RLA Preemption and Mass Assignment Standing in Texas: Commentary on The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA), No. 22-0631 (Tex. June 20, 2025), is a significant precedent at the intersection of federal labor preemption, state tort law, and standing doctrine. The Court resolves two central questions:

1. Whether the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA) preempts state-law tort claims brought by a pilots’ union against a third-party aircraft manufacturer; and
2. Whether mass assignments of individual pilots’ claims to their union are void as against public policy when used as an alternative to associational standing or class actions.

The Court (Justice Boyd, joined by seven Justices, with a partial dissent by Justice Bland joined by Justice Huddle) holds that:

• The RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s Texas-law claims against Boeing because resolution of those claims is not “substantially dependent” on interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between SWAPA and Southwest Airlines.
• The assignments of claims from thousands of individual pilots to SWAPA are not void as against Texas public policy; they confer standing on SWAPA as assignee, while still requiring proof of each individual pilot’s injuries and damages.

The opinion thus clarifies the scope of RLA preemption in Texas proceedings, particularly with respect to tort claims against non-carrier third parties, and simultaneously develops Texas law on the validity and use of mass assignments to associations as a procedural device in complex litigation.

II. Case Background

A. The Parties and the Aircraft

SWAPA is a nonprofit labor organization representing approximately 11,000 Southwest Airlines pilots. It negotiates CBAs with Southwest on their behalf.

Boeing, a major commercial aircraft manufacturer, developed successive variants of the Boeing 737. In 2011 it introduced the 737 MAX, marketed as a more fuel-efficient but operationally similar successor to previous 737 models—supposedly requiring no additional pilot training.

In 2018 and 2019, two 737 MAX aircraft crashed in Indonesia and Ethiopia, killing all 346 people aboard. The crashes were linked in part to a new system, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), about which pilots had not been adequately informed or trained. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the MAX worldwide after the second crash.

B. The 2006 and 2016 CBAs and the MAX Dispute

Southwest and SWAPA had a 2006 CBA that listed aircraft types pilots would fly. It did not, of course, mention the yet-unborn MAX. When Southwest purchased 150 MAX aircraft after Boeing’s 2011 launch, Southwest took the position that the 2006 CBA’s aircraft list was broad enough to include the MAX; SWAPA disagreed, and its pilots refused to fly the MAX.

Key CBA timeline:

• 2006 CBA: lists aircraft types; no explicit MAX.
• 2012: 2006 CBA becomes “amendable” under the RLA—meaning open for renegotiation while the status quo must be maintained.
• 2012–2016: protracted, highly public negotiations over whether pilots may or must fly the MAX under the old and any new CBA.
• 2016: SWAPA sues Southwest in federal court, arguing the 2006 CBA’s “status quo” did not require pilots to fly the MAX.
• 2016 CBA: SWAPA and Southwest agree to a new CBA that explicitly requires pilots to fly the MAX; SWAPA dismisses its lawsuit against Southwest.
• 2017: Southwest places its first MAX into service.

C. SWAPA’s Allegations Against Boeing

SWAPA claims Boeing inserted itself into the union’s negotiations with Southwest over the 2016 CBA and made material misrepresentations about the MAX, including that:

• the MAX was essentially just a more fuel-efficient version of the 737 variant already in use; and
• pilots could operate the MAX without additional training.

SWAPA alleges it relied on those misrepresentations in agreeing in the 2016 CBA that its members would fly the MAX and in dismissing its litigation against Southwest. After the FAA grounding, Southwest cancelled hundreds of flights, and SWAPA’s members allegedly suffered lost wages because they lacked aircraft to fly. SWAPA asserts damages both:

• for itself (loss of membership dues related to lost pilot earnings, and legal fees), and
• on behalf of its pilots (lost wages and related losses).

D. Procedural History

1. State suit and removal SWAPA sued Boeing in Texas state court asserting Texas-law claims, including:
   • fraudulent misrepresentation
   • negligent misrepresentation
   • tortious interference with contractual/business relations
   • negligence
   • fraud by non-disclosure
   Boeing removed the case to federal court, arguing that the RLA “completely preempts” the claims, creating federal-question jurisdiction.
2. Federal remand The federal district court (N.D. Tex.) disagreed that the RLA completely preempts state-law claims. It noted that even if SWAPA’s claims required interpretation of a CBA, the RLA does not transform such state-law claims into federal ones for purposes of removal jurisdiction. The court remanded the case to state court.
   See Sw. Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 613 F. Supp. 3d 975 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
3. Plea to the jurisdiction in state court Back in state court, Boeing filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting:
   • RLA preemption of SWAPA’s claims (ordinary preemption depriving the state court of jurisdiction); and
   • SWAPA’s lack of “associational standing” to assert pilots’ individual damages claims.
4. Assignments of claims to SWAPA In response, 8,794 SWAPA members executed assignments of their claims against Boeing to SWAPA. The assignments:
   • transferred “all rights, title, and interest” in any claims arising out of the MAX crisis to SWAPA;
   • authorized SWAPA to prosecute, settle, and compromise such claims; and
   • provided that any recovery would be distributed equitably to pilots in proportion to gross W‑2 earnings.
   Boeing amended its plea, arguing the assignments were void as against public policy because they were designed to circumvent Texas associational-standing and class-action limitations.
5. Trial court dismissal The trial court granted Boeing’s plea and dismissed all of SWAPA’s claims with prejudice, without explanation.
6. Second lawsuit and post-judgment motion SWAPA moved to modify the judgment to have the dismissal of claims asserted on behalf of its pilots be without prejudice, so it could pursue them in a separate, already-filed suit as assignee. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed the second suit on res judicata grounds. The Dallas Court of Appeals later reversed the res judicata dismissal of the second suit.
7. Court of appeals’ decision in this case The Dallas Court of Appeals (704 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022)):
   • held that the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s claims;
   • held that SWAPA lacks associational standing to sue on behalf of its members;
   • held that SWAPA does have standing to pursue its own claims; and
   • held that the assignments are not void, but do not retroactively cure standing defects in this particular suit.
   It:
   • affirmed the dismissal of SWAPA’s member-representative claims but modified that dismissal to be without prejudice; and
   • reversed the dismissal of SWAPA’s own claims and remanded them for further proceedings.
8. Texas Supreme Court review Boeing petitioned for review of:
   • the holding that the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s claims; and
   • the modification of the dismissal of member-representative claims to be without prejudice, premised on the validity of the assignments.
   SWAPA did not cross-petition to reinstate associational standing. The Supreme Court thus reviews only:
   • whether the RLA preempts SWAPA’s claims; and
   • whether the assignments are void as against public policy.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding on RLA Preemption

The Court holds that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA’s state-law claims against Boeing because resolution of those claims is not substantially dependent on interpretation of the CBAs between SWAPA and Southwest. The key points:

• RLA preemption mirrors Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preemption: state-law claims are preempted only when they require interpretation or application of a CBA.
• SWAPA’s claims for misrepresentation and tortious interference can be adjudicated by applying state tort standards to Boeing’s alleged conduct and SWAPA’s reliance and damages, without interpreting the meaning of CBA terms.
• Even though the 2006 CBA’s scope was disputed (whether it required pilots to fly the MAX), SWAPA’s theory is that, regardless of what the 2006 CBA required, it would not have agreed in the 2016 CBA to fly the MAX but for Boeing’s misrepresentations.

The Court therefore affirms the court of appeals’ rejection of RLA preemption (though based on slightly different reasoning than the federal district court).

B. Holding on Assignments and Standing

The Court next holds that the assignments of individual pilots’ claims to SWAPA are not void as against public policy. Because:

• Causes of action are assignable in Texas unless public policy is violated.
• The assignments in this case do not create the same risks the Court has found objectionable in cases like State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, such as collusive settlements designed to inflate judgments or distort liability among defendants.
• The claims are “property-based and remedial” (lost wages and similar economic losses), not “personal and punitive” (e.g., DTPA, unfair-settlement claims) which Texas deems generally non-assignable.
• SWAPA is not a “stranger/entrepreneur” but the party that negotiated the CBA and allegedly relied on Boeing’s statements.

Accordingly, the assignments give SWAPA standing as assignee to pursue the individual pilot claims in the separate suit. But SWAPA, as assignee, must still prove:

• for each individual pilot, the elements of any tort claim (e.g., reliance, causation, damages); and
• that each pilot suffered a concrete “injury in fact.”

The Court emphasizes that trial courts retain broad discretion under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g., joinder, severance, consolidation, separate trials) to manage how thousands of assigned claims are actually tried, and that assignments cannot be used to “circumvent” the procedural and statutory limits on associational standing or class actions.

C. Disposition

The Court:

• Affirms the court of appeals’ judgment remanding SWAPA’s own claims for further proceedings.
• Affirms as modified the dismissal without prejudice of claims SWAPA originally asserted on its members’ behalf, in recognition that SWAPA may pursue those claims as assignee in a separate action.
• Holds: “We conclude that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA's claims … We also conclude that … SWAPA's members' assignments of their claims to SWAPA are not void as against public policy and gave SWAPA standing to pursue those claims as assignee.”

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Federal Preemption and the RLA

1. Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris

The Court relies heavily on Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the RLA does not preempt state-law claims if they can be resolved without interpreting a CBA. Norris established:

• RLA preemption is limited to “minor” disputes requiring CBA interpretation or application.
• State-law rights that exist independently of the CBA and do not require CBA interpretation are not preempted, even if they cover the same factual ground.
• The RLA’s preemptive scope is “virtually identical” to § 301 LMRA preemption.

In Boeing v. SWAPA, the Texas Supreme Court follows Norris directly: it asks whether SWAPA’s misrepresentation and interference claims are “dependent upon the interpretation of [the] CBA,” and answers no.

2. Lingle v. Norge and the LMRA Analogy

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), an LMRA case, is the template for the Court’s analysis. In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Illinois retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted because its elements (discharge, motive, causation, damages) could be resolved without interpreting the CBA, even though the same facts might be relevant to a CBA grievance.

The Texas Supreme Court follows Lingle’s approach:

• Identify elements of the state-law tort claims.
• Ask whether any element requires interpreting the CBA.
• Conclude that even if the CBA’s terms are part of the factual background, the case can proceed if the core issues are factual (e.g., misrepresentations, reliance) rather than contractual interpretation.

3. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck and Lucas Flour

The Court cites Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), and Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), to restate the core reason for labor-preemption doctrine:

• To foster uniform interpretation of CBAs across jurisdictions.
• To prevent divergent state-court interpretations of identical CBA provisions from undermining federal labor policy and the stability of collective bargaining.

Preemption thus attaches only when interpretation of the CBA is necessary to decide the claim.

4. Consolidated Rail, Detroit & Toledo, and RLA Framework

The Court references Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 491 U.S. 299 (1989), Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969), and other RLA cases to explain:

• “Major” disputes: formation or efforts to secure CBAs (new rights).
• “Minor” disputes: interpretation or application of existing CBAs (enforcing rights).
• Minor disputes must go through mandatory arbitral mechanisms (adjustment boards) under the RLA.

Boeing argued that because SWAPA’s claims implicated the pilots’ obligations and rights under the 2006 and 2016 CBAs, they were “minor” disputes subject exclusively to RLA procedures and thus preempted. The Court rejects this characterization because SWAPA’s claims do not seek to interpret or enforce CBA terms between airline and pilots, but to obtain state-law remedies against a third party for alleged misrepresentations.

B. Texas Standing and Assignment Cases

1. Texas Associational Standing: Texas Association of Business

The Court notes that Texas follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hunt test for associational standing, as adopted in Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993):

(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

The Texas Legislature codified this as Business Organizations Code § 252.007(b). SWAPA does argue in passing that it has associational standing, but because it never filed a cross-petition for review on that point, and previously disclaimed reliance on associational standing before the Supreme Court, the Court treats associational standing as waived and does not decide it. This is important: the decision about assignments is not a substitute finding of associational standing; it is about standing via assignment.

2. Assignability and Public Policy Limits: Gandy and Progeny

Texas generally permits assignment of causes of action unless public policy is offended. The modern leading case limiting assignments is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996). In Gandy, the Court held that certain assignments—especially in the context of collusive arrangements between a plaintiff and one defendant designed to shift liability onto an absent insurer—are void because they:

• “tend to increase and distort litigation;”
• mislead juries and promote unethical collusion; and
• allow less-culpable defendants to bear inflated judgments.

More recent cases elaborating this line include:

• Henry S. Miller Commercial Co. v. Newsom, Terry & Newsom, LLP, 709 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2024) (general rule of assignability subject to public-policy limits);
• PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partnership, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004) (DTPA claims, being more “personal and punitive,” are generally non-assignable);
• Texas Medical Resources, LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2023) (unfair-settlement claims non-assignable);
• Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing On Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2010) (upholding assignments to a third party where the assignee was not a “stranger entrepreneur”).

The Court distinguishes these cases and finds that the SWAPA pilots’ assignments:

• do not carry the collusive or distortive features condemned in Gandy; and
• fall into the class of permissible, “property-based and remedial” claims that can be validly assigned.

3. Pass-through Assignments: Sprint v. APCC Services

The Court refers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008), which upheld the standing of assignees who had agreed to pass through all recovered funds to their assignors. That case confirms that:

• standing via legal title (assignment) does not depend on the assignee’s economic stake in the ultimate recovery; and
• pass-through arrangements—where the assignee sues but distributes the proceeds to others—are historically and doctrinally acceptable.

This precedent directly rebuts Boeing’s insinuation that SWAPA’s “pass-through” arrangement is inherently improper.

4. Standing via Assignment: Jackson v. Thweatt

In Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994), the Court held that an assignee “steps into the shoes” of the assignor and acquires the same legal rights, but no greater. Boeing v. SWAPA reiterates this black-letter principle:

• SWAPA gains whatever rights the pilots had but must prove Boeing’s liability to each assignor.
• Assignments do not obviate the need to prove individual reliance, causation, and damages where those are elements of the tort.

5. Procedural Discretion: Womack, Bennett, Sealy

The Court cites classic Texas precedents on trial court discretion over joinder, severance, consolidation, and separate trials, including:

• Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1956);
• Bennett v. Grant, 525 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2017);
• Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of America, L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. 2024).

These precedents anchor the Court’s conclusion that managing thousands of assigned claims is a procedural question for the trial court, reviewed only for abuse of discretion, guided by considerations of prejudice, justice, and convenience.

V. Legal Reasoning

A. RLA Preemption: Independent State-Law Rights vs. CBA Interpretation

1. The Preemption Test Applied

Under Norris and Lingle, the key question is whether resolving the state-law claims is “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of” a CBA or whether the CBA is the “only source” of the right asserted. The Court applies this test by examining each element of SWAPA’s tort claims.

For fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, the relevant elements include:

• a material (false) representation;
• knowledge of falsity (or lack of reasonable care) when made;
• intent that the plaintiff rely;
• actual reliance by the plaintiff; and
• injury caused by the reliance.

For tortious interference with a prospective business relation, SWAPA must show:

• a reasonable probability of entering into a contractual relationship;
• Boeing’s intent to prevent or knowledge that its conduct would substantially interfere;
• independently tortious or unlawful conduct by Boeing;
• proximate causation; and
• actual damage or loss.

The Court concludes that none of these elements requires interpreting the 2006 or 2016 CBA:

• The misrepresentations concern the nature and safety of the MAX / training requirements—issues about aircraft design and training standards, not about the legal meaning of CBA terms.
• Reliance concerns SWAPA’s and pilots’ internal decision-making: would they have agreed to the 2016 CBA language regarding the MAX but for Boeing’s statements?
• Damages are framed in terms of lost wages and union revenue, which are calculable from payroll and economic evidence independent of CBA interpretation.

2. The 2006 vs. 2016 CBA: Why the 2006 CBA Is Not Dispositive

Boeing’s central preemption argument relies on the 2006 CBA: if it already required pilots to fly the MAX, Boeing contends, then misstatements about the MAX could not have caused SWAPA or pilots to incur new obligations in 2016 or new damages, so causation and injury would require interpretation of the 2006 CBA.

The Court responds in two steps:

1. The 2006 CBA became “amendable” in 2012 under the RLA. When a CBA becomes amendable, the parties must renegotiate, but the status quo is maintained. SWAPA maintains that, irrespective of what obligations the 2006 CBA imposed:
   • it had no obligation to agree to include the MAX explicitly in the 2016 CBA; and
   • it would not have done so but for Boeing’s misrepresentations.
2. The factual question of what SWAPA would have done is distinct from the legal question of what the 2006 CBA meant. As the Court explains, even if the 2006 CBA did require pilots to fly the MAX:
   • SWAPA could have sought a different arrangement in the 2016 CBA; and
   • its allegation is that Boeing’s misstatements influenced its bargaining position and ultimate acceptance of explicit MAX obligations and the dismissal of its lawsuit.

Thus, causation and injury can be assessed as a matter of fact (SWAPA’s and pilots’ decision-making) without deciding the legal question of what the 2006 CBA required under federal labor law.

3. Factual Overlap vs. CBA Interpretation

The Court underscores the Lingle distinction between:

• Factual overlap: the same events and documents (including a CBA) may be relevant in both a state tort claim and an RLA grievance; and
• Legal dependence: preemption arises only if the state claim cannot be decided without interpreting the CBA as a legal instrument.

Here, the CBA is part of the factual context but not the legal linchpin of the cause of action. The misrepresentations alleged are about aircraft characteristics and training; whether SWAPA could have been required to fly the MAX under the 2006 CBA is ancillary to, not determinative of, those tort allegations.

4. Non-binding Nature of the Federal Remand’s “Interpretation” Comment

Boeing invoked the federal district court’s observation in the removal proceeding that SWAPA’s claims “will require interpretation of the CBA.” The Texas Supreme Court expressly notes:

• That statement was unnecessary to, and independent of, the federal court’s holding that the RLA does not completely preempt state claims.
• Both parties in federal court agreed that whether CBA interpretation would be necessary was irrelevant to the question of complete preemption.

Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court does not treat that comment as binding or persuasive on the ordinary preemption question it must decide.

B. Assignments and Public Policy

1. The Nature of the Pilots’ Assignments

The 8,794 pilots’ assignments to SWAPA share four key features:

1. They transfer all rights, title, and interest to “any and all claims, demands, and/or causes of action for [the pilot’s] damages ... arising out of the MAX crisis.”
2. They authorize SWAPA to prosecute, settle, and compromise those claims.
3. They authorize SWAPA to collect, receive, and distribute damages recovered from Boeing, with distribution to be made proportionally based on pilots’ W‑2 gross earnings.
4. They expressly acknowledge that individual pilots waive the right to pursue their own claims against Boeing independently.

These assignments transform SWAPA from a mere representative to the formal legal owner of the assigned claims.

2. Why the Assignments Do Not Violate Texas Public Policy

Boeing characterizes the assignments as an improper attempt to “circumvent” the Legislature’s limits on associational standing and the rules governing class actions. The Court rejects this view for several reasons.

1. No inherent distortion or collusion Unlike the arrangements condemned in Gandy and similar decisions, these assignments do not:
   • involve a settling defendant colluding with a plaintiff to inflate a judgment against a non-settling party;
   • encourage misleading the jury about the real parties in interest; or
   • reallocate liability in a way that unfairly targets a less-culpable defendant.
   Instead, the assignments consolidate ownership of claims in the very entity (SWAPA) that negotiated the underlying CBA and allegedly relied on Boeing’s misrepresentations.
2. Efficiency rather than proliferation of litigation The Court notes that without assignments, the alternative may be “as many as 10,000 individual lawsuits” arising from the same alleged conduct. Having one institutional plaintiff as assignee could reduce litigation complexity rather than increase it.
3. Nature of the claims The pilots’ claims are for economic losses—lost wages and related economic damages. The Court characterizes them as “property-based and remedial,” distinct from the non-assignable “personal and punitive” claims (e.g., DTPA or unfair-settlement claims) in cases like PPG Industries and Texas Medical Resources.
4. SWAPA is not a “stranger entrepreneur” Drawing on Southwestern Bell v. Marketing On Hold, the Court stresses that assignments to third parties are especially suspect when the assignee is a “stranger/entrepreneur” with no real connection to the underlying dispute. Here, SWAPA is central to the events: it negotiated the CBA, it allegedly relied on Boeing’s statements, and it experienced its own organizational losses. This mitigates concerns about opportunistic litigation entrepreneurship.

3. Assignments vs. Associational Standing and Class Actions

The dissent, and Boeing, contend that allowing mass assignments to SWAPA effectively evades:

• Business Organizations Code § 252.007(b) (which denies associational standing where individualized participation is required), and
• Rule 42 class-action safeguards (e.g., typicality, adequacy, predominance, superiority).

  The majority answers:

  • Associational standing, class actions, and assignment are distinct bases for standing, recognized independently in law (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
  • Using one route instead of another is not “circumvention” but the exercise of a different lawful option—with its own burdens and limitations.
  • Any advantage SWAPA gains by avoiding class certification (no need to show predominance, etc.) is offset by the heavy burden of proving each individual assigned claim without the representational shortcuts available in associational or class actions.

  Critically, the Court insists that SWAPA must litigate as an assignee, not as a de facto representative association. That means:

  • SWAPA cannot rely on generalized proof of union-wide harm alone to obtain individual pilots’ damages.
  • SWAPA must demonstrate Boeing’s duty, breach, causation, and damages with respect to each pilot whose claim it owns, as if that pilot were individually suing.

  4. Standing at the Time of Filing and the Role of the Separate Suit

  Texas law measures standing at the time the suit is filed. Because:

  • SWAPA originally filed this suit purporting to represent its pilots without yet having assignments; and
  • the assignments were executed only after Boeing challenged associational standing,

  the assignments cannot retroactively cure any standing defect in this original action. That is why the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court, maintain the dismissal of the representative claims from this case—but modify the dismissal to be without prejudice, recognizing that SWAPA may pursue those claims in the separate suit it subsequently filed as assignee.

  5. Trial Management of Thousands of Claims: Rules 39, 40, 41, 174

  The Court explicitly declines to decide “whether and how” SWAPA can practically prosecute thousands of assigned claims—whether they must or may be joined, consolidated, severed, or set for separate trials. It emphasizes:

  • Texas procedural rules (39, 40, 41, 174) give trial courts discretion to tailor joinder and trial structure to avoid prejudice, do justice, and increase convenience.
  • That discretion is not unlimited but is subject to abuse-of-discretion review.

  This leaves a substantial amount of procedural innovation and risk in the hands of the trial court and the parties in the companion suit, but the doctrinal holding is clear: the assignments are valid and confer standing; how the cases are tried is a separate procedural question.

  VI. Impact and Significance

  A. RLA Preemption: Broader Space for State Tort Remedies Against Third Parties

  The decision cements a relatively narrow view of RLA preemption in Texas state courts:

  • Even where a dispute “touches” on a CBA or arises in a unionized setting, state-law claims are not preempted unless the court must construe the CBA’s terms to decide liability.
  • Third-party defendants (like manufacturers) invoking RLA preemption face an uphill battle unless they can show that the CBA’s meaning is legally dispositive of the state claim.
  • This preserves state tort remedies for union actors (unions and individual union members) against non-carrier entities whose conduct allegedly influenced collective bargaining outcomes or working conditions.

  Practically, this may:

  • Encourage unions and employees to assert state-law misrepresentation or fraud claims against third parties where those parties allegedly shaped bargaining or working conditions through misinformation or omissions.
  • Limit the ability of such third parties to channel disputes into RLA arbitration by characterizing them as “minor disputes” over CBA interpretation.

  B. Ordinary vs. Complete Preemption Clarified in Practice

  Though the Court does not dwell on it, the case also clarifies the distinction between:

  • Complete preemption (a jurisdictional doctrine allowing removal to federal court when a federal statute wholly displaces a field of state-law claims), and
  • Ordinary preemption (a defense on the merits that federal law displaces specific state causes of action).

  The federal district court held that the RLA does not completely preempt state law; the Texas Supreme Court now holds that, as applied here, the RLA also does not ordinarily preempt SWAPA’s claims. Together, these decisions:

  • Confirm that RLA-based preemption arguments often must be litigated in state courts, not removed to federal court.
  • Signal to state courts that they must conduct a Lingle/Norris-style element-by-element analysis of dependence on CBA interpretation rather than accepting broad preemption assertions.

  C. Assignments as an Alternative Aggregation Device

  The Court’s acceptance of mass assignments to SWAPA is a notable development in Texas complex-litigation practice:

  • It validates an alternative aggregation mechanism beside class actions and associational suits, particularly where individual claims are relatively homogeneous but still require individual proof.
  • It may encourage trade unions, associations, and other organizations to utilize assignments to centralize litigation arising from widespread harms to members or customers.
  • However, it also warns that:
    • trial courts must ensure that assignments do not become disguised associative or class devices that sidestep statutory requirements; and
    • assignees must carry the full burden of proving each assignor’s claim—no “shortcuts” via representative evidence simply because the claims are all owned by one entity.

  Future disputes will likely center on:

  • how trial courts manage such cases procedurally (sample trials, issue classes, bellwethers, etc.);
  • whether, in practice, large sets of assigned claims can be tried without devolving into “representative” litigation in substance; and
  • the extent to which courts will allow common proof or statistical evidence to stand in for individualized proof of reliance and damages in misrepresentation cases.

  D. Institutional Role of Unions and Associations

  This decision also has implications for the institutional role of unions:

  • It legitimizes unions acting as litigation assignees in large-scale disputes related to working conditions and bargaining outcomes, especially where unions themselves allegedly relied on third-party misrepresentations.
  • It may enhance union bargaining leverage, knowing they can consolidate members’ claims against third parties when misrepresentations affect CBA negotiations.

  At the same time, the Court’s emphasis that SWAPA cannot “circumvent” associational standing by treating assignment-based suits as representative underscores that unions retain distinct roles in:

  • collective bargaining and statutory representation of employees; versus
  • acting as legal assignees of individual damages claims, where the union stands in for the individual but must prove individualized injury.

  VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

  A. The Railway Labor Act: Major vs. Minor Disputes

  The RLA, originally enacted for railroads and later extended to airlines, aims to avoid disruptions in interstate commerce by:

  • promoting collective bargaining; and
  • providing mandatory, peaceful dispute-resolution mechanisms.

  It distinguishes:

  • Major disputes: disputes about creating or changing CBAs (e.g., negotiating a new agreement, changing wage rates). These may involve mediation, cooling-off periods, and other processes, but are not necessarily subject to binding arbitration.
  • Minor disputes: disputes about interpreting or applying existing CBAs (e.g., whether current rules allow a carrier to change schedules or assign duties). These must be resolved by arbitration before an adjustment board; courts lack jurisdiction to decide them in the first instance.

  Preemption arises when a claim is in substance a “minor dispute” requiring CBA interpretation. In Boeing v. SWAPA, the Court holds that SWAPA’s tort claims are neither major nor minor disputes under the RLA, but rather independent state-law claims against a third party.

  B. Complete vs. Ordinary Preemption

  • Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine: some federal statutes are so comprehensive that any claim they cover is necessarily federal, allowing removal from state to federal court. The RLA, as the federal courts have held, does not have this effect on state-law tort claims.
  • Ordinary preemption is a defense on the merits: a state-law claim may be dismissed because it conflicts with, or is displaced by, federal law, even though the case remains in state court.

  In this case, the federal court rejected complete preemption, and the Texas Supreme Court now rejects ordinary preemption.

  C. Associational Standing vs. Assignment-Based Standing

  Associational standing allows an organization to sue on behalf of its members when:

  • members would have standing individually;
  • the interests are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
  • neither the claims nor the relief require individual participation.

  Because SWAPA’s claims involve individualized damages (lost wages, reliance), the third requirement is difficult to meet. The Legislature codified this limitation in § 252.007(b).

  Assignment-based standing is different: the individual transfers ownership of a claim to another party. The assignee:

  • is treated as if it had suffered the injury itself;
  • can sue in its own name; but
  • must prove whatever the assignor would have had to prove (including individual damages).

  The Court’s decision underscores that these are distinct doctrines, each with its own trade-offs.

  D. What It Means for a Claim to Be “Substantially Dependent” on a CBA

  A state-law claim is “substantially dependent” on a CBA when:

  • the court must interpret disputed CBA terms to decide liability (e.g., what “seniority” or “just cause” means under the contract); or
  • the CBA defines the right or duty alleged to have been breached in a way that cannot be separated from the claim.

  A claim is not substantially dependent when:

  • the right arises under state law, not the CBA (e.g., freedom from fraud, negligence, retaliation); and
  • the elements can be decided based on factual evidence—what was said, what was known, how parties relied—without construing any CBA term.

  That is the situation the Court finds here.

  E. Why Some Claims Are Non-Assignable

  Texas draws a line between:

  • Property-based claims (e.g., contract rights, many economic torts), which are freely assignable, and
  • Personal or punitive claims (e.g., consumer-protection claims designed to punish wrongdoers, certain bad-faith or unfair-settlement claims), which are non-assignable because assignment might undermine their deterrent or personal character.

  SWAPA’s claims for lost wages and economic damages are firmly in the “property-based” category. The Court sees no policy reason to prohibit their assignment, especially where assignment facilitates coherent prosecution of large numbers of similar claims without the distortions found in Gandy.

  VIII. Conclusion

  The Boeing Company v. SWAPA is significant on two fronts:

  1. RLA Preemption The Court reaffirms a narrow, element-focused approach to RLA preemption aligned with Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris and Lingle:
     • State-law tort claims are not preempted simply because they arise in a unionized environment or reference CBA negotiations.
     • Preemption applies only when interpretation of the CBA is necessary to decide the claim, not when the CBA is merely part of the background facts.
     This preserves a robust sphere for state tort remedies even in the heavily regulated and unionized airline industry, particularly against third parties like manufacturers.
  2. Assignments and Collective Litigation The Court validates mass assignments of economic tort claims from individual union members to their union as consistent with Texas public policy:
     • Assignments confer standing on the assignee, who “steps into the shoes” of assignors.
     • Such assignments are permissible aggregation tools, distinct from associational and class-action mechanisms.
     • They do not, however, allow the assignee to bypass the need to prove individualized reliance, causation, and damages for each assignor.
     • Trial courts retain broad discretion to manage the procedural complexities of such large-scale assigned-claims litigation.

  Taken together, these holdings create a clear doctrinal pathway in Texas for unions and similar organizations to pursue large numbers of members’ claims against third parties without triggering federal labor preemption, provided those claims rest on independent state-law rights and do not require CBA interpretation. At the same time, the Court’s careful insistence on individualized proof and trial-court discretion in managing joinder and severance guards against the risk that such assignments might become unregulated substitutes for class actions or associational suits.