Introduction

In French v. Twentieth Judicial District Court, the Montana Supreme Court clarified a previously unresolved question: whether the peremptory substitution statute, § 3-1-804, MCA, applies when a criminal case is appealed from a non-record justice court to the district court for a trial de novo. The Court held that it does, recognizing the appellant’s right to one substitution of the district judge—just as if the case had originated in district court.

The case arises from Mark French’s misdemeanor conviction in the Sanders County Justice Court (a non-record court). French appealed for a trial de novo in district court, then moved to disqualify and, in the alternative, to substitute the assigned district judge, the Honorable John W. Larson. After the Montana Supreme Court denied disqualification as moot in a separate order, Judge Larson denied substitution relying on D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, a case holding that substitution is unavailable when the district court is acting purely in an appellate capacity to review a specific pretrial ruling from justice court. French petitioned the Supreme Court for supervisory control.

The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, reversed the denial of substitution, and remanded. In doing so, it set a clear precedent: where an appeal from a non-record justice (or city) court results in a trial de novo under § 46-17-311, MCA, the peremptory substitution right under § 3-1-804, MCA, applies.

Parties: Petitioner Mark French (self-represented); Respondent Judge John W. Larson (self-represented); the Sanders County Attorney’s Office appeared for the State.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court exercised supervisory control, a remedy reserved for extraordinary situations, because denial of a motion to substitute a judge in a criminal case meets the urgency criteria of M. R. App. P. 14(3)(c).
• Holding: When a criminal case is appealed from a non-record justice or city court and is tried de novo in district court pursuant to § 46-17-311, MCA, § 3-1-804, MCA entitles each adverse party to one substitution of the district judge. The situation differs from D.H., where no trial de novo occurred and the district court functioned solely in an appellate capacity.
• Application: The Court concluded French timely sought substitution and is entitled to it. It reversed the district court’s denial and remanded for further proceedings before a substituted judge.
• Ancillary issues: The Court rejected French’s argument that transmission of the justice court record was improper, citing § 46-17-311(3), MCA. It did not dismiss the underlying district court proceeding and did not grant broader relief (e.g., dismissal or resolution of a jury-trial claim).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Stokes v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, 2011 MT 182: Reiterates that supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy reserved for extraordinary circumstances. This sets the threshold for the Court’s intervention.
• M. R. App. P. 14(3)(c): Lists specific criteria warranting supervisory control, including when an underlying court “has granted or denied a motion for substitution of a judge in a criminal case.” This rule supplies the procedural doorway for the Supreme Court’s immediate review.
• Collins v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 2018 MT 125: Establishes that when a defendant asserts a right to have a different judge preside over a criminal case, urgency is present and normal appeal is inadequate. This justifies direct supervisory review rather than waiting for post-judgment appeal.
• City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 2021 MT 122: Provides that a district court’s substitution decision is reviewed for correctness—a purely legal question. That standard frames the Court’s analysis.
• D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, 2012 MT 106: Holds there is no right to substitute a judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, where the district court acts “entirely in an appellate capacity” to review a specific pretrial justice court ruling; there is no trial de novo. The Court distinguishes D.H. because French’s case involves a trial de novo, not limited appellate review.
• Montana Constitution, art. VII, § 4(2) and § 3-5-303, MCA: Recognize district courts’ appellate jurisdiction over justice courts. These provisions are the constitutional and statutory backbone for district court involvement in justice court appeals.
• § 46-17-311, MCA: Governs criminal appeals from justice or city courts not of record; mandates a trial de novo and permits a six-person jury. Central to the holding that the case begins anew in district court.
• § 3-1-804, MCA: The peremptory substitution statute granting each adverse party one substitution of a district judge. The Court applies it to de novo appeals.
• § 3-1-805, MCA: Disqualification for cause (distinct from substitution). French’s earlier disqualification motion was denied as moot in a separate order because the trial date was vacated.
• § 25-33-301, MCA and McDunn v. Arnold, 2013 MT 138: Explain that when an action is tried anew on appeal, it proceeds “in all respects as other trials in the district court.” The Court cites these to reinforce that a de novo appeal resets the case posture to a trial court setting, supporting the availability of substitution.
• State v. Kesler, 228 Mont. 242 (1987) and Maloney v. Gordon, 254 Mont. 314 (1992): Confirm the clear statutory intent and longstanding practice of trial de novo on appeals from non-record justice courts.
• § 46-17-311(3), MCA: Requires transmission of the justice court record to district court within 30 days—dispositive of French’s objection to the record transfer.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps. First, it establishes the propriety of supervisory control: a denial of a substitution motion in a criminal case presents a purely legal issue with urgency, making ordinary appeal inadequate (M. R. App. P. 14(3)(c); Stokes; Collins). Second, it addresses the merits: whether § 3-1-804, MCA, applies when a district court conducts a trial de novo on appeal from a non-record justice court.

The Court draws a pivotal distinction between two appellate postures:

• Pure appellate review of a specific pretrial ruling (no de novo trial): The district court acts solely as an appellate tribunal. In this posture, as in D.H., § 3-1-804, MCA, does not apply because the proceeding is not a “trial” in district court; it lacks the trial-court functions that animate the substitution statute.
• Appeal resulting in a trial de novo under § 46-17-311, MCA: The case is “tried anew” on both law and fact—“as if there had been no trial in the first instance” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary). In this reconstituted trial posture, the district court functions exactly as it would in an original criminal case, and the case must be conducted “in all respects as other trials in the district court” (McDunn; § 25-33-301(2), MCA).

Because a trial de novo is a fresh proceeding at the trial-court level, the Court holds the peremptory substitution right attaches in the same way it would if the case had started in district court. The opinion emphasizes that, aside from record transmission, the case “essentially begins anew” in district court. The Court thus interprets § 3-1-804, MCA, to afford appellants in de novo criminal appeals from non-record justice courts the same one-substitution right as any district court criminal litigant.

Applying that rule, the Court finds French “timely sought a substitution of a judge” and is legally entitled to it. It reverses the August 13, 2025 denial and remands for reassignment.

Finally, the Court disposes of French’s procedural challenge to the record transfer. Section 46-17-311(3), MCA, requires the justice court to transmit the record within 30 days. The transfer was proper, and the district court did not err by relying on it. Although § 25-33-301(1), MCA (civil appeals), contains certain phrasing not repeated in § 46-17-311 (criminal appeals), the Court expressly notes these distinctions do not affect the substitution analysis.

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision squarely answers a question left open after D.H.: when a justice (or city) court case not of record is appealed and proceeds to a de novo trial, the peremptory substitution statute applies. Key implications include:

• Uniform application of substitution rights in de novo appeals: Criminal defendants appealing from non-record justice or city courts can exercise one substitution under § 3-1-804, MCA, once the case is set for de novo proceedings in district court. The Court’s reasoning strongly suggests parity with cases originally filed in district court.
• Broader systemic clarity: District courts should not deny substitution in de novo appeals on the theory that the case “comes from” a court of limited jurisdiction. Once de novo posture attaches, the case is functionally a district court trial.
• Boundary confirmed for D.H.: Substitution remains unavailable when the district court sits purely as an appellate reviewer of a discrete legal ruling from justice court (no de novo trial).
• Procedural planning for counsel: Practitioners should monitor assignment and timing requirements under § 3-1-804, MCA, and local rules to ensure a “timely” substitution in the appeal context. The Court confirmed timeliness here but did not elaborate generally; counsel should not delay after assignment.
• Jury-trial rights untouched on the merits: While § 46-17-311 explicitly allows a six-person jury in de novo criminal appeals, the Court did not adjudicate French’s separate constitutional jury-trial claim; it resolved only the substitution and record-transfer issues via supervisory control.
• Record management: Justice courts must transmit the record within 30 days of appeal, and district courts may rely on that record even though the case will be tried anew. Counsel should expect the record to be present but recognize that the de novo trial permits fresh presentation of facts and law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervisory Control: A special, discretionary remedy allowing the Montana Supreme Court to correct lower-court errors immediately when waiting for a normal appeal would be inadequate (e.g., denial of a substitution motion in a criminal case). It is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.”
• Substitution vs. Disqualification:
  • Substitution (§ 3-1-804, MCA): A peremptory right allowing each adverse party one change of the assigned district judge without showing cause, subject to timeliness and procedural rules.
  • Disqualification (§ 3-1-805, MCA): A for-cause removal based on bias, conflict, or other grounds. French’s disqualification attempt was denied as moot in a separate order because the trial date was vacated.
• Trial de Novo: A completely new trial on law and facts in district court, conducted “as if there had been no trial in the first instance.” In Montana, criminal appeals from non-record justice or city courts proceed this way under § 46-17-311, MCA.
• Courts of Record vs. Non-Record Courts:
  • Courts of record keep verbatim records; appeals are based on that record and involve legal review.
  • Non-record courts (e.g., most justice/city courts) do not maintain a full record; appeals go to district court for a trial de novo.
• Appellate Capacity vs. Trial Capacity:
  • In appellate capacity, the district court reviews decisions made below; no new trial occurs and peremptory substitution does not apply (D.H.).
  • In trial capacity, the district court conducts a full new trial; peremptory substitution applies.
• Transmission of Record: Even in de novo appeals, the justice court transmits its record to district court within 30 days (§ 46-17-311(3), MCA). This does not negate the de novo nature of the district court trial.
• Standard of Review—Correctness: Whether a party is entitled to substitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness, not for discretion or deference.

Procedural Background in Context

• French appealed a misdemeanor conviction from a non-record justice court to district court for a trial de novo (§ 46-17-311, MCA).
• He moved to disqualify Judge Larson (§ 3-1-805, MCA), and in the alternative to substitute (§ 3-1-804, MCA). The Supreme Court denied disqualification as moot in a separate matter, noting the district court’s authority to assess substitution timeliness.
• Judge Larson denied substitution, relying on D.H., which the Supreme Court now distinguishes as inapplicable to de novo appeals.
• The Supreme Court exercised supervisory control, reversed the denial of substitution, and remanded for proceedings before a substituted judge.
• The Court also confirmed the propriety of record transmission and declined to dismiss the underlying criminal proceeding.

Open Questions and Guidance for Practitioners

• Timeliness mechanics: The opinion confirms French’s substitution motion was timely but does not elaborate generally on how timeliness is computed in the appeal context. Counsel should consult § 3-1-804, MCA, any applicable local rules, and the specific assignment order to ensure prompt filing after judicial assignment.
• Civil de novo appeals: Although this decision arises from a criminal appeal under § 46-17-311, MCA, the Court’s reasoning—centered on the district court functioning as a trial court in a de novo posture—suggests analogous treatment where civil matters are tried anew. That said, the holding directly resolves the criminal context.
• Scope of D.H. going forward: D.H. remains good law for appeals limited to legal review of specific rulings from justice court. Practitioners should distinguish carefully between pure appellate review and de novo trial postures when assessing substitution rights.

Conclusion

French v. Twentieth Judicial District Court establishes an important procedural rule: the peremptory substitution right in § 3-1-804, MCA, applies to criminal cases appealed from non-record justice or city courts and tried de novo in district court. By distinguishing the limited appellate-review posture in D.H. from the full trial posture of a de novo appeal, the Court ensures that litigants in de novo proceedings receive the same substitution rights as parties whose cases originate in district court.

The decision enhances procedural clarity for the bench and bar, confirms the routine transmission of records in de novo appeals, and underscores the Supreme Court’s willingness to use supervisory control to promptly correct substitution errors in criminal cases. Going forward, district courts should grant timely substitution motions in de novo appeals, and practitioners should act swiftly upon judicial assignment to preserve their clients’ substitution rights.