Roberts Reaffirms Objective Pretext Doctrine and Recorded-Consent Vehicle Searches in West Virginia

Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Steven Verrell Roberts, No. 23-422 (W. Va. Sept. 16, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia issued a memorandum decision affirming the denial of a motion to suppress and upholding convictions for (1) possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and (2) transportation into the State of five to fifty grams of methamphetamine. The case arose from a nighttime traffic stop on Route 19 in Fayette County by Oak Hill Police Department officers conducting drug interdiction. After observing the vehicle cross the lane line on two occasions, officers initiated a stop, engaged the driver, and obtained his twice-repeated oral consent—captured on body-worn camera audio—to search the vehicle. The search yielded approximately 1,006 methamphetamine pills.

On appeal, Roberts argued that the stop was invalid because the officers lacked a “subjectively reasonable” basis and that his consent was coerced. The Court rejected both arguments. Relying principally on State v. McMutary (2024) and Whren v. United States (1996), the Court reaffirmed that subjective officer motivations do not factor into the constitutional analysis where there is probable cause (or, within the Court’s framing, a legally observed traffic violation) for the stop. It further held that the recorded, repeated oral consent satisfied West Virginia’s statutory requirement for warrantless searches of vehicles during traffic stops, codified at West Virginia Code § 62-1A-10.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding:

Officers had a lawful basis to stop the vehicle after observing two lane deviations in violation of West Virginia Code § 17C-7-1. The Court emphasized deference to the circuit court’s factual finding on this point, even though the body camera did not capture the actual traffic infraction.
Under State v. McMutary and Whren v. United States, an officer’s subjective motivations or “pretextual indicators” are irrelevant so long as there is an objectively valid basis (here, a lane violation) to support the stop.
Roberts twice provided oral consent to search, and those consents were recorded, satisfying West Virginia Code § 62-1A-10. The circuit court’s finding that consent was “freely and voluntarily” given was not clearly erroneous.
Arguments that the officers’ positioning or lighting created hazardous conditions prompting the lane violations, and that a K-9’s presence rendered consent involuntary, were either contradicted by the record or not preserved in the circuit court and thus not cognizable on appeal.

Concluding that the record reflected no prejudicial error and presented no substantial question of law, the Court issued a memorandum decision under Rule 21 and affirmed the convictions and consecutive sentences.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996). The Court reiterated the standard of review for suppression rulings: appellate courts construe the facts in the light most favorable to the State; circuit court factual findings receive “particular deference” and are reviewed for clear error. This deference proved decisive given that the lane violations were not captured on body camera but were credited by the circuit court.
State v. McMutary, 250 W. Va. 78, 902 S.E.2d 410 (2024). McMutary reaffirmed West Virginia’s adherence to Whren under Article III, § 6 of the West Virginia Constitution: a stop is reasonable if police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred; officers’ subjective intentions are irrelevant. McMutary’s Syllabus Point 4—“the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”—is quoted and applied here.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court held that subjective intentions play no role in ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis. The West Virginia Supreme Court, through McMutary and now Roberts, aligns its state constitutional analysis with Whren, rejecting arguments for a “subjectively reasonable” basis tied to an officer’s true motivations.
State v. Farley, 230 W. Va. 193, 737 S.E.2d 90 (2012) (cited in part). Cited for the “particular deference” afforded to circuit court findings establishing the basis for a traffic stop. This bolsters the trial court’s acceptance of the officers’ testimony regarding lane deviations despite the absence of contemporaneous video.
State v. Justice, 191 W. Va. 261, 445 S.E.2d 202 (1994), and State v. Plantz, 155 W. Va. 24, 180 S.E.2d 614 (1971), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. White v. Mohn, 168 W. Va. 211, 283 S.E.2d 914 (1981). These cases anchor the proposition that voluntary consent by a vehicle’s operator authorizes warrantless searches, a rule now layered with the recording requirement in § 62-1A-10.
State v. Thomas, 157 W. Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). Preservation doctrine: issues not raised in the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. The Court used Thomas to dispose of new appellate theories about officer-created hazards and K-9 coercion.

Statutes and Their Application

West Virginia Code § 17C-7-1. Requires driving on the right half of the roadway on roads of sufficient width. The officers observed Roberts “veer across the dotted line on two different occasions,” an undisputed violation that provided probable cause for the stop.
West Virginia Code § 62-1A-10. Limits vehicle searches during stops for traffic misdemeanors unless specified conditions are met. One enumerated path is to obtain “the oral consent of the operator of the vehicle” and to ensure that this oral consent is “evidenced by an audio recording.” The Court found this requirement satisfied; Roberts twice gave recorded oral consent.

Legal Reasoning

The Court followed a two-step analysis. First, it addressed the validity of the stop. The circuit court found that the officers observed two lane deviations, a violation of § 17C-7-1. Applying Lacy and Farley, the Supreme Court deferred to that factual finding and held the stop “reasonable” under Article III, § 6. Second, it considered the search of the vehicle. The record showed Roberts twice provided oral consent, and that consent was recorded in compliance with § 62-1A-10. Under Justice and Plantz, voluntary consent authorizes a warrantless search; the circuit court expressly found the consent to be “freely and voluntarily” given.

Crucially, the Court rejected the appellant’s invitation to scrutinize the officers’ “true motivations.” Under McMutary and Whren, subjective intent—e.g., interdiction training cues such as braking on approach, a “fixed stare,” or a rigid posture—does not invalidate an objectively supported stop. The actual basis for the stop was the lane violation, and that alone justified the seizure. Once lawfully stopped, and with the operator’s recorded consent, the officers’ subsequent search comported with both constitutional and statutory requirements.

The Court also declined to entertain arguments not raised below—namely, that the officers’ cruiser placement and lights purportedly induced the traffic violation, and that the K-9’s presence rendered consent involuntary—citing Thomas. On the limited remark that the body cameras were not activated until after the stop and that there was a brief initial audio mute, the Court implicitly accepted the circuit court’s resolution of credibility and fact-finding based on the full record, including the later-recorded consents.

Impact

While a memorandum decision and not a full published opinion, Roberts reinforces several practical and doctrinal points in West Virginia search-and-seizure law:

Objective pretext doctrine cemented under state law. Following McMutary, Roberts confirms that Article III, § 6 of the West Virginia Constitution is coextensive with Whren on pretext: where an officer observes a traffic violation, subjective motivations are legally irrelevant. Defense arguments urging a “subjective reasonableness” standard are foreclosed.
Probable cause via minor traffic violations suffices. Even modest lane infractions, when credited by the trial court, will support a stop. The absence of bodycam footage of the infraction itself is not fatal on appeal if the circuit court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
Recorded consent is the safe harbor for vehicle searches during traffic stops. Section 62-1A-10’s recorded-consent pathway is validated and encouraged. Officers who obtain and record clear oral consent insulate searches from suppression challenges premised on statutory noncompliance.
Preservation matters. Claims about officer-created hazards or coercive K-9 presence must be raised in the trial court with evidentiary support. Absent preservation, appellate review will be foreclosed regardless of potential merit.
Body-worn cameras remain influential but not determinative. Courts will rely on the totality of the record. Non-recording of the instigating violation or partial audio gaps will not automatically suppress evidence where the trial court credits sworn testimony and key consent is recorded.

Looking forward, Roberts signals that:

Law enforcement may continue interdiction strategies that leverage minor traffic violations to initiate stops, with courts applying an objective standard to the validity of the seizure.
Defense counsel should focus on factual disputes in the circuit court (e.g., whether a lane violation truly occurred) and on voluntariness evidence if consent is at issue, because appellate courts will heavily defer to trial-level findings.
Consent obtained and recorded contemporaneously with the traffic mission (e.g., while drafting a warning) is less vulnerable to challenge alleging unlawful prolongation of the stop.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Pretext stop: A stop motivated by an ulterior purpose (e.g., drug interdiction) but supported by a valid objective reason (e.g., a traffic violation). Under Whren and McMutary, the ulterior motive does not invalidate the stop if the objective reason exists.
Probable cause vs. reasonable suspicion: Probable cause is a higher threshold than reasonable suspicion. West Virginia frames traffic stops as reasonable where officers have probable cause to believe a traffic law was violated; objectively witnessing a violation meets that standard.
Voluntary consent: A person can permit a search without a warrant. The consent must be voluntary (not coerced). In West Virginia, for vehicle searches during traffic stops, the consent must be captured by audio recording under § 62-1A-10 unless another statutory exception applies.
Preservation of error: Parties must raise issues in the trial court to preserve them for appeal. New arguments introduced for the first time on appeal are typically not considered.
Standard of review—clear error: Appellate courts defer to trial courts’ factual findings (like whether an officer observed a lane violation) unless those findings are clearly wrong. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, but factual credibility calls are left largely undisturbed.
Memorandum decision: An opinion format used when no substantial question of law or prejudicial error is present. It affirms or disposes of the case without extensive published analysis, but it still applies governing law and may be cited as authority under the appellate rules.

Conclusion

State v. Roberts underscores, and operationalizes, two pillars of West Virginia search-and-seizure law: (1) the objective validity of traffic stops under Article III, § 6, as articulated in McMutary and consistent with Whren, and (2) the centrality of recorded consent under West Virginia Code § 62-1A-10 to sustain vehicle searches during traffic stops. The Court’s decision reflects deference to trial-level credibility findings, insists on issue preservation, and treats minor lane infractions as sufficient objective grounds for stops. Although issued as a memorandum decision, Roberts offers practitioners a clear roadmap: officers should document consent meticulously; defendants must build factual records and raise all coercion or hazard-creation claims in the circuit court; and courts will continue to apply an objective pretext framework that detaches constitutional reasonableness from officer motives so long as a traffic violation actually occurred.