Rheeder v. Gray, City of Marion, Slagle & McHale – Iowa Supreme Court (2025)

Clarifying the “Severe-or-Pervasive” Harassment Standard and the “Materially Adverse” Retaliation Threshold under the Iowa Civil Rights Act

1. Introduction

In Rheeder v. Gray, the Iowa Supreme Court issued an interlocutory decision that refines two pivotal doctrines under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216:

• What factual showing is necessary for sexual harassment to be deemed “severe or pervasive” enough to create a hostile work environment.
• What conduct qualifies as a “materially adverse action” for purposes of a retaliation claim.

The plaintiff, Valerie Rheeder, a custodian for the Marion Police Department, alleged she had been subjected to unwanted sexual advances by Deputy Chief Douglas Slagle and subsequently retaliated against by Administrative Manager Shellene Gray and Chief of Police Joseph McHale. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment (save for a constructive-discharge issue). Four defendants sought and received interlocutory review.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Justice May, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to dismiss all ICRA claims:

1. Sexual Harassment Claim – Even construing the record in the light most favorable to Rheeder, Slagle’s conduct was not objectively “severe or pervasive.” Hence, no actionable hostile environment arose.
2. Retaliation Claim – Neither McHale’s memorandum requiring no non-business contact nor Gray’s alleged threats and intimidation surpassed the “materially adverse” threshold because they produced no objective injury or harm likely to deter a reasonable employee from complaining in the future.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque HRC, 672 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 2003) – Source of the four-factor test for hostile-environment severity (frequency, severity, physical threat/humiliation, work interference). Adopted wholesale.
• Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, 897 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 2017) – Exemplifies “sea of misogyny” sufficient to reach a jury; used as contrast to show how limited Slagle’s conduct was.
• Watkins, 914 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 2018) – Restates subjective vs. objective components for harassment; Court leans on its articulation.
• Godfrey v. State, 962 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 2021) – Clarified difference between discrimination and retaliation “adverse action.” Court borrows its two-part “actual injury/harm” + “objective deterrence” requirement.
• Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) – U.S. Supreme Court anchor for retaliation standard; Iowa adopts its test, requiring materiality judged by a reasonable employee.
• Federal persuasive authorities on reprimands and vague threats (Hill v. City of Pine Bluff, 8th Cir.; Lewis v. Wilkie, 7th Cir.) provided support that written warnings and unspecified discipline, standing alone, are not materially adverse.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Harassment Analysis

• Frequency – Main incidents happened over 3 days; some minor interactions weeks earlier. Labeled “isolated events.”
• Severity – Minimal physical contact (handshakes, cheek-touch). One suggestive line (“tell me what you want …”) and texting banter that ended once plaintiff objected.
• Threat/Humiliation – No threats, no public humiliation, no group behavior amplifying the hostility.
• Work Interference – Plaintiff did miss some work, but evidence tied to subjective reaction, not demonstrable job impediment; no shift change, demotion, discipline, or deprivation of resources.

The Court concluded these factors did not collectively meet the “severe or pervasive” threshold under Iowa caselaw.

b) Retaliation Analysis

The Court treated alleged acts two ways: discrete-act retaliation (McHale’s memorandum) and “retaliatory hostile environment” (Gray’s threats and intimidation). In both categories, the key failure was absence of a materially adverse action.

1. McHale’s Joint Directive – Merely prohibited both parties from non-business contact; imposed no discipline, pay cut, change in duty. Lacked objective harm.
2. Gray’s Conduct – Threats “I will get you” were too vague; physical grabbing momentary; no subsequent discipline, demotion, schedule change, or tangible detriment followed. Kitchen/vacuum incidents likened to “petty slights.”

Because neither set of acts would dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination, summary judgment for defendants was mandated.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Elevated Evidentiary Bar – Plaintiffs under the ICRA now face a clarified, arguably stricter, benchmark for proving hostile-environment harassment and retaliation. Single-actor, short-lived misconduct is unlikely to survive summary judgment absent compelling aggravating facts.
• Employer Investigations Endorsed – The opinion implicitly validates employers issuing bilateral “no-contact” directives after complaints, signaling such remedial steps will not ordinarily be viewed as retaliation.
• Retaliatory Hostile Environment Still Possible – Court leaves open whether a “severe-or-pervasive” element applies to retaliatory hostile environments, noting federal circuit split. Future Iowa cases may address that question.
• Practical Guidance – Human-resource professionals gain a clearer sense of what ≤does not≥ count as retaliation (e.g., vague threats, informal verbal criticism) versus what likely will (e.g., loss of pay, suspension, significant change in duties).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Severe or Pervasive – Conduct must be either very bad (severe) even if rare, or pretty bad but happening often (pervasive), and change the job’s atmosphere.
• Objective vs. Subjective – The law asks how a reasonable person would view the conduct, not just how the actual plaintiff felt.
• Materially Adverse Action (Retaliation) – Something that causes real harm (money, status, safety, or similar) and would likely scare an average worker from complaining.
• Summary Judgment – A procedural device where the court ends a case early because, even assuming all facts favor the non-moving party, the law still entitles the moving party to win.
• Interlocutory Appeal – An appeal taken before the trial is over, allowed here because the ruling involves substantial legal questions that would save time if resolved now.

5. Conclusion

Rheeder v. Gray crystallizes two core principles in Iowa employment discrimination law:

1. Sexual harassment under the ICRA must be both unwelcome and—when judged objectively—so intense or chronic that it fundamentally changes workplace conditions.
2. Retaliation requires more than criticism, vague threats, or administrative instructions; it demands objectively serious harm that would chill protected activity.

By reversing the district court and ordering dismissal, the Iowa Supreme Court sends a strong signal that courts will rigorously police the evidentiary line between genuinely actionable misconduct and less-serious workplace friction. As employers design policies and plaintiffs evaluate potential claims, Rheeder will serve as a prominent touchstone for what crosses, and what fails to cross, the legal threshold under the ICRA.