Ripeness Exception for Successive §2255 Motions: In re Henley

Introduction

In In re: Henley, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a federal prisoner needs appellate authorization to file what would ordinarily be a “second or successive” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion when the new claim only became ripe after a state court set aside a judgment used to enhance his federal sentence. Movant Winford Lamont Henley, sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), challenged the validity of a state‐court amendment to his prior conviction. After two unsuccessful § 2255 motions, Henley obtained postconviction relief in state court restoring his original conviction record, then sought to file a third § 2255 claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on that restoration. The central issue became whether that counsel‐based claim constitutes a second or successive motion requiring our authorization.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit held that Henley’s new ineffective‐assistance claim was not “second or successive” under § 2255 because it did not exist until the state court set aside the amended judgment. The court observed:

A district court lacks jurisdiction over a successive § 2255 motion without prior appellate authorization (In re Cline).
However, a claim that was not ripe at the conclusion of prior § 2255 proceedings—here, because the state judgment invalidating the 2015 amendment did not yet exist—does not count as successive (In re Weathersby).
Henley’s claim turned on the invalidity of the 2015 amended state‐court judgment, which he could not challenge in federal collateral proceedings until he first obtained state relief (Daniels v. United States).

Accordingly, the court denied Henley’s motion for authorization as unnecessary and directed the district court to accept his proposed § 2255 motion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008): Establishes that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a second or successive § 2255 motion without prior appellate authorization.
In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2013): Clarifies the “ripeness” exception—if a claim was not ripe when earlier § 2255 motions concluded, a later filing does not count as successive.
Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001): Holds that a federal § 2255 motion cannot be used to collaterally attack state judgments; one must seek state‐court relief first.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Defines the two‐prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel (deficient performance and prejudice).
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983): Describes the law‐of‐the‐case doctrine, which the government urged but which the court declined to apply.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

Jurisdictional Bar on Successive Motions: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (incorporated by § 2255), a movant must obtain appellate authorization before filing a second or successive motion. The court first reaffirmed this jurisdictional rule.
Ripeness Exception: Relying on Weathersby, the court explained that a claim “that remained unripe until after earlier § 2255 proceedings ended” falls outside the successive‐motion bar. Because Henley’s ineffective‐assistance claim depended on the state court’s November 2023 order setting aside the 2015 amended judgment, the claim did not exist at the time of his first two § 2255 motions.
No Law‐of‐the‐Case Bar: The government argued that a district‐court dismissal of Henley’s second § 2255 motion on successive‐motion grounds created a binding law‐of‐the‐case. The panel rejected that view: the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was not a merits adjudication, and the court saw no proper basis to treat the two separate § 2255 proceedings as part of the “same case.”

Impact

This decision establishes a clear application of the ripeness exception in the Tenth Circuit:

Prisoners who obtain state‐court relief invalidating a judgment or enhancement that was previously relied upon for federal sentencing can bring new § 2255 claims without seeking authorization—provided those claims did not exist at the time of the earlier motions.
District courts must accept such ripened claims on the merits rather than dismissing for lack of jurisdiction as “second or successive.”
Future litigants will look to In re Henley when their new § 2255 claims are premised on post‐conviction developments in state court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Second or Successive Motion: A § 2255 motion filed after one has been decided, raising the same or new claims. Without appellate permission, courts lack jurisdiction over such motions.
Ripeness: A claim is “ripe” when the facts supporting it are fully developed. If key facts only arise after a prior motion, the new motion is not “successive.”
Law‐of‐the‐Case Doctrine: Once a court rules on an issue, it generally will not reconsider it in the same case. Here, the Tenth Circuit refused to apply it because the successive‐motion dismissal was procedural, not a merits decision.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Under Strickland, a defendant must show counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard and that but for the error, the outcome would likely have been different.

Conclusion

In re Henley affirms that the jurisdictional bar on second or successive § 2255 motions does not apply to claims that only ripened after earlier collateral proceedings concluded. By clarifying the scope of the ripeness exception and refusing to apply the law‐of‐the‐case doctrine to a procedural dismissal, the Tenth Circuit ensures that prisoners can pursue timely challenges when state courts later undo convictions or judgments upon which federal enhancements were based.