Riley v. Bondi: Clarifying “Final Orders of Removal” and Re-branding the §1252(b)(1) Deadline as a Non-Jurisdictional Claims-Processing Rule

1. Introduction

In Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. ____ (2025), the United States Supreme Court addressed two deceptively technical, yet highly consequential, questions at the intersection of immigration and administrative procedure:

When is an immigration removal order “final” for purposes of the 30-day petition-for-review deadline in 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1) when the non-citizen is simultaneously pursuing “withholding-only” protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)?
Is that 30-day deadline a strict jurisdictional bar or a claims-processing rule that can be forfeited or waived?

The Court’s answers—(i) the finality clock starts when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues the Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO), not when subsequent CAT proceedings conclude; and (ii) §1252(b)(1) is non-jurisdictional—reshape removal litigation, reconcile (or exacerbate) circuit splits, and recalibrate the Government’s and non-citizens’ strategic calculations in expedited-removal cases.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Holding 1 – Finality: A Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying CAT deferral in a “withholding-only” proceeding is not a “final order of removal.” The only reviewable final order is the earlier FARO issued by DHS. Therefore, the 30-day filing window starts on the FARO’s date, even though CAT litigation continues.
Holding 2 – Character of the Deadline: Section 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day period is a mandatory claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Courts may enforce it sua sponte, but they are not compelled to, and the Government can waive or forfeit it.
Disposition: Fourth Circuit’s dismissal vacated; case remanded for proceedings consistent with the clarified standards.
Voting line-up: Justice Alito for the Court (joined in full by Roberts C.J., Thomas, Kavanaugh, Barrett; joined in part by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Jackson); concurrence by Thomas; partial dissent by Sotomayor (joined by Kagan, Jackson, Gorsuch in part).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020)
• Distinguished CAT orders from removal orders—CAT relief “does not disturb” the underlying removal order.
• The majority in Riley extrapolates that if CAT relief does not merge into a removal order, it likewise does not delay that order’s finality.
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021)
• Held that removal orders are “administratively final” for detention purposes even while withholding-only proceedings are pending.
• Riley imports this concept of finality to the filing-deadline context.
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) and progeny (Henderson, Kwai Fun Wong, Boechler, Wilkins, Harrow)
• Require a “clear statement” from Congress to classify a rule as jurisdictional.
• The Court relies on these cases to recast §1252(b)(1) as non-jurisdictional.
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995)
• Stone’s stray reference to a prior 90-day immigration filing period as “jurisdictional” is deemed “drive-by.” Riley refuses to give that label controlling weight.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Textual Construction of “Final Order of Removal”

Congress, in 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(47)(A)-(B), defined an “order of removal” and when it “becomes final.” Justice Alito interprets this definition strictly: a FARO both (a) concludes deportability and (b) orders deportation. Because expedited-removal respondents cannot seek IJ/BIA review of the FARO itself, the “period in which the alien is permitted to seek [Board] review” ends immediately—rendering the FARO final instantly. Ongoing CAT litigation, the Court says, does not reopen or suspend that finality.

3.2.2 Jurisdictional vs. Claims-Processing Analysis

Plain text of §1252(b)(1) “tells aliens what to do” but “provides no directives to courts.”
The provision is located outside §1252(a)(2)’s jurisdiction-stripping subsections.
Past Court reluctance to declare deadlines jurisdictional absent “magic words” leads to reclassification.

3.2.3 Policy & Pragmatics

The majority acknowledges the “legitimate practical concerns” (duplicative protective appeals, docket inefficiencies, potential loss of CAT review) but insists that adherence to text and precedent outweighs administrative convenience. It hints that DHS and appellate courts can mitigate hardships by:

Notifying non-citizens of the need for immediate petitions,
Holding cases in abeyance while CAT claims proceed, and
Declining, as the Solicitor General did here, to enforce the 30-day bar in equitable circumstances.

3.3 Impact & Future Litigation

Surge in “Protective Petitions” – Non-citizens subject to expedited removal will file petitions within 30 days of the FARO and ask courts to hold them in abeyance pending BIA disposition of CAT or withholding claims. The administrative burden shifts to courts and DHS.
Government Waiver Dynamics – Because the deadline is not jurisdictional, the Justice Department must affirmatively invoke it. Policy memos will be needed to guide when to waive or enforce the rule.
Circuit Split on Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction – Justice Thomas’s concurrence foreshadows a new fight: whether courts may hear only a CAT order when the petitioner fails to include the FARO in the notice for review.
Statutory Reform Pressure – Congress may confront the “Kafkaesque” timing mismatch highlighted by the Sotomayor dissent by amending §1252 to tie the filing window to the completion of withholding-only proceedings.
Trans-Substantive Spill-Over – The method of characterising deadlines (text + placement + precedent) will influence other statutory schemes (e.g., veterans’ benefits, tax, Medicare) where filing limits loom.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO): A summary order issued by DHS in “expedited removal” cases involving aggravated felons. It skips the immigration-judge stage and designates the country of removal.
Withholding-Only / CAT Proceedings: Special hearings limited to whether the non-citizen can be sent to the designated country. They do not revisit whether the person must leave the United States.
Final Order vs. Administratively Final: “Final order” (for appeals) triggers the 30-day review period. “Administratively final” (for detention) starts the 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. §1231.
Claims-Processing Rule: A procedural requirement governing litigants (e.g., when to file). It can be waived or forfeited. Contrast with jurisdictional rules, which circumscribe the court’s power and cannot be waived.

5. Conclusion

Riley v. Bondi cements two doctrinal pillars:

In expedited-removal contexts, the FARO—not the later CAT decision—constitutes the “final order of removal,” starting the 30-day review clock.
The §1252(b)(1) deadline is non-jurisdictional, harmonising immigration timing rules with the Court’s modern “clear-statement” approach to jurisdiction.

The ruling delivers textual clarity at the expense of procedural simplicity, provoking strong dissent that warns of “protective appeal” chaos. Whether agencies, courts, and Congress will streamline the new landscape—or whether Riley invites another round of statutory tinkering—remains to be seen. What is certain is that litigants, advocates, and judges must now recalibrate their timelines and litigation strategies in removal cases to account for earlier filing obligations and the possibility of equitable flexibility when the Government elects not to enforce the deadline.