excited utterances. The Court relied on Bruce to:

  • Evaluate emotional distress as probative of nontestimonial character and spontaneity;
  • Emphasize the informality of 911 calls compared to structured police interrogations; and
  • Map the five excited-utterance factors to the facts here.
• Moore v. State, 2013 WY 146, 313 P.3d 505:

  Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing hearsay rulings, underscoring deference to trial courts where a legitimate basis for the ruling exists.

• Boykin v. State, 2005 WY 15, 105 P.3d 481:

  Explained the rationale of the excited utterance exception—stress reduces the likelihood of fabrication—and affirmed the necessity of a fact-specific inquiry.

• Sanchez v. State, 2011 WY 77, 253 P.3d 136:

  Clarified that the key question is whether the statement is spontaneous and not the product of reflection or deliberation.

• Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, 98 P.3d 172:

  Cited for the proposition that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible absent unavailability plus prior cross-examination opportunity—an articulation consistent with modern Crawford-line doctrine. Here, it buttressed the Court’s threshold focus on whether the statements were testimonial at all.

Legal Reasoning

1) Confrontation Clause: Applying the Primary Purpose Test

The Court framed the analysis around the objective circumstances of the 911 call. Several factors collectively demonstrated that the purpose of the exchange was to respond to an ongoing emergency rather than to memorialize past facts for prosecution:

• Temporal Proximity: Grier called 911 within approximately five minutes of the robbery and assault, described active danger, and reported that the perpetrators had fled.
• Continuing Threat: The perpetrators were believed to be armed and at large, creating a present risk to Grier, responding officers, and the public, mirroring the threat landscape in Bryant.
• Nature of Questions: The dispatcher’s inquiries were safety-centric—Are you safe? Is anyone injured? Where is the gun? Which direction did they go?—consistent with managing an emergency rather than collecting testimonial evidence.
• Emotional State and Informality: Grier was crying, speaking with a shaky voice, and plainly distressed. The 911 context is informal and reactive, unlike a structured interrogation aiming at trial use.

The Court emphasized that the “initial portion” of the 911 call bore these hallmarks. Implicitly, this aligns with the widely practiced “segmented analysis” of 911 recordings: statements contemporaneous with emergency mitigation are nontestimonial, while later, reflective narratives—if they exist—might be testimonial. Here, the emergency-driven character sufficed to treat the admitted portion (and, in affirmance, the recording as used at trial) as nontestimonial. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment did not bar admission.

2) Hearsay: The Excited Utterance Exception (W.R.E. 803(2))

Having found no constitutional impediment, the Court turned to hearsay. The district court admitted the statements under both W.R.E. 803(2) (excited utterance) and W.R.E. 803(1) (present sense impression). The Supreme Court affirmed on 803(2) alone, applying the Bruce five-factor test:

• Nature of the Event: A violent robbery, with the victim reporting being hit with a gun—undeniably startling.
• Physical Manifestations of Excitement: Labored breathing, crying, trembling voice—all indicative of ongoing stress.
• Age of Declarant: Grier’s age (67) was neutral.
• Lapse of Time: Approximately five minutes—strongly supports spontaneity.
• Response to Inquiry: Statements were elicited by dispatcher questions, but that does not defeat 803(2); the key is whether the content was spontaneous and non-reflective. The Court cited Boykin to underscore that responsive statements can still be excited utterances.

On balance, the Court concluded the statements were “spontaneous and impulsive,” not deliberative, and “related to a startling event” while Grier was still under the stress of that event—squarely within W.R.E. 803(2). Because that exception sufficed, the Court found no need to reach the present sense impression ground.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Clearer Guidance on 911 Calls and Confrontation: The decision reinforces that 911 calls made in the immediate aftermath of a violent crime can be nontestimonial when the perpetrators remain at large, especially if believed armed. The emergency’s scope includes risks to police and the public, not just the caller’s momentary safety.
• Segmentation Encouraged: By referencing the “initial portion” of the call, the opinion encourages trial courts to parse recordings and make on-the-record findings distinguishing emergency management from retrospective narration. This protects defendants’ confrontation rights without unduly excluding critical, time-sensitive safety information.
• Excited Utterance Flexibility: Wyoming reaffirms that minutes (and in some circumstances longer) can still qualify under 803(2) if the declarant remains under stress. The fact that statements respond to questions is not disqualifying; the touchstone is spontaneity versus reflection.
• Victims with Memory Issues: When a victim later becomes unavailable or unreliable for trial (as the State disclosed here), properly admitted nontestimonial 911 statements may still be used. Prosecutors should, however, be prepared to show the emergency context and the declarant’s stress; defense counsel should probe for moments when the emergency ended or the declarant calmed, potentially rendering later segments testimonial or non-excited.
• Trial Practice Pointers:
  • For prosecutors: Establish timeline, emotional state, and nature of dispatch questions; document the ongoing threat (e.g., armed suspects at large). If possible, offer the recording with proposed redactions and request a limiting instruction as needed.
  • For defense: Seek line-by-line analysis; argue that once the caller reported safety and the scene stabilized, later statements became testimonial; challenge whether the declarant remained under the stress of the event; and request appropriate limiting instructions.
  • For judges: Make explicit findings on the primary purpose for each portion of the call; articulate the excited-utterance factors; and consider redaction to separate emergency mitigation from retrospective detail-gathering.
• Jury Consideration and Prejudice: The Court’s observation that the jury acquitted on the aggravated count suggests jurors can critically assess 911 statements alongside conflicting evidence. While not a formal harmless-error analysis, it signals that such evidence, when properly admitted, need not be unduly prejudicial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Confrontation Clause: The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right to confront “witnesses” against them. It bars admission of out-of-court “testimonial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. If a statement is not testimonial, the Clause does not apply.
• Testimonial vs. Nontestimonial: Testimonial statements are typically formal, aimed at proving past facts for prosecution (e.g., police interrogations). Nontestimonial statements are made primarily to address an emergency (e.g., 911 calls addressing ongoing threats).
• Primary Purpose Test: Courts ask, objectively, what the exchange was mainly for: resolving an immediate danger (nontestimonial) or building a case (testimonial).
• Ongoing Emergency: Not limited to the caller’s immediate personal safety; includes broader public risks—especially when an armed suspect is at large.
• Excited Utterance (W.R.E. 803(2)): A statement about a startling event made while the speaker is still under the stress of excitement. Consider the event’s nature, the declarant’s distress, timing, and whether the statement was prompted. The key is spontaneity, not the absence of questions.
• Present Sense Impression (W.R.E. 803(1)): A statement describing an event while perceiving it or immediately thereafter. It focuses on temporal immediacy; excited utterance focuses on the declarant’s stress, which can persist beyond “immediately.”
• Standards of Review:
  • Confrontation Clause: Reviewed de novo (fresh look), with deference to trial court fact findings unless clearly erroneous.
  • Hearsay exceptions: Reviewed for abuse of discretion—trial courts get leeway if they had a legitimate basis for their ruling.

Conclusion

Robin v. State crystallizes Wyoming law at the intersection of the Confrontation Clause and hearsay doctrine for 911 calls. The Court’s key holdings are twofold:

• Statements made to a 911 dispatcher in the immediate aftermath of a violent event, when armed perpetrators remain at large, are nontestimonial because their primary purpose is to resolve an ongoing emergency.
• Such statements, if made under the stress of the event, can qualify as excited utterances under W.R.E. 803(2), even when elicited by dispatcher questions and even several minutes after the event.

The decision aligns Wyoming practice with controlling Supreme Court authority (Davis, Bryant, and Smith), encourages careful segmentation and on-the-record findings for 911 recordings, and provides a pragmatic framework for admitting or challenging such crucial evidence. In a landscape where victims may be unavailable or memory-impaired, Robin ensures that urgent, reliable emergency communications can reach the jury without violating constitutional guarantees, while preserving robust judicial gatekeeping through the hearsay rules.