RFRA’s “Appropriate Relief” Does Not Waive Federal Sovereign Immunity for Retrospective Monetary Relief: Sixth Circuit Treats Missed Reserve Drill Pay and Retirement Points as Legal Damages

Introduction

In a published opinion of lasting significance for federal sovereign immunity and religious liberty litigation, the Sixth Circuit in Michael Poffenbarger v. Frank Kendall, III (decided May 12, 2025) affirmed dismissal of a reservist’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and First Amendment challenge to the military’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Although the district court had dismissed the case as moot following rescission of the mandate, the appellate panel (Judge Kethledge, joined by Judges Bush and Murphy) affirmed on different grounds: sovereign immunity bars the only remaining relief sought—restoration of missed reserve drill pay and retirement points.

The case arises from the Air Force’s 2021 COVID-19 vaccination requirement and its implementation of religious, medical, and administrative exemptions. First Lieutenant Michael Poffenbarger sought a religious accommodation, was denied, refused vaccination, and was placed on “No Pay/No Points” status, receiving a letter of reprimand. He sued, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and “damages,” including an order to restore the drill pay and retirement points allegedly lost due to the unlawful mandate.

After Congress directed rescission of the mandate and the Department complied, many related injunctions—including the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Doster v. Kendall—were vacated as moot. The question here was whether Poffenbarger’s monetary request kept his case live and, if so, whether any waiver of sovereign immunity allowed recovery. The Sixth Circuit held the monetary relief kept the case from being moot but was barred by sovereign immunity because RFRA’s “appropriate relief” does not unmistakably authorize damages against the United States, and the specific monetary relief sought is properly characterized as legal damages rather than equitable specific relief.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, but not on mootness. The panel’s core holdings are:

• The case was not moot merely because the vaccine mandate was rescinded; a live controversy persisted in the form of Poffenbarger’s claim for restoration of $4,346.16 in drill pay and 24 retirement points.
• However, the claim for drill pay and retirement points is barred by federal sovereign immunity. RFRA’s remedial clause, allowing “appropriate relief against a government” (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c)), does not clearly waive the United States’ immunity from damages claims.
• Characterizing the requested relief as “restoration” does not convert it into equitable specific relief. Because RFRA mandates forbearance from substantially burdening religion—not the payment of money—and because reservists are not statutorily entitled to pay for drills they did not attend, the request is retrospective compensation for a past wrong, i.e., legal damages.
• Arguments that government counsel waived immunity or should be judicially estopped were rejected. Sovereign immunity cannot be waived by litigation conduct, and judicial estoppel did not apply because the district court rejected the government’s earlier position.

Result: Judgment affirmed; the suit cannot proceed because the only remaining relief is barred by sovereign immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Rescission and Mootness Context
  • Doster v. Kendall, 48 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2022), and 54 F.4th 398 (6th Cir. 2022): The Sixth Circuit had affirmed preliminary injunctions against the Air Force regarding religious accommodations to the COVID-19 mandate. Congress subsequently directed rescission (Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 525), leading the Supreme Court to vacate Doster as moot (Kendall v. Doster, 144 S. Ct. 481 (2023) (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950))). This background frames why injunctive and declaratory relief frequently fell out of these cases, leaving only potential backward-looking monetary claims.
  • Resurrection School v. Hertel, 35 F.4th 524 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Ohio v. EPA, 969 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2020); and University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981): These cases articulate the Article III mootness principles the panel used to explain that the existence of a live claim for monetary relief can keep a case from becoming moot even after a policy rescission.
• Sovereign Immunity and RFRA’s Waiver
  • Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963): Official-capacity suits are suits against the United States, bringing sovereign immunity into play.
  • Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020): RFRA permits damages against federal officials in their individual capacities and defines “government” to include officials; but Tanzin left untouched whether RFRA waives the United States’ immunity to damages.
  • F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012): Waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed; ambiguity defeats a waiver claim.
  • Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011): The phrase “appropriate relief” in a related statute (RLUIPA) does not clearly waive state sovereign immunity for damages. This reasoning strongly informs interpretation of the identical phrase in RFRA.
  • Morgan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 129 F.4th 1043 (7th Cir. 2025): Collects circuit authority holding that RFRA does not authorize damages against the United States. The Sixth Circuit joins that consensus.
• Legal v. Equitable Relief
  • Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988): Courts distinguish between legal damages (compensation for past injury) and equitable specific relief (orders to give the plaintiff the very thing to which a statute entitles them). Bowen recognizes that some monetary awards can be equitable when they enforce a statutory “shall pay” mandate.
  • Collin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 881 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2018): Elaborates the difficulty of labeling monetary relief equitable versus legal, and applies Bowen’s distinction.
  • Joseph Story, Equity Treatises (quoted in the opinion): Reinforces the historical differentiation between preventative/transformative equitable relief and backward-looking compensatory legal relief.
• Military Pay Entitlements
  • Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1999): As to reservists, there is no entitlement to pay for drills not actually attended—even if a reservist was wrongfully removed from a pay billet. This precedent is central to characterizing missed drill pay/points as damages rather than specific relief tied to a statutory entitlement.
  • Schelske v. Austin, 2023 WL 5986462 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2023): Cited as distinguishable; active-duty pay entitlements can differ meaningfully from reserve entitlements.
• Waiver and Estoppel Against the Government
  • Gaetano v. United States, 994 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2021): Government officials or attorneys cannot waive sovereign immunity by litigation conduct.
  • New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001): Standards for judicial estoppel were not met because the district court rejected the government’s earlier argument.

Legal Reasoning

1. Article III: The claim for drill pay and retirement points keeps the case live.

   The panel explained that a case is moot only when a judicial decision would have no practical effect on the parties’ rights. Although rescission of the COVID-19 mandate mooted requests for forward-looking injunctive and declaratory relief, Poffenbarger also sought a backward-looking monetary remedy: restoration of drill pay and retirement points lost while on “No Pay/No Points” status. Because a court could, in principle, grant that relief (subject to any sovereign-immunity barrier), the case was not moot.

2. Sovereign Immunity: RFRA’s “appropriate relief” does not unequivocally authorize damages against the United States.

   Lawsuits against federal officials in their official capacities are suits against the United States, triggering sovereign immunity. Waivers must be clear and unequivocal. RFRA provides that a person whose religious exercise has been burdened may obtain “appropriate relief against a government.” The Supreme Court in Sossamon held that the same phrase in RLUIPA did not clearly waive state immunity for damages; the courts of appeals (including the Seventh Circuit in Morgan) have extended that reasoning to RFRA claims against the federal government. The Sixth Circuit aligned with that consensus, concluding that RFRA’s text does not unambiguously open the United States to damages liability.

   The panel acknowledged Tanzin (permitting RFRA damages claims against federal officers in their individual capacities) but emphasized that Tanzin did not address, much less approve, damages claims against the United States itself. That distinction is dispositive here because Poffenbarger sued only official-capacity defendants.

3. Characterization of the Requested Relief: Retrospective compensation, not equitable specific relief.

   The court carefully distinguished between legal and equitable remedies. Some monetary orders can be equitable when they enforce a statutory command to pay a particular sum, as in Bowen, where the Medicaid statute required the Secretary to pay the state certain amounts (“shall pay”). There, the very entitlement at issue was payment, so ordering payment was specific performance of a statutory mandate.

   Not so here. RFRA mandates governmental forbearance from substantially burdening religious exercise; it does not mandate the payment of money. The “very thing” RFRA entitles a plaintiff to is freedom from substantial burdens—not cash. The monetary relief Poffenbarger seeks would compensate for a past burden on religious exercise; it would not enforce a statutory “shall pay” command. That is the hallmark of legal damages.

   The military pay backdrop confirms the point. Under Palmer, a reservist has no statutory entitlement to reserve drill pay for drills not actually performed—even if the nonperformance resulted from a wrongful removal from pay status. Because there is no underlying “shall pay” entitlement, ordering payment here cannot be cast as equitable specific performance. The same reasoning applies to retirement points: awarding points retrospectively would impose obligations under a different statutory regime and, again, functions as compensatory relief for past harm rather than enforcement of a money-mandating statute.

4. Rejection of Waiver/Estoppel Arguments.

   Poffenbarger’s arguments that the government had waived sovereign immunity or should be judicially estopped failed. Officials cannot waive the United States’ immunity by litigation positions, and judicial estoppel did not apply because the district court did not accept the allegedly inconsistent government position.

5. Disposition: Affirmance on alternative grounds.

   While the district court dismissed on mootness grounds, the panel clarified that a live monetary claim remained, but that claim is barred by sovereign immunity. The court thus affirmed the dismissal on a different ground—a commonplace appellate practice when the result is correct but the reasoning differs.

Potential Impact

• Clarifies the scope of RFRA’s waiver against the federal government in the Sixth Circuit.

  This published decision solidifies that RFRA’s “appropriate relief” does not waive the United States’ immunity from damages. Litigants seeking monetary recovery from the federal government for RFRA violations in the Sixth Circuit will face a categorical bar unless Congress enacts an unmistakable waiver.

• Labels matter: “Restoration” can still be damages.

  Plaintiffs cannot convert damages into equitable relief through artful phrasing. Where the underlying statute does not mandate the payment of money, and where military pay statutes do not create entitlement (as with reservist drill pay for unattended drills), requests to “restore” pay and points will be treated as damages claims—barred by immunity in official-capacity suits.

• Reservist v. active-duty distinctions.

  The opinion underscores the difference between reserve and active-duty pay entitlements. While the court did not decide active-duty scenarios, it flagged that cases involving statutory “shall pay” obligations might present different remedial characterizations. Practitioners must analyze the specific money-mandating statute before invoking Bowen-style specific relief.

• Strategic pleading implications.

  After Tanzin, damages under RFRA are potentially available against federal officials in their individual capacities. But such claims may face other obstacles (e.g., qualified immunity, military-specific justiciability doctrines, or other immunity principles). Official-capacity claims seeking monetary relief under RFRA are foreclosed. Injunctive or declaratory relief may be available prospectively; however, policy rescissions often moot those remedies.

• Mootness doctrine refined in mandate-rescission cases.

  The panel’s approach illustrates that policy rescission does not automatically moot cases where monetary relief remains available in principle. Courts should separate mootness (Article III) from immunity (remedial availability).

• Record-correction and alternative avenues.

  For service members, especially reservists, the opinion signals that financial relief for missed drills cannot be shoehorned into equitable specific relief. Alternative paths may include administrative record correction and prospective relief, but backward-looking compensation against the United States via RFRA is not available in the Sixth Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mootness: A case is moot if a court’s decision will have no concrete effect on the parties. Even after a policy is rescinded, a case can remain live if the plaintiff still seeks relief the court could grant—such as money—unless another doctrine (like sovereign immunity) bars it.
• Sovereign Immunity: The United States cannot be sued without its consent. Any waiver must be clear in the statute’s text. Ambiguity is resolved in favor of the sovereign.
• RFRA’s “Appropriate Relief”: RFRA authorizes “appropriate relief against a government,” which includes injunctive or declaratory relief. Courts have held that this phrase does not clearly authorize damages against the United States itself.
• Legal Damages vs. Equitable Specific Relief: Damages compensate for past injury. Equitable specific relief orders the defendant to give the plaintiff the very thing a statute already mandates (e.g., a “shall pay” sum). Money can be equitable only if it enforces a money-mandating statute; otherwise, it is damages.
• Bowen’s Narrow Exception: When a statute requires payment of specific funds, a court may order those funds paid as equitable relief. RFRA contains no such money-mandating directive.
• Official vs. Individual Capacity Suits: Official-capacity suits are suits against the government (immunity applies). Individual-capacity suits target the person; RFRA permits damages in such suits (Tanzin), but other defenses may apply.
• Reserve “No Pay/No Points” Status: A reservist who does not attend drills typically earns no pay or retirement points, and—per Palmer—has no entitlement to pay for unattended drills, even if the failure to attend stems from a wrongful action.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision in Poffenbarger v. Kendall articulates a clear, two-step framework in the RFRA–sovereign immunity context. First, rescission of a challenged policy does not necessarily moot a case if a claim for monetary relief remains. Second, and dispositively here, RFRA’s “appropriate relief” does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity for damages. Framing a request for money as “restoration” does not transform damages into equitable specific relief where the underlying statute (RFRA) mandates forbearance rather than payment and where military pay statutes provide no entitlement to the monies sought (particularly for reservist drill pay not earned by attendance).

This opinion thus provides a durable precedent in the Sixth Circuit: claims seeking retrospective monetary redress from the United States for RFRA violations are barred absent an unequivocal statutory waiver. For service members and other federal litigants, the decision narrows the remedial landscape after policy rescissions, channeling RFRA relief toward prospective injunctions and individual-capacity damages—where available—and away from official-capacity monetary recovery against the sovereign.