Reyes Santos v. Bondi: Strict Exhaustion and the Non-Jurisdictional Nature of Date-Less Notices to Appear

1. Introduction

Reyes Santos v. Bondi, No. 23-7182 (2d Cir. May 6 2025) is a Second Circuit summary order that revisits two recurrent themes in contemporary U.S. immigration litigation: (1) whether a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that omits the initial hearing’s date and time deprives an immigration court of jurisdiction, and (2) the consequences of failing to preserve—or adequately brief—arguments before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the reviewing court. Although issued as a non-precedential summary order under Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision solidifies existing circuit doctrine and offers important practical reminders for immigration advocates.

Petitioner José Leonel Reyes Santos, a Salvadoran national, sought review of a BIA order summarily affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief. Represented by counsel, Reyes Santos argued principally that (1) his defective NTA failed to vest jurisdiction and (2) the IJ wrongly rejected his fear-of-gang-violence claims.

Key Procedural Posture

IJ decision: October 21 2019 (New York Immigration Court).
BIA summary affirmance: September 11 2023.
Second Circuit petition for review: denied May 6 2025.

Central Issues on Review

Jurisdiction: Does an NTA without date/time invalidate proceedings?
Exhaustion & Abandonment: Were petitioner’s arguments preserved?
Merits: Did the IJ err in denying asylum, withholding, and CAT relief?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit denied the petition in its entirety, holding that:

The defective NTA argument was unexhausted and, in any event, foreclosed by Cupete v. Garland, 29 F.4th 53 (2d Cir. 2022).
Reyes Santos abandoned his asylum and withholding theories by failing to articulate a protected ground; mere gang avoidance is not, without more, a political opinion or cognizable particular social group.
The CAT claim failed because the record did not compel a finding that torture was “more likely than not.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114 (2d Cir. 2024) – reiterates strict exhaustion: circuit courts lack jurisdiction to review claims not specifically raised to the BIA.
Cupete v. Garland, 29 F.4th 53 (2d Cir. 2022) – holds that omission of date/time in an NTA does not defeat immigration-court jurisdiction when a follow-up hearing notice is served.
Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008) – authorizes the reviewing court to examine the IJ decision directly when the BIA issues a streamlined affirmance.
Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018) – recites the standards: substantial-evidence review for facts; de novo review for law.
Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022) – clarifies that the “one central reason” causation test applies to both asylum and withholding.
Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023) – non-briefed issues are deemed abandoned on appeal.
Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2021) – refusal to join a gang, without more, is not a political opinion.
Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2014) & M-E-V-G-, 26 I.&N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) – articulate the three-part test for a cognizable “particular social group” (immutability, particularity, social distinction).
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) – ordinary criminal targeting is generally not persecution of a social group.
Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008) – a chain-of-events theory under CAT fails if any link is not more-likely-than-not.
Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021); Lin v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005) – reinforce the “record evidence” and “particularized evidence” requirements for CAT claims.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

3.2.1 Jurisdictional Challenge to the NTA

Reyes Santos asserted that his NTA lacked the statutory prerequisites to invoke 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) jurisdiction. The court bypassed the merits by holding the argument unexhausted because it was not raised before the BIA. Nevertheless, it offered an alternative merits discussion to foreclose future litigation: under Cupete, a subsequently issued hearing notice cures any date/time omission. Thus, the immigration court’s jurisdiction remained intact.

3.2.2 Asylum & Withholding – Abandonment & Nexus

The petitioner’s principal substantive failure was evidentiary and procedural: he did not clearly identify a protected ground (political opinion or particular social group) either before the BIA or in his circuit brief. The IJ had rejected the proposed social group “Salvadoran youth who are deported back to El Salvador and left without familial protection” for lack of social distinction and particularity. Because Reyes Santos supplied no contrary evidence or detailed argument, the court deemed the theory abandoned (Debique). Absent a protected ground, the “one central reason” causation test could not be met, and the asylum/withholding claims necessarily failed.

3.2.3 CAT – Insufficient Probability of Future Torture

The Second Circuit applied a straightforward “substantial evidence” lens. There were only two minor gang encounters, two years apart, with no physical harm. Under Savchuck, a chain of speculative events cannot yield a more-likely-than-not chance of torture. The petitioner’s country‐conditions evidence (general gang violence in El Salvador) did not specifically connect to him, a requirement underscored by Lin.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Even though summary orders lack precedential force, Reyes Santos v. Bondi will resonate in practice because it:

Reaffirmed the Second Circuit’s post-Pereira trajectory: a defective NTA is not jurisdictional when followed by a proper notice.
Reemphasized stringent issue exhaustion and abandonment doctrines— a cautionary tale for counsel who rely on generic or boiler-plate protected-ground arguments.
Clarified that generalized gang violence, without individualized threat or protected-ground nexus, remains insufficient for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief.
Encouraged practitioners to develop country-conditions evidence tying gang violence to an applicant’s particular circumstances and governmental acquiescence, rather than relying on broad reports alone.
Signaled continued judicial skepticism toward expansive social-group formulations premised on “youth” or “lack of familial protection.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Notice to Appear (NTA): The charging document that initiates removal proceedings. After Pereira v. Sessions, much litigation questioned whether omission of hearing specifics invalidates jurisdiction. The Second Circuit says no—if a later notice supplies the date/time.
Exhaustion Requirement: Before a federal court can review an immigration claim, the petitioner must have raised the specific argument to the BIA. Failure to do so deprives the court of jurisdiction.
Abandonment on Appeal: Even an exhausted argument is forfeited if not meaningfully briefed. A single conclusory sentence will not suffice.
Particular Social Group (PSG): To qualify, the group must be (1) immutable, (2) defined with particularity (clear boundaries), and (3) socially distinct (recognized in the home society). Over-broad or vague terms (“youth,” “without protection”) typically fail.
“One Central Reason” Test: The protected ground must be at least one central reason for the anticipated persecution—not merely incidental.
CAT Standard (“More Likely Than Not”): The applicant must show (a) a >50% chance of torture and (b) governmental involvement or acquiescence. A weak link anywhere defeats the claim.

5. Conclusion

Reyes Santos v. Bondi does not break new doctrinal ground, but it powerfully synthesizes current Second Circuit teachings: a date-less NTA is a curable, non-jurisdictional defect; arguments not specifically presented to the BIA or sufficiently briefed on appeal are lost; and generalized fears of gang violence—however real— cannot substitute for the statutory requirements of protected-ground nexus or a particularized likelihood of torture. Future litigants must therefore: (1) timely raise all arguments to the agency, (2) craft narrowly defined, evidence-supported particular social groups, and (3) marshal individualized evidence of governmental complicity for CAT purposes. Adherence to these guideposts will be decisive in subsequent immigration cases within the Second Circuit and beyond.