Ripeness at Sixty-Five and the Conformity Clause: Florida Rejects a Categorical “Elderly” Exemption from Execution in Smithers v. State (Fla. 2025)

Introduction

In Samuel L. Smithers v. State of Florida, decided October 7, 2025, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the summary denial of a successive capital postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. With an active death warrant in place, Smithers—now 72—argued that executing a septuagenarian constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. The Court, per curiam, rejected the claim on two independent grounds: (1) timeliness and procedural bar under Rule 3.851’s one-year limitation, and (2) Florida’s “conformity clause,” which binds Florida courts to the United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and forecloses expansion to a categorical “elderly” exemption absent federal recognition.

The decision is significant for two reasons. First, it clarifies ripeness and timeliness for age-based execution challenges in Florida: a claim premised on a categorical exemption for “elderly” individuals ripens when the inmate crosses the asserted age threshold, not when a death warrant is signed. Second, it reaffirms that Florida courts cannot recognize broader protections against cruel and unusual punishment than those established by the United States Supreme Court—presently limited, in age terms, to the categorical exemption for offenders under 18 at the time of the crime (Roper v. Simmons).

Background

The case traces back to two 1996 murders in Plant City, Florida. Smithers, hired to maintain a large rural property, was linked by physical, forensic, and video evidence to the killings of Cristy Cowan and Denise Roach, whose bodies were found in ponds on the property. After providing inconsistent statements, Smithers ultimately admitted involvement during police interviews. He was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The jury unanimously recommended death for both counts.

At sentencing, the trial court found multiple aggravators: for Cowan’s murder, prior violent felony (the contemporaneous murder of Roach), heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), and cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); for Roach’s murder, prior violent felony (the contemporaneous murder of Cowan) and HAC. The court also found substantial statutory and nonstatutory mitigation, including great weight to the victim’s father’s request for life imprisonment. The death sentences were affirmed on direct appeal in 2002; certiorari was denied in 2003. Subsequent state and federal postconviction proceedings were unsuccessful, including a Hurst-based successive motion and a federal habeas challenge where the Eleventh Circuit granted a limited certificate of appealability on penalty-phase ineffectiveness but ultimately affirmed denial of relief.

On September 12, 2025, the Governor signed a death warrant for Smithers. One week later, he filed a successive Rule 3.851 motion asserting a single claim: that executing a 72-year-old person constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because of the inmate’s advanced age and status as elderly. After a Huff hearing, the circuit court summarily denied relief; the Florida Supreme Court now affirms.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court holds:

• Smithers’ claim is untimely and procedurally barred under Rule 3.851(d)(1). None of the three exceptions in Rule 3.851(d)(2) applies. The claim, framed as a categorical exemption for persons 65 and older, ripened when Smithers turned 65. It could and should have been raised then, rather than after the signing of the death warrant.
• Independently, Florida’s “conformity clause” (art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.) forecloses the requested relief. Florida courts must interpret the state prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “in conformity” with United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has recognized only one age-based categorical exemption—Roper’s under-18 rule. Florida is bound by that limit and cannot adopt a categorical “elderly” exemption.

Because these two grounds are dispositive, the Court does not reach Smithers’ arguments that executing elderly inmates is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency, nor his contention that such executions serve neither deterrence nor retribution. The Court orders immediate issuance of the mandate, allows no oral argument, and disallows rehearing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005): The U.S. Supreme Court established a categorical Eighth Amendment bar on executing offenders who were under 18 at the time of their capital crimes. The Florida Supreme Court treats Roper as the sole age-based categorical exemption recognized by federal law; no federal case creates an “elderly” exemption.
• Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2833 (2025): Recently reaffirmed that Florida courts are “precluded from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment” to exempt individuals whose chronological age was over 18 at the time of their capital crime(s). Smithers relies on Gudinas’ restatement that the Eighth Amendment’s scope, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, delineates the outer bounds for Florida under the conformity clause.
• Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025), quoting Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023): The Court again underscores that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is “both the floor and the ceiling” for Florida’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. This language is central to foreclosing expansion to a new category.
• Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 2023); Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2021); Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. 2009): These cases provide the standard for summary denial of successive postconviction motions and the de novo appellate review standard when the record conclusively refutes entitlement to relief.
• Rule 3.851(d), Fla. R. Crim. P.: Establishes a one-year limitation for capital postconviction motions, with narrow exceptions. The Court interprets timeliness and ripeness through this rule, concluding the age-based claim was cognizable and due when the inmate reached the asserted age threshold—here, 65.
• Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016); Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020): These appear in the procedural history to show prior unsuccessful successive litigation and are not directly part of the present Eighth Amendment analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) Timeliness and Ripeness Under Rule 3.851

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(1) requires capital postconviction motions to be filed within one year of final judgment and sentence. Rule 3.851(d)(2) allows late claims only if:

• newly discovered facts unavailable with due diligence;
• a fundamental right newly established and retroactively applicable; or
• postconviction counsel neglect in filing the motion.

Smithers did not contend, and the Court did not find, that any exception applies. Instead, Smithers argued ripeness occurred upon the signing of the death warrant in September 2025. Rejecting that premise, the Court held that, because the claim sought a categorical exemption for all persons 65 and older, it “became ripe when he turned sixty-five.” In the Court’s words:

“By that definition, his claim became ripe when he turned sixty-five; therefore, he could have or should have raised his claim in prior proceedings rather than waiting until after the signing of his death warrant.”

Two implications follow:

• A litigant cannot use a death warrant to bootstrap timeliness for a claim that depends on an age status achieved years earlier. The warrant’s timing is not a “new fact” within the meaning of Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).
• Absent a newly recognized and retroactive federal right (Rule 3.851(d)(2)(B)), an age-based Eighth Amendment claim must be filed within one year after it accrues—here, upon turning 65 (the threshold the movant himself proposed).

2) The Conformity Clause and Substantive Foreclosure

Florida’s article I, section 17 includes a “conformity clause”: Florida courts must construe the state’s cruel and unusual punishment provision “in conformity with” the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment. The Court reiterates that this makes federal Eighth Amendment decisions “both the floor and the ceiling” for Florida’s protections. As of today, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes only one age-based categorical bar (Roper’s under-18 rule). There is no U.S. Supreme Court decision categorically exempting the “elderly” from execution.

The Court thus declines to “break new ground.” Citing Gudinas, it states that Florida is “precluded from interpreting” its constitutional prohibition to exempt those whose chronological age exceeded 18 at the time of the offense. The Court also rejects the contention that the absence of U.S. Supreme Court precedent specifically addressing the “elderly” leaves room for Florida to expand protections; the conformity clause prevents Florida from providing more expansive Eighth Amendment protections than those recognized by the Supreme Court.

Having resolved the case on timeliness and the conformity clause, the Court expressly declines to reach Smithers’ arguments about evolving standards of decency, deterrence, and retribution. Those are the axes on which the U.S. Supreme Court typically evaluates categorical Eighth Amendment rules, but Florida cannot perform that analysis to expand protections beyond federal baselines.

Impact

Immediate Consequences for Florida Capital Litigation

• Ripeness trigger set at the claimed age threshold. Where a capital defendant asserts a categorical age-based prohibition (e.g., “no executions of persons 65 and older”), the claim accrues when the defendant reaches the asserted age. Raising the claim for the first time during warrant litigation is untimely absent a Rule 3.851(d)(2) exception.
• Conformity clause limits innovation by state courts. Florida’s high court cannot adopt a categorical “elderly” exemption unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes one. Florida courts remain tethered to federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for both scope and limits.
• Streamlined warrant-stage proceedings. By declining oral argument, refusing rehearing, and ordering immediate issuance of the mandate, the Court signals its intention to avoid last-minute litigation on foreclosed and untimely Eighth Amendment theories.

Longer-Term Doctrinal and Strategic Implications

• State-court exhaustion strategy. Given the conformity clause, Florida litigants seeking to develop age-based Eighth Amendment claims for potential federal review should file them when they ripen (i.e., at the asserted threshold age) to avoid state procedural bars that could complicate or preclude federal habeas review. Waiting until a warrant issues risks both state untimeliness and federal procedural default arguments.
• No Florida-based “evolving standards” route for the elderly. Arguments that executing the elderly violates evolving standards of decency, lacks deterrent value, or offends retribution are, as a matter of state constitutional law, unavailable unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court endorses such a categorical rule. Florida litigants must direct those contentions to federal courts or advocate for legislative change.
• As-applied claims remain distinct. The decision addresses a requested categorical exemption. Florida and federal law still recognize as-applied bars unrelated to age per se, such as intellectual disability and incompetency to be executed (Ford/Panetti/Madison), which Smithers did not claim. This decision does not alter those avenues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 3.851 (Florida’s capital postconviction rule): Sets strict deadlines and procedures for challenging capital convictions and sentences after they become final. A “successive” motion is a later filing after an initial postconviction motion; it is only permitted on narrow grounds (new facts, new retroactive rights, or counsel’s neglect).
• Ripeness and timeliness: A claim is “ripe” when the facts supporting it have occurred. Here, because the claim was a categorical exemption for those 65+, the Court deemed it ripe when the inmate turned 65. “Timeliness” requires filing within a fixed period after ripeness—generally, within one year for capital postconviction claims unless a specified exception applies.
• Conformity clause (art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.): Requires Florida courts to interpret the state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment in lockstep with U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment decisions. This means Florida courts cannot expand protections beyond federal precedent.
• Eighth Amendment categorical exemptions: The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized categorical bars for specific classes: juveniles (Roper), the intellectually disabled (Atkins), and certain offense-based restrictions for juveniles (e.g., Graham, Miller). There is currently no categorical bar for the “elderly.”
• HAC and CCP (aggravating factors): “Heinous, atrocious, or cruel” refers to murders that are especially torturous or conscienceless. “Cold, calculated, and premeditated” denotes heightened premeditation without pretense of justification. These aggravators, when found, support imposing the death penalty.
• Huff hearing: A preliminary hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary on postconviction claims. If the record refutes the claim, the court may summarily deny without a full evidentiary hearing.

Conclusion

Smithers v. State cements two important propositions in Florida capital jurisprudence. First, an age-based Eighth Amendment claim predicated on a categorical exemption for “elderly” inmates ripens when the inmate crosses the asserted age threshold, not when the Governor signs a death warrant. Thus, raising such claims for the first time at the warrant stage is untimely absent a Rule 3.851 exception. Second, Florida’s conformity clause forecloses the state courts from adopting a categorical “elderly” bar unless the U.S. Supreme Court first recognizes it under the Eighth Amendment.

The Court’s refusal to reach broader policy arguments—evolving standards, deterrence, retribution—reflects the structural constraint imposed by the conformity clause: Florida cannot innovate beyond federal Eighth Amendment doctrine. For practitioners, the decision underscores the necessity of early, proactive litigation of any age-based challenges and the practical limits of state-court warrant-stage advocacy on issues foreclosed by federal precedent. In the broader landscape, Smithers consolidates Florida’s alignment with U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment law and clarifies procedural expectations for any future attempts to press novel categorical bars to execution.

Case Identification

Case: Samuel L. Smithers v. State of Florida, No. SC2025-1507 (Fla. Oct. 7, 2025)

Disposition: Summary denial of successive Rule 3.851 motion affirmed; no oral argument; no rehearing; immediate mandate.

Panel: MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur; LABARGA, J., concurs in result; CANADY, J., recused.