Rivera Samayoa v. Bondi:
The First Circuit’s Post-Wilkinson Blueprint for Reviewing
“Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Findings

1. Introduction

In Rivera Samayoa v. Bondi, No. 24-1432 (1st Cir. July 28 2025), the First Circuit confronted the perennial tension between the humanitarian goals of cancellation-of-removal relief and the jurisdiction-stripping provisions Congress inserted into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Miguel Armando Rivera Samayoa, a Guatemalan national who had lived in Massachusetts for nearly three decades and fathered four U.S.-citizen sons, sought cancellation under INA §240A(b)(1). The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found that Rivera satisfied the first three statutory prongs, but not the fourth: he failed to show that his removal would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on his children.

On petition for review, Rivera asked the First Circuit to overturn the BIA’s hardship determination and to correct several alleged factual and legal errors. The court—invoking the Supreme Court’s recent trilogy of jurisdiction cases (Wilkinson, Patel, Guerrero-Lasprilla)—drew bright lines around what it could and could not examine. Ultimately, the panel (Gelpí, Lipez & Thompson, JJ.) denied the petition, but in doing so delivered a methodical framework for post-Wilkinson review of hardship claims.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdictional Holding: The court reaffirmed that it may review pure legal questions and mixed questions applying law to settled facts, but not raw factual disputes in cancellation cases.
No Legal Error Found: The BIA did not “turn a blind eye” to critical evidence; it weighed all facts Rivera offered.
Hardship Finding Upheld: Even viewing the cumulative medical, economic, and educational concerns, the Agency reasonably concluded that the sons’ prospective hardship was not “substantially beyond” the ordinary consequences of deportation.
Petition Denied: Because Rivera failed to meet the statutory hardship threshold and no reviewable legal error appeared, the panel denied relief.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024)
Clarified that hardship determinations are mixed questions and therefore reviewable, but only for legal error or misapplication of the standard. The First Circuit adopts that framing and expressly notes the Supreme Court left the exact degree of deference “for another day.”
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022)
Confirmed that pure factual findings in discretionary-relief contexts are insulated from judicial review. The panel uses Patel to bar challenges to the IJ’s findings on the children’s Spanish proficiency and medical stability.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020)
Allows review of questions of law—including application of law to facts. The court relies on this to examine whether the BIA ignored salient evidence (a legal error).
In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) and Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020)
Provide the substantive yardstick for “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” including the need for a cumulative assessment and proof of both (a) serious medical condition and (b) unavailability of care abroad. The BIA’s analysis—and the First Circuit’s endorsement—tracks these guideposts.
Post-2024 Circuit Cases (Figueroa, Contreras, Nolasco, etc.)
These decisions illustrate the First Circuit’s application of Wilkinson; the panel situates Rivera squarely within this emerging line.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Issue Sorting Framework
• Step 1: Classify each appellate claim as factual, legal, or mixed.
• Step 2: Dismiss or decline review of pure factual challenges (e.g., child’s language ability, health status).
• Step 3: Review alleged legal errors de novo (e.g., failure to consider critical evidence).
• Step 4: Review hardship determination deferentially (undefined “deference”; outcome-determinative regardless of precise label).
No “Blind-Eye” Error
The record contained only Rivera’s generalized testimony on Guatemalan healthcare and economics; the IJ and BIA discussed that testimony. Because they acknowledged and weighed it, there was no legal error under the “salient facts” doctrine of Contreras.
Cumulative Hardship Applied
Both IJ and BIA expressly listed Monreal-Aguinaga factors (ages, health, finances, conditions in Guatemala, etc.) and considered two relocation scenarios (children stay vs. children depart). That satisfied the statutory requirement for a holistic assessment.
Outcome: Burden Not Met
With no expert medical evidence and only conjectural assertions on Guatemala’s healthcare, Rivera could not show hardship “substantially beyond” ordinary separation. The panel found the Agency’s conclusion reasonable and substantively unassailable under deferential review.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Post-Wilkinson Appellate Strategy: Practitioners now have a roadmap: (1) segregate legal questions; (2) document everything needed to show the IJ “ignored” crucial evidence; (3) accept that pure factual disputes are dead on arrival in the First Circuit.
Heightens Evidentiary Expectations: Rivera lost, in part, because he supplied no corroborating medical or economic documentation. The opinion signals that generic country-conditions reports and parent testimony alone rarely suffice.
Reinforces IJ Discretion on Late Evidence: Although the panel notes hundreds of pages struck as untimely, Rivera did not contest the exclusion. The tacit lesson: file evidence on time or waive it.
BIA Citation Practice Endorsed: The court accepted the BIA’s “short-form” adoption with added commentary, suggesting that detailed IJ findings plus a BIA imprimatur meet the demands of administrative law in hardship cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of Removal (INA §240A(b)): Discretionary relief allowing certain long-term, non-LPR non-citizens to remain if they meet four criteria, the hardest being the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” prong.
Exceptional & Extremely Unusual Hardship: Higher than “extreme hardship” (used in waivers) but lower than “unconscionable.” Must be substantially beyond the normal pain of separation, proven through cumulative evidence aimed at the qualifying relative (here, U.S.-citizen children).
Jurisdiction-Stripping: INA §1252(a)(2)(B)&(C) bar courts from reviewing “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” several provisions, including cancellation. §1252(a)(2)(D) carves back power to review constitutional claims or questions of law.
Mixed Question of Law & Fact: Application of a legal standard to facts already found by the agency. Courts may review for correct legal application, but not to re-find those facts.
Deferential Review (Unnamed Standard): The First Circuit—like many circuits—has not chosen between “substantial evidence,” “abuse of discretion,” or another label for hardship review after Wilkinson. Practically, it amounts to reversal only if the record compels the opposite result.

5. Conclusion

Rivera Samayoa v. Bondi is less about the heartbreaking facts of one family’s impending separation and more about the procedural architecture that now governs hardship appeals. By meticulously classifying claims and refusing to disturb fact-finding, the First Circuit cements a stringent—yet predictable—post-Wilkinson regime:

Applicants must front-load documentary proof of both the existence of hardship and the inadequacy of foreign remedies.
Attorneys must elevate only genuine questions of law; factual quibbles belong, if at all, before the IJ.
Judges will look for an explicit cumulative analysis, but a brief statement referencing Monreal-Aguinaga factors will usually suffice.

In short, the decision crystallizes the high evidentiary bar for cancellation-of-removal applicants and delineates the razor-thin path for judicial intervention. While it offers practitioners a clear doctrinal map, it simultaneously underscores the formidable burden borne by non-citizens hoping to avoid tearful departures like Mr. Rivera’s.

Rivera Samayoa v. Bondi: The First Circuit’s Post-Wilkinson Blueprint for Reviewing “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Findings